J. R. Henderson

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking the proceeds of a property sale, relying on a separation agreement between the deceased and the defendant.

The defendant argued the agreement was signed under duress.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because the notice of motion failed to comply with Rule 37.06 by not specifying the rules relied upon, and lacked a proper evidentiary record for either a Rule 20 or Rule 21 motion.

The court also struck the defendant's counterclaim with leave to amend to properly plead the request to set aside the separation agreement.

The father brought a motion to change a final order, seeking joint custody, access in the U.S., a name change for the child, and termination of spousal support.

The mother sought sole custody, restricted access, and increased child and spousal support.

The court dismissed the father's requests for joint custody, U.S. access, and a name change, finding he lacked credibility and the mother had encouraged access.

The court permitted the father to register the child's birth in the U.S. to preserve citizenship rights.

Child and spousal support were increased retroactively based on the father's higher income, but spousal support was ordered to terminate in 2018.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his attending physician's finding that he lacked capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness and that the finding of incapacity was unreasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice found no procedural unfairness but concluded the Board's decision on capacity was unreasonable.

The court noted a lack of evidence that the physician had actually explained the proposed treatment, its consequences, or alternatives to the appellant, which is a prerequisite to finding an inability to appreciate reasonably foreseeable consequences.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.

Following a motion with divided success regarding an adjournment and changes to a parenting regime, both parties sought costs.

The court found that neither party could be characterized as the successful party, as both had mixed successes and failures.

The court declined to apportion costs on an issue-by-issue basis, noting it would be inefficient and inappropriate given the interdependent sub-issues.

Finding no bad faith and that neither party beat their settlement offers, the court ordered no costs payable by either party.

Following a four-week trial regarding the passing of estate accounts, both the estate trustee and the objecting beneficiary sought costs.

The court found that both parties had mixed success and neither was entitled to costs personally from the other.

The court also declined to order full reimbursement of the trustee's $187,597.09 legal costs out of the estate, as doing so would unfairly burden the objecting beneficiary's 50% share of the estate.

The trustee was awarded $10,000 out of the estate for routine administration costs, with the remainder to be borne personally.

The plaintiff suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in a motor vehicle accident.

Following a jury trial that apportioned liability between the defendants, this trial assessed the plaintiffs' damages.

The court awarded the primary plaintiff $275,000 in general damages, finding he sustained permanent cognitive and behavioural impairments but achieved moderate functional independence through extensive rehabilitation.

The court also awarded significant damages for future loss of income, future medical and rehabilitation expenses, and attendant care, while deducting collateral benefits received.

Additional awards were made for a 5% management fee and Family Law Act claims for the plaintiff's mother, sister, and daughters, including compensation for the sister's extensive caregiver services.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a declaration that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction over all matrimonial issues, including custody, support, and property division.

The respondent father argued that a New Orleans court had already assumed jurisdiction over the divorce and ancillary matters, excluding custody.

The court found it had jurisdiction simpliciter due to the mother and child's habitual residence in Ontario.

However, applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court stayed all claims except custody and access to avoid conflicting judgments with the New Orleans court.

The plaintiffs brought a motion at the start of trial to strike the jury notice served by the defendant, arguing the issues surrounding the plaintiff's severe brain injury were too complex for a jury.

The defendant opposed the motion or alternatively sought bifurcation.

The court found the scientific evidence and damages calculations related to the brain injury were unduly complex and better suited for a judge alone.

However, the court determined the liability issues were straightforward enough for a jury.

The motion was allowed in part, and the trial was bifurcated with liability to be tried by a jury and damages by a judge alone.

The plaintiff sued the City of Hamilton for injuries sustained after falling into a ravine in a wooded area of a city park at night.

The court held that the lower standard of care under s. 4(1) of the Occupiers' Liability Act applied because the plaintiff was engaged in a recreational activity and had wandered off a marked recreational trail.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the City did not act with reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety, as it had no prior knowledge of the danger and the natural hazards were obvious.

Damages were assessed provisionally.