Court and Parties
Superior Court of Justice
His Majesty The King
v.
Zachary Gibson
Reasons for Sentence
Delivered by: The Honourable Justice J. Di Luca On: October 18, 2024, at Oshawa, Ontario
Appearances: P. Affleck, Counsel for the Crown A. Goldkind (virtually), D. Molloy (in court), Counsel for Zachary Gibson
Reasons for Sentence
DI LUCA J. (Orally):
On July 13, 2022, Zachary Gibson brutally murdered Michael Grawberger. He was arrested and initially charged with first-degree murder. On September 9, 2024, the date scheduled for the start of his trial, Mr. Gibson appeared before me and following a detailed plea comprehension inquiry, entered a guilty plea to the lesser and included offence of second-degree murder.
The matter was adjourned for a two-day sentencing hearing that occurred on September 26 and 27, 2024. During that sentencing hearing, I received various victim impact statements, a pre-sentence report and defence letters in support. I also received the helpful and focused submissions of all counsel.
Following the completion of submissions, I adjourned the proceedings to today’s date to give me time to digest the evidence, submissions and caselaw.
My task in these reasons is to come up with the appropriate sentence to impose.
The length of the custodial sentence is straightforward. By operation of the Criminal Code, Mr. Gibson will receive a life sentence in prison.
Contrary to the perception of some members of the public and media, a life sentence is not a fixed sentence. A life sentence means exactly that. It is a sentence that ends when the person subject to that sentence dies.
My remaining issue in this case is to set the period of parole ineligibility. This is the period of time Mr. Gibson must serve before he can apply for parole and it runs from the date on which Mr. Gibson was arrested in relation to this offence.
To be clear, the date of parole eligibility is not the date that Mr. Gibson will be released from prison. It is simply the date on which he may apply for full parole. There is no guarantee that he will get parole. Even if he gets parole, he will remain subject to the terms and conditions set by the Parole Board.
In this specific case, the Crown is seeking a 22‑year period of parole ineligibility. The defence submits that a period of 13-14 years is sufficient in the particular circumstances of this case.
The Principles Governing the Parole Ineligibility Determination
Section 745 (c) of the Criminal Code provides that on conviction for second-degree murder, the offender must be sentenced to life imprisonment, with no eligibility for parole for a fixed period ranging from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 25 years.
Section 745.4 requires the sentencing judge to fix the parole ineligibility period, from that minimum of 10 years to the period the judge deems fit, up to the maximum of 25 years.
I am directed, by s. 745.4 of the Code that, in exercising my discretion, I must have regard to the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission. While not applicable in this case, I would also in another case consider any recommendation by a jury.
The determination of the parole ineligibility period is “a very fact sensitive process”. See: R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 1. The sliding scale of parole ineligibility reflects the fact that “within second degree murder there is both a range of seriousness and varying degrees of moral culpability”. See: Shropshire, at para. 31.
As a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by the sentencing judge’s determination that, according to the criteria set out in s. 745.4, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability for release assessed. An increased parole ineligibility period does not require unusual circumstances. See: Shropshire, at paras. 26 to 29. There is no requirement that the facts of a specific case be “unusual” in order for a period of parole ineligibility in excess of 10 years to be considered fit and appropriate.
In R. v. McKnight (1999), 44 O.R. (3d) 263 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that in assessing the s. 745.4 criteria and in deciding whether to increase the period of parole ineligibility, all of the objectives of sentencing are relevant. Those objectives, as set out in s. 718, are denunciation of unlawful conduct and the harm caused to victims or to the community; deterrence both general and specific; the separation of offenders from society where necessary; rehabilitation; reparation for harm done to victims or to the community; and promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community. The Court, however, observed in McKnight that the statutory 10-year minimum ineligibility period limits the weight that can be accorded to the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation.
The period of parole ineligibility to be imposed must reflect the fundamental principle of proportionality set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, which provides that a sentence must be “proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. See: R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 and R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64. A sentence is proportionate when it reconciles the individual offender’s circumstances and the relative parity of sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.
Lastly, and as indicated earlier in my reasons, regardless of the period of parole ineligibility imposed, the sentence remains one of life imprisonment. I am not deciding whether Mr. Gibson should be paroled but merely the period he must serve before parole can even be considered. It will be up to the Parole Board many years from now to decide if Mr. Gibson should ever be released back into the community.
The Circumstances of the Offence
The facts of the offence are particularly brutal. They are set out in detail in the agreed statement of fact, which has been filed as an exhibit in these proceedings.
