John Lo Faso

The deceased died intestate and his separated wife was appointed estate trustee.

The respondent, claiming to be the deceased's common law spouse, sought a declaration of dependency and support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The estate trustee served a notice of contestation under the Estates Act and later sought a declaration that the respondent had abandoned her claims by failing to meet the limitation period in the Estates Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent's claims for declaratory relief were not a 'claim or demand' within the meaning of the Estates Act, which applies only to creditors' claims.

The limitation period under the Succession Law Reform Act governed the respondent's claims.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant commercial tenant appealed an order granting relief from forfeiture on strict terms.

The tenant argued that the landlord's notice of default did not comply with s. 19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act and that the terms of the relief, which required extensive repairs and financial disclosure, were too strict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the notice of default sufficient and the terms of the discretionary relief appropriate and within the scope of the lease.

The original mortgagors sold their property and the purchaser assumed the mortgage.

The mortgagee and the purchaser later agreed to renew the mortgage without notifying the original mortgagors.

When the mortgage went into default, the mortgagee sold the property under power of sale and sued the original mortgagors for the deficiency.

The Court of Appeal held that the original mortgagors were entitled to notice of the renewal agreement.

Because they did not receive notice and did not consent to the renewal, they were released from their obligations under the mortgage.

This appeal concerned competing claims by a landlord, an equipment vendor, and a financing company to restaurant equipment left in leased premises after the tenant abandoned them.

The court held that the priority dispute was governed by s. 31(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act, not by the priority provisions of the Personal Property Security Act.

Because the tenant never had title to the equipment, the landlord could not invoke the statutory exception for title derived from the tenant and could only distrain against whatever equity the tenant may have acquired under the lease arrangement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.