David J. Feliciant

The applicant, Anishinabek Police Service, sought judicial review of two arbitration awards that allowed grievances regarding an unpaid suspension and subsequent termination of a First Nations Constable to proceed to arbitration.

The applicant argued that the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process barred the arbitration because the constable's dismissal had already been adjudicated under the employer's Code of Conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the adjudicator under the Code of Conduct was not exercising a statutory function and did not make a judicial decision.

Therefore, the prior adjudication did not preclude the union from pursuing grievances under the collective agreement and the Canada Labour Code.

The mother sought leave to appeal a trial judge's decision regarding costs in a lengthy child protection proceeding.

The trial judge had dismissed the Society's application for Crown wardship and returned the child to the mother, but only awarded the mother costs for procedural delays, not substantive issues, despite the mother beating her offer to settle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably exercised her discretion in balancing the Society's mandate under Rule 24(2) with the offer to settle provisions in Rule 18(14).

The applicant sought judicial review of an order made by a Superior Court judge sitting in Family Court in a child protection proceeding.

The applicant argued that the judge should be deemed a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice under the Courts of Justice Act, making the decision subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the judge was sitting as a Superior Court judge and that certiorari does not lie against a decision of a Superior Court judge.

The applicants, foster parents of an Aboriginal Crown ward, sought an urgent judicial review and interim injunction to prevent the children's aid society from removing the child from their care and transferring her to a First Nation in British Columbia.

The society planned to move the child just weeks before she would have been in the applicants' care for two years, at which point they would acquire additional statutory rights.

The court found that the society's haste was motivated by a desire to avoid the applicants gaining these rights, rather than the child's best interests.

The court granted an interim order prohibiting the removal of the child pending the completion of the administrative and judicial reviews.