While I will not repeat them here in great detail, I have considered them all and simply note the following summary for context.
Mr. Gibson and Kristina Freiwillig were common-law partners. They have three children, Jax, Kai and Kane. Mr. Gibson is Kane’s biological father. Mr. Gibson also raised the other two boys as if they were his own.
Mr. Gibson and Ms. Freiwillig resided together at 66 Regatta Crescent in Whitby for approximately six years. Towards the end of the time period, the relationship between them grew distant. Approximately one week before the murder, Ms. Freiwillig told Mr. Gibson that their relationship was over and that she would never love him in a romantic way again.
By this time, Ms. Freiwillig had started a relationship with the deceased, Mr. Grawberger. She did not believe that Mr. Gibson knew of the relationship.
On July 12, 2022, the day before the murder, Ms. Freiwillig picked up the children from her mother’s and drove them back to the family home. Once there, Mr. Gibson spoke with Ms. Freiwillig and the children. He then took the children to the family trailer at Duck Lake. The plan was that Mr. Gibson and the children would stay at the trailer until July 14. Mr. Gibson departed with the children. He was driving a Dodge Caravan.
The following day, July 13, 2022, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Ms. Freiwillig was at the family residence in the company of Mr. Grawberger.
Earlier that day at around 1:23 p.m., Ms. Freiwillig received a Facebook message from Mr. Gibson indicating that he would be returning home the following morning, Thursday, July 14, 2022.
Unbeknownst to Ms. Freilwillig and Mr. Grawberger, Mr. Gibson left the trailer in the early afternoon of July 13. He drove to his parents’ house in the Dodge Caravan. Once there he dropped off the kids and switched vehicles to his mother’s Dodge Avenger. He told his mother that he would not be long.
During the drive, Mr. Gibson’s six-year-old son Kane heard Mr. Gibson state that he would kill someone. While Mr. Gibson does not specifically recall making this utterance, he accepts that his son was being truthful in recounting this event. Kane also observed a knife on the front passenger seat of the Dodge Caravan.
Mr. Gibson then drove over to the family home. He parked the Dodge Avenger several houses north of the family home in a visitor parking lot.
At approximately 3:33 p.m., Mr. Gibson entered the family residence through the front door using a key. He slammed the door behind him as he entered. He was armed with two knives. One was described as a large kitchen knife and the other was described as a curved machete.
When he entered the home, he found Ms. Freiwillig and Mr. Grawberger lying down on the living room couch. Ms. Freiwillig was on top of Mr. Grawberger. Mr. Gibson said “hello there”. He then lunged towards the couch and stabbed Mr. Grawberger 25 times. Ms. Freilwillig tried to stop him but was unsuccessful. Mr. Gibson then cornered Ms. Freiwillig by the front door, preventing her escape. She managed to flee out the back door and went to the neighbour’s home.
Ms. Freilwillig and a neighbour eventually returned to the family residence. They had called 911. Ms. Freiwillig applied CPR to Mr. Grawberger until paramedics arrived. Mr. Grawberger was “vital signs absent” upon transport to Sunnybrook Hospital. His cause of death was multiple stab wounds to the torso. The fatal wound was a stab wound to the right chest area which partially transected the aorta and pulmonary trunk as well as damaging the upper atrium of the heart.
Following the murder, Mr. Gibson left the scene and returned to his parents’ house. He had blood on his clothing. He then switched vehicles back to the Dodge Caravan and returned to the trailer at Duck Lake.
Police went searching for Mr. Gibson - first at his parents’ home and then at Duck Lake. Mr. Gibson was arrested at the trailer at Duck Lake at approximately 10:33 p.m. Upon arrest, he stated that he had made the biggest mistake of his life. He explained that his girlfriend had been having relations with another man for over a year and he had been helping pay for her kids. He told the officers that he was planning on turning himself in the following day.
Police found numerous items of evidence at the Duck Lake trailer, including red stained clothing found in a bag in a shed. The clothing was tested and the DNA analysis revealed the presence of Mr. Grawberger’s blood on the clothing. Police also located bloodstained shoes and a knife which had DNA on it from both Mr. Grawberger and Ms. Freiwilling.
Other Evidence
During their investigation, police learned that at 4:30 in the morning on July 13th, prior to the murder, Mr. Gibson texted a co-worker and said that he had hacked into Ms. Freiwillig’s Facebook account and knew that she was cheating on him. He indicated that he was working on a plan and indicated he wanted to kill the man that was messaging Ms. Freiwillig. In reference to Ms. Freiwillig, Mr. Gibson indicated that he was going to “fuck her over hard and her friends.”
