Sean Grayson

The plaintiffs advanced funds to the defendants for a real estate investment.

When the investment failed, the plaintiffs obtained a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendants' personal residence.

To facilitate the sale of the residence, the parties agreed to discharge the CPL and hold $600,000 from the sale proceeds in court pending a further motion.

The plaintiffs moved to keep the funds in court under Rule 45.02, while the defendants sought their release.

The court found that the plaintiffs established a right to a specific fund, a serious issue to be tried, and that the balance of convenience favoured preserving the funds.

The plaintiffs' motion was granted.

Following a motion where the moving party successfully sought to withdraw admissions involving approximately $14,000,000, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the responding parties took a tactical and precarious position in opposing the motion, as the granting of leave was foreseeable absent any evidence of prejudice.

Costs were awarded to the moving party fixed at $15,000.

The moving party, in the midst of complex family trust litigation, sought leave to withdraw admissions made in a previous affidavit and to file three new affidavits.

The moving party argued the admissions regarding multi-million dollar shareholder loans were made inadvertently due to confusion and reliance on her former, now-deceased counsel.

The responding parties opposed, arguing the admissions were formal and the new evidence was an attempt to repair her case mid-hearing.

The court granted the motion, finding the admissions were likely inadvertent, raised a triable issue, and caused no non-compensable legal prejudice to the responding parties.

The court emphasized the need to decide the case on its true merits rather than a solicitor's or party's mistake.

The respondent was successful on a half-day motion brought by the applicants to remove her solicitors and add a defendant.

She sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $81,193.45, or alternatively on a partial indemnity basis of $61,637.67.

The court found that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted and that the requested amounts were disproportionate.

Costs were fixed and awarded to the respondent in the total amount of $42,520.33.

Following the Court of Appeal’s reversal of a certification order in a proposed class action alleging misclassification of supervisors and unpaid overtime under the Canada Labour Code, the motion judge was directed to fix the defendant’s costs of the certification motion.

The defendant sought over $1 million in partial indemnity costs, arguing that it had achieved complete success and that the litigation involved substantial complexity and financial exposure.

The representative plaintiff and the Law Foundation argued that costs should be nominal or substantially reduced because the proceeding raised novel legal issues and public interest considerations under s. 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Applying issue estoppel arising from the Court of Appeal’s reasons and considering the purposes of class action costs, the court fixed costs at $475,000 all inclusive.

A mining company sought indemnification from the federal government for environmental remediation costs associated with uranium tailings produced under Cold War-era fixed-price uranium supply contracts with a Crown corporation.

The plaintiff argued that the contracts contained an implied term guaranteeing profitability or requiring indemnification if later government regulation increased production costs, and alternatively alleged breach of a duty of good faith and unjust enrichment.

The government moved for summary judgment dismissing the action, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

The court held that the proposed implied term was inconsistent with the express fixed‑price structure of the contracts and failed the necessity test for implying contractual terms.

It further held that the doctrine of good faith could not be used to create new obligations inconsistent with the contract, and that the government's enactment of environmental legislation did not constitute contractual bad faith.