Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of two young sisters (ages 6-10 and 3-4 at the time of the alleged incidents) between 2015 and 2018.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence regarding the testimony of both complainants.

The court rejected the similar fact evidence application due to concerns about unconscious collusion between the sisters, finding that the Crown failed to rebut collusion on a balance of probabilities.

At trial, the court found both complainants credible but unreliable due to significant inconsistencies in their testimony, recovered memories through flashbacks and dreams, and lack of independent corroborating evidence.

The court acquitted the accused on all counts, finding a reasonable doubt existed regarding guilt.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention.

The offender had pleaded guilty to criminal harassment, defamatory libel, and other offences against a former domestic partner.

The court found that the offender's conduct constituted a serious personal injury offence and that he posed a threat to the mental well-being of others due to a pattern of repetitive behaviour that he was unable to restrain.

The court concluded that the offender's risk was intractable and that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment.

The defendant, Waqar Ali, was sentenced after being found guilty of sexually assaulting two young women and assault causing bodily harm to one.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victims' extreme intoxication and vulnerability, the defendant's predatory behavior as an Uber driver constituting a breach of trust, and the significant impact on the victims.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's lack of prior record, family support, and efforts to address mental health and addiction issues.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, imposing a total sentence of 18 months and 20 days of incarceration, along with a three-year probation order and other ancillary orders.

The offender, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of assault for striking a young Black man in the face with a metal pipe while the victim was injured and seeking help.

The court emphasized the need for denunciation and general deterrence, noting the breach of public trust and the racialized context of the offence.

The offender was sentenced to 9 months in jail, followed by 12 months of probation, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude evidence of a submachine gun, ammunition, and utterances obtained during a warrantless search of his home.

The police attended the applicant's home to investigate a gun allegation made by his intoxicated girlfriend.

The officers searched the home without a warrant and without advising the applicant of his right to refuse the search or his right to counsel upon detention.

The court found that the applicant was psychologically detained and did not give informed consent to the search, resulting in breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the officers' conduct was serious and the impact on the applicant's rights was significant, warranting the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicants sought a stay of fraud charges due to the loss of a video-taped complainant statement, arguing a breach of their Charter rights to full answer and defence.

The court found the Crown breached section 7 of the Charter due to unacceptable police negligence in preserving the evidence, as a clear policy for making copies was not followed and no explanation was provided for the loss.

However, the court determined that the applicants failed to demonstrate substantial or material prejudice, or an inability to put forward their defence, given the availability of other extensive disclosure.

Consequently, the application for a stay was dismissed, but the court deemed an adverse inference instruction to the jury appropriate as a lesser remedy.

The appellant, Christopher Yong, appealed his conviction for assault following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal raised grounds including judicial notice, assessment of the investigating officer's evidence, and misapprehension of the Crown's evidence by the trial judge.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the complainant showing photographs of injuries to the police officer and the likelihood of the complainant sustaining workplace bruises.

These misapprehensions were deemed essential to the trial judge's reasoning process, leading to the conclusion that the appellant did not receive a fair trial.

The applicant sought a declaration that a deceased father's statement, implicating himself in drug importation and exculpating his daughter, was admissible at her trial either as a declaration against penal interest or under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court denied the application, finding that the statement did not meet the criteria for a declaration against penal interest due to lack of apprehended penal vulnerability and remoteness of consequences.

Furthermore, it lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for the principled exception, given the circumstances of its making, the declarant's criminal record for dishonesty, and absence of corroborating evidence.

The accused, Daniel Veldman, brought an application seeking a finding that the interviewing officer violated his s. 10(b) Charter rights by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel of choice.

The Crown had initially sought a ruling on the voluntariness of Veldman's videotaped statement, but the defence conceded voluntariness.

The court dismissed Veldman's Charter application, finding that his preferred counsel was not a lawyer and that Veldman had unequivocally waived his right to counsel by insisting on giving a statement despite being offered duty counsel multiple times and advised not to speak by duty counsel.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of James Bernard for driving with excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had found violations of Mr. Bernard's s. 10(b) Charter rights (informational and implementational components) and excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and erred in law regarding the s. 10(b) Charter analysis, particularly concerning officer safety exceptions and the feasibility of roadside counsel consultation.

The court also found errors in the s. 24(2) Grant analysis.

The appeal was granted, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Donald Barber appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied a stricter scrutiny standard to his testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in misapprehending the appellant's testimony regarding being 'sucker-punched in the face,' which was a material error affecting the assessment of credibility.

