Allison Speigel

The plaintiff creditor brought a motion for summary judgment declaring that the defendant Clarke was the beneficial owner of two properties, with legal title held by the defendant Bailey in trust.

Clarke claimed his common law spouse, Reid, was the beneficial owner.

The court found numerous badges of fraud and sham transactions, concluding that beneficial title always remained with Clarke.

As Clarke had assigned himself into bankruptcy while holding beneficial title, the court declared the properties remained vested in his discharged trustee in bankruptcy and ordered the trustee's reappointment to complete the administration of the estate.

This was a costs endorsement following the dismissal of cross-motions, the striking of an amended statement of claim without leave to amend, and dismissal of the action.

The court held that the successful moving defendants were entitled to costs and that separate costs could be claimed for counsel representing the trustee services interests because that representation was distinct and necessary.

Applying the normal rule that costs follow the event, and considering the factors under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court rejected the unsuccessful plaintiffs' claim for their own costs.

Although the defendants sought substantially more, the court exercised restraint and fixed partial indemnity costs at $20,000, with differentiated payment responsibility between all plaintiffs and one plaintiff individually.

The moving defendants sought to strike the amended statement of claim under Rules 21.01 and 25.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs alleged numerous causes of action arising from disciplinary proceedings and a trusteeship order involving the professional practice of a lawyer and sought extensive damages against the regulator, its employees, and media defendants.

The court held the pleading was rambling, vexatious, and failed to disclose reasonable causes of action.

Claims including defamation, malicious prosecution, and derivative Family Law Act damages were inadequately pleaded or legally barred.

The court further found the claims constituted an impermissible collateral attack on prior disciplinary and court decisions and were barred by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act.

A commercial tenant sought declarations that a landlord’s distraint against its goods for alleged rent arrears was unlawful and that the landlord had forfeited the lease.

The landlord had changed the locks to the premises while simultaneously posting a distress notice demanding payment of a substantially inflated sum that included amounts not payable under the lease.

The court held that a landlord must choose between the mutually exclusive remedies of forfeiture and distress and that the landlord’s conduct effectively excluded the tenant from the premises.

By locking the tenant out and conditioning re-entry on payment of improper charges, the landlord forfeited the lease and the subsequent distress was unlawful.

Declarations were granted and a trial of damages was directed.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a $90,000 rent deposit.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the deposit was voluntary and therefore not 'required' under section 106 of the Residential Tenancies Act, meaning there was no contravention of section 135.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that section 106(6) requires interest to be paid on the deposit, calculated on the monthly declining balance.