SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

COMMERCIAL LIST

RE: Estate of Marla Bennett, Michael Bennett, Linda Bennett and Lisa Bennett, Plaintiffs

AND:

Islamic Republic of Iran and Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, Defendants

BEFORE: D. M. Brown J.

COUNSEL:
J. Dais-Visca, for the moving party, the intervenor, Attorney General of Canada

J. Adair and G. McGuire, for the Plaintiffs

No one appearing for the defendants who have been noted in default

M. Arnold, for the plaintiffs in the Jacobsen v. Iran action, CV-12-464847

HEARD: October 31, 2013

REASONS FOR DECISION

I. Motion to set aside that part of a Mareva injunction affecting the diplomatic assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran

[1] The Attorney General of Canada moved to set aside that part of a Mareva injunction made by E. MacDonald J. on October 31, 2012 in this action which affected diplomatic assets of the defendant, the Islamic Republic of Iran, located in Canada.

[2] For the reasons set out below, I grant the motion.

II. Background to the motion

[3] Allen J., in her October 17, 2013 Reasons granting an ex parte Mareva order, described the nature of this proceeding:

The Plaintiffs brought a claim against the Defendants in an action commenced in the United States for damages for wrongful death (“the U.S. Action”). Ms. Bennett, a U.S. citizen at the time, was killed as a result of a terror attack bombing by Hamas at the Hebrew University while she was a student there. In the U.S. the Plaintiffs alleged damages against the Defendants for Ms. Bennett’s death on the grounds the Defendants provided material support to Hamas, the organization responsible for the bombing.

On a standard of “clear and convincing evidence”, the Plaintiffs proved their claim to the satisfaction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (“the U.S. Court”). The U.S. Court found that Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) provided persistent support to Hamas. Judgment was ordered on August 30, 2007 in favour of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $12,904,548 (USD) (“the U.S. Judgment”) [Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran 507 F.Supp.2d 117 (2007)]. The U.S. Judgment is final and binding in respect of the U.S. Court. Problems arose in the Plaintiffs’ attempts to enforce the U.S. Judgment against Iranian assets in the U.S.[^1]

[4] On September 7, 2012, the federal Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act came into force.[^2] As expressed in section 3 of the JVTA:

3. The purpose of this Act is to deter terrorism by establishing a cause of action that allows victims of terrorism to sue perpetrators of terrorism and their supporters.

Section 4(5) of the JVTA provides:

4. (5) A court of competent jurisdiction must recognize a judgment of a foreign court that, in addition to meeting the criteria under Canadian law for being recognized in Canada, is in favour of a person that has suffered loss or damage referred to in subsection (1). However, if the judgment is against a foreign state, that state must be set out on the list referred to in subsection 6.1(2) of the State Immunity Act for the judgment to be recognized.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the states set out on that list.[^3]

[5] The Plaintiffs commenced this action on September 13, 2012. Allen J. granted the plaintiffs’ motion for an ex parte Mareva injunction on October 17, 2012. As I wrote in previous reasons:

The background to this action, which seeks the recognition and enforcement of an August 30, 2007 judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia made pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7), for damages caused by a terrorist bombing, was set out fully by Allen J. in her reasons of October 17, 2012 granting the initial Mareva injunction: 2012 ONSC 5886, 2012 ONSC 5886. That order was extended once on an ex parte basis, but then extended indefinitely by E. MacDonald J. by order dated October 31, 2012 (the “Mareva Order”), which was made on notice to the defendants. The defendants did not respond to that motion. Nor have the defendants filed a defence to this action. As a result, they have been noted in default and a motion for default judgment will be heard at the end of this month.

Paragraph 1 of the Mareva Order prohibits and enjoins the defendants and others (the “Subject Parties”), from directly or indirectly:

1. (a) selling, removing, dissipating, alienating, transferring, assigning, encumbering or similarly dealing with any of their assets located in Canada (the “Subject Assets”), including but not limited to the assets listed in Schedule “A” hereto;

(b) instructing, requesting, counseling, demanding or encouraging any other person to do so; and,

(c) facilitating, assisting in, aiding, abetting, or participating in any of the acts the effect of which is to do so.

