James Renihan

The plaintiff brought motions for leave to appeal two orders of a motion judge: one adding a competing car dealership as a party defendant, and another dissolving an interim interlocutory injunction that had restrained the defendant manufacturer from appointing an additional dealer in the plaintiff's market area.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decisions and no issues of general importance to the administration of justice.

The applicant, Labatt, brought an application seeking an interpretation of a renewal provision in a previous sponsorship agreement with the respondent, NHL.

The application judge found that the parties had reached a new, binding sponsorship agreement, a position that Labatt had not pleaded or advanced during the hearing.

The NHL and Molson appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was procedurally unfair and contrary to natural justice for the application judge to base his decision on a novel theory of liability that was never pleaded and to which the respondents had no opportunity to respond.

The judgment was set aside and the matter remitted to a different judge.

Class counsel appealed a motion judge's order fixing their fees at $14.5 million instead of the requested $27.5 million following the settlement of a class action regarding payday loans.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge did not err in applying section 32(4) rather than the base fee/multiplier approach in section 33(7) of the Class Proceedings Act, as the fee agreement was not approved by the court.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's decision to treat the fees of consultants and other lawyers retained on a contingency basis as disbursements.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, ruling that the representative plaintiff's $3,000 compensation should be paid out of the settlement fund rather than out of class counsel fees.