Wilson J.

The appellant, a young offender, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures programme, arguing that its admission criteria infringed sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its concurrent judgment in R. v. S. (G.), which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such a programme and that the admission criteria do not infringe the Charter.

The appellant, a battered woman, shot and killed her common law partner in the back of the head as he left the room following an argument where he physically abused her and threatened to kill her.

At trial, a psychiatrist testified as an expert on battered woman syndrome to explain her state of mind and why she reasonably apprehended death or grievous bodily harm.

The jury acquitted the appellant, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible to assist the jury in assessing the reasonableness of a battered woman's apprehension of death and her belief that lethal force was necessary.

The respondent lawyer was sued for fraud by a bank.

He sought a defence from his liability insurer.

The insurer denied the obligation to defend, relying on an exclusion clause for fraudulent acts.

The bank later discontinued the action, and the respondent sued the insurer for his unrecovered defence costs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the duty to defend is governed by the pleadings.

Since the pleadings only alleged fraud, which was excluded from coverage, the insurer had no duty to defend.

The appeal by the insurer was allowed.

The appellant elected to be tried by judge and jury for a narcotics offence but failed to appear for jury selection and the commencement of his trial.

The trial judge ruled that under s. 526.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant lost his right to a jury trial because he did not have a legitimate excuse for his absence.

The appellant was convicted by a judge alone.

He appealed, arguing that s. 526.1 violated his right to a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that while s. 526.1 infringes s. 11(f), it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter because it protects the administration of justice and public respect for the criminal trial process.

The respondent, a fire fighter, was subjected to mandatory retirement at age 62 pursuant to a collective agreement.

He filed a complaint alleging age discrimination under the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code.

The Board of Inquiry found discrimination, but the Court of Queen's Bench reversed this decision.

The Court of Appeal restored the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the mandatory retirement policy was a reasonable occupational requirement, applying the principles established in a companion case.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after a victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat over a bounced cheque.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a first degree murder conviction can be sustained by combining the mens rea of intending to cause bodily harm likely to cause death (s. 212(a)(ii)) with the requirement of planning and deliberation (s. 214(2)).

However, the Court ordered a new trial because the Crown improperly cross-examined a defence alibi witness using intercepted private communications without first proving the interceptions were lawful under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant applied for a re-hearing to vary a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the Social Service Tax.

The Court granted the application and varied the judgment to include prejudgment interest at the District Registrar's rate from the date of the several remittances to March 15, 1984, and postjudgment interest for the period following March 15, 1984.

The appellant was awarded costs of the re-hearing.

The employer, Paccar, terminated its collective agreement with the union and, after negotiations reached an impasse, unilaterally imposed new terms and conditions of employment.

The union complained to the Labour Relations Board, which held that the employer had the authority to unilaterally alter terms after expiry, subject to the duty to bargain in good faith.

The British Columbia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal quashed the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the courts must show curial deference to the specialized tribunal's policy choices.

The Court also held that the Board had standing to make submissions defending the reasonableness of its decision.

The appellants, charged with murder in Ontario, sought to waive their right to a jury trial and be tried by a judge alone.

The Criminal Code required a jury trial for murder in all provinces except Alberta.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while an accused can waive the benefit of a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter, this does not create a constitutional right to a non-jury trial that overrides the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the geographic distinction allowing non-jury trials only in Alberta did not violate s. 15 of the Charter, as persons accused of murder outside Alberta do not constitute a disadvantaged group subject to discrimination.

The plaintiff Indian Band brought a trespass action in the Federal Court against the defendant Indian Band regarding the use and occupation of a reserve, alleging the Crown breached its fiduciary and statutory duties.

The defendant Band moved to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction under section 17(3)(c) of the Federal Court Act, as the dispute involves conflicting claims to an obligation owed by the federal Crown, and the claim is based on 'laws of Canada' including the Indian Act and the federal common law of aboriginal title.

The appellant employee was dismissed without just cause after ten years of service.

He complained to the Director of Labour Standards, who ordered reinstatement and lost wages under s. 67A of the Labour Standards Code.

The Labour Standards Tribunal upheld this decision.

The employer successfully appealed to the Appeal Division, which held that the provisions conferring this power on the Tribunal violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court applied the Residential Tenancies test and held that while the Tribunal exercises a judicial function broadly conformable to that of s. 96 courts at Confederation, it does so as a necessarily incidental aspect of the broader policy goal of providing minimum standards of protection for non-unionized employees.

The appeal was allowed and the legislation was upheld as intra vires the province.

The Woodstock Indian Band barricaded a railway right-of-way that crossed their reserve, claiming the railway company had no right to use the land.

The railway company sought a permanent injunction to restrain the Band from interfering with its right-of-way.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the railway company's predecessor had acquired a statutory easement in the nature of a right-of-way over the land prior to Confederation, with the permission of the Crown.

This valid right-of-way was sufficient to support the award of a permanent injunction against the Band, without needing to determine whether the Band's underlying interest in the fee held by the Crown had been extinguished.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the delegation of federal powers to a provincial minister to set fishing quotas.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially adopting the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Court clarified that while provinces cannot regulate commercial fishing through general legislation, they do have jurisdiction to regulate provincially-owned fisheries as an aspect of administering public property, subject to overriding federal legislation.

The respondents were charged with indictable offences and required to appear for fingerprinting under the Identification of Criminals Act prior to conviction.

They challenged the requirement as a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while mandatory fingerprinting deprives a person of liberty and security of the person, it does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court found that fingerprinting is a minimally intrusive, reliable, and necessary tool for law enforcement that is less serious than the arrest itself.

The appellant mining company sought to claim an investment tax credit for its 1974 taxation year under the Corporations Tax Act, 1972.

Because the credit could only be carried forward if the taxpayer had incurred a 'net loss' in previous years, the appellant attempted to amend its 1971 and 1972 tax returns to create such a loss by claiming capital cost allowance.

The federal authorities accepted the amendments, but the provincial Minister of Revenue refused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the appellant met the qualifying provisions for the tax credit, the Minister was not obliged by statute or regulation to accept the amended returns, despite the federal administrative practice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a nursing assistant, challenged regulations requiring her to pass a French language test to obtain a professional permit, arguing they were discriminatory and contained an unauthorized subdelegation of power.

The regulations exempted candidates with three years of secondary instruction in French.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the issue was not moot despite legislative amendments, as the government had an interest in the validity of its regulations.

The Court concluded the regulations were not discriminatory under the Charter of human rights and freedoms because they did not impair the right to full equality, and the subdelegation to a testing committee was purely administrative and authorized by statute.

The appellant brought an application to vary the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced on October 9, 1986.

The Court allowed the application and varied the judgment to specify that interest runs until August 9, 1982, in accordance with the pre-trial agreement between the parties.

No costs were awarded on the motion for a re-hearing or on the re-hearing.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal which allowed an appeal from the appellant's acquittal on charges under the Combines Investigation Act and ordered a new trial.

The issue was the admissibility of evidence discovered as a result of an unconstitutional search.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's finding under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissing an appeal from a conviction for attempting to set fire to a dwelling-house.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal orally, finding that the dissent in the Court of Appeal did not raise a question of law.

The Crown appealed a decision holding it liable in nuisance for damage caused to the respondents' orchards by the use of road salt as a de-icing agent on an adjoining highway.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the trial judge's conclusions and reasons, which had been affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents on a solicitor and client basis.