James David Bunting

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and, alternatively, sought security for costs under Rule 56.01(d).

The court held that a pleading need not expressly name a cause of action provided it pleads sufficient material facts to support a recognized legal claim.

While the claim adequately pleaded causes of action including knowing assistance and inducing breach of contract, the allegation of fraud was materially deficient because it failed to provide particularized allegations against each moving party as required by Rule 25.06(8).

The court struck the fraud allegation with leave to amend but dismissed the remainder of the motion.

The request for security for costs was also dismissed because the evidence of a small PPSR registration did not establish good reason to believe the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets to satisfy a potential costs award.

The applicant sought remedies under Part VII.1 of the Competition Act after the respondents advertised that their wireless service had fewer dropped calls than competitors without conducting adequate and proper testing beforehand.

The court previously found the respondents engaged in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b) for making an untested performance claim, although the applicant failed to prove the claim was false or misleading under s. 74.01(1)(a).

In determining remedies, the court assessed proportionality and the factors in s. 74.1(5), including market reach, financial position, and the fact that later testing substantiated the claim.

The court held that post-claim substantiation does not excuse the statutory requirement for prior testing but is relevant to penalty quantum.

An administrative monetary penalty of $500,000 was imposed, while the request for a 10‑year prohibition order was denied.

The court addressed scheduling for submissions regarding the appropriate penalty in a proceeding brought by the Commissioner of Competition against telecommunications companies.

The parties appeared to establish timelines for written submissions and oral argument on penalty.

The court set deadlines for the applicant’s submissions, the respondents’ responding submissions, and the applicant’s reply.

Dates were also scheduled for oral argument concerning the penalty to be imposed.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under ss. 74.01(1)(a) and (b) of the Competition Act regarding claims of fewer dropped calls by a wireless provider, the court addressed discovery disputes involving communications between the Competition Bureau and industry participants.

The respondents sought disclosure of communications between the applicant and several wireless competitors, as well as internal investigative notes.

The court held that public interest privilege did not apply to communications with two competitors that had publicly promoted their role in the investigation, and ordered disclosure of communications occurring before litigation became the dominant purpose.

However, documents created after litigation was contemplated were protected by litigation privilege.

Communications involving another competitor and internal notes relating to discussions with a federal department remained protected by public interest privilege.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under s. 74.01(1)(b) of the Competition Act, the respondents sought leave to call eight expert witnesses despite the five‑expert limit imposed by s. 7 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing that some expert evidence was duplicative and that certain proposed opinions concerning the “general impression” of advertisements were inadmissible.

The court held that the proposed expert evidence was not unnecessarily duplicative and would not unduly prolong the hearing.

The court also determined that the admissibility of portions of the challenged expert evidence, including survey evidence and analysis of advertisements, could be addressed during trial if relied upon.

Leave was therefore granted to the respondents to call eight expert witnesses.

The Commissioner of Competition brought an application against Rogers and Chatr alleging that their advertising claims of 'fewer dropped calls than new wireless carriers' and 'no worries about dropped calls' were false, misleading, and made without adequate and proper testing, contrary to the Competition Act.

The court found that the applicant failed to prove the claims were false or misleading.

However, the court found that the respondents failed to conduct adequate and proper testing in certain cities prior to launching the advertising campaign, thereby engaging in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b).

The court also dismissed the respondents' constitutional challenges, finding that s. 74.01(1)(b) is a justified limit on freedom of expression and that the administrative monetary penalty does not engage s. 11 of the Charter.

Following the refusal of an interlocutory injunction sought by the landlord applicants to compel a hotel operator to continue operating a hotel under a particular brand, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicants argued that an indemnity clause in a lease entitled them to full indemnity costs from a former tenant alleged to have breached the lease.

The court held that the indemnity clause did not permit the landlord to recover litigation costs from a prior tenant where the present tenant supported the motion and where the lease’s procedures regarding a change of operating name had not been followed.

Even if the clause applied, the court would decline to exercise its discretion to award costs to the applicants.

Costs were awarded instead to the successful respondent hotel operator.

Bell Canada brought an application to strike two arbitration proceedings commenced by Plan Group Inc. (PGI) and its predecessor partnership.

PGI brought a motion to stay the application in favour of arbitration.

The court found that the first arbitration was a nullity because it was commenced by a dissolved partnership that no longer existed.

The court also found that the second arbitration was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the arbitration agreement did not contain clear and express language contracting out of the statutory limitation period.

The court declined to stay the application, finding that the issues were questions of law appropriate for summary judgment under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The application was granted and the motion to stay was dismissed.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction compelling a hotel operator to continue managing and branding a hotel under a particular brand pending determination of a permanent injunction application.

They argued the lease required continued operation of the hotel using the brand and associated operational infrastructure despite expiry of the hotel management agreement.

The court applied the RJR‑MacDonald test and held that the lease provisions did not clearly impose an obligation requiring the operator to continue providing the full operational benefits of the brand.

The alleged harm, primarily reduced participation rent and potential reputational impacts, was found to be quantifiable and compensable in damages.

The balance of convenience favoured the operator, which would otherwise be compelled to operate a business relationship it no longer wished to maintain.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that the arbitration clause in its Alliance Agreement with the respondent did not require a party to file a notice of request to arbitrate with the Arbitration and Mediation Institute of Ontario to commence arbitration.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in his interpretation of the arbitration clause.

The Court held that the standard of review for contractual interpretation in this case was correctness, and that the clear wording of the agreement required the arbitration to be conducted under the 'then-current rules' of the Institute, which mandated filing a notice with the Institute to commence proceedings.

During a hearing to review a decision of the Toronto Stock Exchange regarding HudBay Minerals Inc.'s proposed acquisition of Lundin Mining Corporation, HudBay and Lundin requested confidentiality orders for certain documents filed in evidence.

The Ontario Securities Commission considered the open court principle and the test for confidentiality under section 9(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club.

The Commission granted confidentiality for documents that were not relevant to its decision on the merits, including handwritten notes and a financial presentation.

However, it ordered that relevant documents, such as special committee minutes and an engagement letter, be made public, subject to minor redactions for third-party sensitive information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and issued an endorsement on costs.

The respondents were collectively awarded costs of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST, payable by the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN) and La Régie Des Rentes Du Québec.

The appellants, Confederation of National Trade Unions and La Régie Des Rentes Du Québec, appealed an order staying the obligation of Slater Steel to file an actuarial report and relieving the company and its directors from any resulting obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's reliance on evidence that further employer contributions were not due until the valuation report was filed.

The Court also noted that other parties had acted in reliance on the stay order.