Jill C. Cameron

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting an unarmed 17-year-old victim five times in a residential neighbourhood.

At the time of the offence, the offender was bound by multiple court orders, including a probation order imposed earlier that same day.

The court considered the offender's difficult upbringing, exposure to systemic anti-Black racism, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions as mitigating factors.

However, given the unprovoked nature of the public shooting, the use of a firearm, and the offender's blatant disregard for court orders, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at 17 years.

The appellant father brought an urgent motion for a stay pending appeal of a trial order that permitted the respondent mother to permanently relocate to Croatia with their one-year-old child.

The appellant argued he was unfairly prevented from calling witnesses at trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried given the appellant's documented history of litigation abuse, disruptive behaviour, and failure to comply with court orders.

The court also found the appellant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, noting the respondent would suffer prejudice from further delay.

The accused admitted shooting the deceased during an unlawful street transaction but argued that he acted in self-defence or, alternatively, lacked the mens rea for murder.

Applying the modified W.(D.) framework and the Supreme Court's self-defence analysis under s. 34 of the Criminal Code, the court rejected the accused's account as not credible and accepted eyewitness and video evidence showing the deceased was backing away with his hands up when the shooting began.

The court held there was no reasonable basis for a belief that force was being used or threatened, and in any event the later shots, including a return shot after the accused had already retreated, had no defensive purpose and were unreasonable.

On the totality of the circumstantial evidence, the court found the accused intended to kill or cause bodily harm he knew was likely to cause death and convicted him of second degree murder.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking the return of an assignment fee paid in an aborted real estate transaction.

The original builder went bankrupt, and the purchase agreement was terminated by court order.

The plaintiff argued that the assignment agreement's default provision (Article 17) and a specific refund clause in Schedule A entitled her to the fee's return.

The defendant contended the contract was ambiguous, the evidentiary record incomplete, and that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by rejecting a new offer from a stalking horse purchaser.

The court found the case suitable for summary judgment, interpreting the contract to mandate the refund of the assignment fee upon the builder's default, and dismissed the defendant's arguments.

The defendant, Mike Vukmanovic, pleaded guilty to 16 firearms and ammunition offences, including manufacturing firearms, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession while subject to a prohibition order, and possession without a licence.

A search of his residence revealed a significant cache of weapons, a 3D printer used for manufacturing firearms, and over 3,600 rounds of ammunition.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the volume of untraceable manufactured weapons, disturbing communications indicating a potential intent to use firearms against authority, and improper storage in a residential area.

Mitigating factors included a 10-year gap in his criminal record, his guilty plea, and deplorable conditions experienced during pre-sentence custody.

Applying principles of proportionality, deterrence, and denunciation, the court imposed a total sentence of seven years in custody, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

Ancillary orders, including a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture, were also imposed.

Dr. Wameed Ateyah was convicted of 16 counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual exploitation involving 13 female patients.

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of trust, the number of victims, the intrusive nature of the offences, and falsification of medical records.

Mitigating factors included lack of criminal antecedents, otherwise good character (though attenuated due to breach of trust), collateral consequences (loss of medical license), and physical/mental health issues.

The Crown sought a 9-year sentence, while the Defence sought 3 years.

The court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, and public protection as dominant sentencing objectives.

Applying the principle of totality, the court imposed a global sentence of nine years in jail, with credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a final sentence of eight years and 357 days.

The defendant, a doctor, was charged with 24 counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference involving fifteen female patients.

The Crown alleged that the defendant intentionally touched patients' breasts and/or genitals for sexual purposes under the guise of medically unnecessary examinations, capitalizing on his position of trust.

The defense argued that some events did not occur or were medically appropriate, and alleged collusion among complainants.

The court granted the Crown's similar fact evidence application, finding a distinctive pattern of behavior and false record-keeping.

The court found the defendant's testimony lacked credibility and reliability.

Ultimately, the defendant was found guilty of 16 counts of sexual assault and 1 count of sexual interference, and acquitted on other counts due to insufficient evidence or Crown's request.

Pafco Insurance Company brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss third-party claims against it, arguing its automobile insurance policy for Tammy Lea Todish was validly terminated.

Desjardins General Insurance Company cross-moved for a declaration that the policy was in effect.

The court found that the notice of cancellation, despite not explicitly providing an address for payment but rather a broker's name and phone number, was not deficient given the insured's prior understanding and ability to reinstate the policy.

Consequently, the court ruled that no insurance policy was in effect at the time of the accident, granting Pafco's motion and dismissing the third-party claim.

The offender was sentenced in absentia after absconding following jury convictions on five child sexual interference offences arising from repeated sexual abuse over approximately eight years.

The court applied the sentencing principles in ss. 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing proportionality, denunciation and deterrence, and relied heavily on the guidance in Friesen concerning the gravity of sexual offences against children.

Aggravating factors included the complainant's very young age, the repeated and invasive nature of the abuse, the offender's position of trust and authority, and the profound lifelong impact on the complainant.

Mitigating factors were limited to the offender's lack of prior record, age, and otherwise pro-social life.

A penitentiary sentence of seven years plus ancillary orders was imposed.

In a multi-accused pre-trial Charter motion arising from a violent home invasion and related firearms and conspiracy allegations, the applicants sought excision of Home Depot records, Instagram-derived identification evidence, tower dump material, and Part VI interceptions.

The court held the applicants lacked standing to challenge the Home Depot records and store surveillance, and that the private Instagram account did not attract an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances.

The court further upheld the tower dump authorization under s. 487.015 of the Criminal Code, found the subsequent subscriber query authorized, and rejected claims that the ITO relied on speculation.

Applying Garofoli and Araujo, the court concluded that, after amplification and excision, the Part VI authorization still had sufficient grounds and satisfied investigative necessity.

The motion was dismissed, with remaining search issues relating to later searches to be addressed separately.

The defendant, Daniel Reza, was convicted of six offences including assault, assault with a weapon, multiple sexual assaults (some involving penetration while the victim was asleep or incapacitated by marijuana), and threatening to kill the victim's father.

The offences occurred within a domestic relationship.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the domestic context, repeated manipulation, the victim's vulnerability (asleep), use of an object, and lasting impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's youth, lack of criminal record, and mental health/addiction issues.

The Crown sought a six-year custodial sentence, while the defence proposed two years.

The court imposed a global custodial sentence of 4.5 years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and issued ancillary orders including a no-contact order, DNA order, SOIRA order, and s. 109 order.

Vanessa Porchetta appealed her conviction for driving with over 80 mg of alcohol, arguing breaches of her s. 10(b) Charter rights and an error in relying on hearsay evidence for the alcohol standard solution.

The trial judge found two s. 10(b) breaches but declined to exclude the breath readings under s. 24(2) of the Charter, deeming the breaches technical and their impact minimal.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no unreasonable factual findings or errors in law regarding the Charter analysis or the admissibility of the breath technician's evidence concerning the alcohol standard solution.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagors following a default on a mortgage.

The defendants admitted the default but disputed the plaintiff's calculation of the amount owing, pointing to a double-counted fee.

The court granted summary judgment on the issue of default, finding no genuine issue for trial, but referred the determination of the exact amount owing to a Master pursuant to Rule 20.04(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicants sought to rescind an Agreement of Purchase and Sale and recover their deposit due to undisclosed easements for storm and sanitary sewers.

The court found that the easements did not materially affect the use or enjoyment of the property, as per clause 10(d) of the agreement, and dismissed the application.