Later that day at approximately 3:49 p.m., Mr. Gibson called the same co-worker and told him he had stabbed Mr. Grawberger.
Police eventually seized and examined Mr. Gibson’s cell phones. On one phone, they discovered that Ms. Freiwillig’s Facebook account was activated and that, as a result, Mr. Gibson had access to her Facebook communications, including those with Mr. Grawberger.
Police also found a communication between Mr. Gibson and his boss which occurred approximately three hours before the murder. In this communication, Mr. Gibson’s boss asked whether Gibson was interested in another shift. Mr. Gibson replied that he was going to be “MIA” for a while.
Evidence from Ms. Freiwillig’s phone also revealed communications, very close in time to the murder, wherein Mr. Gibson expressed disappointment and anger at the breakdown of the relationship.
The Circumstances and Character of the Offender
Mr. Gibson is 44 years of age. He has no criminal record. He grew up in a stable and functional household that was free from abuse, criminality, mental illness and/or drug and alcohol abuse.
Mr. Gibson has a high school education and has completed some additional training including a water treatment technician course. He has a track record of employment in various positions and was most recently employed at a water control plant where his father also worked. He was at this position for a period of six years ending with his arrest.
While Mr. Gibson claims to have no significant issues with alcohol or drugs, he explains that he was regularly using Percocet which he obtained from Ms. Freiwillig. He also explained that he and Ms. Freiwillig would occasionally use cocaine.
Mr. Gibson has a history of anxiety and ADD but no other significant mental health issues.
In terms of his relationship with Ms. Freiwillig, Mr. Gibson asserts that he felt like a “trapped animal” and that she would “come at him” and “yell at him” and he would walk away and leave the situation. That said, he claims he was blindsided when he learned that Ms. Freiwillig was cheating on him.
Mr. Gibson worked hard at being a good father and, surprisingly, everyone involved in this tragic case seems to agree that he was, in fact, a good father, despite the irony of that statement in view of what happened.
Both in the pre-sentence report and in his address to the court, Mr. Gibson accepted responsibility for the offence, demonstrated remorse and indicated a willingness to accept his punishment.
In addition to the pre-sentence report, I also received a volume of letters in support from Mr. Gibson’s family, friends, former boss and former co-workers as well as a letter from a fellow inmate. These letters all describe Mr. Gibson as kind, generous, a supportive person, an excellent hardworking employee, a gifted athlete and above all else a proud family man. Several of the letters describe Mr. Gibson as a gentle giant who was never prone to violence and often took bullies to task. Almost every letter describes him as an excellent father who was dedicated to raising the three boys he shared with Ms. Freiwillig. Lastly, the letter writers all note that the offence is entirely out of character and not in keeping with the person they know and love.
Victim Impact Statements
A large volume of victim impact statements were filed during the sentencing hearing. Many of the victims were present in court and several took the opportunity to read their victim statements in court.
Having heard and re-read the victim impact statements, it is obvious to me that Mr. Grawberger’s death has had a devastating, life-altering impact on those who had the privilege of knowing him. In short, they are absolutely shattered by his death.
Mr. Grawberger is described as a loving and kind man, who was caring for four young children as a single father following the untimely death of the children’s mother. He was also heavily involved in his stepson Eli’s life. All these children have been deprived of a loving and caring father. They will now be forced to travel through life in his absence with their memories forever tarnished by the circumstances of his death.
Mr. Grawberger’s death is also acutely felt by his parents Peter and Terry and his brother and grandmother. Their lives have been irreparably damaged by this loss.
This crime has had a particularly devastating impact on Ms. Freiwillig who, as I will discuss in a moment, was the focus of Mr. Gibson’s rage and anger, though it was ultimately visited most directly and violently upon Mr. Grawberger.
In her victim impact statement, Ms. Freiwillig speaks eloquently about the long-lasting damage this horrific offence has had on her. She states:
“I lost not only my dreams and goals for the future, but my sense of self-worth. Everyday, I wake up with the overwhelming grief and darkness that clouds my ‘forced’ new life, knowing that no one can truly understand the pain, isolation, and alienation caused by the uniqueness of what I have endured.”
Ms. Freiwillig explains how all the happy family memories have been replaced by the horrors she witnessed on July 13. She also speaks about the impact that this offence has had on her children and how the shame of what Mr. Gibson did will hang heavily over all of them. Poignantly, Ms. Freiwillig describes how she has been alienated by those close to Mr. Gibson and that this alienation is essentially a rejection of her truth and her children’s truth. Notwithstanding the hurt and pain, Ms. Freiwillig displays a resolve to not let this crime define her or destroy her.
