Benjamin T. Glustein

The applicants sought an order for the assessment of legal bills rendered by the respondent law firm under the Solicitors Act, arguing that no final bill was delivered or, alternatively, that special circumstances existed.

The court found that all bills delivered prior to and including the last bill in October 2013 were interim bills, meaning no final bill was ever issued, thus permitting an assessment as of right.

The court further determined that even if a limitation period applied, numerous "special circumstances" existed, including the delivery of 39 bills over an eight-year retainer, involvement of 11 lawyers, billing for file reviews, lack of transparency regarding hourly rates, and internal firm pressure to bill for unnecessary work, which would justify an assessment.

The court rejected the respondent's preliminary objections regarding the applicant's affidavit and claims of bad faith based on animosity between counsel.

The applicants sought to transfer an appeal from the Mining and Lands Tribunal to the Superior Court of Justice under section 107 of the Mining Act.

The underlying appeal concerned the refusal of a permit by the Cataraqui Region Conservation Authority under the Conservation Authorities Act for a pool house.

The court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the original proceeding was not "under the Mining Act." Even if jurisdiction existed, the court would not have exercised its discretion to transfer, as the matter fell within the specialized expertise of the Tribunal and did not raise general legal principles outside its scope.

The court also rejected arguments regarding tribunal delay and the deteriorating condition of the structure, noting the applicants' own conduct in building without a permit.

The defendant, Michael R. Elliott, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff, Tahar Amrane's statement of claim without leave to amend, pursuant to Rules 21.01(1)(b), 21.01(3)(d), and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Elliott, as manager of the Law Society of Ontario's Compensation Fund, had confirmed the rejection of Amrane's claim for compensation.

Elliott argued that the action should be struck because he benefited from statutory immunity under section 9 of the Law Society Act, he owed no private law duty of care to Amrane as a claimant to the Fund, and the action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Fund's decision.

The court agreed with Elliott, finding that Amrane's allegations did not establish bad faith, no private law duty of care existed, and the action was an abuse of process.

The motion to strike was granted, and leave to amend was denied.

Costs were awarded to Elliott in the amount of $200.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for certification of a class action, approval of a $1 million settlement agreement, and approval of class counsel's fees and disbursements.

The action alleged misrepresentations in WesternOne Inc.'s public documents regarding a construction project.

The court granted the motion, certifying the action, approving the settlement as fair and reasonable given the litigation risks, and fixing class counsel's fees and disbursements.

The net settlement fund, after deductions, was directed to the Access to Justice Fund via a cy-près payment due to the impracticality and uneconomical nature of direct distribution to individual class members.

The purchaser, Salvatore Benedetto, failed to close an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for three properties, having paid a $100,000 deposit held by Re/Max.

Benedetto had signed the APS "In Trust For A Company to be Incorporated without any Personal liabilities," relying on s. 21(4) of the Business Corporations Act to argue the deposit should be returned.

The vendor, 2453912 Ontario Inc., moved for summary judgment, seeking forfeiture of the deposit.

The court ruled that s. 21(4) prevents personal liability for contractual obligations but does not prevent the forfeiture of a deposit, which serves as an earnest to secure performance.

The court granted the vendor's motion, ordering the deposit released to the vendor, and dismissed Benedetto's claim for its return.

The applicant condominium corporation sought a permanent injunction and a contempt order against the respondents for persistent harassment, abuse, and threatening conduct towards its personnel and other unit owners, in breach of three prior interim court orders.

The court dismissed the respondent's request for a third adjournment based on unsubstantiated medical claims and proceeded without responding evidence due to the respondent's failure to pay outstanding costs.

The court granted the permanent injunction, found the individual respondent in contempt, and ordered the respondents to sell their unit and vacate all premises within the commercial condominium, citing the severe and persistent nature of the misconduct.

This decision addresses a scheduling dispute in a proposed class action concerning the Bell Canada Pension Plan.

The defendants sought to have their motion to stay the class action, arguing that the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) was the preferable forum, heard before the certification motion.

The plaintiff opposed this, requesting both motions be heard concurrently.

The court, applying the Cannon factors and principles against litigation by installments, denied the defendants' request, directing that the stay motion be heard together with the certification motion, emphasizing that the preferability of jurisdiction is an issue best determined within the certification context.

The defendants brought a motion for a mistrial during trial, alleging prejudice from a newspaper article and improper conduct by plaintiffs' counsel.

The court dismissed the mistrial motion, finding no real danger of prejudice as no jurors had read the article, and that appropriate judicial instructions could cure any potential harm.

The court also ruled on the admissibility of the plaintiffs' expert evidence regarding dependency loss, specifically allowing a scenario based on career advancement despite some foundational facts not being fully proven, emphasizing that the weight, not admissibility, of expert testimony is affected by unproven facts.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs had sued the defendant, who was counsel for opposing parties in a prior action, alleging fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and obstruction of justice.

The court found that counsel owes no duty to an opposing party and that the factual basis for the claim, including allegations against judicial decisions and an "organized set up" with a judge, was legally unsustainable and frivolous.

The plaintiffs failed to deliver written submissions after being given notice under Rule 2.1.01(3).

This costs endorsement followed successful summary judgment motions by the Bachly Defendants, the Township of Oro-Medonte, and the third party W.R. Hodgson, dismissing the plaintiffs' grading claims and the Bachly Defendants' third-party claim against Hodgson.

The court assessed the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs sought by the successful parties against the plaintiffs.

