J. Adair

The defendant moved to strike a new action for unjust enrichment as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiff should have sought leave to add her to an existing related action.

The plaintiff cross-moved to consolidate the actions.

The defendant also moved to stay the action or strike the plaintiff's affidavit because the plaintiff spoke to his counsel during a break in a virtual cross-examination.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the new action was not an abuse of process as it involved a new party.

The court allowed the consolidation motion.

While the court found a breach of cross-examination rules occurred during the virtual break, it held that staying the action or striking the affidavit was a disproportionate remedy given the innocuous nature of the discussion.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking the recusal of the case management judge, alleging bias.

The judge had previously found the father engaged in severe parental alienation and ordered reintegration therapy, which the father repeatedly delayed and undermined.

Following a Divisional Court ruling that stayed other contested motions pending the recusal motion, the judge voluntarily withdrew from the case.

The judge issued a lengthy endorsement detailing the father's history of alienation, deception, and manipulation, explaining that his withdrawal was necessary to prevent the father from using the recusal motion to further delay proceedings and harm the children.

Following a successful summary judgment motion by the defendant dismissing claims against it, the court determined the appropriate costs awards relating to both the summary judgment motion and an earlier procedural motion for directions under rule 34.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the plaintiffs were successful on the earlier procedural motion and awarded them partial indemnity costs of $10,000.

However, the defendant was entirely successful on the summary judgment motion and was entitled to partial indemnity costs.

After considering proportionality, reasonableness, and the complexity of the litigation, the court reduced the defendant’s claimed fees and fixed total costs for the summary judgment motion at $129,153.32.

After setting off the $10,000 owed to the plaintiffs for the procedural motion, the court ordered two plaintiffs to pay the defendant $119,153.32 in costs.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant art gallery for damages to a plaster sculpture allegedly attributed to Auguste Rodin, which was loaned to the gallery for a failed 'art flip' tax scheme.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred and for judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid storage fees.

The court found that the plaintiffs' agents knew of the damage more than two years before the action was commenced, and this knowledge was imputed to the plaintiffs.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred and awarding the defendant $8,522.55 on its counterclaim for storage costs.

The Attorney General of Canada moved to vary a Mareva injunction obtained by victims of terrorism seeking to enforce a U.S. judgment against Iran.

The motion concerned whether Iranian diplomatic property in Canada could remain subject to the injunction.

The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to make full and frank disclosure when obtaining the original ex parte orders, including failing to disclose unsuccessful attempts to attach similar Iranian diplomatic property in the United States and mischaracterizing relevant Canadian authority concerning the Vienna Convention and Crown prerogative.

Given the material nondisclosure and the principles of diplomatic immunity under the State Immunity Act and Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, the court varied the Mareva order to exclude assets certified by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as diplomatic property.

The plaintiffs brought an ex parte motion seeking confirmation that certain bank accounts identified by the federal government as assets of a foreign state fell within the scope of an existing Mareva injunction issued in an action to recognize and enforce a U.S. terrorism judgment.

Relying on information provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs pursuant to s. 12.1 of the State Immunity Act, the plaintiffs argued that the accounts constituted assets of the defendants in Canada and should therefore be frozen under the existing order.

The court held that the plaintiffs had established a strong arguable case that the identified accounts were subject to the Mareva order and confirmed that the injunction applied to those accounts.

However, broader disclosure of full banking records was limited to situations where the accounts were held directly by entities already named in the injunction, with further directions reserved for later proceedings.

Investor plaintiffs alleged fraud, knowing receipt, and unjust enrichment against the principal of an investment company and related parties following the company’s bankruptcy.

They brought a motion seeking ex parte Mareva injunctions and, alternatively, Norwich orders against financial institutions holding accounts of the defendants.

The court held that ex parte relief requires strict full and frank disclosure and evidence of extraordinary urgency.

Because the motion record contained inaccuracies regarding the state of the pleadings and omitted a filed statement of defence, and because the defendants had long been aware of the litigation and potential asset-freezing relief, the plaintiffs failed to justify proceeding without notice.

The court therefore declined to hear the motion ex parte and required that notice be given to the responding parties.