Howard J. Wolch

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $116,706.47 following a successful motion and the dismissal of the defendant's cross-motion.

The plaintiff argued the defendant engaged in suspicious and abusive conduct, including commencing a separate action in Korea and insisting on unnecessary foreign law experts.

The court agreed that the defendant's aggressive and strategic conduct unnecessarily complicated the dispute.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $80,000 against the primary defendant and $3,000 against the secondary defendant.

The parties engaged in a long-running dispute over two oil field joint ventures in Egypt.

Following multiple prior court decisions across Canada, a reference was held to conduct an accounting and valuation of the applicants' interest in the joint venture.

Relying on a joint neutral expert, the court determined the financial calculations.

The court also held that a 500% penalty clause for failing to make a cash call, drafted by the applicant, was an enforceable genuine pre-estimate of damages rather than an unenforceable penalty.

Ultimately, the applicants were ordered to pay the respondents $331,087.33.

The plaintiff brought a motion to consolidate two actions or amend its statement of claim.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to stay the second action based on an arbitration clause in their sales agreement.

The court found that the defendant was estopped from relying on the arbitration clause because it had previously commenced a court action in Korea alleging breach of contract, rendering the arbitration clause inoperative.

The cross-motion to stay was dismissed, and the plaintiff's motion to amend and consolidate the actions was granted to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, which alleged oppression and breach of good faith by the individual directors and officers in relation to a share purchase agreement.

The defendants argued the plaintiff lacked standing as the conduct occurred before it became a shareholder, and that insufficient facts were pleaded to attract personal liability.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the plaintiff had standing as a beneficial shareholder and that the pleadings sufficiently alleged the defendants' personal involvement and benefit.

The court also granted the plaintiff's motion to consolidate the action with a related proceeding against the corporate defendants.

The applicant sought an order for directions and his appointment as Estate Trustee under a 2020 Will.

The respondent objected, alleging the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to alcoholism and was subject to undue influence.

The respondent sought widespread production of the deceased's medical, legal, and financial records.

The court found that the respondent had not met the minimal evidentiary threshold required by Neuberger Estate v. York to compel proof in solemn form or order extensive productions at this stage.

The court adopted the applicant's proposed order for directions, allowing the respondent to file further evidence before determining if the threshold is met.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Gilmore J. dated September 24, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $10,000.

The moving party, executor of an estate in Saskatchewan, brought a motion to stay or dismiss an application in Ontario regarding a Locked-in Retirement Account (LIRA) on the basis of jurisdiction.

The responding party, the deceased's former spouse residing in Ontario, sought a declaration that she was the designated beneficiary of the LIRA held by CIBC.

The court applied the Van Breda test and found that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter because the contract was located in Ontario, the executor lived in Ontario, and CIBC's head office was in Ontario.

The court also declined to find that Saskatchewan was a more appropriate forum, dismissing the motion and awarding costs to the responding party.

The moving party defendants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the plaintiffs/defendants by counterclaim from competing, soliciting vendors, and using their brand, as well as orders to unfreeze a bank account and provide an accounting.

The dispute arose from a complex business arrangement and subsequent breakdown between the parties involving the transfer of a medical aesthetics business.

The court granted the injunction against the principal plaintiff and his related entities, finding a strong prima facie case of breach of a negative covenant and irreparable harm, but declined to grant the injunction against former employees who had been terminated.

The court also ordered the unfreezing of the bank account and an accounting.

The plaintiff and defendant sought costs on a full indemnity scale after the moving party withdrew her motion to intervene and set aside a writ of possession.

The moving party had claimed to be a lawful tenant under a lease, which the plaintiff and defendant alleged was fraudulent.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, noting that because the motion was withdrawn, it could not make the necessary factual findings of reprehensible conduct.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, fixing the plaintiff's costs at $68,092.48 and the defendant's costs at $11,959.92, payable by the moving party.

The Applicant and Respondent both brought motions concerning disclosure, amending pleadings, questioning, child support, spousal support, and interim disbursements.

The court granted mutual orders for disclosure and amending pleadings, with the Respondent advancing funds for the Applicant's disclosure costs.

Leave was granted for both parties to question each other, with time limits.

The court ordered the Respondent to pay interim child support of $1,296 per month retroactive to January 1, 2018, and interim spousal support of $2,185 per month retroactive to January 1, 2018.

