David J. Feliciant

In a case management conference, the plaintiff requested an amendment to the Discovery Timetable to allow more time to deliver written questions arising from the recent production of approximately 4,000 additional documents by the defendant.

The defendants did not dispute the need for additional time but questioned the structure of the questioning stages.

The court granted the amendment, extending the deadlines for the delivery of follow-up written questions and answers, and maintained the remainder of the timetable.

The applicant First Nation sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of Exploration granting a mining exploration permit to a corporate respondent on lands within the applicant's traditional territory.

The applicant argued the Crown failed to properly discharge its duty to consult.

The Divisional Court found that the Crown and its delegate had created clear expectations for a community meeting and a Memorandum of Understanding, but abruptly changed course without explanation to expedite the permit for commercial reasons.

The court held that the consultation process lacked genuine engagement and failed to maintain the honour of the Crown.

The application was granted, the permit was set aside, and the matter was remitted for adequate consultation.

The applicant, Anishinabek Police Service, sought judicial review of two arbitration awards that allowed grievances regarding an unpaid suspension and subsequent termination of a First Nations Constable to proceed to arbitration.

The applicant argued that the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process barred the arbitration because the constable's dismissal had already been adjudicated under the employer's Code of Conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the adjudicator under the Code of Conduct was not exercising a statutory function and did not make a judicial decision.

Therefore, the prior adjudication did not preclude the union from pursuing grievances under the collective agreement and the Canada Labour Code.

The Applicant foster parent applied for a review of the Society's decision to remove a severely autistic Crown Ward from her treatment foster home.

The Society removed the child without the required written notice, citing funding concerns and the need for a secure placement.

The Board found that while the Applicant provided appropriate care, the child's placement was tenuous due to funding issues raised by the foster agency.

Considering the child had already been moved to a group home and settled there, the Board concluded it was not in the child's best interests to be moved again and confirmed the removal.

The applicant foster parent brought a motion to determine whether the Child and Family Services Review Board had jurisdiction to review the removal of a foster child from her care.

The respondent Society argued that because the child had already been removed, it was no longer a 'proposed removal' under section 61 of the Child and Family Services Act, and thus the Board lacked jurisdiction.

The Board rejected this argument, finding that the Society's failure to provide the required 10-day statutory notice could not operate to deny the foster parent's right to a review.

The Board concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the application on its merits.

The mother sought leave to appeal a trial judge's decision regarding costs in a lengthy child protection proceeding.

The trial judge had dismissed the Society's application for Crown wardship and returned the child to the mother, but only awarded the mother costs for procedural delays, not substantive issues, despite the mother beating her offer to settle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably exercised her discretion in balancing the Society's mandate under Rule 24(2) with the offer to settle provisions in Rule 18(14).

The applicant sought judicial review of an order made by a Superior Court judge sitting in Family Court in a child protection proceeding.

The applicant argued that the judge should be deemed a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice under the Courts of Justice Act, making the decision subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the judge was sitting as a Superior Court judge and that certiorari does not lie against a decision of a Superior Court judge.

The applicants, foster parents of an Aboriginal Crown ward, sought an urgent judicial review and interim injunction to prevent the children's aid society from removing the child from their care and transferring her to a First Nation in British Columbia.

The society planned to move the child just weeks before she would have been in the applicants' care for two years, at which point they would acquire additional statutory rights.

The court found that the society's haste was motivated by a desire to avoid the applicants gaining these rights, rather than the child's best interests.

The court granted an interim order prohibiting the removal of the child pending the completion of the administrative and judicial reviews.