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The accused was found not criminally responsible for arson and mischief due to active psychosis.
The court considered whether Charles Duku was criminally responsible for arson and mischief, following a trial in which he was found guilty.
After conviction, the Crown sought a verdict of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) under section 672.34 of the Criminal Code, based on psychiatric evidence that Mr. Duku was suffering from active psychosis at the time of the offence.
The court accepted the expert evidence and the respondent’s consent, finding that Mr. Duku was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder.
The accused was convicted of arson and mischief based on circumstantial evidence proving he intentionally set a fire in his apartment.
The accused, Charles Duku, was charged with intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire (arson) contrary to s. 434 of the Criminal Code, and mischief contrary to s. 430(3) of the Code, following a fire in his high-rise apartment.
The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including testimony from firefighters and an expert fire investigator who classified the fire as "incendiary." The defence did not call evidence.
The court found that the accused was the sole resident, was seen entering and exiting the apartment around the time of the fire, and possessed the means to set it.
The evidence indicated the fire was not accidental.
The court concluded that guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts.
The accused was sentenced to 4.5 years imprisonment for multiple firearms and robbery offences.
The defendant, Roydin Gerard Dias, pleaded guilty to multiple firearms and robbery-related charges, including possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, unauthorized possession of a firearm, vehicle occupancy with a shotgun, robbery with an imitation firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, use of an imitation firearm, and disguise with intent.
The Crown sought a global sentence of 5 years, while the defence sought 3 years.
The court confirmed that a pharmacy incident, where nothing was taken but threats were made with a firearm, constituted robbery under section 343(c) of the Criminal Code, applying the definition of assault from section 265.
Aggravating factors included unsafe firearm storage, illegal possession purpose, dangerous flight from police, and the impact on victims and the community.
Mitigating factors included a guilty plea, genuine remorse, no prior criminal record, and difficult pre-trial detention conditions.
The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years (54 months), with credit for 21.5 months of pre-trial custody, leaving 32 months to serve concurrently for all charges.
Additional orders included a DNA order, a lifetime firearms prohibition, and forfeiture of weapons.
A child witness's prior video-recorded statement was admitted under the principled exception to hearsay.
The Crown sought to admit a prior video-recorded statement made by a child witness to police as substantive evidence of hearsay.
The child witness had failed to adopt the statement at trial and testified with apparent memory loss regarding the events.
The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm, assault by suffocation, sexual assault, assault of a child, and threatening bodily harm.
The court conducted an admissibility voir dire to determine whether the hearsay statement met the threshold reliability and necessity requirements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.
Delayed rights to counsel breached section 10(b), excluding oxycodone but admitting lawfully seized cocaine.
The accused was charged with possession of two controlled substances (cocaine and oxycodone) and failing to comply with the terms of his recognizance.
Following a high-speed pursuit and traffic stop, police observed a baggie of cocaine in the accused's waistband and arrested him.
A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed oxycodone pills.
The court found the arrest was lawful based on reasonable grounds, but determined there was a breach of the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) regarding the delay in providing rights to counsel.
The cocaine and health card were admitted as evidence, but the oxycodone was excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.
The accused was convicted of possession of cocaine and failing to comply with recognizance, but acquitted of the second possession charge.