The Respondent was also ordered to pay $20,000 in interim disbursements to the Applicant.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside a 2015 judgment based on alleged new evidence of fraud and deceit, and sought $500,000 in damages.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants had already attempted to introduce this evidence before appellate courts on five previous occasions, rendering the matter res judicata and an abuse of process.

The respondents' cross-motion to authorize the Master on an outstanding reference to determine interest rates was granted.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $21,644.02 against the applicants due to their history of bringing hopeless, duplicative proceedings.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court who had refused to extend the time to appeal.

The applicants argued the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error of fact by finding no evidence was filed, but the panel noted the motion record contained no affidavits.

The court refused to admit fresh evidence, noting the self-represented applicant was a sophisticated litigant and the evidence could have been adduced earlier with due diligence.

The motion was dismissed as devoid of merit, and costs of $53,000 were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The applicants sought an extension of time to appeal a Superior Court decision dismissing their application as an abuse of process.

The application had sought relief regarding an alleged breach of a joint venture agreement concerning the Abu Sennan oil reserve.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Chambers judge's refusal to grant the extension, finding no merit in the proposed appeal.

The court determined that the applicants were bound by the result of a prior British Columbia action on the same issue and that the application constituted an abuse of process.

The respondents sought costs following the dismissal of the moving party's motion to extend time.

The respondents claimed costs on a substantial indemnity basis, including fees for new counsel necessitated by the moving party commencing an action against the respondents' original counsel.

The court found the motion was an abuse of process and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

After adjusting the hours and rates to reflect a fair and reasonable amount, the court fixed costs at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff, a distributor, sued the defendant, a manufacturer of adult sex toys, for breach of three purported exclusive distribution agreements.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding that the parties were merely negotiating and had never reached a binding consensus ad idem on the essential terms.

The defendant counterclaimed for defamation and other torts based on a complaint the plaintiff's principal sent to Health Canada alleging safety defects in the defendant's products.

The court granted the counterclaim for defamation and injurious falsehood, finding the statements were false, defamatory, and made with the intent to harm the defendant's reputation and business.

The defendant was awarded $50,000 in general damages.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to appeal an order dismissing their application as an abuse of process.

Although the moving parties formed an intention to appeal within the time limit and adequately explained their delay, the court found no merit to the proposed appeal.

The claims related to an oil reserve had already been litigated and finally determined in British Columbia, rendering the Ontario application an attempt to relitigate.

Furthermore, the limitation period had expired several years prior.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court.

The moving party had received incorrect advice from the Divisional Court Registrar that such an order could not be appealed to the Divisional Court, leading him to file in the Court of Appeal.

The motion was dismissed because under section 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, jurisdiction to set aside or vary the decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court is reserved to a panel of the Divisional Court, and a single judge of the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction.

Following two related applications argued together, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The successful party sought a global partial indemnity costs award exceeding $40,000 against two opposing parties.

The court emphasized the importance of proportionality, reasonable expectations of the parties, and compliance with Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the requirement to exchange Costs Outlines before the hearing.

Finding the claimed amount excessive and inadequately supported by time breakdowns, the court reduced the requested costs and apportioned them separately between the two opposing parties based on their respective involvement in the proceedings.

Following a motion for security for costs, the defendants sought additional costs related to the fees of former counsel and other related issues.

The court declined to increase the amount of security for costs because the defendants provided redacted accounts that failed to show the nature of the work performed, despite the court previously requesting such evidence.

The court also rejected arguments that a prior settlement offer should affect the costs analysis, as the amount ordered was lower than the offer and the conduct of the plaintiff did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

Additional costs requested for undertakings issues were also denied.

The previously ordered security and costs structure remained unchanged.

Celadon brought an application seeking a declaration that Hoss exercised an option to purchase a leased commercial property on Celadon's behalf, pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement.

Hoss brought a separate application seeking an order requiring the landlord, Turoczi, to transfer the property to Hoss pursuant to the option.

The court found that Celadon failed to exercise its discretion to require an assignment of the lease within a reasonable time, that there was no equitable assignment of the lease, and that a subsequent Release Agreement terminated any right Celadon had to the lease.

The court also found that Hoss was in good standing under the lease when it exercised the option to purchase.

Celadon's application was dismissed, and Hoss's application was granted, ordering Turoczi to transfer the property to Hoss.