James Wortzman

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court found that the offer lacked a genuine element of compromise, as it essentially demanded the defendants either purchase the property or pay equivalent damages.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $150,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, after deducting costs for an earlier consent motion and an unsuccessful summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff corporation entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale to buy a residential property from the defendants.

The defendants subsequently refused to close the transaction, breaching the agreement.

The plaintiff sued for specific performance, arguing the property was uniquely suited as a recreational compound for its principals' extended family.

The defendants argued the purchase was a commercial investment and damages were the appropriate remedy.

The court found the property had a peculiar and special value to the plaintiff and ordered specific performance.

The plaintiff appealed an Associate Justice's decision removing its counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defendant, a former lawyer for the plaintiff being sued for professional negligence, intended to call lawyers from the plaintiff's current firm as witnesses regarding advice they provided to the plaintiff before, during, and after the defendant's retainer.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's conclusion that the lawyers were likely to be material witnesses and that their continued representation would impair the administration of justice.

The moving parties (defendants) sought an order to approve a loan and dispense with the consent of the responding parties (plaintiffs) for the loan and future financing.

The moving parties argued that the responding parties' refusal to consent was oppressive and intended to leverage a buyout.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties had not made a claim for oppression and that the court could not use its inherent jurisdiction to rewrite a commercial agreement negotiated at arm's length by sophisticated parties.

Despite the responding parties' success, the court declined to award costs due to their inequitable conduct.

The plaintiffs requested an amendment to the court's previous reasons dismissing their request for injunctive relief, citing an error in a transcript regarding whether the Law Society of Upper Canada was investigating the plaintiffs.

The defendant conceded the transcript error but argued the dismissal should be maintained.

The court corrected the factual error in its supplementary reasons but declined to amend its previous order, finding that the plaintiffs' case for injunctive relief was still not ironclad enough to warrant the exceptional remedy sought.

The plaintiff and defendant, siblings, were involved in a dispute over the ownership and management of a family partnership.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's claim was for breach of contract and statute-barred.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking the appointment of a receiver and manager, further production, and an accounting.

The court dismissed the defendant's summary judgment motion, finding the plaintiff's claim was grounded in breach of fiduciary duty, to which no limitation period applied under the transition provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding no clear evidence of irreparable harm to justify the extraordinary remedy of appointing a receiver, and concluding the requests for production and an accounting lacked a proper jurisdictional basis.

The defendant landlord moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim seeking rectification of a lease amendment.

The tenants alleged that an early termination clause permitting the landlord to terminate the lease on 270 days’ notice had been inserted without their knowledge or agreement.

The court held that rectification requires convincing proof of a definite and ascertainable prior oral agreement, knowledge of the mistake amounting to fraud or its equivalent, and proof of the precise form of the corrected instrument.

The evidentiary record consisted largely of self‑serving assertions unsupported by documentary evidence and failed to demonstrate any prior agreement excluding the termination clause.

Summary judgment was granted, the claim for rectification dismissed, and the certificate of pending litigation vacated.