Daley

The plaintiff municipality brought a motion for an interim preservation order under Rule 45.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure that documents and electronic devices seized by the police during a criminal investigation (Wagg items) were preserved pending the determination of the plaintiff's Wagg motion.

The plaintiff adduced uncontradicted evidence that the items were relevant to its civil fraud actions and that there was a real risk of spoliation if the items were returned to the defendants.

The court applied the factors from BMW Canada Inc. v. Autoport Limited and granted the interim preservation order to maintain the status quo and protect trial fairness.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The action was commenced in 2012 and had previously been administratively dismissed and reinstated with a strict timetable.

The self-represented plaintiff failed to comply with the timetable, failed to file responding materials, and repeatedly sought adjournments without adequate medical evidence.

The court found the plaintiff's delay to be intentional, contumelious, and inexcusable, causing significant prejudice to the defendants.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed for delay and as an abuse of process.

The applicant mother brought a motion for an order under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act to appoint a qualified person to assess the needs of the parties' 11-year-old child.

The child had expressed a strong desire not to spend time with the applicant and experienced physical and emotional symptoms of stress regarding access visits.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer and a reunification therapist both provided evidence that the child was capable of forming her own views and that forcing a further assessment would be counterproductive and potentially harmful.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was already sufficient expert and clinical evidence available for trial and that a further assessment would not be in the child's best interests.

The plaintiffs in a complex medical malpractice action served a neuroradiology expert report late, breaching a case management order and necessitating a second adjournment of the trial.

The defendant doctors sought $30,000 in costs thrown away for wasted trial preparation time.

The court emphasized the importance of complying with case management orders and the court's inherent jurisdiction to award costs for abuse of process.

Taking into account the lack of detailed dockets, the court's knowledge of the file, the need for deterrence, and the plaintiff's physical limitations, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay $20,000 in costs thrown away to the defendant doctors in any event of the cause.

The deceased died intestate.

The applicant, claiming to be the deceased's common-law spouse, sought appointment as estate trustee and intended to advance a dependant's support claim.

The respondent, the deceased's biological son and former Crown Ward, brought a motion to be appointed estate trustee or litigation administrator.

The court appointed the respondent as Litigation Administrator under Rule 9.02 and determined that an independent Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL) should be appointed under Rule 75.06 to manage and protect the estate assets pending the resolution of the disputes.

The plaintiff brought an action for constructive dismissal against her former employer.

The defendants counterclaimed against the plaintiff and her parents, alleging conspiracy, misrepresentation, and breach of contract regarding the plaintiff's salary and potential tax liabilities.

The defendants to the counterclaim moved for summary judgment to dismiss the counterclaim.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the counterclaim, finding that the plaintiffs by counterclaim failed to adduce any evidence of actual damages suffered, which is an essential element of the torts alleged.

The applicant sought an interim injunction to prevent the Town of Caledon from enforcing a work order requiring the removal of 5,500 tonnes of illegal fill from his property, as well as an order of mandamus for document disclosure.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, noting the high hurdle for enjoining a public authority enforcing its by-laws in the public interest.

Finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the Town, the court dismissed the motion for injunctive relief and mandamus.

Following a summary judgment motion where the defendant successfully had the plaintiff's main action dismissed but was denied summary judgment on his counterclaim, the court determined costs.

The defendant, who was partially self-represented, sought costs of $26,325.

The plaintiff failed to provide a costs outline.

The court awarded the defendant all-inclusive costs of $10,000, taking into account the simplified procedure rules and the defendant's status as a self-represented litigant for part of the proceedings.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action and to grant judgment on his counterclaim for unpaid services.

The plaintiff elected not to file any responding evidence, relying solely on its pleadings.

The court drew an adverse inference against the plaintiff and dismissed its action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

However, the court dismissed the defendant's motion for judgment on the counterclaim, finding the evidentiary record inadequate to determine liability and damages, and directed the counterclaim to proceed to a simplified procedure trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in a simplified procedure action arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The defendants, as purchasers, failed to close the transaction and pay the balance of the purchase price.

The court granted partial summary judgment on liability, finding the defendants breached the agreement of purchase and sale, as they offered no defence to the breach.

