Sharon Hassan

Supplementary reasons establishing the timeline and procedure for the parties to make written submissions on costs following the release of the main judgment.

The parties separated after a 27-year marriage during which the applicant primarily raised their children and assisted in building the respondent's financial advising business.

The applicant, now disabled by fibromyalgia, sought spousal support and equalization of net family property.

The court ordered spousal support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, retroactive to the date of separation, finding the applicant's delay in seeking support was reasonably explained by her health and financial circumstances.

For equalization, the court accepted the applicant's expert valuation of the respondent's business, which included significant value for the goodwill in his book of business, and ordered an equalization payment of $278,316.85.

The parties disputed whether a custody settlement reached through written proposals and communications was legally binding after the father refused to sign formal minutes of settlement.

The mother sought an order enforcing the agreement regarding joint custody, primary residence with the mother, and access with the father.

The court applied common law principles on settlement formation and held that an agreement is binding where essential terms are settled, even if a formal document is contemplated later.

The court found that the parties had agreed on the essential terms and that the father’s alleged condition regarding employment in Niagara Falls was not part of the agreement.

The settlement was enforced with a minor modification to the child’s return time after weekend access.

Interim custody motion concerning a young child following a serious assault allegedly committed by the mother, who was subsequently charged under the Criminal Code and remained in custody.

The child’s maternal aunt and the father each sought interim custody.

The court applied the best interests of the child analysis under s. 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, emphasizing stability, existing relationships, and the importance of maintaining elements of the child’s status quo following a traumatic event.

Given the father’s prolonged absence from the child’s life and the child’s strong integration into the aunt’s household and community, the court found it inappropriate to change the child’s principal residence on an interim basis.

The child was ordered to remain primarily with the aunt while the father received structured parenting time pending further investigation by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The applicant sought costs following a successful motion for interim spousal support.

The applicant claimed $19,933.50 plus HST, while the respondent argued costs should be limited to $4,500.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs and that her offers to settle were closer to the final order, though they did not trigger the automatic costs consequences of Rule 18(14).

The court fixed the applicant's costs at $15,000 plus HST, for a total of $16,950, noting the complexity of determining the respondent's income.

The applicant brought a motion for interim relief, which resulted in a final consent order for child support and the dismissal of her claims for interim spousal support and an order directing the respondent to return to work.

The respondent sought costs, arguing he was entitled to the automatic cost consequences of Rule 18(14) based on his offers to settle.

The court found the respondent did not meet the burden under Rule 18(14) because his offers were either less favourable than the order or failed to comply with the timing requirements.

The court awarded the respondent costs for his partial success but reduced the amount due to his unreasonable failure to disclose a severance payment, fixing costs at $4,746 payable at the conclusion of the case.

The applicant wife brought a motion for interim spousal support and an order directing the respondent husband to return to full-time employment and not retire during the course of the lawsuit.

The parties had previously signed a separation agreement resolving all issues, which was filed with the court.

The court treated the motion as an interim variation of a final spousal support order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate urgency, hardship, or that the continuation of the existing support order was incongruous and absurd.

The court also found no merit in ordering the respondent not to retire, noting that imputation of income could be addressed at trial.

Following a 154‑day child protection trial, the father sought full indemnity costs exceeding $3 million against the Children’s Aid Society and the mother.

The court found the mother had acted in bad faith by advancing false allegations that fueled prolonged litigation.

The court further concluded the Society breached its statutory duties by failing to conduct an objective investigation, withholding disclosure, and advocating for the mother rather than reassessing its case as contrary evidence emerged.

While rejecting costs against counsel for the children or the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, the court held that the Society bore the greatest responsibility for the extraordinary length and expense of the proceedings.

Costs were fixed at just over $2 million, apportioned 70% to the Society and 30% to the mother.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child and spousal support.

The respondent had lost his employment and started unsuccessful business ventures, including purchasing an expensive motor home.

The court found the respondent intentionally under-employed and imputed an income of $90,000 based on his earning capacity.

The court also imputed income to the applicant based on full-time employment.

Interim child support of $1,293 per month and spousal support of $500 per month were ordered, with the respondent's equity in the matrimonial home standing as security.

The applicant child protection agency brought an application regarding three children, while the parents concurrently sought a divorce, custody, and property division.

Following a 154-day trial, the court dismissed the protection application, finding that the mother had made false allegations of domestic violence against the father and had a significant, unacknowledged alcohol problem.

The court awarded sole custody of the youngest child to the father, with restricted access for the mother, and ordered the mother to pay child support for all three children.

The court also determined that funds in the father's offshore account were held in a resulting trust and excluded from his net family property.

During a highly complex and lengthy child protection trial, the oldest child turned 18.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to vary the order appointing a lawyer for the child and to remove the OCL as his legal representative, arguing that the child was no longer a 'child' under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that while the child aged out of the statutory provisions, fairness and due process required his continued legal representation.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to order that the child's lawyer continue to represent him and that the OCL continue to fund the representation until the completion of the trial.