Schedule “A” to the Mareva Order identified four properties, but Paragraph 2 of the Mareva Order showed the breadth of the order:

That paragraph 1 applies to all of the Subject Parties’ assets whether or not they are in their own names and whether they are solely or jointly owned. For the purposes of this Order, the Subject Parties’ assets include any asset which they have the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were their own. The Subject Parties are to be regarded as having such power if a third party holds or controls the assets in accordance with their direct or indirect instructions coming from the defendants, or any of them.[^4]

[6] Two of the properties identified in the October 31, 2012 Mareva Order were 245 Metcalfe St. and 524 Acacia Avenue, Ottawa.

[7] On February 1, 2013, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade issued a certificate under sections 11 (a) and (e) of Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (“FMIOA”)[^5] certifying that a diplomatic mission of Iran “continued to exist…with the consent of the Government of Canada”, the premises of which were located at 245 Metcalfe St. and 524 Acacia Avenue, Ottawa, and that a property at Unit 1202, 570 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa also was diplomatic property. An amended certificate was issued on August 15, 2013 expanding the designated diplomatic property to include two named bank accounts. Section of the FMIOA states, in part:

11. A certificate purporting to be issued by or under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and containing any statement of fact relevant to any of the following questions shall be received in evidence in any action or proceeding as proof of the fact stated in the certificate without proof of the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate:

(a) whether a diplomatic mission, a consular post or an office of a political subdivision of a foreign state has been established with the consent of the Government of Canada;

(e) whether any person, diplomatic mission, consular post, office of a political subdivision of a foreign state, international organization or accredited mission has privileges, immunities or benefits under this Act.

[8] By letter dated February 6, 2013, counsel for the AG Canada sent the Certificate to plaintiffs’ counsel and requested the plaintiffs to move to vary the Mareva Order by removing the designated diplomatic properties from the list of restrained assets.

[9] By order made April 12, 2013 Moore J. granted the AG Canada leave to intervene in this action to make submissions, inter alia, on whether “diplomatic property of the Islamic Republic of Iran as set out in any Certificate issued by or under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs pursuant to section 11 of the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act is available to execution creditors” (the “Intervention Order”).

[10] By letter dated September 4, 2013 to plaintiffs’ counsel, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada disclosed a list identifying Iranian non-diplomatic and diplomatic assets in Canada while, at the same time, advising that “consistent with article 45 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and customary international law, diplomatic properties are protected and are immune from attachment”.

III. The argument advanced by the AG Canada

[11] The AG Canada seeks to vary the Mareva Order to set aside those portions that affect assets which the Government of Canada has certified as the diplomatic property of Iran. The main argument advanced by the AG Canada was that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts on the motions which resulted in the orders of Allen J. and the later Mareva Order.

[12] Although the AG Canada did not file a formal notice of motion seeking that relief, the plaintiffs acknowledged both that the AG Canada had standing to seek such relief by reason of the Intervention Order and that the request to set aside part of the Mareva Order properly was before this Court notwithstanding the absence of a notice of motion.

[13] Although the plaintiffs did not make a substantive objection to the lack of a formal notice of motion, the AG Canada should have filed such a notice. I say that because its argument shifted from the time of its initial factum (September 26) to that of its final reply factum (October 28). Specifically, over the span of its several factums the AG Canada expanded the number of material facts in respect of which it alleged the plaintiff had failed to make full and frank disclosure. Although the plaintiffs were able to respond to that expanded argument, in fairness the AG Canada should have filed a notice of motion which clearly set out the allegations it was making. While the failure to do so will not affect my determination of the substantive issues, it will affect the issue of costs.