However, due to errors and confusion in the plaintiffs' evidence regarding damages and mitigation, the court directed the issue of damages to proceed to a summary trial under Rule 76.

The plaintiff sought to deny costs to the successful defendants following a dismissed motion regarding civil jury challenges for cause.

The plaintiff argued the motion was a test case, raised novel issues, and involved public interest litigation.

The court rejected the public interest and test case arguments, noting the plaintiff had a direct pecuniary interest in the personal injury action.

However, recognizing the technical novelty of the motion, the court applied a 15% reduction to the defendants' partial indemnity costs, awarding $19,918.36 to two defendants and $7,853.24 to another.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, or to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, had commenced the action against the defendant, a YMCA employee, based on an internal incident report disclosed during a related Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario proceeding.

The court found that the plaintiff issued the claim to manipulate and threaten the defendant into retracting evidence.

The court dismissed the action as an abuse of process and struck the statement of claim without leave to amend for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and violating pleading rules.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interim interlocutory injunction to stay the election of the Board of Directors of the defendant religious temple pending the adjudication of a broader motion.

The defendants challenged the plaintiffs' standing, arguing they were not members of the temple.

The court found that at least one plaintiff had standing based on uncontradicted evidence of her long-standing devotion and the denial of membership application forms.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm from the potential loss of the right to vote, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case brought a motion to exclude potential jurors who pay auto insurance premiums, arguing they have an inherent conflict of interest.

The plaintiff sought to introduce survey evidence suggesting residents would limit damages to lower their premiums.

The court excluded the survey evidence as inadmissible hearsay that failed the threshold test for expert evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no statutory basis in the Juries Act to exclude such jurors or permit a broad challenge for cause, and no evidence of widespread bias to justify striking the jury notice.

The defendant brought a motion for the production of numerous documents following a further examination for discovery of the plaintiff's representative.

The defendant sought documents that were not considered by the plaintiff's damages expert in preparing his report, arguing they were relevant to the calculation of damages and mitigation.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that documents not forming the foundational information used by the expert cannot be ordered produced under Rule 31.06(3).

Furthermore, the court found the requested disclosure to be entirely disproportionate under Rule 29.2.03 given the late stage of the proceeding and the volume of irrelevant documentation sought.

The plaintiff brought a motion to restore two motor vehicle accident actions to the trial list after they were dismissed by the trial judge for failure to comply with trial management orders.

The Court of Appeal had referred the matters back for reconsideration on a more fulsome record.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion and both actions, finding that the plaintiff remained in intentional breach of previous trial management orders, failed to provide new medical evidence, offered no acceptable explanation for the extraordinary delay (over 15 years for the first action), and failed to demonstrate that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application, the respondents sought costs.

One respondent settled their costs claim, while the other, represented by pro bono counsel, sought substantial indemnity costs due to the applicants' conduct.

The court held that pro bono representation does not preclude a costs award and that ordinary costs rules apply.

The court found the applicants' conduct expanded the litigation but did not rise to the level of reprehensible conduct required for substantial indemnity.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the pro bono respondent in the amount of $84,836.79.

During a case conference regarding an application to sell a house, the court determined that the parties' mother appeared to have an interest in the property.

Given an Enduring Power of Attorney that only takes effect upon incapacity, the court ordered a capacity assessment of the mother under s. 9(3) of the Substitute Decisions Act to determine if she is capable of managing her property and whether a litigation guardian needs to be appointed.

The plaintiffs brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction to register a charge against the defendant's property.

The defendant had anticipatorily breached an agreement of purchase and sale for the plaintiffs' residential property.

The court found the plaintiffs established a strong prima facie case and met the five-part test for a Mareva injunction, noting the defendant had taken her property off the market and was travelling to India with no return date.

The motion was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for approval of the settlement of tort and statutory accident benefit claims on behalf of two minor plaintiffs injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The court reviewed the contingency fee agreement and found it fair in form, but reduced the solicitor's fees on the accident benefits claim from 20% to 15%, noting the distinction between tort litigation and processing accident benefits.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's proposed structured settlement format, instead approving the structure recommended by the Office of the Children's Lawyer, which maximized the funds and included indexation to protect against inflation.

The settlement for the other minor plaintiff was approved as proposed.