Alfred Morris Kwinter

The appellant appealed a jury's damages award in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

She argued that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the meaning of 'material' contribution regarding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge was not deficient when read as a whole.

The court noted that the jury was entitled to accept the defence theory, supported by the appellant's own medical expert, that her condition could have been caused by factors other than the accident.

The successful appellant insurer sought partial indemnity costs of $171,943.31 for an appeal.

The Court of Appeal reduced the fees claimed by two-thirds, noting that the preparation time spent by junior lawyers and law clerks was excessive given the lack of complexity of the issues.

The court also reduced the costs because the insurer's trial counsel had failed to raise the issues on which the insurer ultimately succeeded on the liability appeal.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 for fees and $10,000 for disbursements, plus GST.

The insurer appealed a jury verdict awarding the insureds compensatory and punitive damages following a fire that destroyed a commercial building.

The insurer had denied the claims based on arson, misrepresentation, and fraud.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the law of misrepresentation and the interpretation of a 'shut down' exclusion clause.

The Court also set aside the jury's $1.2 million award for loss of profits as unsupported by evidence, and found the $2.5 million punitive damages award to be grossly excessive.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her negligence claim against the respondent dairy after she tripped and fell in its parking lot.

The trial judge found the parking lot was in a state of disrepair and the respondent's inspection system was inadequate, but dismissed the action because the appellant could not identify the precise location of her fall.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in her causation analysis by setting too high an onus.

Given the uncontradicted evidence of the parking lot's extensive disrepair and the absence of any alternative cause, the court found the respondent's negligence caused or materially contributed to the appellant's injuries.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action based solely on their failure to satisfy a prior costs order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that because the prior costs order did not specify a time for payment, the motion judge erred by not giving the appellants a reasonable opportunity to pay the outstanding costs.

The action was reinstated on the condition that the costs award be paid within thirty days.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his insurance company and broker following a house fire.

The trial judge found that the appellant had a financial motive to set the fires, misrepresented his insurance history to the broker, and had the best opportunity to commit the arson.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, motive, opportunity, or the overwhelming evidence of arson.

The appellant's house was destroyed by a fire intentionally set by her husband, who was convicted of arson.

The respondent insurer denied the appellant's claim under her homeowner's policy based on an exclusion clause for loss resulting from the intentional or criminal acts of any person insured by the policy.

The appellant argued the clause was ambiguous and should not apply to an innocent co-insured.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the exclusion clause clear and unambiguous in excluding losses suffered by any insured person resulting from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order dismissing her motion to add a third party as a defendant in a snowmobile accident claim.

The Master had dismissed the motion due to case management delays and found the proposed claim untenable in law.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by relying on an outdated timetable and by concluding the proposed pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff was granted leave to add the third party as a defendant.

The insured died accidentally when a cocaine-filled condom burst in his stomach.

The appellant insurer refused to pay the life insurance proceeds to the respondent, the insured's former spouse and designated innocent beneficiary, arguing that public policy prevents a person from insuring against their own criminal act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the public policy rule preventing a criminal from profiting from their crime does not apply to an innocent beneficiary claiming in their own right, rather than through the criminal's estate.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was entitled to the insurance proceeds.

The appellant insured suffered a theft of equipment and subsequently made a claim for loss of income.

The respondent insurer denied the claim on the basis that it was barred by a one-year limitation period set out in the policy's conditions.

The appellant argued that the limitation period, which mirrored the statutory conditions for fire insurance under the Insurance Act, did not apply to theft or loss of profits, and that the late delivery of the policy prejudiced its ability to claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the insurer was free to incorporate the one-year limitation period into the contract for all perils, and that the contractual language was clear and unambiguous.

The court also found no prejudice from the late delivery of the policy, as the appellant's adjuster had misinterpreted the policy rather than being unaware of it.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitration decision finding that the respondent was not excluded from receiving weekly statutory accident benefits.

The respondent had been convicted of failing to produce an insurance card, but a charge of driving without insurance was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The Director of Arbitrations dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion under paragraph 17(1)(c) of the Schedule requires a specific conviction for driving without insurance, which did not occur.

Furthermore, the exclusion under paragraph 17(1)(d) for driving while not authorized by law relates to licensing issues, not insurance status.

The applicant, a passenger on a TTC bus involved in a collision, sought statutory accident benefits including weekly benefits, housekeeping expenses, and a special award.

The arbitrator found the applicant's evidence unreliable and fraught with misrepresentations, preferring the insurer's medical evidence that the applicant was malingering and did not suffer from chronic pain syndrome or a disabling disc injury.

The claims for benefits were dismissed.

Finding the arbitration to be an abuse of process due to the applicant's deliberate misrepresentations, the arbitrator ordered the applicant to pay $1,000 in expenses to the insurer.

The applicant, a 65-year-old retired man, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits for one year.

The insurer terminated weekly benefits, arguing his ongoing disability was due to a pre-existing condition.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's back pain and headaches pre-dated the accident, relying on clinical notes that contradicted the family physician's testimony.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant failed to prove a substantial inability to perform his essential tasks of daily life, as he continued to shop, socialize, and travel as he did before the accident.

The claim for ongoing weekly benefits and a special award was dismissed, but the applicant was awarded expenses.

The Applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving an uninsured vehicle.

He was convicted of failing to produce an insurance card under s. 3(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, and a subsequent charge of operating without insurance under s. 2(1) was stayed based on the Kienapple principle.

The Insurer denied statutory accident benefits, arguing the Applicant was excluded under ss. 17(1)(c) and (d) of the Schedule.

The Arbitrator held that the Applicant was not excluded, as a conviction under s. 3(1) is not equivalent to a conviction for operating without insurance, and 'authorized by law' in s. 17(1)(d) refers to licensing, not insurance.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought weekly income benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Insurer terminated benefits, arguing the Applicant was not employed or on a temporary lay-off at the time of the accident.

The arbitrator found that the Applicant, who had been laid off due to a shortage of work but maintained a reasonable expectation of recall, was on a temporary lay-off at the time of the accident.

The Applicant was deemed eligible for benefits and awarded arbitration expenses.