This misapprehension was deemed substantial and played an essential role in the trial judge's reasoning, leading to an unfair trial.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant, R.P., was charged with sexual interference in relation to C.H., his wife's daughter, then aged ten.

The judge-alone trial focused on the credibility of C.H.'s testimony regarding an attempted sexual assault.

The court assessed C.H.'s credibility as a young witness, applying Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on child evidence and victim reactions.

The mother's testimony, which sought to discredit C.H., was found not credible due to her motives and inconsistencies.

The court found C.H. to be a credible and reliable witness, noting her candidness and lack of embellishment.

R.P. was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with sexual interference against his daughter, who alleged he touched her inappropriately while sharing a bed when she was 9 or 10 years old.

The complainant disclosed the incident years later to a teacher.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant, her sister, her mother, and the accused.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the accused's denial unpersuasive but concluded the complainant's evidence was unreliable due to inconsistencies, particularly regarding her prior disclosure to her sister.

The Crown failed to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The appellant, Paul J. Lochner, appealed his conviction for assault and the conditional discharge and 18 months probation sentence.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty after a trial marked by significant disruptions from the appellant and his family.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in credibility findings and by failing to provide adequate reasons.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the record, and that the appellant could not complain about inadequate reasons given his and his family's disruptive behavior that forced the trial judge to cut short his ruling.

The court also rejected the appellant's motion for recusal and adjournment.

The accused Dhillon ordered the kidnapping of the victim over a suspected drug debt.

The victim was bound, beaten, and confined in Dhillon's garage, where he subsequently died.

The cause of death was undetermined but involved either asphyxiation or methamphetamine toxicity.

The court found that the stress and exertion of the kidnapping significantly contributed to the victim's death, satisfying the causation requirement for manslaughter.

Dhillon was found guilty of manslaughter, kidnapping, and interfering with a dead body.

The co-accused Johal was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact for providing the keys to the victim's vehicle to help dispose of the body.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his daughter, brought a pre-trial application to exclude expert opinion evidence suggesting starvation as a possible cause of death.

The accused argued the Crown provided late notice of this theory and that the underlying estimates of the victim's pre-death weight lacked scientific validity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that late notice did not warrant exclusion given the time remaining before trial, and that the experts' estimates, based on specialized experience rather than strict scientific testing, met the threshold reliability required for admissibility.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police stopped his vehicle for a traffic infraction and discovered heroin in the car.

The defence argued that police orchestrated the traffic stop and planted heroin on the vehicle’s console to justify a warrantless search.

The court conducted a blended voir dire addressing the admissibility of the seized drugs under s. 8 of the Charter.

After identifying serious credibility issues and collusion in police testimony, the court concluded that the heroin visible on the console was planted to create a pretext for the search.

The search was found to violate the accused’s Charter rights and the drug evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused was convicted of manslaughter for the unprovoked stabbing death of his stepfather.

The accused suffers from severe schizophrenia and was likely in an acute psychotic state at the time of the offence.

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the defence sought a sentence equivalent to 4 years and 3 months followed by probation.

The court weighed the gravity of the unprovoked attack against the mitigating factor of the accused's major mental illness.

The court sentenced the accused to 6 years' imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in a further 33 months to serve, and recommended placement in a specific facility to ensure ongoing psychiatric treatment.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood‑alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood under the Criminal Code.

The appeal alleged that the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence did not establish that the damaged vehicle observed by one officer was the same vehicle later found with the accused, and that the trial judge’s reasons were legally inadequate.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence—timing, proximity, and distinctive damage to the vehicle—reasonably supported the inference that the same vehicle had been observed driving moments earlier.

The court also found that the trial judge’s reasons sufficiently explained the basis for the conviction and allowed meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with trafficking in crack cocaine following an undercover purchase by a police officer.

The case turned primarily on identification evidence, as the undercover officer observed the seller for less than a minute and no photo line-up was conducted.

The court reviewed the recognized frailties of eyewitness identification and the investigative deficiencies, including the failure to verify phone records or conduct a formal identification procedure.

Nevertheless, the judge found the officer’s identification reliable, noting his detailed observations and immediate recognition of the accused after seeing a photograph at a police briefing.

The identification evidence was materially strengthened by circumstantial evidence showing that a cell phone seized from the accused upon arrest rang when police dialed the same number used to arrange the drug transaction.

Taken together, the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the seller.