Employment and Labour Law

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence in an estate action.

The motion judge struck the pleading after finding the appellants deliberately breached a court order requiring them to produce passwords for business email accounts and prohibiting the deletion of emails.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Falcon Lumber test and concluding that striking the defence was an appropriate sanction for the appellants' repeated and continuous failure to provide transparent disclosure of estate business documents.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment based on citizenship, marital status, and age, claiming that workplace break scheduling favoured a 'Facebook and Smoker elite' group.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant could not point to any evidence linking the alleged unfair treatment to protected grounds under the Human Rights Code.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant, a police officer, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on place of origin, disability, and marital status.

The respondent requested dismissal of several allegations due to delay and argued that others had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the historical allegations did not form a series of incidents with the timely allegations, as there was no nexus between them, and dismissed them for delay because the applicant's desire to resolve matters informally did not constitute a good faith explanation.

However, the Tribunal declined to dismiss the allegations against one acting sergeant for having no reasonable prospect of success, as the applicant indicated he had witnesses who could testify to discriminatory comments.

The respondents objected to the Canadian Union of Public Employees and its Local 2484 being granted intervenor status, arguing it was inappropriate while the application was deferred and the union was pursuing the same issues in another forum.

The Tribunal dismissed the objection, noting that the application had been reactivated, removing the basis for the objection.

The scope of the union's involvement will be determined by the hearing adjudicator.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, specifically a failure to accommodate.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to determine whether the application should be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had previously filed an Employment Standards Act claim.

The Tribunal found that while the ESA claim was another proceeding, it focused on unpaid wages and termination, and did not appropriately deal with the substance of the accommodation allegations.

The Tribunal allowed the application to proceed.

Additionally, the Tribunal removed the individually named respondent, finding that the corporate respondent was vicariously liable and capable of remedying any alleged Code infringement.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal in employment on the basis of disability.

The respondent requested dismissal on preliminary grounds, including delay, abuse of process due to prior Minutes of Settlement, and no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found the application was filed in time.

It held that permitting the applicant to re-litigate the incident covered by the Minutes of Settlement would be an abuse of process, rejecting her argument of economic duress.

However, the Tribunal allowed the remaining allegations of failure to accommodate and reprisal to proceed, finding they had a reasonable prospect of success.

The respondent requested an order prohibiting the union from intervening in the applicant's human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The Tribunal found no exceptional circumstances to deny the union's intervention, noting that a union generally has an interest in an application brought by an employee in its bargaining unit.

The request to prohibit intervention was dismissed, with the scope of intervention left to the hearing adjudicator.

The applicant filed two human rights applications alleging discrimination on the basis of creed and reprisal.

The respondents requested that certain documents be struck from the first application, while the applicant requested that the applications be consolidated and deferred pending the conclusion of related grievance arbitrations.

The Tribunal deferred the second application pending the grievance arbitrations but declined to consolidate the applications at this time.

The respondents' request to strike documents was deferred to the member presiding at the upcoming preliminary hearing.

The applicant filed a human rights application while concurrently pursuing a union grievance based on the same facts and human rights issues.

The respondent supported deferring the application, while the applicant opposed it.

The Tribunal, noting its normal approach to defer to concurrent legal proceedings capable of addressing human rights issues, ordered the application deferred pending the completion of the grievance process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on race, colour, place of origin, ethnic origin, age, and reprisal.

The respondents requested that the Tribunal defer consideration of the application pending the completion of an ongoing union grievance proceeding dealing with the same facts and issues.

The Tribunal found that deferral was appropriate to avoid concurrent proceedings and the possibility of inconsistent decisions.

The application was deferred pending the completion of the grievance process.

The applicant alleged age discrimination and reprisal after receiving over two years' working notice of termination.

The respondent requested dismissal of the termination and early retirement allegations, arguing they were filed outside the one-year limitation period under section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code, which it claimed began when notice was given.

The Tribunal held that the limitation period for a termination begins on the effective date of the termination, not the date notice is given.

As the applicant was still in his working notice period, the termination allegation was not out of time.

The Tribunal deferred issues of prematurity and the timeliness of the specific termination meeting events to the hearing adjudicator.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by her employer (CAMH), her union (ONA), and a psychiatrist (Dr. Klassen) on multiple grounds including race, sex, age, disability, and reprisal.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the allegations had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed all allegations against ONA and Dr. Klassen, and all allegations against CAMH except those relating to disability accommodation and termination, finding the dismissed allegations lacked evidence linking the respondents' conduct to Code grounds or were out of time.

The remaining disability allegations against CAMH were scheduled for a further preliminary hearing to address timeliness and whether they had been dealt with in another proceeding.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and harassment in employment based on gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, and disability.

The respondent requested that the application be dismissed on preliminary grounds of delay and having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the allegations, which spanned several years, constituted a series of incidents under section 34 of the Code, and therefore were not out of time.

The Tribunal also found that the allegations were Code-based and, if proven, could establish a breach, meaning the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The requests to dismiss were denied.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment based on disability.

The respondents requested access to the applicant's medical records held by the hospital's Corporate Health and Safety Services Department and an extension of time to file their Response.

The applicant sought to review and redact the records prior to disclosure.

The Tribunal ordered the disclosure of the medical records without prior redaction by the applicant, noting their relevance to the issues of disability and accommodation, and granted the respondents a three-week extension to file their Response.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of race and ethnic origin, as well as reprisal.

The applicant had also filed a claim under the Employment Standards Act (ESA) based on the same facts, seeking unpaid wages and damages for wrongful dismissal.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer.

Finding that the subject matter of the two proceedings was substantially similar and that proceeding concurrently could result in inconsistent findings, the Tribunal exercised its discretion to defer the human rights application pending the outcome of the ESA claim.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the human rights application pending the conclusion of an ongoing grievance arbitration involving the same parties and issues.

The respondent supported deferral, while the applicant opposed it on the basis of delay.

The Tribunal ordered the application deferred, noting that grievance arbitrators have the authority to enforce human rights obligations and that deferral is appropriate to avoid concurrent proceedings and inconsistent factual findings.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the application pending the conclusion of concurrent grievance arbitration and WSIB proceedings.

The respondent supported deferral, while the self-represented applicant opposed it due to concerns about delay.

The Tribunal found significant overlap in the issues raised across the proceedings and deferred the application to avoid the potential for differing conclusions on the same facts, noting that grievance arbitrators have the authority to enforce human rights obligations.

The applicant requested to reactivate his human rights application, which had been deferred pending the completion of a grievance proceeding.

An arbitrator had issued a decision on the grievance, canvassing all issues raised in the application.

The respondents argued the Tribunal had no basis to proceed given the arbitrator's decision, but did not oppose reactivation.

The Tribunal granted the request to reactivate and scheduled a preliminary hearing to determine whether the application should be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and constructive dismissal.

He subsequently commenced a civil action in the Superior Court of Justice relying on the same facts and seeking damages for breaches of the Human Rights Code.

The respondent requested that the application be dismissed pursuant to s. 34(11) of the Code.

The Tribunal found that the applicant raised the same facts and issues in his civil action and sought remedies for them, triggering s. 34(11).

The application was dismissed as being outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a previous Tribunal decision that dismissed her application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The applicant argued that there were new facts or evidence and that the decision conflicted with established jurisprudence.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's arguments were essentially reiterations of positions articulated during the hearing and did not meet the criteria for reconsideration under Rule 26.5.

The request for reconsideration was denied.