Aliza Karoly

The appellant, a passenger in a vehicle driven by an unlicensed driver without the owner's permission, sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident.

He sued the driver, vehicle owner, and the owner's liability insurer, claiming entitlement to uninsured motorist coverage under section 265(1) of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment, finding that section 1.8.2 of the standard Ontario Automobile Policy excluded uninsured motorist coverage where the vehicle was operated without the owner's consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, applying the precedent established in Shipman v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. The appellant was limited to Statutory Accident Benefits and could pursue other claims through the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The moving party sought summary judgment to dismiss a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident at an intersection where the traffic lights were not operating due to a power outage.

The moving party relied on dashboard camera video evidence, which the responding party argued was inadmissible.

The court admitted the video, finding it to be a fair and accurate representation of the events.

Based on the video and the responding party's evidence, the court concluded that the moving party had entered the intersection first and had the right-of-way, and that the responding party failed to yield.

The action was dismissed with costs awarded to the moving party.

The plaintiff, William Conners, was injured as a passenger in a car accident.

He initiated two actions: one against the driver, owner, and their insurer, Gore Mutual, and another against Unica Insurance, an insurer of a past employer.

Both Gore Mutual and Unica brought motions for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the actions against them.

Gore Mutual argued lack of coverage due to the driver operating the vehicle without the owner's consent.

Unica contended no coverage as Conners was no longer an employee for whom a vehicle was furnished.

The court dismissed both actions, finding that Conners was not an "insured person" under either policy based on the Insurance Act and relevant policy exclusions.

This is a costs decision following a successful summary judgment motion where the plaintiff's action against the defendant Vincenza Tartaglia was dismissed.

Ms. Tartaglia claimed costs totaling $33,858.86 for the summary judgment motion and the action.

The plaintiff objected to the claim, citing delays caused by another defendant and disputing several disbursements.

The court found Ms. Tartaglia's claim modest and reasonable, disallowed the specific disbursements but increased the counsel fee by an equal amount, ultimately allowing the full claimed costs.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a car driven by an unlicensed 15-year-old.

The vehicle was owned by the driver's aunt, who was out of the country and had left the car at her sister's house.

The aunt brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against her, arguing she was not vicariously liable under s. 192 of the Highway Traffic Act because the vehicle was in the driver's possession without her consent.

The court reviewed the extensive case law on express and implied consent to possession.

The court found that the aunt had entrusted possession to her sister, but the sister's possession was interrupted when the son took the vehicle without consent.

As there was no express or implied consent for the driver to possess the vehicle, the owner was not vicariously liable.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The defendant Crown brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for failing to comply with the 60-day notice requirement under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiff, an inmate who was assaulted by another inmate, argued that incident reports and statements given at the time of the assault constituted sufficient notice.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the initial reports contained no element of complaint against the Crown.

The action was commenced less than 60 days after formal written notice was provided by the plaintiff's counsel, rendering the action a nullity.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The defendant brought a summary judgment motion arising from a rear-end motor vehicle collision on the Don Valley Parkway.

The court considered whether the plaintiff could rebut the presumption of negligence that applies where a driver rear-ends another vehicle.

After reviewing affidavit, documentary, and transcript evidence, the court concluded the plaintiff had not rebutted the presumption and had failed to demonstrate any genuine issue requiring a trial.

The evidence established the plaintiff was following too closely and was inattentive to surrounding traffic.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the plaintiff’s claim.