Craig Collins-Williams

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for negligence and defamation on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired, and a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for a breach of their section 6 Charter mobility rights.

The court found that the plaintiffs could not have reasonably discovered the material facts of their claim until the release of the Iacobucci Inquiry Report, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

The court also refused to strike the section 6 Charter claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail given the practical restrictions on the plaintiffs' ability to leave Canada.

Both motions were dismissed.

The appellants sought a new hearing before a differently constituted Human Rights Tribunal, arguing a lack of procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court found conflicting evidence regarding attempts at service, a suspicion of evasion, and a failure to use available translation services.

Concluding that procedural fairness was not achieved on the record, the court ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted Tribunal and made no order as to costs.

A federal agency received a request under the Access to Information Act for records pertaining to the respondent company.

The agency notified the company that the records might contain confidential business information and, after receiving representations, decided to disclose the records with redactions.

The company applied for a review under s. 44 of the Act, seeking to raise the personal information exemption under s. 19.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a third party may raise the s. 19 personal information exemption in a s. 44 review, as the plain language of the statute and the combined purposes of the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act support protecting privacy rights.

The appellants, representing members of a salaried pension plan, appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal that upheld the Superintendent's consent to merge their plan with an hourly-paid plan.

The appellants argued the merger would dilute their plan's surplus and that the surplus constituted 'other benefits' protected under s. 81(5) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the matter and that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.

On the merits, the Court found that an actuarial surplus in an ongoing defined benefit plan is not an 'other benefit' under s. 81(5), and dismissed the appeal.