C. McGoogan

The defendants moved to stay the plaintiff's action under s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, arguing the dispute over a promissory note was subject to an arbitration clause in a related Master Cannabis Agreement.

The plaintiff argued the promissory note was a standalone agreement not subject to arbitration.

The court found the agreements were inextricably intertwined and the dispute fell within the broad scope of the arbitration clause.

Finding no exceptions under s. 7(2) applied, the court granted the motion and stayed the action.

The defendant moved to strike a new action for unjust enrichment as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiff should have sought leave to add her to an existing related action.

The plaintiff cross-moved to consolidate the actions.

The defendant also moved to stay the action or strike the plaintiff's affidavit because the plaintiff spoke to his counsel during a break in a virtual cross-examination.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the new action was not an abuse of process as it involved a new party.

The court allowed the consolidation motion.

While the court found a breach of cross-examination rules occurred during the virtual break, it held that staying the action or striking the affidavit was a disproportionate remedy given the innocuous nature of the discussion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's Statement of Defence without leave to amend and for default judgment.

The defendant admitted to misappropriating funds but claimed her actions were caused by mental distress resulting from the plaintiff's demands that she assist in fraudulent acts.

The court found it was not plain and obvious that the defence could not succeed, but held that the particulars improperly focused on the plaintiff's alleged illegal acts rather than the acts causing the defendant's stress.

The court struck paragraphs 6 to 14 of the Statement of Defence with leave to amend.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' negligence claim for mental distress arising from the death of a family member in a helicopter crash.

The defendants argued that common law precludes recovery for mental distress resulting from the negligently caused death of a human being unless the plaintiffs witnessed the accident or its aftermath.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Saadati v. Moorhead, the court found that geographic, temporal, and relational proximity restrictions are not absolute bars to recovery.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding it was not plain and obvious that the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' 70-page Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs' action alleged misfeasance in public office and Charter breaches arising from a withdrawn child protection proceeding.

The Master found she had jurisdiction to hear the motion and concluded that the pleading was overly prolix, contained evidence, argument, and immaterial facts, and violated the rules of pleading.

The motion was granted, striking numerous paragraphs with leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.