David F. Smye

Following an assessment hearing relating to costs, the court considered written submissions from the parties regarding entitlement to costs of the assessment proceeding itself.

The moving party argued that costs should be awarded because participation in the hearing was necessary to quantify the costs previously awarded.

The responding party argued that the amounts claimed had been substantially reduced during the assessment.

The court concluded that success was divided and that it was appropriate for each party to bear its own costs.

Following a successful trial in an accident benefits dispute, the parties were unable to agree on the quantum of trial costs after the Court of Appeal permitted submissions on the issue.

The plaintiff sought nearly $297,000 in legal fees plus significant disbursements, including expert accounts with high compound interest.

The court held that the interest component of the damages under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule did not justify treating the litigation as a $500,000 case for costs purposes.

The hourly rates claimed by plaintiff’s counsel were reduced and significant reductions were made to the claimed fees and certain disbursements.

The court fixed partial indemnity fees at $170,000 plus GST and disallowed interest claimed on expert disbursements.

The plaintiff appealed a costs award made at a status hearing, arguing a denial of natural justice because he was not given an opportunity to make submissions.

The defendant cross-appealed the status hearing judge's refusal to dismiss the action for delay.

The Divisional Court found that the status hearing judge erred by failing to apply the proper test for dismissal for delay, specifically regarding whether the defendant suffered non-compensable prejudice.

The cross-appeal was granted, the original order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a re-convened status hearing before a different judge.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when struck by a motor vehicle driven by an impaired driver who had been drinking at a university pub.

The jury found the driver 70% liable and the pub 30% liable, awarding general, aggravated, and punitive damages, but dismissing the family members' claims.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability apportionment and general damages, but struck the separate aggravated damages award.

The Court affirmed that punitive damages are available in negligence actions for impaired driving but reduced the quantum from $100,000 to $20,000.

The Court also allowed the family members' appeal, awarding them damages under the Family Law Act.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when struck by a motor vehicle driven by an impaired driver who had been drinking at a university pub.

The jury found the driver 70% liable and the pub 30% liable, awarding general, aggravated, and punitive damages, but dismissing the family members' claims.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability apportionment and general damages, but struck the separate aggravated damages award.

The Court affirmed that punitive damages are available in negligence actions for impaired driving but reduced the quantum from $100,000 to $20,000.

The Court also allowed the family members' appeal, awarding them damages under the Family Law Act.

On an appeal from a Rule 21 determination in a fatal motor vehicle case, the court held that family members' independent nervous shock claims were barred by s. 266 of the Insurance Act because the claimants themselves did not meet the statutory threshold.

However, the majority held that s. 61(1) of the Family Law Act permits recovery for a family member's pecuniary loss in the form of lost income resulting from the death, and is not confined to loss of expected financial benefits from the deceased.

Because the trial judge later took the opposite view and made no necessary factual findings on causation and loss, the trial judgment was set aside and a new trial ordered on the loss of income claim.

No costs were awarded because success was divided.

Parents appealed from a trial judgment arising out of their son's death in a motor vehicle accident.

The court held that awards under s. 61(2)(e) of the Family Law Act for loss of care, guidance and companionship were low but within range and should not be disturbed.

Applying the deduction analysis under s. 267 of the Insurance Act, the court held that only statutory death benefits, and not no-fault wage-loss or disability benefits, were deductible from those awards because the death benefits were akin to the compensable loss.

The court also held, by reference to the companion appeal, that a loss of income claim under s. 61(1) could proceed and ordered a new trial on that issue.