Denis E. Burns

The applicant sought permission to add six witnesses to the trial list shortly before the scheduled family law trial, despite an order from the trial management conference restricting witnesses to those listed.

The proposed witnesses were intended to testify about the applicant's physical and emotional condition following separation.

The court refused permission, noting the lack of a reasonable explanation for the delay, the potential prejudice to the respondent, and the lack of detailed 'will say' statements, while leaving the ultimate evidentiary rulings to the trial judge.

The applicant brought a motion for interim relief, which resulted in a final consent order for child support and the dismissal of her claims for interim spousal support and an order directing the respondent to return to work.

The respondent sought costs, arguing he was entitled to the automatic cost consequences of Rule 18(14) based on his offers to settle.

The court found the respondent did not meet the burden under Rule 18(14) because his offers were either less favourable than the order or failed to comply with the timing requirements.

The court awarded the respondent costs for his partial success but reduced the amount due to his unreasonable failure to disclose a severance payment, fixing costs at $4,746 payable at the conclusion of the case.

The applicant wife brought a motion for interim spousal support and an order directing the respondent husband to return to full-time employment and not retire during the course of the lawsuit.

The parties had previously signed a separation agreement resolving all issues, which was filed with the court.

The court treated the motion as an interim variation of a final spousal support order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate urgency, hardship, or that the continuation of the existing support order was incongruous and absurd.

The court also found no merit in ordering the respondent not to retire, noting that imputation of income could be addressed at trial.

The wife appealed the trial judge's dismissal of her claim for spousal support for 2002 and 2003, and the denial of a proportionate sharing of childcare costs.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in characterizing the request for 2002 and 2003 support as retroactive, finding instead that it was a claim for prospective support from the date of notice.

The Court also found that the trial judge erred in requiring childcare expenses to be 'extraordinary' under section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, as the provision only requires them to be necessary and reasonable.

The appeal was allowed, with the husband ordered to pay a lump sum for spousal support and a proportionate share of childcare expenses.

The parties separated after a ten-year traditional marriage.

The separation agreement provided for time-limited spousal support and child support.

The father's income subsequently increased substantially, and the parties' son moved in with the father while the daughter remained with the mother.

The father drafted an amending agreement reducing child support, which the mother signed without financial disclosure or independent legal advice.

The mother later applied to vary spousal and child support, seeking retroactive increases.

The trial judge increased support but declined to make it retroactive to the date the father's income increased.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, increasing the quantum of spousal support to reflect the mother's economic disadvantage and making the child support increase retroactive due to the father's financial non-disclosure and blameworthy conduct.