Blair R.S.J.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Town Council resolution that required a property owner's consent as a pre-condition to any heritage designation under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The applicants, a group of parishioners, had requested the designation of a local church to prevent its demolition by the Diocese.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Town's resolution was patently unreasonable.

By imposing a condition not found in the Act, the Town fettered its own discretion and aborted the statutory decision-making process.

The moving party sought to set aside an order of a single judge refusing leave to appeal a substantial costs award made by the Ontario Municipal Board.

The moving party argued that the costs award penalized them for exercising their right to a hearing de novo.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the single judge did not decline jurisdiction or apply a wrong principle in refusing leave to appeal, but rather considered the argument on its merits and rejected it.

The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care sought judicial review of a decision by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Commissioner had ordered the Ministry to confirm or deny the existence of records relating to a settlement with an individual, interpreting s. 21(5) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as requiring a two-part test.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation was unreasonable and clearly wrong, as the plain language of s. 21(5) does not require the institution to prove that disclosing the mere existence of the record would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

The appellants appealed an order clarifying a previous judgment regarding interest payable to a dissenting shareholder under s. 185 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motion judge initially ordered interest 'in accordance with section 185' and later clarified that only postjudgment interest would be awarded from the date of judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge retained jurisdiction to specify both the rate and the time period for interest, and properly exercised his discretion.

The applicant, a former public service employee, sought judicial review of an order of the Crown Employees Grievance Settlement Board that incorporated a settlement reached between his union and his employer regarding his termination.

The applicant argued the termination was a nullity due to lack of delegated authority.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant lacked standing to pursue the judicial review, as only the union, as the bargaining agent, had the authority to process and settle the grievance under the collective agreement.

The defendants appealed a decision refusing to strike out paragraphs of a statement of claim in a proposed national class proceeding regarding the prescription drug Prepulsid.

The defendants argued the representative plaintiff, an Ontario resident, could not assert causes of action under the legislation of other provinces, such as subrogated health insurance claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Class Proceedings Act permits a representative plaintiff to advance claims on behalf of class members that the plaintiff might not have personally.

However, the court ordered the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim to explicitly plead the out-of-province statutes relied upon as material facts.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision reinstating an employee who was terminated for excessive innocent absenteeism under an attendance management system.

The arbitrator found that the termination violated the Human Rights Code because the absences relied upon included a compensable workplace injury, and the employer failed to show undue hardship in accommodating the employee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, upholding the arbitrator's decision and finding no error in the arbitrator's application of human rights principles regarding the duty to accommodate.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay $7,000 to the respondent.

The trial judge found that the respondent and the appellant Tony Chao had an oral agreement wherein Chao would hold $7,000 in trust for the respondent in a dormant corporate account.

The appellants argued that the respondent breached his fiduciary duties as an officer and lawyer for the corporation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample uncontradicted evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that this was a simple contract and no fiduciary duty was breached.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment to enforce a $50,000 penalty clause under minutes of settlement.

The respondent had defaulted on the final payment due to a dishonoured cheque caused by an administrative change, and a replacement cheque had a minor shortfall, both of which were corrected promptly.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's decision to exercise her discretion under Rule 49.09 to decline enforcement of the penalty clause, finding no palpable or overriding error.

The plaintiff sued the defendant doctor for sexual assault.

Criminal charges against the defendant were stayed, but during the criminal proceedings, the defendant received a Crown Disclosure Brief, which included a statement he made to police that was ruled inadmissible due to a s. 10(b) Charter violation.

In the civil action, the plaintiff sought production of the Crown Brief.

The Divisional Court held that while the existence of the Crown Brief must be disclosed, its contents should not be produced until the Attorney General and relevant police service are notified and either consent or a court orders production.

Furthermore, the defendant's Charter-infringing statement to police was protected from production in the civil proceeding.

The plaintiff brought a civil action for damages for sexual assault against the defendant, whose criminal charges for the same allegations were stayed.

The plaintiff sought production of the Crown Disclosure Brief from the criminal proceedings, which included a statement the defendant made to police that was ruled inadmissible in criminal court due to a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The Divisional Court held that while the existence of the Crown Brief must be disclosed, its contents should not be produced without a screening mechanism involving the Attorney General and police to protect public interest.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the defendant's Charter-infringing statement to police was protected from production in the civil proceeding.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments for a shopping mall for the 1996 and 1997 taxation years.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to use a recent arm's length sale price as the best evidence of market value, and by applying a 'current value' approach rather than a 'market value' approach.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's treatment of the recent sale was a question of mixed fact and law and thus not appealable.

However, the Court found the Board erred in law by applying a 'current value' (unencumbered fee simple) approach, which was introduced by 1997 amendments not applicable to the years in question.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for redetermination based on the correct 'market value' test.