Alan G. Smith

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, seeking compensation for loss of income due to termination.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer because the applicant had also commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal against the respondents.

The Tribunal found that the close relationship between the facts and issues in the two proceedings strongly favoured deferral to avoid adjudicative duplication.

The application was deferred pending the conclusion of the civil action.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal's correspondence to the applicant was returned as undeliverable, and the applicant failed to respond to subsequent email directions to provide a current postal address.

Pursuant to Rule 5.4 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, the application was deemed abandoned and dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The respondent requested deferral or dismissal because the applicant had initiated an Employment Standards Act claim.

The Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction requiring the applicant to provide the status of the ESA claim and submissions on the respondent's request.

When the applicant failed to respond to the direction, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The respondents requested to defer the human rights application pending the outcome of an ongoing workplace grievance and arbitration process.

The applicant opposed the deferral, arguing the grievance might not address the Code violations, could not award punitive damages, and was too slow.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, noting that grievance arbitrators have the power to enforce human rights obligations and award similar remedies, and that deferral avoids adjudicative duplication.

The applicant filed a human rights application against the respondent.

After an unsuccessful mediation, the respondent requested a second mediation date.

The applicant failed to respond to the Tribunal's request for available dates and a subsequent direction to advise of her intentions regarding the application.

Pursuant to Rule 5.4 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, the application was deemed abandoned and dismissed.

The respondent employer requested to defer the applicant's human rights application pending the outcome of an ongoing workplace grievance and arbitration process.

The grievance, filed by the applicant's bargaining agent, involved the same core issue of an alleged failure to accommodate the applicant's disability.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, noting that grievance arbitrators have the power and responsibility to enforce human rights obligations, and deferral avoids adjudicative duplication and the risk of inconsistent decisions.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability following the termination of her employment.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the application pending the outcome of an ongoing workplace grievance-arbitration process dealing with the same termination.

The respondent agreed with the deferral, the union took no position, and the applicant did not file submissions.

The Tribunal deferred the application to avoid adjudicative duplication and inconsistent decisions, noting the considerable factual overlap between the proceedings.

The applicants filed human rights applications alleging discrimination by their landlord based on race, ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin, and reprisal.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer because the applicants had also filed an application with the Landlord and Tenant Board of Ontario (LTBO) raising the same factual allegations.

The respondent supported deferral, while the applicants did not file submissions.

The Tribunal deferred the applications pending the conclusion of the LTBO process to avoid adjudicative duplication and inconsistent decisions.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, which the Tribunal deferred pending the conclusion of ongoing grievance proceedings.

The Tribunal subsequently requested an update on the status of the grievance, warning that failure to respond could result in the application being dismissed as abandoned.

Although the applicant's union informed the Tribunal that the grievance had been resolved at arbitration, the applicant himself failed to respond.

As a result, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceeding seeking to re-activate his human rights application, which had been deferred pending the outcome of a workplace grievance-arbitration procedure.

The applicant argued that the grievance procedure was not being processed in a timely manner.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that dissatisfaction with the pace of the grievance process is not a sufficient reason to reverse the previous decision to defer the application until the conclusion of the grievance arbitration process.

The respondent requested to defer the applicant's human rights application pending the outcome of her concurrent claim under the Employment Standards Act.

Both proceedings involved the same facts surrounding the termination of her employment and alleged breaches related to pregnancy and parental leave.

The Tribunal granted the deferral to avoid adjudicative duplication and the risk of inconsistent findings, noting that the remedies available under both statutes are potentially similar.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in services based on disability, claiming the respondent searched her purse without permission.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intention to Dismiss (NOID) because the application failed to identify specific acts of discrimination linked to a protected ground.

The applicant's response reiterated her narrative but failed to explain how the treatment she received was connected to her disability or distinguishable from how others were treated.

The Tribunal found it plain and obvious that the application fell outside its jurisdiction and dismissed it at the preliminary stage.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in educational services by York University and two personal respondents, including a fellow student, Nanette Climans.

Climans brought a request to be removed as a personal respondent on the basis that she was a student and did not provide services to the applicant.

Applying the Persaud factors, the Tribunal found that the institutional respondent had the ability to remedy any Code infringement and that there was no compelling reason to continue the proceeding against the fellow student.

The request was granted and Climans was removed as a respondent.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability, which appeared to be filed outside the one-year time limit.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss.

The applicant submitted that he mailed the application via priority post within the time limit and was promised delivery within five days.

The Tribunal found that a plain and obvious lack of jurisdiction was not established at this stage, as the delay may have been caused by factors beyond the applicant's control, and directed that the application be processed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability more than one year after his termination.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for delay.

The applicant argued he was unaware of his rights under the Code and was awaiting the outcome of a union grievance.

The Tribunal found that ignorance of one's rights and awaiting the outcome of other processes do not constitute a good faith explanation for delay under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant filed a human rights application more than four years after the last alleged incident of discrimination, claiming the delay was due to depression.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide medical documentation substantiating his inability to file, and failed to explain how he was able to pursue other legal claims, obtain a professional designation, and work during the same period.

The application was dismissed as untimely because the delay was not incurred in good faith under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The respondent requested that the human rights application be dismissed as untimely, arguing that its records showed the only incident between its security personnel and the applicant occurred outside the one-year limitation period.

The applicant maintained the incident occurred within the limitation period.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the material dispute of fact regarding when the incident occurred could not be resolved at a preliminary stage, as it was not plain and obvious that the application was untimely.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment against an investment/securities company and two individuals.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss to determine whether the employer was federally-regulated and outside its jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found that the regulation of the investment/securities industry falls under provincial jurisdiction pursuant to section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, even if the firm is wholly-owned by a federally-regulated bank.

The Tribunal concluded it had jurisdiction and ordered the application to proceed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability and age in employment.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the application pending the outcome of an ongoing workplace grievance-arbitration process dealing with the same termination.

Both parties consented to the deferral.

The Tribunal ordered the application deferred to avoid adjudicative duplication, noting that grievance arbitrators have the power and responsibility to enforce human rights obligations.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed his human rights application for being filed outside the one-year limitation period.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in its application of the discoverability doctrine.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the applicant was merely attempting to re-argue his case and appeal the original decision, which does not meet the strict criteria for reconsideration under Rule 26.5.