Claude-Alain Burdet

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim (the Burdet Group) brought a motion for a timetable order to schedule a trial for their counterclaim and for an order to recalculate past arrears.

The plaintiff/defendant by counterclaim (CCC396) brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The court granted the cross-motion, ordering the Burdet Group to post $836,415 in security for costs due to multiple unpaid costs awards and a history of vexatious litigation.

The Burdet Group's motions were dismissed, with the timetable request deemed premature until security is posted.

John Przybytek, having successfully obtained an order to discharge an invalid and unconscionable mortgage, sought substantial indemnity costs against 3002071 Canada Inc., 1457563 Ontario Inc., and lawyer Claude-Alain Burdet personally.

The court awarded costs against 3002071 Canada Inc. only, on a substantial indemnity basis, for fees and disbursements incurred up to March 11, 2019, totaling $16,570.00.

The request for costs against Mr. Burdet personally was denied, as the court found that the applicant's own counsel's firm had engaged in similar problematic conduct regarding a second mortgage, creating an ironic basis for the argument.

Following a successful application to discharge a mortgage, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, including a request for costs against the respondent's lawyer personally under Rule 57.07(1).

The court noted that the respondent's lawyer had not been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations as required by Rule 57.07(3).

The court issued directions giving the applicant the option to withdraw the request or confirm it, in which case the respondent's lawyer would be given an opportunity to request a hearing and retain counsel.

The applicant sought to discharge a $50,000 mortgage registered against his property by the respondent.

The respondent, operated by the son of the applicant's former lawyer, brought a counter-application seeking repayment of various loans.

The court declined to join the proceedings, finding the counter-application required a trial.

On the main application, the court found the mortgage was invalid and unconscionable because there was no contract for debt, the applicant was unaware of the mortgage, and there was an undisclosed relationship between the applicant's lawyer and the lender.

The mortgage was ordered discharged and the counter-application was converted into a separate action.

This endorsement addresses procedural issues arising from a "counter-application" filed by the respondent and a joint applicant.

The court clarified that "counter-applications" do not exist under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but treated the filing as an irregularity in commencing a new application.

The hearing was adjourned, and orders were made regarding the filing of cross-examination transcripts, confirmation forms, and crucially, that the "counter-application" would not be heard unless the applicant's sister, Helen Butt, was properly served due to her potential interest in the relief sought.

The appellants were found liable for condominium arrears following a trial.

Their appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful, as was their subsequent motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellants then brought a motion in the Superior Court under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside the judgment and obtain judgment in their favour.

The motion judge dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.02(1), fixing costs at $500.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the Rule 59.06(2) motion to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellants sought relief that exceeded what was permissible on such a motion, and the set-off issue argument they raised had already been made at trial.

This appeal concerns the management of Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 396 following a 35-day trial.

The trial judge found that the director engaged in oppressive conduct including self-dealing, lack of financial disclosure, charging personal legal fees to the corporation, failing to declare conflicts, refusing to produce court-ordered records, and implementing an invalid by-law.

The trial judge ordered termination of the condominium corporation, declared the director's oppressive conduct, held the director personally liable for costs, and awarded common expense arrears to the corporation.

The appellants challenged the oppression finding, personal liability, and termination order.

The respondents cross-appealed the timing of arrears payment and the cost award against them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upheld the oppression finding and termination order, confirmed personal liability for the director, and modified the cost award.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a 2014 trial judgment regarding unpaid condominium fees, relying on an affidavit they claimed contained new facts.

The court found the motion to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 21.02(1).

The court noted that the burden under Rule 59.06(2) is high and the defendants failed to present any facts that arose after the trial or could not have been reasonably discovered prior.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, Phillip Owen, withdrew his claim against the Estate of Barbara Owen and consented to judgment on the counterclaim.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs.

The defendants, including the Litigation Guardian and the Estate Trustee, sought full indemnity costs due to the plaintiff's vexatious conduct, including fraud and non-compliance with court orders.

The court found the defendants successful and awarded full indemnity costs, albeit reduced from the amounts claimed, to both the Litigation Guardian ($60,500) and the Estate Trustee ($30,000), payable by the plaintiff.

The minority unit owners of a commercial condominium brought an action against the majority unit owner, who also served as a director and officer, alleging oppressive conduct under s. 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The majority owner used his voting control to direct condominium contracts and payments to a related corporation, ETRE, without declaring his conflict of interest, and charged the condominium for personal litigation and construction costs.

The court found the majority owner's conduct to be oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, and in breach of his fiduciary duties.

Due to the structural fault in the condominium's voting rights and the ongoing deadlock, the court ordered the termination of the condominium corporation under s. 128 and appointed a receiver to sell the assets.

The court also resolved various financial claims, ordering the minority to pay common expense arrears while dismissing most of the majority owner's claims for penalty charges, promissory notes, and time charges.

The plaintiff condominium corporation brought an action against the defendant unit owners (the 'Majority') for unpaid condominium fees, special assessments, and a declaration of the validity of registered liens and notices of sale.

The defendants denied owing fees, claiming credits for water consumption and a right of setoff for promissory notes allegedly owed by the corporation.

The court rejected the defendants' claims for setoff and water credits, finding that the obligation to pay common expenses under section 84 of the Condominium Act is absolute and cannot be avoided due to claims against the corporation or other unit owners.