Many of Ms. Freiwillig’s sentiments are echoed in the other victim impact statements. Her mother, Dagmar Freiwillig described the life shattering moment when she first learned of the murder and how she rushed to be by her daughter’s side to deal with the traumatic fallout. She describes how she had to fake strength and calmness for the sake of the boys only to then end up in tears in the shower. She expresses unrelenting grief for all the families involved and especially from Mr. Grawberger “whose only crime was to love and be at the wrong place at the wrong time.”
Finally, I turn to the victim impact statements filed by Ms. Freiwillig’s three children, Jax, Kai and Kane. These victim impact statements are short but they are incredibly powerful. They highlight the duality that these children are struggling to reconcile. While it is clear that they love their father, they are mad at what he has done. It does not take a psychologist to understand that these children are and will continue to be in pain. In fact, I have no doubt that these children will struggle to comprehend how a person they love and admire, their father, could in an instant cause so much harm. I suspect that they may never be able to reconcile this duality.
On the whole, the victim impact statements presented in court fully demonstrate a sense of open and raw anguish over Mr. Grawberger’s death, the particularly brutal nature of the crime, and the broader impacts on Ms. Freiwillig and all the children. Their pain is obvious and palpable, and I have no doubt that it will mark the remainder of their lives.
All of the victims should rest assured that I have heard their voices and I have felt their pain. No sentence I impose could ever bring back Mr. Grawberger or undo all of the pain or loss. The sentence I impose must consider all factors within a legal framework. I urge all the family members to move forward from today and continue on the path of healing with strength, courage and resilience that they have shown before the court. I wish them strength in this emotional and overwhelming task.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Aggravating Factors
I find the following to be aggravating:
- The murder of Mr. Grawberger involved a brutal attack - it was a one-sided attack against a vulnerable unarmed individual. It involved 25 wounds which included at least 16 stab wounds, including one through the heart.
- While Mr. Gibson entered a guilty plea to second-degree murder, the offence has obvious features of planning and deliberation. On this issue, I note that Mr. Gibson switched vehicles before driving to his residence. He parked the vehicle he was driving some distance away. He then entered the residence armed with two knives. There was no argument or conflict once inside the house. Instead, he essentially lunged towards Mr. Grawberger and stabbed him many times. When coupled with the agreed facts relating to the communication with his co‑worker and the comments made to his son prior to the murder, the facts in this case come very close to first-degree murder.
- The murder occurred in a domestic context. While Mr. Grawberger was the murder victim, the target of Mr. Gibson’s rage and control was Ms. Freiwillig. He simply could not accept the fact that she had started another romantic relationship and he took steps to deprive her of her new found partner. On this issue, I want to be perfectly clear. Ms. Freiwillig is not to blame for what happened here. In no way did she cause this offence to happen. Mr. Gibson is the one who is solely responsible for it.
- The murder took place inside the sanctity of the family residence. This should have been a place of safety and security for Ms. Freiwillig and her children.
- Lastly, I note the breadth of victimization, as the Crown aptly noted the topography, stemming from this violent and selfish act. Mr. Gibson killed Mr. Grawberger. He deprived Mr. Grawberger’s children of their only remaining parent. He deprived his children of himself. He deprived Ms. Freiwillig of her new found romantic partner. He deprived Mr. Grawberger’s family of their son, brother and nephew. He deprived Ms. Freiwillig’s family of Ms. Freiwillig in the sense that she is no longer the person that she once was. In short, the consequences of this offence are vast.
Mitigating Factors
I find the following to be mitigating:
- Mr. Gibson entered a guilty plea which involves an acceptance of responsibility. The guilty plea is also a demonstration of remorse and serves to spare everyone, particularly his son Kane, the challenges of an emotional trial. While the plea came late in the day, I find that it nonetheless serves as a significant mitigating factor.
- Mr. Gibson is a first offender with no criminal record.
- Apart from this incident, Mr. Gibson has led a pro-social life, with gainful employment, a large and supportive family, friend and peer group.
- Mr. Gibson has rehabilitative potential and is willing to accept counselling, which he has already started since being incarcerated.