It determined that the plaintiffs were liable for the costs of the Bachly Defendants and the Township, and also for the third party Hodgson's costs, applying principles that allow for third-party costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff when the third-party proceedings were a natural and inevitable consequence of the plaintiff's action.

The court fixed specific amounts for partial indemnity costs for each successful party.

The plaintiffs brought claims for lot grade deficiencies against the defendants (Bachly Investments Inc., 411931 Ontario Ltd. o/a Heights of Moonstone, The Township of Oro-Medonte) and a third party claim was brought by the Bachly Defendants against W.R. Hodgson.

The defendants and third party brought summary judgment motions to dismiss these claims, primarily arguing they were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and that there was no evidence of professional negligence against Hodgson.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiffs' grading claims were statute-barred as they knew or ought to have known of the issues by summer/fall 2010, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of standard of care or causation against Hodgson.

The court also found that a prior release only covered a specific driveway issue and not the broader grading claims.

The court determined ongoing and retroactive child and spousal support following an earlier judgment on property and income issues.

Key issues included the appropriate income for retroactive calculations, the duration and quantum of ongoing spousal support, and whether retroactive spousal support should be adjusted for tax consequences due to non-deductibility.

The court fixed ongoing spousal support at the lower end of the mid-range, ordered it indefinitely subject to review, and applied a 30% reduction to retroactive spousal support for non-deductibility.

The defendants, Ammar Khan and Brink's Canada Ltd., brought a motion for summary judgment in a motor vehicle negligence claim arising from an accident.

The plaintiff, Victola Mayers, alleged Khan was liable.

The court applied the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin and found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding Khan's liability.

The court rejected both the plaintiff's "advance green light" theory, which was contradicted by an independent witness, and the "contributory negligence" theory, finding no evidence that Khan had a reasonable opportunity to avoid the accident.

The motion was granted, and the action was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, Steven Bresnark, and the defendant, Thomson Reuters Canada Limited (TR), brought cross-motions for summary judgment in a libel and breach of privacy action concerning an article published by TR.

TR also sought to strike the privacy claim.

The court granted TR's motion for summary judgment and to strike the privacy claim, dismissing the action.

The court found the action statute-barred due to the plaintiff's awareness of the article in 2012, the article was protected by qualified privilege for fair and accurate reporting of judicial proceedings, and no common law or Charter privacy right was engaged.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The wife and her boyfriend brought a motion to remove the husband's lawyer due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The boyfriend had a brief consultation with the lawyer for his own matrimonial matter, and the husband's answer in the current litigation alleged an affair between the wife and boyfriend and extravagant spending.

The moving parties claimed the lawyer breached duties of confidence, loyalty, and candour, and faced a potential conflict in cross-examining the boyfriend as a witness.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no confidential information was disclosed, the relationship between the wife and boyfriend was not confidential, and the two matrimonial litigations were not sufficiently related to create a presumption of conflict.

The court also found no breach of a limited duty of loyalty or candour, and no impediment to cross-examination.

The applicant mother (L.L.) and respondent father (M.C.) each brought separate motions to vary final orders concerning custody, access, and child support for their son, J. M.C. sought equal access, while L.L. sought to restrict M.C.'s consultation rights regarding J's well-being, clarify holiday schedules, recalculate child support, and dispense with M.C.'s consent for travel.

The court applied the material change test from *Gordon v. Goertz* and *Brown v. Lloyd*.

It found that neither party demonstrated a material change in circumstances that fundamentally altered J's needs or the parents' ability to meet them, nor were the issues unforeseen or not reasonably contemplated by the original judge.

The court dismissed both motions, noting that the parties' communication issues and J's academic struggles/ADHD diagnosis were not fundamental changes warranting a variation.

The applicant sought costs related to parenting issues after a settlement was reached on both parenting and financial matters at the outset of trial.

The court found that success on parenting issues was divided and that the respondent, a self-represented litigant, had acted reasonably in negotiations, securing more favourable terms than the applicant's offer.

The court declined to award costs, emphasizing the importance of encouraging settlement and not "pre-judging" the outcome of issues resolved through negotiation.

The moving party sought summary judgment recognizing and enforcing a United States District Court judgment from Indiana exceeding US$46 million.

The responding parties argued the judgment was not final because an appeal was pending and alleged a denial of natural justice based on the alleged mental incompetence of one defendant during the foreign trial.

The court held that a foreign judgment is final for enforcement purposes when the foreign court has no power to vary or rescind it, even if an appeal is pending and no stay of enforcement exists.

The court further held that the enforcing court’s role is limited to assessing procedural fairness rather than re‑litigating substantive issues such as competence at trial.

The Indiana judgment was recognized and enforced in Ontario, subject to an interim stay of enforcement pending developments in the foreign appeal.

Following a ten‑day motor vehicle accident trial in which the plaintiffs’ damages claims were dismissed, the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $250,000.

The defendant relied primarily on prior settlement offers to justify the elevated costs scale.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted because there was no reprehensible conduct and the parties’ settlement positions were reasonable given the contested medical causation and income loss issues.

Exercising discretion under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at $170,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following the dismissal of motions seeking an interlocutory voting injunction, an imaging order, and a contempt order, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The unsuccessful moving party argued that most costs should be deferred to trial because the evidence overlapped with issues to be litigated on the merits.

The court rejected this submission, applying the principle that a successful defendant resisting interlocutory injunctive relief is generally entitled to costs payable forthwith.

After considering factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the high stakes of the motions, the absence of legal complexity, and certain conduct contributing to the contempt motion, the court fixed reduced partial indemnity costs for each successful defendant.