The court granted judgment for the plaintiff for the unpaid principal and compound interest, upheld the validity of the liens, but found some notices of sale invalid due to overstated arrears.

During a case conference concerning an anticipated motion for summary judgment, the moving parties had previously scheduled a hearing date but faced objections from the responding parties, who indicated they intended to bring cross-motions and anticipated a possible appeal.

At the conference convened to determine whether the motion would proceed, the moving parties advised the court that they would not proceed with the summary judgment motion in light of those objections.

The court also addressed trial management matters, confirming that the presiding judge for the conference was scheduled to act as the trial judge for the upcoming trial.

One responding party indicated it would seek instructions regarding that arrangement.

During a condominium dispute trial, the court issued a case conference endorsement seeking clarification on numerous factual and legal issues arising from the parties’ written submissions and evidentiary record.

The questions addressed matters including authority for condominium declaration amendments, evidence supporting alleged admissions regarding water consumption calculations, lien discharge obligations under the Condominium Act, and accounting calculations concerning arrears and credits among unit owners.

The court also requested clarification regarding voting eligibility, mortgage evidence, water meter installation evidence, and whether special assessments could be levied against select units.

The defendants’ counterclaim was scheduled to proceed to trial at a later date.

At a case conference prior to a scheduled civil trial, the court addressed whether issues relating to condominium fee arrears owed by certain unit owner plaintiffs to the condominium corporation would fall within the scope of the upcoming trial.

The pleadings raised the validity and amount of arrears, including fees, penalties, charges, and interest for a lengthy historical period.

The parties confirmed that the trial judge would have jurisdiction to determine the validity and quantum of any arrears and to award judgment in favour of the condominium corporation against the relevant unit owners.

No party opposed inclusion of these issues in the trial.

The court directed that the identified matters form part of the trial issues to be determined.

The plaintiffs in the Dewan Action brought a motion to adjourn their trial, scheduled for March 24, 2014, until after the completion of an ongoing trial in a related action (the CCC 396 Action).

The adjournment was requested because the plaintiffs intended to call an expert witness whose testimony in the CCC 396 Action had not yet been completed due to repeated delays caused by defence counsel's health issues.

The court granted the adjournment, noting that previous orders indicated the CCC 396 Action should be completed first, as its outcome would impact the Dewan Action.

The court also ordered that all summonses issued for the original trial date remain valid and subsequently set new trial dates for both actions during a case conference.

Decision on costs following a prior ruling that counsel for a closely held corporation must withdraw due to a conflict of interest in related family litigation between the corporation’s shareholders.

The moving party sought full indemnity costs and requested that opposing counsel personally bear responsibility for the costs arising from the conflict.

The court found that the majority shareholder abused his authority in directing the corporation’s actions and that the conflict issue had been raised earlier but ignored.

Although the court declined to award the full amount claimed, it held the majority shareholder personally responsible for the moving party’s costs.

The court also ordered the lawyer and law firm not to bill the corporation for work performed after the conflict was identified.

The moving party brought a motion in a family law proceeding seeking to add a closely held corporation as a respondent, amend the pleadings, ratify service on the corporation, and obtain related procedural relief.

The responding party opposed the addition of the corporation, arguing the corporate shares were excluded property under the Family Law Act and that the corporation had no legal interest in the litigation.

The court held that the alleged excluded property status had not yet been proven and that the corporation could be substantially affected by the final judgment.

The court therefore granted the motion to add the corporation and to amend the pleadings, ratified service, and refused the responding party’s request to adjourn and proceed with a child support motion due to delays and failure to provide financial disclosure.

In a family law proceeding concerning equalization of net family property, the moving party sought to add a family farm corporation as a party and requested an order disqualifying the respondent’s lawyer from acting for the corporation due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The court considered whether the lawyer could represent both the corporation and the majority shareholder in circumstances where the minority shareholder alleged misconduct and oppression.

Evidence showed the lawyer had arranged a loan to the corporation through a company whose directors were members of his family.

Applying principles governing solicitor loyalty and conflicts of interest, the court held that a lawyer cannot simultaneously represent a corporation and its majority shareholder where allegations of misconduct by that shareholder are at issue.

The court found both a real and apparent conflict and ordered the lawyer and his firm to cease acting for the corporation.

The plaintiffs and the court-appointed Administrator brought motions to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the action.

The defendant had obtained the dismissal order ex parte on December 31, 2012, relying on a prior endorsement that required the action to be set down by December 29, 2012.

However, the defendant failed to disclose to the Registrar that the court had subsequently extended the deadline to February 28, 2013.

The court found that the defendant's failure to disclose the extension constituted a material misstatement and that the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the action.

The dismissal order was set aside, and substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving parties.

The parties, brother and sister, disputed the ownership of a property previously owned by their late father.

The father had originally transferred the property into joint tenancy with the son.

Years later, the father unilaterally severed the joint tenancy and transferred his resulting one-half interest to the daughter.

The son sought to set aside the transfer, arguing it was procured by the daughter's undue influence and that the original joint tenancy was an irrevocable inter vivos gift.

The court dismissed the son's claims, finding that a joint tenancy can be unilaterally severed and that the father, while elderly, acted independently and was not under the daughter's dominating influence.

An accounting of the property's rental income and expenses was ordered.