- In his allocution before the court, Mr. Gibson expressed sincere remorse and appeared to accept the breadth and gravity of the harm he has caused. That said, the degree of mitigation on this point is lessened somewhat by the fact that Mr. Gibson appears to believe, as is stated in the pre-sentence report, that this offence came about as a result of a “series of unfortunate events.” This suggests a lack of true insight into what caused this incident, which I find is rage and anger towards Ms. Freiwillig.
In terms of the mitigating effect of harsh pre-sentence conditions, I note that the caselaw is divided on whether harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody can be considered when setting a period of parole ineligibility for murder. See, for example, R. v. Daley, 2021 ONSC 7678, on the one hand and R. v. Morales, 2023 ONSC 1607, on the other.
Assuming without deciding that I can consider pre-sentence custody, I would place minimal, if any, weight on that factor in this case. The records suggest that during 805 days of incarceration, Mr. Gibson was triple bunked on four days. He was also subject to partial lockdowns (less than six hours) on 440 occasions and full lockdowns (more than six hours) on 194 occasions. While this number of lockdowns is far from ideal, I have no evidence about the personal impacts that these lockdowns had on Mr. Gibson. Even if I were to infer that these conditions had some direct impact Mr. Gibson, that finding would simply not move the needle on the parole ineligibility period in this case.
Periods of Parole Ineligibility in Similar Cases
Both parties have provided helpful case briefs that contain a number of cases they submit are helpful in determining the appropriate period of parole ineligibility. I note that as is often the case, no single case is “on all fours” with the one before the court now. Sentencing in cases of second-degree murder is particularly fact-sensitive and case-specific.
That said, the Court of Appeal has provided guidance in cases of domestic second-degree homicide. In R. v. French, 2017 ONCA 460, the Court noted that cases from the Court of Appeal allow for a range of up to 17 years in circumstances where there are no mitigating factors or remorse. The range discussed in R. v. French has been more recently approved. See: R. v. Tayongtong, 2021 ONCA 281 at para. 47 and R. v. Ranhotra, 2022 ONCA 548 at para. 77, both from the Court of Appeal.
Of course, ranges are not meant to be straitjackets. See: R. v. Lacasse, at paras. 57-60. The particular facts of a case may warrant a sentence that sits outside the range of previously decided cases.
In terms of the cases relied on by the Crown which range from 20 to 22 years of parole ineligibility, I note that in three of the four cases, the sentences were imposed after trial. These cases are R. v. Ching, 2022 ONCA 183 affirming 2020 ONSC 129, R. v. Owusu-Ansah, 2024 ONCA 192, and R. v. Murray, 2021 ONSC 597. The Murray decision bears little factual similarity to this case and does not assist in my task.
The Ching and Owusu-Ansah cases bear some factual similarity but there are also significant differences, in addition to the fact that the sentence in those cases was imposed after trial. In particular, Mr. Owosu-Ansah had a criminal record that included prior entries for domestic violence. He committed arson to the body after the murder and he was held to constitute a danger to women with whom he had a sexual relationship. In terms of Mr. Ching, the trial judge found that Mr. Ching committed the brutal murder of his ex-wife’s uncle in the course of carrying out his plan to kill his ex-wife. As such, the trial judge was satisfied that his degree of moral blameworthiness was akin to that of an offender who committed first-degree murder.
Lastly, I turn to R. v. Brush, 2017 ONSC 664, where the defendant was sentenced to 22 years of parole ineligibility following a guilty plea to second-degree murder. Again, the facts of this case are particularly horrific and do not greatly assist in determining the appropriate sentence in this case. Mr. Brush entered the victim’s apartment to steal her underwear and masturbate. The victim happened to come home and was attacked by Mr. Brush who threw a blanket over her head, choked and punched her, beat her with a table leg, attempted to slash her throat with a butcher’s knife, and then went to the kitchen to retrieve a better knife to “finish her off”. The victim had 45 different areas of injury including the amputation of almost all of her fingers. The victim was also doused in gasoline and set on fire. While the task of ranking cases based on brutality is unpalatable at best, the facts in Brush are distinguishable from those present in this case.
I next turn to the cases cited by the defence. In this regard, I note that these cases set out a range of 10 to 17 years, with the bulk of cases clustered at 13 to 14 years. In particular, I consider the following cases to be helpful, R. v. Randhawa, 2024 ONSC 1326, R. v. Gebere, [2013] O.J. No. 3744, and R. v. Lake, 2023 ONSC 658, given their rough factual similarities.
