A. A. Khoorshed

The accused was charged with two counts: (1) failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code, and (2) breaching a probation order by failing to provide a breath sample when requested by a police officer.

The accused refused to provide a roadside breath sample, stating he wished to consult with counsel first and believed he could provide the sample at the police station.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, holding that the accused cannot rely on a mistaken belief regarding the right to counsel before complying with a roadside breath demand, and that such a stated intention constitutes an unequivocal refusal.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired care or control and over 80 care or control of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had found no realistic risk of danger, accepting the respondent's "alternate plan" to sleep in his vehicle after his initial plan to stay at a friend's house fell through.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to articulate a path of reasoning demonstrating appreciation of all relevant circumstances regarding the risk of danger, as required by R. v. Boudreault.

The trial judge's conclusion that it was "very unlikely" the respondent would have driven was deemed conclusory without sufficient analysis of factors such as the high blood alcohol level, the failed sleep-over plan, lack of corroboration for a morning plan, and the individual's isolation.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act: operating a motor vehicle without insurance and knowingly using a false insurance card.

The trial proceeded in the defendant's absence.

The Crown proved that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on Highway 403 in Oakville on November 7, 2011, and that she was the registered owner of the vehicle.

The defendant's insurance policy had been cancelled on October 8, 2011, due to non-payment of premiums.

The defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle was insured at the time of the offence.

The defendant also failed to establish the defence of reasonable care.

The Crown stayed the second count, and the defendant was convicted on the first count.

Herbert Adams was convicted after trial of four counts of fraud over $5,000 contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The frauds involved defrauding shareholders of Majestic Supply Company of $5.3 million and three named individuals of $381,000 combined.

Adams personally received $1,610,444 in proceeds of crime.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of five and one-half years on the primary count with concurrent two-year sentences on the remaining counts, along with a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $1,610,444, a restitution order of $5.3 million, a no-contact order, and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle motor vehicle collision on an icy road.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, and the adequacy of the right to counsel consultation under section 10(b).

The court rejected all Charter applications, finding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the odour of alcohol, the accused's admission to drinking, the circumstances of the accident, and his apology for committing a DUI.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable and incredible.

On the trial on the merits, the court convicted the accused on both counts based on expert toxicological evidence establishing a blood alcohol concentration over 80 at the time of driving, corroborated by observations of impairment and the accused's own admissions.

The defendant was charged with five counts of fraud under $5,000 arising from fraudulent credit card transactions at a Telus retail store.

The Crown alleged the defendant, a sales representative, knowingly processed fraudulent transactions with the defendant's high school acquaintance.

The defendant claimed she was merely providing customer service and did not know the credit cards were fraudulent until a phone call on August 28, 2011.

The court found the defendant's written statement to the loss prevention officer was voluntary and reliable, rejected her trial testimony as fabrication, and found she had actual knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the transactions based on incriminating text messages, the circumstances of the purchases, and her own confession.

The defendant was convicted on all counts.

The applicant sought to strike her guilty pleas to assault, uttering a death threat, and breach of recognizance, alleging the pleas were not fully informed, voluntary, or unequivocal.

The applicant claimed she was not properly advised of the consequences of her pleas and that she maintained her innocence.

The court found the guilty pleas were valid, noting the applicant had appeared multiple times before the court, participated in a thorough judicial pre-trial, had full disclosure, and was assisted by section 486 counsel.

The court rejected allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and found the applicant's subsequent change of position was motivated by concerns about implications in concurrent family court proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

At trial, the judge found serious breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the appellant's property and residence.

However, the trial judge convicted the appellant based on an in-dock identification by a civilian eyewitness.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to properly instruct himself on the inherent frailties of eyewitness identification, particularly in-dock identification without a prior identification procedure.

Given the lack of corroborative evidence and the unreliability of the identification, the conviction was quashed and an acquittal was entered.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after a conviction for assault arising from a domestic dispute between separated partners, where the assault consisted of the accused spitting at the complainant in the presence of their child.

The trial judge imposed an absolute discharge after considering six days of pre-sentence custody and the minor nature of the assault.

On appeal, the Crown argued the sentence failed to properly reflect denunciation and deterrence, particularly given the presence of a child and the accused’s prior criminal record.

The court held that appellate intervention in sentencing is limited and found no error in principle or demonstrably unfit sentence.

The discharge fell within the acceptable range given the minor nature of the assault, the provocation involved, the pre-sentence custody, and the passage of time since the offence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on breath test results obtained using an Intoxilyzer 8000C.

The defence challenged the reliability of the breath tests by cross-examining the qualified technician extensively regarding deviations from manufacturer protocols, including failure to visually monitor the instrument during diagnostic checks, uncertainty regarding simulator identification, and temperature recording discrepancies.

The defence sought to rebut the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(c) by establishing the instrument was operated improperly.

The court found that without expert toxicological evidence to establish the significance of the alleged procedural deviations, a reasonable doubt could not be raised regarding proper operation of the instrument.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to a $1,100 fine and one-year driving prohibition.