[14] At the hearing the AG Canada contended that the plaintiffs had failed to put before Allen J. and E. MacDonald J. the following material information:

(i) The fact that after obtaining the 2007 U.S. Judgment the plaintiffs had obtained writs of attachment against five of Iran’s former diplomatic properties in Washington, D.C., but those writs had been quashed by the U.S. District Court, a decision affirmed on appeal in 2010 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit;[^6]

(ii) The reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal in its 2003 decision in Copello v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs)[^7] was not explained fully to the motions judges. If it had been, argued the AG Canada, the judges would have understood that notwithstanding the failure of section 3(1) of the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act to declare that Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations had “the force of law in Canada in respect of all foreign states”, the issue of the availability of diplomatic property for attachment under domestic law when Canada had suspended relations with a foreign state remained “in the sphere of the Crown prerogative in the conduct of foreign affairs by Canada and immune from judicial review”; and,

(iii) The fact of the subsequent issuance of the Certificate issued under the FMIOA identifying properties in Ottawa as diplomatic property.

[15] Before considering these allegations, let me first turn to the applicable law.

IV. The governing legal principles

[16] The basic obligation of full and frank disclosure on a motion without notice was articulated by the Court of Appeal in Chitel v. Rothbart:

There is no necessity for citation of any authority to state the obvious that the plaintiff must, in securing ex parte interim injunction, make full and frank disclosure of the relevant facts, including facts which may explain the defendant's position if known to the plaintiff. If there is less than this full and accurate disclosure in a material way or if there is a misleading of the court on material facts in the original application, the court will not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff and continue the injunction.[^8]

[17] That principle finds expression in Rule 39.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:

Where a motion or application is made without notice, the moving party shall make full and fair disclosure of all material facts, and failure to do so is in itself sufficient ground for setting aside any order obtained on the motion or application.

[18] Master Egan, in Euro United Corp. (Interim Receiver of) v. Rehani,[^9] discussed in detail the application of those general principles to the practical preparation and argument of ex parte motions. Let me summarize that discussion:

(i) Material facts are those of which the court must be made aware in arriving at a decision, non-disclosure of which may have affected the court’s approach to the motion, made the decision doubtful, or affected the outcome of the motion;

(ii) This duty of a balanced presentation of facts and law extends not only to absent parties, but also to those who may be affected by the order;

(iii) In making full and frank disclosure of the relevant facts, the plaintiff must include facts which may explain the defendant's position, if known to the plaintiff. The onus on the plaintiff to make full and complete disclosure is not discharged by disclosing only what is the most limited basis of information that may be relevant. Full disclosure may and often will require a plaintiff to advise the court of matters of both fact and of law which form the position of the other side;

(iv) It is insufficient for a plaintiff to simply append a document as an exhibit without highlighting in the body of the affidavit itself any important clauses or portions of the exhibits;

(v) The test of materiality is an objective one. In the United States of America v. Friedland[^10] the court quoted the following passage from the English text, Gee, Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller Relief (3d Edition 1995 at p. 97):

... The duty extends to placing before the court all matters which are relevant to the court's assessment of the application, and it is no answer to a complaint of non-disclosure that if the relevant matters had been placed before the court, the decision would have been the same. The test as to materiality is an objective one, and it is not for the applicant or his advisers to decide the question; hence it is no excuse for the applicant subsequently to say that he was genuinely unaware, or did not believe, that the facts were relevant or important. All matters which are relevant to the 'weighing operation' that the court has to make in deciding whether or not to grant the order must be disclosed.

(vi) If a finding is made of material misrepresentation or material non-disclosure the court is not stripped of all of its discretion but, generally speaking, the ex parte order will be set aside.

V. Analysis

A. Did the obligation to make full and frank disclosure which applies to ex parte motions arise on the motion of October 31, 2012?

[19] The plaintiff’s initial motion for a Mareva order was made without notice. As a result, Allen J. provided that her order of October 11, 2012 only ran for 10 days. In her October 17, 2012 Reasons, Allen J. acknowledged that the plaintiff had raised some “special considerations” which arguably could render the diplomatic property at 245 Metcalf Street immune from attachment, but concluded that the plaintiffs had presented “a strong prima facie case that the enforcement of the U.S. Judgment against 245 Metcalfe Street may not be precluded by the Vienna Conventions. That asset could therefore be an asset against which enforcement might potentially be effected.”

