Superior Court of Justice

This ruling addresses a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose, argued that the total delay of 33 months and 16 days exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown attributed significant portions of the delay to defence conduct and exceptional circumstances.

The court analyzed the procedural chronology, attributing 120 days of delay to the defence, primarily due to counsel's availability for the preliminary inquiry and a delay in responding to a pretrial invitation.

With this defence delay deducted, the net delay fell to 29 months and 2 days, below the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the onus shifted to the applicant to prove the delay was unreasonable, which they did not attempt.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Defence to add a counterclaim and new parties, alleging breach of contract and copyright infringement related to the transfer of intellectual property.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing the proposed counterclaim was statute-barred.

The court found that the defendants knew or ought to have known the material facts giving rise to the claim more than two years prior to seeking the amendment.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that allowing the amendment would cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs given the imminent trial date.

This document indicates a criminal case where the full reasons for the decision are not yet available.

The plaintiffs commenced an action in 2020 alleging breach of an airport lease and negligent misrepresentation regarding a lease extension promised between 1985 and 1995.

The defendants moved to strike the claims under Rule 21.01(1) as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs argued the Real Property Limitations Act applied or that the breaches were ongoing.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the claims were subject to the Limitations Act, 2002 and the former Limitations Act.

The court held it was plain and obvious that the plaintiffs discovered their claims between 1999 and 2013, well beyond the applicable limitation periods.

The action was dismissed without leave to amend.

This is a record of a criminal case (R. v. Flemmings Agpoon and Mughal) from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

The official reasons for the decision are not available at this time.

The applicants in a CCAA proceeding sought approval for a revised Wind-Down Plan, a Liquidity Contribution Alternative and Turnover Order, a Stay Extension, and a Key Employee Retention Plan (KERP).

The court approved the relief, finding the revised plan addressed previous concerns by allowing secured creditors (Recourse Lenders) the option to pay their pro rata share of the liquidity requirement to retrieve collateral, or for the applicants to sell inventory to fund the wind-down.

The court also found the KERP appropriate and necessary for an efficient wind-down and extended the stay of proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages from the defendant for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for residential property.

The defendant failed to close the transaction due to inability to secure financing.

The defendant admitted breach but disputed the quantum of damages and alleged the plaintiffs failed to mitigate their losses.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs acted reasonably in mitigating damages and assessing damages based on the actual resale date.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendants for passing off their sports hydration products (Cwench) as the plaintiffs' (BioSteel).

The plaintiffs alleged that Cwench's products, flavors, and packaging ("get-ups") were confusingly similar to BioSteel's.

The court dismissed the injunction request, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case or a serious issue to be tried regarding goodwill in their product's get-ups, misrepresentation causing confusion, or actual/potential damages.

The court determined the injunction was mandatory, requiring a higher "strong prima facie case" standard, and found that similarities were common industry features or functional choices, and evidence of consumer confusion was insufficient.

The accused, Norbert Budai, was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his estranged wife, Henrietta Viski, who died after being doused with gasoline and set on fire.

Budai pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder but guilty to second-degree murder, which the Crown did not accept.

The court, sitting without a jury, found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, rejecting the defence's argument that Budai's consumption of alcohol and fentanyl limited his capacity to plan and deliberate.

Budai was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The Applicant mother sought final orders for sole decision-making responsibility, child support, and section 7 expenses for the child.

The Respondent father sought additional parenting time and joint decision-making responsibility.

The court, after an uncontested trial where the Respondent's pleadings were struck for financial issues, granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility with a duty to consult, ordered the father to pay child support based on his current income and arrears for section 7 expenses, and increased the father's parenting time beyond alternate weekends, including mid-week overnights, finding the previous contact insufficient for a child of the child's age.

The court also ordered life insurance as security for child support and continued health benefits.

The accused, Malachi McTague, was charged with aggravated assault.

He admitted to wounding the complainant with a knife but claimed self-defence.

The court found that the Crown failed to disprove the self-defence claim beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and the reasonableness of his response given the circumstances, including the presence of other potentially armed individuals.

The accused was found not guilty.

The applicant brought a motion alleging the respondent breached a Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form (TSEF) by failing to serve his and his witnesses' affidavits in chief by the stipulated deadline.

The respondent argued the deadline was flexible due to trial adjournment.

