Guillermo Schible

These consolidated appeals addressed the interpretation and application of the amended summary judgment regime under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment may be granted not only where claims or defences are without merit or the parties agree, but also where the motion judge can achieve a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings on the motion record, possibly supplemented by limited oral evidence.

The court articulated the “full appreciation” test, confirmed that the standard of review on whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial is correctness, and explained the proper use of the new powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, draw inferences, and hear oral evidence on discrete issues.

Applying those principles, the court dismissed the Combined Air, Misek, and Parker appeals, dismissed the Mauldin appeal, and allowed the Bruno appeal by setting aside summary judgment and dismissing the motion.

The respondent patient was in a persistent vegetative state on a mechanical ventilator.

The appellant treating physicians proposed to withdraw life support and provide palliative care, arguing that the life support was medically futile and did not require the consent of the patient's substitute decision-maker.

The substitute decision-maker refused consent.

The Court of Appeal held that the withdrawal of life support and the administration of end-of-life palliative care are integrally linked and constitute a 'treatment package' under the Health Care Consent Act.

Therefore, the physicians required the substitute decision-maker's consent, and in the absence of consent, were required to refer the matter to the Consent and Capacity Board.

The plaintiff, an investment advisor, was terminated without cause and commenced a wrongful dismissal action.

Four years later, he sought to amend his Statement of Claim to increase damages, alleging loss of clientele and moral damages due to the lack of working notice.

The Master refused the amendments, finding they constituted a new cause of action that was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that there is no legal right to working notice and that the proposed claims for lost clientele and moral damages were untenable and statute-barred.

The respondent commenced arbitral proceedings against the appellant.

The arbitrator ordered the respondent to post security for costs.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to set aside the arbitrator's order.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge lacked jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1991 to review the arbitrator's procedural order for security for costs, as it was neither an award nor a ruling on the arbitrator's jurisdiction to conduct the arbitration.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision and brought a motion for a true copy of the trial audiotapes, alleging that the transcripts omitted comments showing a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The appellant also sought an extension of time to perfect his appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant failed to show good reason to doubt the accuracy of the transcripts under s. 48(2) of the Evidence Act, and that the alleged omitted comments would not support a finding of bias.

The request for an extension of time was consequently dismissed.

The respondent law firm brought a motion for security for costs of the appellant's appeal under Rule 61.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondent argued the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant had unpaid costs awards.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious, and noted the respondent had agreed to an indulgence regarding the unpaid costs while the appellant sought an investigation.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed an order refusing a discretionary remedy regarding the carriage of a bankruptcy proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant's conduct, specifically her decision to assume the role of a participating creditor, warranted the refusal of the requested order.

The Court noted the respondent's undertaking to pursue the claim forcefully and cooperatively.