[20] On October 18, 2012, the plaintiff attended before Lederman J. to seek an extension of the initial Mareva. That continuation motion was made without notice. Lederman J. extended the Mareva injunction for an additional 10 days. In his endorsement Lederman J. wrote:

I am satisfied that a) the Plaintiffs have made out a strong prima facie case on the merits and have a good arguable case that the Embassy property and the former residence of the Iranian Ambassador are available for execution even after Canadian/Iran relations have been severed…

Lederman J. set a date for the hearing of “the plaintiff’s motion, on notice, to continue the injunctive relief granted by the October 11, 2012 Order and this Order…” and directed that Iran be given notice of the continuation motion by the procedure specified by section 9(2) of the State Immunity Act and by delivering the materials to a Toronto counsel who previously had acted for Iran in a 2010 proceeding involving the Steen Estate.

[21] On October 31, 2012, the matter came back before the Court. No one appeared on behalf of the defendants. E. MacDonald J. granted a further Mareva Order, the main terms of which I set out above. In support of that order E. MacDonald J. wrote the following endorsement:

Order to go in the form signed by me today. The court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have made reasonable efforts to notify or serve the parties affected by this Order. This order is appropriate given the previous orders of Justices Lederman and Allen, and their reasons for making their orders.

[22] Although a form of notice had been given to Iran of the motion returnable before E. MacDonald J., I conclude that on the return of that motion the moving party plaintiffs were obliged to make full and frank disclosure of all materials facts to the motion judge of the same kind and degree as they would have been obliged to make under the jurisprudence concerning ex parte motions.

[23] The identity of the responding party – a foreign state – drives that conclusion. In an ordinary commercial case where a court grants an ex parte Mareva and notice has been given to the responding party of the continuation hearing, yet the party fails to appear at the hearing, a court usually takes the view that the ex parte full and frank disclosure standard no longer applies. That conclusion flows from the following line of reasoning: since the responding party has had the opportunity to review the motion materials, but has elected not to attend, then the court reasonably can infer that the fact of non-attendance signals that the evidence filed on the ex parte motion can be treated as accurate and reliable. If that evidence had omitted or mis-stated material facts, the court would expect the responding party to attend at the continuation hearing and draw the omission or mis-statement to the attention of the court.

[24] When one moves into the world of litigation against foreign states, that line of reasoning is not open to a court. Section 3 of the State Immunity Act provides:

3(1) Except as provided by this Act, a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of any court in Canada.

(2) In any proceedings before a court, the court shall give effect to the immunity conferred on a foreign state by subsection (1) notwithstanding that the state has failed to take any step in the proceedings.

[25] Given that a court must give effect to any immunity conferred by the SIA on a foreign state, even if “the state has failed to take any step in the proceedings”, then if a foreign state fails to attend at the hearing of a motion, the court must consider whether any recognized immunity would prevent it from issuing the order sought against the foreign state. Since Canadian courts operate on the principle that under an adversarial system it is the obligation of the parties to bring to the court’s attention all material facts, it follows, in my view, that when an order is sought by a party against a foreign state, but the foreign state fails to attend at the court hearing, the party seeking the order must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to the court to the same extent as the party would be required to do on an ex parte motion before the court. Put another way, the effect of SIA s. 3(2) is to place an obligation of full and frank disclosure on a party seeking an order against a foreign state where the state does not appear at the hearing, even if notice has been given to the state. The obligation to make full and frank disclosure of all materials facts results from the importance accorded by our system of law to the principle of state immunity.

[26] As can be seen from the endorsements of each of three judges who granted or continued a Mareva order, in discharging their duties under SIA s. 3(2) they relied only on the plaintiffs’ evidence and submissions; they could look to no other party for assistance in determining the issues before them. The initial Mareva order granted by Allen J. was an ex parte one, and she gave extensive reasons. Lederman J. relied primarily “on the evidence before Allen J.” in making his continuation order. In turn, E. MacDonald J. made clear her reliance on the reasoning of the two judges who had presided at ex parte hearings in granting her order: “This order is appropriate given the previous orders of Justices Lederman and Allen and their reasons for making their orders”.