The court found the respondent in breach, emphasizing that TSEF timelines are firm orders.

As a consequence, the court ordered that any of the respondent's witnesses whose affidavits were not served by October 25, 2024, would be prohibited from testifying at trial, subject to the trial judge's further order.

The applicant was also awarded costs for the motion.

The plaintiff landlord sued the defendant tenant and its guarantor for breach of a commercial lease.

The tenant failed to take possession and begin fixturing the premises, arguing the landlord had not completed its work to satisfaction.

The court interpreted the lease, finding that the tenant was obliged to take possession when the landlord's work was "sufficiently complete to permit fixturing," not fully complete.

The tenant's failure to take possession constituted repudiation of the lease.

The court awarded the landlord damages, holding both the tenant and the guarantor liable.

This endorsement concerns an application by Accuride Canada Inc. for an Amended and Restated Initial Order (ARIO) under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).

The applicant sought to increase the maximum amounts secured by the Administration, Directors', and Intercompany Charges, approve an Intercompany Supply Agreement with its parent company, and extend the stay of proceedings.

The court granted the ARIO, finding the requested relief necessary for the applicant's continued operations and restructuring efforts, and noting the Monitor's support for the reasonableness and necessity of the proposed changes.

This is a pre-trial ruling in a murder trial concerning the admissibility of two types of evidence: lay recognition opinion testimony (video and voice) and prior discreditable conduct of the accused.

The court admitted the recognition evidence from two youth detention center staff members, finding they had sufficient familiarity with the accused to offer valuable identifying information, including unique mannerisms and gait.

The court also admitted evidence of the accused's prior possession and discharge of the alleged murder weapon three weeks before the killing, and possession of another handgun three days before, balancing its high probative value for identity and means/opportunity against its moral prejudice.

The court imposed limitations on how the relationship evidence between the accused and the staff witnesses could be presented to mitigate prejudice related to the accused's detention history.

The Crown applied under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code for the complainant, LS, to give evidence at trial by videoconference from Bracebridge, Ontario, citing her location and personal circumstances.

The defence opposed, arguing it would compromise the accused's right to a fair trial by impairing cross-examination and that the proposed location was unsuitable.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that LS's age, physical and mental disabilities, and the significant distance to the courthouse weighed in favour of the order.

The court dismissed the defence's concerns, noting that arrangements for physical evidence and police presence would mitigate risks to a fair trial and the integrity of testimony.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for sexual assault charges, arguing a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from information sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 36 months, exceeding the *Jordan* ceiling of 30 months.

The court found that a significant portion of this delay (352 days) was solely attributable to the applicant's repeated requests for adjournments to secure legal representation or funding, including pursuing a *Rowbotham* application.

Subtracting this defence-caused delay resulted in a net delay of approximately 24 months, which falls below the *Jordan* ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Zachary Gibson pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for the brutal killing of Michael Grawberger.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is set at 17 years, considering aggravating factors such as the brutal, planned nature of the attack, its domestic context, and the broad impact on victims, balanced against mitigating factors including the guilty plea, lack of criminal record, and rehabilitative potential.

This decision addresses an anti-SLAPP motion brought by Global News and its journalists to dismiss a libel suit initiated by Wenbin (Vincent) Ke, an Ontario MPP.

Mr. Ke sued after Global News published stories alleging his involvement in a Chinese government election interference scheme, based on leaks from CSIS agents.

The court found that while the reporting concerned a matter of public interest, there were grounds to believe the plaintiff's libel claim had substantial merit and that the defendants' defences of responsible communication and justification (of a lesser truth) could fail at trial.

The court weighed the public interest in protecting the plaintiff's reputation and ensuring democratic integrity against the freedom of expression, concluding that the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue outweighed the interest in protecting the expression.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss was denied, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicant, Sharon Hartin, objected to the accounts of the respondent, Mary McInnis, in her capacities as attorney for property and estate trustee of Anna Evelyn Hartin's estate.

The applicant alleged undue influence, improper transfers, failure to keep proper records, and breach of court orders.

The court found a presumption of undue influence arose due to the deceased's dependency on the respondent, which the respondent largely failed to rebut.

The court also found the respondent acted as attorney for property and failed to keep adequate records.

The court ordered the respondent to reimburse the estate $127,167.70, revoked her Certificate of Appointment as Estate Trustee, and denied her compensation.