Cedric Y.L. Nahum

Following a successful summary judgment motion in a defamation action, the plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $26,547.56.

The defendant did not file responding materials.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1), noting the importance of the issues, the success achieved, and the reasonable rates claimed.

However, applying the principle of proportionality and noting potential duplication of work among multiple timekeepers, as well as the defendant's likely limited financial resources, the court fixed costs at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in a defamation action against the defendant.

The defendant had shared a screenshot of a video of the plaintiffs play fighting, falsely accusing them of racism and mocking the death of George Floyd.

The viral social media campaign resulted in the plaintiffs losing their jobs and facing severe harassment.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the statements defamatory and rejecting the defences of justification and fair comment.

The court awarded each plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and granted a permanent injunction requiring the removal of the posts.

The offenders were found guilty of recruiting two minors for the purpose of exploitation and advertising sexual services.

At sentencing, they challenged the constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 279.011 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the s. 7 overbreadth challenge but found that the mandatory minimum violated s. 12 as it was grossly disproportionate to the offenders' lower level of moral blameworthiness, and it could not be saved under s. 1.

The mandatory minimum was struck down, and the offenders were sentenced to 18 months and 11 months respectively.

The applicant sought certiorari quashing committals entered after a preliminary inquiry on human trafficking and procuring counts involving two young complainants.

The court held that the reviewing function on certiorari is confined to jurisdictional error and that the preliminary inquiry justice had some evidence on each essential element capable of supporting committal.

The court further held that the preliminary inquiry justice considered the whole of the evidence, including exculpatory features relating to the applicant’s comparatively diminished role.

Although the reasons did not separately analyze the procuring counts in detail, the evidentiary record disclosed a sufficient basis to support committal on those counts as well.

The application was dismissed.

In a child protection proceeding, the society sought continuation of an interim order placing three children in its temporary care and custody following apprehension.

The motion focused on the mental health condition of one parent, including psychiatric diagnoses, medication compliance concerns, and recent warnings from the treating psychiatrist indicating potential risk if the children were returned home.

The court emphasized the absence of the ordered family court clinic assessment and the uncertainty surrounding the parent's mental health stability.

Given recent concerns about medication non‑compliance and potential substance use, the court concluded that the risk to the children had not been adequately resolved.

The interim order continuing society care was granted pending the forthcoming assessment.

In a child protection proceeding, the child protection agency brought a motion to terminate the respondent mother's supervised access to a young child pending trial.

The court considered whether there had been a material change in circumstances sufficient to vary a temporary access order under the Child and Family Services Act.

Evidence included psychological assessments, reports of problematic behaviour during supervised visits, and a lengthy period without contact between the mother and child.

The court found that the mother had engaged in conduct during access visits that posed emotional and developmental risks to the child and demonstrated an inability to comply with the conditions of supervised access.

Concluding that continued access would not be in the child’s best interests pending trial, the court suspended the mother’s access.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for an interim supervision order placing two children in the care of the respondent mother, subject to conditions.

The mother opposed a condition requiring her to consent to psychological and educational assessments for her child, who exhibited severe language delays, and opposed releasing school records.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of emotional harm due to delayed development from the mother's failure to act.

The court granted the interim supervision order and found the assessment condition reasonable and appropriate, though it removed the requirement that the mother follow all recommendations before knowing what they are.

In a child protection status review, the Society sought summary judgment for Crown wardship with access in its discretion, while the mother sought a further Society wardship order.

Applying the Hryniak summary judgment framework and the best-interests analysis under the Child and Family Services Act, the court held there was no issue requiring a trial on continuing need of protection, but there was a genuine issue requiring a trial on whether Crown wardship versus Society wardship was in the child's best interests.

The court emphasized the statutory permanency timeline in s. 70, but found it was still too early to foreclose rehabilitation given the parent's longstanding relationship with the child, cultural connection, and some evidence of commitment to treatment.

The request for summary judgment was therefore dismissed except for the protection finding, the application was adjourned, the existing order continued, and no costs were awarded.