[27] The question then becomes, did the plaintiffs make full and frank disclosure of all material facts on the motion before E. MacDonald J. which resulted in the making of the Mareva Order which currently is in force?

B. Did the plaintiffs fail to make full and frank disclosure of material facts on the motion which resulted in the granting of the Mareva Order?

[28] Let me deal first with the third argument advanced by the AG Canada, which was that once the plaintiffs became aware of the February, 2013 Certificate issued under the FMIOA designating properties as diplomatic property, they were under an obligation to go back to Court and draw that information to the Court’s attention. I do not regard that argument as a strong one. First, the reasons of Allen J. indicated that she proceeded on the basis that some of the assets of Iran which might be caught by a Mareva order might be diplomatic property, and she made specific reference to the Iranian Embassy at 245 Metcalfe Street. So, the plaintiffs fairly drew to the court’s attention the prospect that the injunction sought could well capture diplomatic property. Second, once the AG Canada moved for intervenor status, which was not long after the issuance of the Certificate, the plaintiffs co-operated in putting in place a process in which the AG Canada could advance its argument that the scope of the Mareva Order should be reduced. In so doing the plaintiffs acted quite properly.

[29] That brings me back, then, to the first and second grounds advanced by the AG Canada – i.e. the plaintiffs failed to disclose to the Ontario court their failed effort to attach Iranian diplomatic property in the United States and failed to explain fully the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal in the Copello case.

[30] None of the three affidavits which were before Allen J. or Lederman J. disclosed the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful efforts or the U.S. Court of Appeals decision, nor did an additional affidavit from a U.S. national security expert which was placed before E. MacDonald J., together with the others. Included in the first set of affidavits was one from a U.S. attorney, Thomas Fay, who had acted for the Bennetts in their U.S. action. In his affidavit Mr. Fay spent some time describing the history of the Bennetts’ U.S. action. Although in his description of another U.S. suit in which he had been involved Mr. Fay disclosed that a writ of attachment issued against Iran had been quashed, in respect of the Bennett action he simply deposed: “I further confirm that the plaintiffs have not been able to enforce the U.S. Judgment against Iranian assets in the United States.” In the reported decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Bennett action, Mr. Fay was listed as one of their counsel of record.

[31] At the hearing before me plaintiffs’ counsel candidly acknowledged that the plaintiffs did not disclose to Allen J., Lederman J. or E. MacDonald J. their unsuccessful efforts to attach Iranian diplomatic property in the United States or the U.S. Court of Appeals decision. Plaintiffs’ counsel contended that the U.S. case had been decided under a different legislative regime and counsel had concluded the decision was not material to the proceedings before the Ontario courts to obtain a Mareva injunction. I accept that plaintiffs’ counsel made that decision in good faith.

[32] Nevertheless, for the reasons set out below, I conclude that the decision not to disclose the information about the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful efforts in the U.S. to attach Iranian diplomatic property resulted in the plaintiffs failing to make full and frank disclosure of a very material fact to the judges who granted the Mareva orders. Let me explain why.

[33] Simply put, had the plaintiffs disclosed that information to any of the judges who made the initial, continuing or final Mareva Orders, no doubt a conversation along the following lines would have taken place:

The Court: Counsel, I see from your materials that about two years ago your clients sought to enforce the U.S. Judgment in the States. They issued writs of attachment against Iranian diplomatic property in D.C., but the U.S. District and Appeals Court quashed those writs. Is that correct?

Counsel: Yes.

The Court: Well, if the U.S. courts quashed your clients’ attempt to attach Iranian diplomatic property down there, and given the provisions about diplomatic property in the Vienna Convention to which Canada is also a party, how is it that Iranian diplomatic property in Canada would be available for attachment? Wouldn’t diplomatic property here receive the same protection as in the States?