Sentence To Be Imposed
In considering the appropriate length of the period of parole ineligibility, I must place significant weight on deterrence and denunciation. The sentence I impose must reflect the brutal one-sided nature of the attack, the loss of life occasioned, and the deep and forever lasting impact that this murder will have on Mr. Grawberger’s and Ms. Freiwillig’s families, particularly, the children.
I must also consider that Mr. Gibson’s conduct reveals a very high degree of moral culpability, falling just shy of that for first-degree murder.
That said, I must also consider that Mr. Gibson is before the court as a first offender. He has positive family and community supports. He has a rehabilitative potential.
When I take everything into account and balance the governing legal principles, particularly the cardinal principle of proportionality, I find that a parole ineligibility period of 17 years is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. While this is at the high end of the range articulated in R. v. French, the facts of this case warrant a harsh sentence notwithstanding the presence of significant mitigating factors. Simply stated, the murder here was very brutal. It had elements of planning and deliberation and it resulted in significant and life-altering impacts to the extended victims, particularly, Ms. Freiwillig, her children and Mr. Grawberger’s children.
Ms. Gibson, would you please stand, sir.
For the second-degree murder of Michael Grawberger, I sentence you to life in prison. You will not be eligible to apply for parole for a period of 17 years from the date on which you were taken into custody.
In addition to the life sentence of imprisonment, I also impose the following ancillary orders:
- A DNA Order
- A section 109 weapons prohibition order for life
- I also impose a non-communication order with the listed individuals and in a moment I will invite the Crown to read that list out.
- Given your personal circumstances, sir, I waive the imposition of the victim fine surcharge.
Crown, would you please read out the names.
P. AFFLECK: The following names, please: Terry Grawberger, Peter Grawberger, Barbara Grawberger, Christopher Grawberger, Eli Sutton, Samuel Sutton-Grawberger, Emmett Sutton-Grawberger, Laila Sutton-Grawberger, Piper Sutton-Grawberger, Pat Jordan, Dagmar Freiwillig. And the following names will be subject to an exception: Kane Gibson, Jax Gibson and Kai Gibson; except regarding Kane, Jax, and Kai Gibson, pursuant to a valid Family Court Order made after today’s date. Then Tyrese Wisdom, D’Andrej Felix, and finally Jill Lucas. Thank you, Your Honour.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. So those names will be included in a non-communication order and that is for the period of time that Mr. Gibson remains in custody. Are there any other issues from either side, counsel?
P. AFFLECK: Not from the Crown. Thank you, Your Honour.
THE COURT: Thank you. Any other issues from the defence?
A. GOLDKIND: Thank you very much, Your Honour. On behalf of Mr. Gibson and myself, we want to thank you for the time, effort, patience you put into this matter. I think I said that to Your Honour when we last saw you in August, and I think this is the time to repeat that on behalf of my side.
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Well, I thank all the lawyers involved and students behind the lawyers for their hard work in landing what is an emotional and difficult case for everyone involved. I want to thank everyone who is present in the room today. I know how difficult it must be for everyone to be here and I wish you all God’s speed in leaving the courtroom and in finding strength and resilience as you go forward from today’s date. All right.
Officers, will you please remove the prisoner
R E C E S S
U P O N R E S U M I N G :
THE COURT: Yes, counsel.
P. AFFLECK: Thank you, Your Honour. We submitted the 743.21 document and counsel had agreed to the names. I just neglected to read Kristina Freiwillig’s name, and I just want to apologize to her for doing that. In any event, I just wanted that on the record and not just on the paperwork. It should be on the record. Thank you.
THE COURT: It should be on the record. It’s a matter of public record. So that name will be added. Thank you for bringing it to our attention. No issue on the defence side?
D. MOLLOY: No, and Mr. Goldkind isn’t with us but I did speak with him. No issue with that.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. All right. So that name will be added and everything else stays as is. Officers, if you will take Mr. Gibson out, please.
Certificate of Transcript
FORM 3
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
EVIDENCE ACT, subsection 5(2)
I, Lynn Carrière, Authorized Court Transcriptionist, ACT ID 2366775200, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcription, produced to the best of my skills and ability, of the recording of R. v. Zachary Gibson in the Superior Court of Justice held at 150 Bond Street East, Oshawa, Ontario, taken from Recording No. 2812_205_20241018_093116__20_DILUCAJ, which has been certified in Form 1 by Melissa Martin.
December 20, 2024 Date Electronic signature of Lynn Carrière, ACT ID 2366775200 Ontario, Canada
A certificate in Form 3 is admissible in evidence and is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the transcript is a transcript of the certified recording of evidence and proceedings in the proceeding that is identified in the certificate.

