Diana Castillo

In a child protection status review matter, the society sought summary judgment for a final custody order placing three children with a kin caregiver and for discretionary access terms.

The court held that summary judgment in child protection proceedings requires exceptional caution, careful screening for inadmissible hearsay, and confidence that the record permits a fair and just best-interests determination.

The affidavit record was insufficient because it was heavily dependent on hearsay, lacked direct evidence on material protection and placement issues, and raised live disputes about the kin caregiver’s household stability, parenting history, discipline practices, and the practical reality of parental access.

The court concluded that there were genuine issues requiring a trial and that cross-examination was essential before final placement and access orders could be made.

The applicant father filed a complaint against the children's aid society under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, alleging the society failed to hear his concerns and provide reasons regarding its investigation into alleged physical abuse of his child by school staff.

The Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed the complaints relating to the right to be heard, finding the society's worker communicated with the applicant and considered his input.

However, the Board upheld the complaint regarding the right to reasons, finding the society failed to provide a meaningful explanation of its investigation process and how it concluded the abuse was not verified.

The society was ordered to provide a detailed explanatory letter.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order concerning monthly access to children.

The Society argued that the OCJ lacked jurisdiction to entertain an enforcement motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules after a final order had been made, contending that the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 was a complete code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the OCJ retained jurisdiction to enforce its orders, as the definition of "case" in the Family Law Rules explicitly includes "enforcements" and requiring a new proceeding for enforcement would contradict the principle of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the Superior Court judge and addressed procedural fairness concerns.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion.

The respondent mother, F.G., sought to retract her consent to a final custody order placing her 21-month-old son with the maternal grandmother, D.N., which had been made pursuant to an agreed statement of facts.

The court denied the mother's request to retract consent, finding that her arguments did not meet the criteria under Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules for setting aside an order, and the alleged "new evidence" was not a valid ground.

The court also found that the Society met the test for summary judgment under Rule 16(6) of the Family Law Rules, as there was no genuine issue for trial regarding disposition and access.

The final order for custody with the maternal grandmother remained in effect, and the final order regarding access to the mother was granted as sought by the Society.

The local children's aid society brought a motion to transfer a child protection proceeding to the Toronto children's aid society under s. 91(3) of the CYFSA.

The parents had a long history of family law litigation in Toronto, and the Toronto agency had extensive prior involvement investigating repeated, unverified allegations of sexual abuse raised by the mother.

The court found that the preponderance of convenience and the child's best interests favoured transferring the matter to Toronto, as the Toronto agency and courts were more familiar with the family's history of high conflict and coaching concerns.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion seeking an order to prohibit the respondent mother from making public social media postings related to the society's involvement with her children, the children's fathers, caregivers, and society employees, and to compel the removal of existing posts.

The mother opposed the motion.

The court granted the orders, finding that the mother's postings violated subsection 87(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, by identifying children and parties to the proceedings.

The court also relied on its inherent power to control its own process to protect participants from cyberbullying and maintain the integrity of child protection proceedings.