Christopher Rupar

The Information Commissioner of Canada sought judicial review of refusals to disclose records located in the offices of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of Transport, as well as the Prime Minister's agenda held by the RCMP and PCO.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Ministers' offices are not 'government institutions' under the Access to Information Act.

The Court established a two-part test to determine if records in a Minister's office are 'under the control' of a government institution: whether the record relates to a departmental matter, and whether the institution could reasonably expect to obtain a copy.

Applying this test, the requested records were not under the control of the respective government institutions.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister is not an 'officer' of a government institution under the Privacy Act, meaning his agenda is exempt from disclosure as personal information.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a US-based distributor of the patented medicine Thalomid, sold the drug to Canadians through the Special Access Programme.

The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board requested pricing information, asserting jurisdiction under the Patent Act over medicines 'sold in any market in Canada'.

The appellant argued that under commercial law principles, the sales occurred in the United States.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Board's decision, finding that a purposive interpretation of the Patent Act supported the Board's consumer protection mandate to regulate prices of medicines delivered and dispensed in Canada, regardless of the commercial locus of the sale.

The appellants were subcontractors to a general contractor who submitted a bid for a design-build construction project.

The owner awarded the contract to a non-compliant bidder.

The general contractor settled its claim against the owner, but the subcontractors sued the owner in tort for pure economic loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the owner did not owe a duty of care to the subcontractors.

The claim did not fall within a recognized category of pure economic loss, and recognizing a new duty of care was not justified because the subcontractors could have protected themselves by forming a joint venture with the general contractor.

A federal agency received a request under the Access to Information Act for records pertaining to the respondent company.

The agency notified the company that the records might contain confidential business information and, after receiving representations, decided to disclose the records with redactions.

The company applied for a review under s. 44 of the Act, seeking to raise the personal information exemption under s. 19.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a third party may raise the s. 19 personal information exemption in a s. 44 review, as the plain language of the statute and the combined purposes of the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act support protecting privacy rights.

The respondent sought a survivor's pension under the Canada Pension Plan after her former common law partner died.

She had ended the relationship permanently prior to his death.

Her application was denied because she did not meet the definition of 'spouse', which required common law partners to be cohabiting at the time of death.

She argued this violated her equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter based on marital status, comparing herself to separated married spouses.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the correct comparator group was divorced spouses, not separated married spouses.

Since former common law spouses and former married spouses are both denied survivor's pensions, there was no discrimination.

The Information Commissioner appealed a refusal by the RCMP to disclose historical postings and employment information of four RCMP officers requested under the Access to Information Act.

The RCMP claimed the records were exempt as 'personal information' under the Privacy Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the information constituted personal information relating to employment history, it fell within the exception for information relating to the position or functions of a government employee.

The Court ruled that this exception applies retroactively to past positions and ordered the disclosure of the officers' historical postings, ranks, years of service, and anniversary dates.

The appellant requested access to personal information held by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

CSIS refused to disclose the information, claiming exemptions under the Privacy Act for national security and foreign confidences.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 51 of the Privacy Act, which mandates in camera and ex parte hearings when these exemptions are claimed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory ex parte provision did not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the mandatory in camera provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1 because it was overly broad.

The Court read down s. 51(2)(a) to apply only to the ex parte submissions.

On a cross-appeal, the Court held that the law enforcement exemption in s. 22(1)(b) is not limited to current investigations.

The respondents, staff lawyers with the federal Department of Justice, sued the federal Crown for breach of contract regarding salary disparities.

During discovery, the government claimed Cabinet confidentiality over certain documents under s. 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, including some previously listed as producible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 39 provides absolute protection once information is validly certified by the Clerk of the Privy Council, and the common law concept of waiver does not apply.

The Court also upheld the constitutionality of s. 39, finding it does not impermissibly infringe on the core jurisdiction of superior courts or unwritten constitutional principles.

The appellant, an inmate at a federal penitentiary, was seriously injured while working on a prison farm.

He subsequently qualified for and received Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits.

He sued the Crown in tort for his injuries.

The Crown moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by s. 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, which precludes proceedings against the Crown if a pension or compensation has been paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund 'in respect of' the injury.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 9 does not bar the action.

The Court reasoned that CPP disability benefits are contingent on a contributor's disabled status and adequate contributions, not on the specific event of death, injury, damage, or loss.

Therefore, the benefits were not paid 'in respect of' the injury within the meaning of s. 9.