S. Zacharias

On a motion in a proposed class proceeding, the moving party sought an order sealing specified portions of the responding record containing sensitive youth-related personal information, with alternative relief based on statutory privacy protections under the CYFSA and YCJA.

Applying the Sherman Estate framework and related appellate authorities, the court found a serious risk to an important public interest in protecting youth privacy and concluded narrower alternatives were insufficient.

The court held the salutary effects, including protection of dignity and trial fairness, outweighed the limited deleterious effect on the open court principle given the scope of the material.

An interim sealing order was granted on agreed terms, and the alternative statutory declaration was not decided.

The defendant physician brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim in a medical malpractice action.

The impugned paragraphs alleged that the defendant had a history of past incompetence and a pattern of substandard practice, which the plaintiffs argued supported a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient material facts to support the allegations of similar fact evidence and breach of fiduciary duty, and struck the relevant paragraphs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel production of a defence vocational assessment report following an examination of the injured plaintiff conducted by a vocational rehabilitation expert retained by the defendant municipality.

The defendant refused production, arguing the assessor was not a "health practitioner" within the meaning of s.105 of the Courts of Justice Act and therefore Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure did not require disclosure.

The court held that examinations conducted on consent are analogous to court‑ordered examinations under Rule 33.08 and therefore trigger the mandatory disclosure obligation in Rule 33.06.

The court further held that a party cannot avoid production simply by asserting that the assessor is not a statutory health practitioner or by electing not to rely on the report at trial.

The defendant was ordered to produce the report forthwith in the interests of fairness and full disclosure.

Following dismissal of the plaintiffs’ motions, the defendant municipality sought an award of costs.

The court had previously directed written submissions and a bill of costs.

The plaintiffs filed no responding submissions.

The court accepted the defendant’s partial indemnity calculation as standard and unchallenged and exercised its discretion to fix costs rather than assess them.

Costs were fixed in favour of the defendant municipality.

The municipal defendant sought leave to appeal a motion judge’s refusal to grant summary judgment dismissing a negligence claim as statute‑barred under s. 44(8)(b) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The underlying action arose from a motor vehicle collision in which the plaintiff’s vehicle struck a pole located on a median.

The moving party argued the undisputed facts permitted determination of the statutory bar on summary judgment.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s decision and that the proposed appeal raised issues of importance concerning interpretation of the statutory immunity provision and the proper use of summary judgment.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligence claim arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiff's vehicle was struck by another driver who ran a red light, causing the plaintiff's vehicle to collide with a rigid traffic signal pole on a raised median, resulting in severe brain injuries.

The plaintiffs alleged the municipality was negligent for failing to install a breakaway pole.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding liability, causation, and whether the claim was statute-barred under s. 44(8) of the Municipal Act, 2001, as the full appreciation test could not be met on the motion record.