Alexi Wood

The plaintiff commenced a wrongful dismissal action against her former employer in 2019.

In 2022, she commenced a separate tort action against the employer and a co-worker, alleging intentional infliction of mental distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and the novel torts of harassment and stalking, based on the same factual footprint.

The defendants moved to strike the novel torts and to stay or dismiss the 2022 action as an abuse of process or duplicative proceeding.

The court declined to strike the novel torts, finding it was not plain and obvious they would fail.

The court also declined to stay the 2022 action, finding no abuse of process, but struck the 2022 statement of claim for pleading irregularities with leave to amend, and ordered the two actions consolidated.

The plaintiff, a former member of a white supremacist group, sued the defendants, also former members or individuals involved in anti-hate work, alleging they appropriated her life story and committed various torts including injurious falsehood, civil conspiracy, and negligence.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims, and one defendant counterclaimed for defamation, invasion of privacy, and appropriation of personality.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims as frivolous and vexatious, finding no evidence to support any of the alleged torts.

The court granted the defendant's counterclaim, awarding $100,000 in general damages, $50,000 in aggravated damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages, along with a permanent injunction.

The defendants in a complex defamation action brought motions for the production of documents related to 'Project Maple Tree', an operation undertaken by foreign investigative agents (including Black Cube) retained by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs asserted solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the documents.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the motions despite the stay provision in s. 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court rejected the claims of solicitor-client privilege, finding the third-party investigators were not essential to the solicitor-client relationship.

The court also rejected the claims of litigation privilege for the vast majority of the documents, finding their dominant purpose was not legitimate litigation and that the 'Blank exception' applied because the agents engaged in improper conduct, including pretext stings on a former judge and opposing party employees.

In a group of related civil proceedings involving multiple plaintiffs and the same defendants, the court considered a request concerning the deadline for filing third party claims.

Following a prior order, the parties jointly sought an extension of time to file all third party claims.

The court granted the request on consent and extended the deadline to September 25, 2015.

The endorsement reflects a procedural timetable adjustment rather than a substantive determination of the underlying claims.

In a group of related civil proceedings involving multiple plaintiffs and the same defendants, the court considered a request concerning the deadline for filing third party claims.

Following a prior order, the parties jointly sought an extension of time to file all third party claims.

The court granted the request on consent and extended the deadline to September 25, 2015.

The endorsement reflects a procedural timetable adjustment rather than a substantive determination of the underlying claims.

The appellant sought to add the respondent as a defendant to an action for unpaid benefits.

The motion judge declined to add the respondent as a party.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that any liability the respondent might have for the unpaid benefits stems from a collective agreement and would be arbitrable, meaning the respondent is not a proper party to the action.

The appellant, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, appealed a Divisional Court order requiring it to produce a comprehensive record of proceedings under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA) after screening out the respondent's police complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that the Director's decision to screen out a complaint under the Police Services Act is the exercise of a statutory power of decision, as it decides a complainant's legal right to have their complaint pursued.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Divisional Court's order regarding the contents of the record was overly broad, and substituted a narrower requirement for the record of proceedings.

The appellant appealed two summary judgments dismissing her medical negligence claims against two psychiatrists.

The motion judges found that the appellant failed to provide expert evidence from a qualified psychiatrist to establish a breach of the standard of care, whereas the respondents provided expert evidence that they met the standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, confirming that without expert psychiatric evidence, the appellant's claims had no hope of success.