David Albert Sandor

The applicant mother sought leave to advance a Status Review Application under s. 115(5) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, aiming for a final order placing the child in her joint care with the father.

The court granted leave, finding that the mother met the established criteria, including good faith, lack of alternative remedies, unusual circumstances (child in continuous care without permanent placement), and a prima facie case.

The court also found the child continued to be in need of protection.

However, due to insufficient evidence regarding the child's special needs, current services, and the impact of transition, the court deferred the disposition of care, ordering an expedited hearing for supplemental evidence.

The respondent mother, A.D., brought a motion to vary a previous statutory finding under subsection 90(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to include a finding that her children, K.Re. and A.Re., are Métis persons.

The court considered its jurisdiction to revisit prior findings, interpreting the CYFSA remedially to allow for such variations in the children's best interests, especially given the Act's emphasis on Indigenous children's cultural identity and community connection.

Based on the uncontroverted evidence of the parents' self-identification and engagement with Métis community services, the court found sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the Métis identification.

The motion was granted, vacating the previous finding and declaring the children Métis.

The respondent mother brought a motion for an order requiring the applicant child protection agency to disclose the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the agency, along with correspondence and retainer agreements.

The mother alleged she was being surveilled.

The agency relied on litigation privilege and did not file affidavit material.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that surveillance materials are protected by litigation privilege unless the agency intends to rely on them as evidence.

Since the agency had not listed any surveillance witnesses for trial, the surveillance was not part of the case the parents had to meet, and disclosure was not required.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.