La Forest J.

The applicants, two major tobacco companies, sought an interlocutory stay to suspend the enforcement of new packaging regulations under the Tobacco Products Control Act pending their appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada challenging the Act's constitutionality.

The Court established the three-part test for interlocutory relief in Charter cases: a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience.

While the applicants demonstrated a serious question and irreparable financial harm, the Court held that the balance of convenience weighed heavily in favour of the public interest in health, which the regulations aimed to protect.

The applications for a stay were dismissed.

The City of Vancouver passed resolutions declaring it would not do business with Shell Canada until its parent company withdrew from South Africa, in protest of apartheid.

Shell challenged the resolutions as ultra vires the municipality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the resolutions were invalid because they were passed for an extraterritorial purpose rather than a municipal purpose.

The Court found that the city's statutory powers to engage in commercial undertakings and provide for good government did not authorize boycotts based on matters external to the interests of the citizens of the municipality, nor did they authorize discrimination for non-commercial reasons relating to foreign political policy.

The appellant public utility negligently underbilled the respondent dairy co-operative for electricity over a seven-year period due to a multiplier error.

When the utility sued to recover the arrears on a quantum meruit basis, the respondent raised the defence of equitable estoppel, having relied on the bills to set its own prices.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that unlike the legislation in Maritime Electric, the Ontario Power Corporation Act does not impose a positive statutory duty to collect arrears that would preclude the defence of estoppel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that had quashed the respondent's committal for extradition on a continuing criminal enterprise count.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the matter was governed by its recent decision in Re McVey.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the warrant of committal was restored.

The appellant sued Quebec asbestos companies in British Columbia for damages related to asbestos exposure.

He sought discovery of documents.

The respondents refused, citing the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act, which prohibits removing business documents from Quebec pursuant to foreign judicial orders.

The BC courts declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Quebec statute and dismissed the application to compel production.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the BC courts and the SCC had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Quebec statute.

Applying the principles from Morguard, the Court held that the Quebec blocking statute was constitutionally inapplicable to proceedings in other provinces because it offended the principles of order and fairness inherent in the Canadian federation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for defrauding a bank of a sum exceeding $1,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority agreeing with the Court of Appeal.

The dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on an amended indictment, finding that while the Crown established the appellant obtained an extension of credit by deceit, the indictment was not framed that way and the Crown failed to show the accused was not misled in his defence.

The applicants brought a motion for an order abridging the time for hearing an application for leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada denied the motion, stating that notice is abridged only in the most extraordinary situations, such as issues of life and death, which was not the case here.

The appellant appealed a conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada, raising the issue of whether self-induced intoxication resulting in automatism is a defence.

The Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's finding of fact that the case was merely one of intoxication, rendering the automatism issue moot.

The accused was charged under the Young Offenders Act with theft committed when he was 17.

At age 18, he made an inculpatory statement to police without being advised of his right to have an adult present, as required for young persons under s. 56(2) of the Act.

The trial judge excluded the statement and acquitted the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the special protections in s. 56(2) do not apply to statements made by an accused who is 18 years of age or older, as the context of the provision requires the term 'young person' to be limited to those under 18.

The respondent, a permanent resident, was ordered deported after being convicted of an offence punishable by more than five years' imprisonment.

The Minister and Solicitor General filed a report indicating the respondent was likely to engage in organized crime, triggering an investigation by the Security Intelligence Review Committee.

The Committee held a partially in camera hearing and recommended a certificate be issued, which barred the respondent from appealing his deportation on compassionate grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory deportation provisions did not violate sections 7, 12, or 15 of the Charter.

The Court further held that the removal of the compassionate appeal and the procedures followed by the Review Committee did not violate the principles of fundamental justice under section 7.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that reversed in part a Superior Court judgment dismissing a claim for a compensatory allowance regarding a jointly purchased family residence paid for by the husband.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Superior Court's judgment, finding no reason to vary the trial judge's finding and agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal, granting the employers' association standing to challenge the constitutionality of the anti-strike-breaking provisions of the Labour Code.

The Court adopted the reasons of Chouinard J.A. of the Quebec Court of Appeal, setting aside the lower court judgments and dismissing the motion to dismiss.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence of communications the appellant made to her church pastor and a lay counsellor, in which she admitted her involvement in the murder.

The appellant argued these communications were privileged under common law and s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that there is no prima facie common law privilege for religious communications.

Instead, claims of privilege for such communications must be determined on a case-by-case basis using the Wigmore criteria, informed by the Charter.

Applying the Wigmore criteria, the Court found the communications were not privileged because they did not originate in a confidence that they would not be disclosed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge instructed the jury that he could be found guilty as a party to murder under the combined operation of ss. 21(2) and 213(c) of the Criminal Code, even without subjective foresight of death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction using the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 213(c) and s. 21(2) violate ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting a murder conviction without subjective foresight of death, and ordered a new trial.

The City of Longueuil negotiated to purchase the appellant's land and accepted an offer of sale for $500,000.

Knowing the appellant could not deliver clear title due to pending litigation, the City expropriated the land instead of executing the sale.

The Expropriation Tribunal awarded $1,714,936 plus an additional indemnity, finding no binding agreement on the expropriation indemnity.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the $500,000 agreement bound the parties.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the Tribunal's finding that no transaction or agreement governed the expropriation indemnity, but modified the additional indemnity calculation to deduct the provisional indemnity already paid.

The Attorney General for Saskatchewan appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal which found that proposed changes to provincial electoral boundaries infringed the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter.

The impugned legislation imposed a strict quota of urban and rural ridings and required urban ridings to coincide with municipal boundaries, resulting in variances in voter populations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the purpose of s. 3 is not absolute equality of voting power, but effective representation.

The Court found that the deviations from voter parity were justified by factors such as geography, community interests, and population growth patterns, and therefore did not violate s. 3.

The respondent lost her job shortly after turning 65 and was denied regular unemployment insurance benefits due to the age restriction in s. 31 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

She appealed to a Board of Referees, arguing the provision violated s. 15 of the Charter, but the Board upheld the denial without deciding the constitutional issue.

The Federal Court of Appeal directly reviewed the decision and found the provision unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board of Referees lacked the statutory mandate to decide Charter questions, and thus the Federal Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to make a final determination on the issue.

However, addressing the substantive issue, the Court found that s. 31 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of age and could not be justified under s. 1, as it did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The respondents obtained default judgments in Alberta against the appellant for mortgage deficiencies after the appellant had moved to British Columbia.

The respondents then brought actions in British Columbia to enforce the Alberta judgments.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the courts of one province should give full faith and credit to the judgments of another province if the originating court properly exercised jurisdiction.

The Court established the 'real and substantial connection' test, finding that the Alberta court had jurisdiction because the properties and contracts were located there.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Alberta judgments were held to be enforceable in British Columbia.

The respondent was convicted of trafficking in narcotics based partly on intercepted private communications.

At trial, the judge denied the respondent's motion to examine the affidavits filed in support of the wiretap authorizations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that an accused should be granted access to the sealed packet upon request.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming that the accused is entitled to access the sealed packet to make full answer and defence, subject to editing and special concerns for the administration of justice.

The appellant, a young offender, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures programme, arguing that its admission criteria infringed sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its concurrent judgment in R. v. S. (G.), which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such a programme and that the admission criteria do not infringe the Charter.