Keith Brennenstuhl

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of a hearing disability, claiming he was not provided with an ASL interpreter at a courthouse hearing in 2007.

The application was filed nearly four years later.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to determine if the delay was incurred in good faith under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant argued the delay was due to police surveillance and lack of cooperation from Legal Aid.

The Tribunal found the explanation vague and unreasonable, concluding the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction requiring the applicant to file a witness list, witness statements, and documents, warning that failure to do so could result in the application being dismissed as abandoned.

The applicant failed to comply with the direction or communicate with the Tribunal.

As a result, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in housing.

The Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction requiring the applicant to file a witness list, witness statements, and documents, warning that failure to do so could result in the application being dismissed as abandoned.

The applicant failed to comply with the direction or communicate with the Tribunal.

Consequently, the application was dismissed as abandoned.

The applicant sought reconsideration of a decision dismissing his human rights application for being untimely.

He argued that the delay was caused by his father's health issues.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the facts regarding his father's health were available when the application was filed and did not constitute new evidence that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier.

Furthermore, the applicant had failed to raise these issues in his initial application or in response to a Notice of Intent to Dismiss.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, specifically regarding a failure to reclassify her to Detective Constable in 2004.

The application was filed in 2011, well beyond the one-year limitation period.

The applicant argued the delay was incurred in good faith because she was pursuing internal resolution processes.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, holding that pursuing other avenues is not a valid or good faith reason for delay in filing an application under the Code.

The applicant, a paramedic student of Vietnamese heritage who stutters, alleged discrimination and reprisal after the respondent EMS service declined to hire him despite his high academic standing.

The applicant claimed he was subjected to derogatory comments by paramedics during his studies and practicum.

Following a summary hearing to assess whether the application had a reasonable prospect of success, the Tribunal dismissed the application, finding no evidence linking the decision not to hire or the alleged comments to the applicant's Code-protected grounds.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

A summary hearing was scheduled by teleconference to determine if the application should be dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant received notice but failed to attend the hearing.

In the absence of the applicant or any explanation for her non-attendance, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal scheduled a summary hearing by teleconference to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant received notice but failed to attend the hearing or provide an explanation for his absence.

Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment more than two years after his termination.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for delay and lack of jurisdiction over allegations against opposing counsel.

The Tribunal found that waiting for a grievance arbitration to conclude was not a good faith reason for delay.

Furthermore, the Tribunal held it lacked jurisdiction over allegations that opposing counsel asked discriminatory questions during cross-examination, as the relationship between a lawyer and an opposing party does not fall within a social area of the Code.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability, specifically a failure to accommodate his return to work.

The respondents sought to defer the application pending the conclusion of an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement that raised the same facts and human rights issues.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, noting its general practice to defer applications where a concurrent grievance can address the substantive human rights obligations.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, claiming the respondent failed to accommodate him and terminated his employment.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal defer the application because the applicant had also filed an Employment Standards claim with the Ministry of Labour.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, finding that the Employment Standards claim regarding termination and severance pay could involve examining the circumstances of the applicant's employment and termination, raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions and impacting potential damages.

The respondent requested an order to defer the human rights application pending the conclusion of a union grievance under a collective agreement.

The applicant opposed the deferral, arguing the grievance arbitrator lacked authority to rule on human rights violations.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, noting that grievance arbitrators have the power and responsibility to enforce human rights statutes, and there was substantial overlap between the application and the grievance.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination by a Crown Attorney during a pre-trial meeting.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss, noting that the actions of prosecutors carrying out their duties are not 'services' under the Human Rights Code and are subject to prosecutorial immunity.

The applicant failed to provide written submissions as directed.

The Tribunal dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination regarding sick leave benefits more than one year after the last alleged incident.

The applicant argued the delay was in good faith because he was waiting for the completion of a union grievance procedure.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that waiting for another legal proceeding to conclude does not constitute a good faith reason for delay under the Human Rights Code.

The respondents filed a Request for Order during Proceedings seeking to defer the human rights application pending the conclusion of an ongoing union grievance.

The Tribunal noted that the facts and human rights issues in the application substantially overlapped with those in the grievance.

Applying its general practice of deferring applications where an ongoing grievance covers the same issues, the Tribunal granted the request and deferred the application pending the resolution of the grievance.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability, failure to accommodate, and reprisal.

The respondents requested a deferral of the application because the applicant's union had filed a grievance raising the same human rights issues.

The Tribunal found a substantial overlap between the application and the grievance and deferred the application pending the conclusion of the grievance process, consistent with its general practice.

The applicant requested permission to have a court reporter record the upcoming hearing at their own expense.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario granted the request in accordance with its Practice Direction on Recording Hearings, noting that if an official transcript is produced, copies must be provided to the panel and other parties.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability, specifically a failure to accommodate her return to work.

The applicant had also filed a union grievance regarding the same facts.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the application pending the conclusion of the grievance proceedings.

The respondent supported deferral, while the applicant opposed it.

The Tribunal deferred the application, noting its general practice of deferring applications where an ongoing grievance covers the same facts and human rights issues.

The respondents brought a Request for Order during Proceedings seeking to dismiss the application for abuse of process, arguing that the applicant failed to comply with the disclosure requirements under Rules 16 and 17 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure.

The adjudicator noted that the applicant, who was represented by counsel, had missed the deadlines for disclosure.

However, the adjudicator declined to dismiss the application at this stage, instead warning the applicant that failure to comply with the Rules could result in the Tribunal refusing permission to introduce undisclosed documents or witnesses at the hearing.

The respondent requested an order dismissing the application for abuse of process due to the applicant's failure to comply with disclosure rules, and alternatively sought an adjournment because its key witness was unable to leave the United States pending an immigration status adjustment.

The Tribunal declined to dismiss the application at this stage but warned the applicant of the consequences of non-compliance.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment, finding the witness's immigration impediment constituted an extraordinary circumstance and that there was no serious prejudice to the applicant.