C. Sheppard

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting the victim and subsequently dismembering and destroying the body.

The Crown sought a 23-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 14 years with a further reduction for Charter breaches related to prolonged administrative segregation.

The court found the egregious post-offence conduct and the offender's extensive criminal record warranted a 20-year parole ineligibility period.

The court also found that the offender's prolonged administrative segregation violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, granting a 3-year reduction.

The final period of parole ineligibility was fixed at 17 years.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking disclosure of a complainant's youth police occurrence report in a human trafficking and sexual assault prosecution.

The court held that the Youth Criminal Justice Act did not permit accused persons to access a youth record where no charge had been laid, rejecting the line of authority permitting disclosure through s. 123.

The court further held that disclosure was not warranted under the Criminal Code third party records regime because the report contained nothing necessary to full answer and defence, apart from the fact of a proximate police interaction, which the Crown agreed to admit.

The application was dismissed.

On a Crown application in a jury trial for human trafficking and related offences, the court considered whether evidence of one accused's prior discreditable conduct toward a third party was admissible.

Applying the prior discreditable conduct framework, the court held the alleged baton assault had diminished probative value because the complainant did not link that assault to her decision to leave with the accused or to her fear for her safety.

The moral and reasoning prejudice of the physical assault evidence outweighed its probative value, so that portion was excluded.

However, surrounding narrative evidence, including the accused's conversation with the complainant, his statement about dealing with the third party, the verbal argument, the third party's distressed appearance, and her agreement that the complainant could leave, was admitted to explain procurement and the unfolding narrative.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the two complainants on their prior involvement in the sex trade.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to challenge the complainants' credibility regarding statements made to police about their unfamiliarity with escort work.

The court largely dismissed the application, finding the proposed questioning either relied on prohibited twin-myth reasoning or lacked relevance to a live issue at trial.

Limited evidence of prior sex work was permitted solely through an Agreed Statement of Facts to contradict specific statements made to police.

The Crown applied under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to have a key complainant in a human trafficking case testify via videoconference from outside Canada.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the witness's disruptive behaviour at the preliminary inquiry demonstrated that remote testimony would impede the court's ability to control the proceedings and undermine effective cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding the accused failed to show that remote testimony would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.

The court permitted the witness to testify from her home, subject to strict conditions to ensure the integrity of the proceedings.

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, brought a Charter application to exclude text messages extracted from a seized cell phone, alleging multiple s. 8 breaches.

The court dismissed arguments that the police failed to file timely Reports to Justice, conducted an unlawful warrantless search during intake, and relied on a facially invalid warrant.

Although the Crown conceded a minor s. 8 breach because the police retrieved the phone from a locker 25 minutes after the warrant's time window expired, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was minimal and the evidence highly reliable.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 37 months.

The court deducted periods of defence-caused delay, bringing the net delay below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found that exceptional circumstances, including a complainant's disruptive conduct at the preliminary inquiry, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the overall complexity of the multi-accused case, justified the delay.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of armed robbery of a pharmacy, assault with a weapon, wearing a mask, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The offender struck the pharmacist with a handgun and stole opioids.

The court considered the offender's youth, criminal record, and the vulnerability of pharmacies.

A global sentence of 6 years was imposed, consisting of 5.5 years for robbery, concurrent sentences for assault and wearing a mask, and a consecutive 6-month sentence for the firearms prohibition breach, less credit for pre-trial custody.