Counsel: Your Honour, there are important differences between the legal treatment of diplomatic property in the States and in Canada which would give rise to a different result here.

The Court: Please demonstrate to me why that would be the case.

And the conversation would go on from there.

[34] None of the judges from whom a Mareva order was requested had the opportunity to pose that question or to engage in that conversation because the plaintiffs did not disclose the existence of their unsuccessful attempts to attach Iranian diplomatic property in the United States.

[35] Had disclosure of the U.S. Court of Appeals decision been made, how would that conversation likely have gone? Well, from the materials filed, I expect it would have been along the following lines. Both Canada and the United States share a common starting point on the treatment of the diplomatic property of foreign states in each country – the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article 22 of the Convention provides that “the premises of the mission shall be inviolable”, and there is no dispute that inviolability means, in part, that the host state cannot exercise law enforcement rights against diplomatic premises. However, if diplomatic relations are broken off between two states or if a mission is permanently or temporarily recalled, then one moves to Article 45 of the Convention which states that “the receiving State must…respect and protect the premises of the mission…”

[36] On September 7, 2012, Canada suspended its relations with Iran and gave Iranian diplomats five days to leave Canada. The United States had cut diplomatic ties with Iran in 1980 following the take-over of the American Embassy in Tehran.

[37] From the common starting point of the Vienna Convention, Canada and the United States have established legislative regimes to deal with issues concerning diplomatic property. As set out in the 2010 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in the plaintiffs’ case, U.S. federal statute establishes the general principle that diplomatic properties are immune from attachment, and the Foreign Missions Act authorizes the Secretary of State to protect and preserve the property of a foreign mission that has ceased conducting diplomatic activities in the United States. However, the federal Terrorism Risk Insurance Act carves out an exception to the principle of immunity from attachment, authorizing the attachment of “blocked assets” of state sponsors of terrorism to satisfy judgments for compensatory damages for acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, “blocked assets” do not include “property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations” that “is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes”. In the plaintiffs’ case, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that the five properties they had sought to attach had been held and used by the U.S. in fulfillment of its obligation under section 45 of the Vienna Convention to respect and protect the premises of a former mission and therefore did not constitute “blocked assets” available for attachment.

[38] In Canada, the legislative regime starts with the State Immunity Act, section 12(1) of which enacts the general principle that “property of a foreign state that is located in Canada is immune from attachment and execution”, but the section then goes on to create several exceptions to that principle. Section 12(1)(d) creates an exception to the general principle of immunity from attachment where:

(d) the foreign state is set out on the list referred to in subsection 6.1(2) and the attachment or execution relates to a judgment rendered in an action brought against it for its support of terrorism or its terrorist activity and to property other than property that has cultural or historical value.

[39] Does that mean where judgment is granted against a state supporter of terrorism, such as Iran, “in an action brought against it for its support of terrorism”, diplomatic property then becomes available for attachment unless it has “cultural or historical value”? Section 16 of the SIA states:

16. If, in any proceeding or other matter to which a provision of this Act and a provision of the… the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act apply, there is a conflict between those provisions, the provision of this Act does not apply in the proceeding or other matter to the extent of the conflict.

Does the FMIOA contain a provision which applies and might be in conflict?

[40] Section 3(1) of the FMIOA provides that several articles of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations “have the force of law in Canada in respect of all foreign states, regardless of whether those states are parties to those Conventions”. Article 22 of the Vienna Convention is mentioned in FMIOA s. 3(1); Article 45 is not. So, does that mean, as the plaintiffs contended before me, and obviously contended before Allen J. for her reasons so disclose, that since Article 45 is not mentioned, then upon the suspension of diplomatic relations the diplomatic property of a foreign state no longer is “inviolable”, but becomes subject to attachment to satisfy a judgment of a Canadian court? Allen J. accepted that argument advanced by the plaintiffs:

[48] The Plaintiffs submit the omission from s. 3(1) of the FMIO Act of Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Articles 27 and 31 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations expresses Parliament’s intent that thos