Andrew Midwood

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the accused on multiple sexual offences against two child complainants living in his household.

The court carefully assessed child-witness evidence using principles recognizing children's developmental stage while maintaining the Crown's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Videorecorded statements admitted under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code were treated as important contemporaneous evidence.

Alleged inconsistencies, possible influence, and suggested collusion were rejected as immaterial, and the accused's denial was not believed and did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The Crown prosecuted two accused after police surveillance of a licensed firearms purchaser culminated in a stop of a vehicle containing a Glock 17 in an unlocked case on the front passenger floor.

One accused testified that the purchaser accidentally left the firearm in the vehicle and that the pair were on their way to return it, invoking a theory of innocent temporary possession.

The court rejected that evidence as internally inconsistent, contrary to the physical evidence, and implausible, and applied the principles governing possession by requiring proof of knowledge and control.

The court found the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly established that both accused acted together to acquire the firearm, and convicted both on the firearm counts.

The driver was also convicted on a guilty plea to dangerous operation arising from the police chase.

The applicants, charged with firearms offences, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a forensic search of their cellphones.

They argued the Information to Obtain lacked reasonable grounds and the police failed to file a report to justice regarding the data analysis.

The court denied leave to cross-examine the affiant and upheld the validity of the warrant despite minor misstatements.

Although the court found a section 8 Charter breach due to the failure to file a report to justice for the data analysis, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor and technical.

The accused, on trial for firearms and obstruction offences, brought a mistrial application after admitting to possessing a handgun during cross-examination on a Charter application regarding excessive force by a police canine.

The defence argued the admission tainted the trial judge and compromised trial fairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding the cross-examination was proper to assess credibility and the necessity of police force, and affirming that a trial judge can disabuse themselves of inadmissible inculpatory evidence.

In a murder prosecution, the court ruled on the admissibility of multiple statements made by the accused during a missing person and homicide investigation.

Early out-of-custody statements and a spontaneous cell utterance were found voluntary and admissible.

The first late-night custodial interview was held to violate s. 10(b) because police failed to respect the accused's efforts to consult counsel and belittled the right to legal advice; it was also found involuntary because the interrogation overbore the accused's ability to choose whether to speak.

The second custodial interview was tainted by the first, and later statements were found obtained in a manner connected to Charter breaches, including unlawful and arbitrary continued detention contrary to s. 9 arising from non-compliance with s. 503 of the Criminal Code.

All statements made after 11:16 p.m. on July 5, 2011 were excluded under s. 24(2).

The defendant, convicted of manslaughter and aggravated assault after a drug-induced psychotic episode, applied post-conviction but pre-sentencing to re-open his constitutional challenge to s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a recent decision by a coordinate judge (R. v. McCaw), which held that a prior declaration of unconstitutionality was binding, constituted exceptional circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Lessard test requires exceptional circumstances to re-open a case.

The court disagreed with the reasoning in McCaw, affirming that the horizontal convention of precedent applies to constitutional declarations and that the court was not bound by the prior decision striking down s. 33.1.

The accused, charged with murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault after stabbing his father and his father's partner while hallucinating on magic mushrooms, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code.

Section 33.1 precludes the defence of self-induced intoxication for general intent offences involving violence.

The court found that while s. 33.1 violates the accused's rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by substituting the intent to become intoxicated for the fault and voluntariness elements of the offences, the provision is saved under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court held that protecting victims, particularly women and children, from intoxicated violence and ensuring offender accountability are pressing and substantial objectives that justify the Charter infringements.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He had been found asleep in the driver’s seat of a parked vehicle with the engine running while waiting for a designated driver.

The appeal court held the trial judge misapplied the legal test for care or control by treating the accused’s decision to sleep while waiting as undermining his safety plan.

Applying the principles in R. v. Boudreault and related authorities, the court found there was insufficient evidence of a realistic risk that the accused would set the vehicle in motion or change his intention to drive.

The trial judge’s reasoning improperly criminalized the use of the vehicle for a manifestly innocent purpose.