HRTO 2014

The applicant filed a human rights application against the respondent.

The applicant's counsel removed himself from the record prior to the hearing.

The applicant failed to attend the scheduled hearing on March 20, 2014, and did not communicate with the Tribunal to explain her absence.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging employment discrimination based on colour, race, family status, and reprisal.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss because the application appeared to be filed beyond the one-year time limit under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

After reviewing the applicant's written submissions explaining the delay, the Tribunal found it was not plain and obvious that the application was outside its jurisdiction.

The Tribunal directed that the application be delivered to the respondent.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of family status.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (NOID) due to potential delay.

After reviewing the applicant's response, the Tribunal found it was not plain and obvious at this preliminary stage that the application was outside its jurisdiction.

The application was ordered to be delivered to the respondent.

The respondent requested that the applicant's human rights application alleging disability discrimination be deferred pending the outcome of a civil action against a disability insurance carrier and ongoing WSIB proceedings.

The Tribunal dismissed the deferral request, finding that the civil action would not address the central issue of accommodation to the point of undue hardship, and the WSIB proceedings might not deal with the Code-related issues.

The respondent was ordered to file a full Response.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal had previously deferred the application pending the conclusion of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Act proceeding.

The Tribunal subsequently wrote to the applicant requesting an update on the status of the other proceeding and warning that failure to respond could result in dismissal.

The applicant failed to respond or communicate with the Tribunal.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability and sex.

The respondent failed to file a Response despite multiple directions from the Tribunal.

The Tribunal ordered that the respondent is deemed to have accepted all allegations and waived all rights to notice or participation in the proceedings.

A case management teleconference was scheduled to determine next steps.

The corporate respondent requested to defer the human rights application pending the conclusion of an ongoing grievance arbitration process.

The applicant opposed the deferral, arguing it was requested in bad faith and that the arbitration would not address the human rights allegations.

The Tribunal found substantial overlap between the facts and allegations in both proceedings and deferred the application to avoid concurrent proceedings and contrary findings, noting that grievance arbitrators have the responsibility to enforce human rights statutes.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal.

Prior to the hearing, the respondent union requested an adjournment because it had transferred the file to new counsel who was unavailable for the scheduled dates.

The respondent employer (CFJ) requested an order altering the normal order of proceedings so that the union would cross-examine and call its case first, to accommodate CFJ's out-of-town witnesses.

The Tribunal denied the adjournment, finding that a change of counsel does not constitute an exceptional circumstance.

The Tribunal also denied CFJ's request to alter the order of proceedings, directing the parties to confer on witness scheduling instead.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceeding seeking an order requiring the respondent to deliver all arguably relevant documents in its possession, as required by Rule 16.1 of the Tribunal's Rules.

The respondent failed to respond to the Request or provide the documents by the deadline.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to immediately deliver the documents, noting that consequences for failing to comply with the Rules could be addressed at the hearing.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on race, place of origin, ethnic origin, and marital status regarding the care her mother received at a long-term care facility and her own treatment by the facility and the Ministry.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found the applicant lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of her mother without consent.

Regarding her own treatment, the applicant admitted she was relying on assumptions and beliefs rather than factual evidence linking the treatment to the protected grounds.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (NOID) on the basis that the application appeared to be outside its jurisdiction.

The applicant failed to respond to the NOID despite an extension of time.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability by her former employer and her union.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss on the basis of delay, as the application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination.

The applicant argued that the delay was incurred in good faith because she was waiting for the union to pursue her grievances and was unaware of her rights.

The Tribunal rejected these arguments, finding that waiting for another proceeding to conclude and ignorance of rights without making inquiries do not constitute good faith reasons for delay.

The application was dismissed as untimely.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

After the respondent requested to reschedule mediation, the Tribunal directed the parties to select new dates.

The applicant failed to respond to this direction and a subsequent warning letter.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The respondent employer requested the removal of an individual respondent, an Occupational Health Nurse, from the human rights application.

The applicant consented to the removal on the conditions that the employer accept vicarious liability for the nurse's actions, that evidence regarding the nurse's actions could still be relied upon, and that human rights training for the nurse could still be sought as a remedy.

The Tribunal granted the request, noting that the employer is vicariously liable under section 46.3 of the Human Rights Code and that the removal would not preclude the applicant's evidentiary or remedial requests.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order during Proceedings seeking the early production of numerous documents.

The respondent opposed the request as premature.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting that early production is only ordered in exceptional circumstances, which were not present here.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceeding seeking the production of documents in a human rights application that had been previously deferred pending the conclusion of a grievance arbitration.

The respondents opposed the request.

The Tribunal denied the request as premature because the application remained deferred, noting that the applicant could bring the application back on after the grievance process concluded.

The applicant, whose employment was terminated for alleged involvement in a scheme to defraud the respondent's damaged goods program, sought to call the respondent's Vice-President of Distribution Operations as a witness after the respondent decided not to call him.

The applicant argued his evidence was relevant to show he also benefited from the program.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding the proposed evidence irrelevant to assessing whether the applicant's termination was discriminatory based on marital and family status, as the Vice-President was not investigated and did not make the termination decision.

The applicant failed to attend the scheduled hearing.

Her representative later faxed a note citing illness and requesting an adjournment.

The Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction requiring medical documentation to support the adjournment request, warning that failure to comply could result in dismissal.

The applicant did not respond or provide the required documentation.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant, who uses a motorized wheelchair, filed a human rights application alleging that the organizational respondent's restaurant lacked an automatic door opener.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed two requests for orders during proceedings.

The individual respondent's request to be removed as a party was denied because he failed to address the necessary criteria or clarify his relationship with the organizational respondent.

The applicant's request to add a new organizational respondent was denied as there were no allegations supporting a Code violation against it.

However, the applicant's request to amend the application to add a public interest remedy was granted, as it was made early in the process with no prejudice to the respondents.

The applicant filed an application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code against a bank.

The Tribunal advised the applicant that the application appeared to be outside its jurisdiction because banking is a federally regulated service.

The applicant's written submissions failed to address the jurisdictional issue.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, holding that under s. 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over banking, and therefore the provincial Code does not apply.