Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The offender pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm for his role in a vicious, gang-style attack on a fellow inmate at a correctional facility.

The victim suffered a brain bleed and lingering effects.

The Crown sought 18-24 months in custody, while the defence sought 12 months.

The court considered the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and parity, noting a co-accused received 6 months for simple assault.

The offender was sentenced to 15 months in custody (net 198 days after pre-sentence credit) followed by two years of probation.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault, being unlawfully in a dwelling house, and criminal harassment against his former intimate partner.

He was given a suspended sentence and 18 months of probation.

He appealed, seeking a conditional discharge and a reduction of the probation term to 12 months, which was the Crown's position at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the suspended sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the proportionality principle.

However, the court reduced the probation term to 12 months, holding that the trial judge erred by imposing a longer term than the Crown requested without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to make submissions.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and sexual assault offences, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained.

The applicant proposed a new surety who worked from home and could provide 24/7 supervision without internet access.

The court found this constituted a material change in circumstances that addressed the original bail judge's concerns regarding the secondary ground.

The court also found the original judge erred by violating the presumption of innocence in assuming the applicant would not follow conditions simply because he was charged with human trafficking.

The court concluded that a strict release plan with the new surety and a GPS monitor addressed both secondary and tertiary grounds, and ordered the applicant's release.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) analysis, misapprehended his evidence, and erred in assessing the complainant's reliability given her intoxication and memory gaps.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the credibility assessment principles, correctly understood the appellant's evidence as untruthful rather than a mistaken belief, and appropriately evaluated the complainant's reliability against the totality of the evidence.

During a first-degree murder trial, an alternate juror reported that another juror had expressed a belief in the accused's guilt before any evidence was called.

The offending juror was discharged.

The accused moved for a mistrial, arguing the remaining jurors may have been tainted.

The court dismissed the application, finding that several other jurors had immediately criticized the offending remark and defended the presumption of innocence, demonstrating that the jury was not tainted.

The accused was charged with several offences, including sexual assault and child luring.

During the investigation, police impersonated the 15-year-old complainant using her phone to communicate with the accused and capture his messages without a warrant.

Upon his arrest, police conducted a warrantless search of his cell phone, taking screenshots of all messages across multiple applications.

The court found that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his messages to the complainant, and that the warrantless undercover operation violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court also found the search of his phone incident to arrest was overly broad and violated s. 8.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence obtained from the undercover operation and the search incident to arrest.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of Brian Walsh on a charge of driving with a blood alcohol level "over 80".

The trial judge had found two s.8 Charter violations: lack of reasonable suspicion for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand and failure to administer the ASD test "forthwith," leading to the exclusion of breath samples under s.24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in her assessment of "reasonable suspicion" by misapprehending evidence and incorrectly applying legal principles regarding innocent explanations.

While agreeing there was a "forthwith" violation, the appeal court found it less serious than characterized by the trial judge.

The appeal court also determined that the trial judge erred in her s.24(2) Charter analysis by overstating the gravity of the violations and incorrectly assessing the impact on the accused, particularly by considering the entire arrest procedure rather than just the minimal intrusiveness of the breath sample itself.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused killed the victim while suffering from a severe mental disorder.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission, supported by two comprehensive forensic psychiatric reports, that the accused was incapable of assessing the moral wrongfulness of his actions due to psychosis and delusions.

The court accepted the joint submission, rendered a special verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, and referred the disposition to the Ontario Review Board.

Several accused brought Garofoli applications seeking exclusion of evidence obtained through multiple Part VI wiretap authorizations in a large drug trafficking investigation.

They argued the affidavits failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds and improperly named them as known parties under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that one authorization related to a homicide investigation lacked sufficient grounds on the edited record and therefore violated s. 8 of the Charter; intercepted room‑probe communications from a residence were excluded under s. 24(2).

However, the court found that the principal drug trafficking wiretap authorizations were supported by reasonable grounds based on confidential informant information, surveillance, phone records, and associations among targets.

Applications to exclude evidence obtained under those authorizations were dismissed.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of two police interviews with the accused.

The defence conceded voluntariness of the first statement but argued its prejudicial effect outweighed probative value, while challenging the voluntariness of the second statement based on inducements and oppressive interrogation tactics.

Applying the confessions rule and the principles in Oickle and Singh, the court found that the accused’s will was never overborne despite repeated assertions of the right to silence and persistent police questioning.

Both statements were therefore voluntary.

However, the court held that significant portions of the first interview containing police commentary, opinion, and criticism of the accused’s exercise of the right to silence must be edited before being admitted, and the second statement was intended primarily for potential use in cross‑examination rather than for its contents.

On a summary conviction appeal from a conviction for impaired care or control of a vessel, the appellant challenged the trial judge's treatment of conflicting Crown evidence on the identity of the operator.

The appeal judge held that the trial judge mischaracterized one witness's evidence by understating her certainty that the conservation officer arrived only after the vessel was already docked.

The court further held that the reasons did not adequately explain why one Crown witness was preferred over the other on the central credibility issue.

The conviction was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice for a new trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to provide a suitable breath sample contrary to s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing contradictions in the evidence regarding alcohol consumption, improperly accepted the officer’s testimony that he refused to provide a breath sample, failed to consider the mens rea element, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge was entitled to prefer the officer’s evidence and that credibility findings are owed deference on appeal unless unsupported by the evidence.

The court found the trial judge had an evidential basis to conclude the appellant intentionally failed or refused to provide a proper sample despite multiple opportunities.

The $1,500 fine was slightly above the statutory minimum and not demonstrably unfit.

During a criminal jury trial, the Crown sought to introduce expert evidence from a police officer regarding a 'code of silence' within a Toronto neighbourhood, which allegedly discouraged witnesses from cooperating with police due to fear of retaliation.

The proposed evidence was tendered after key witnesses had testified and was intended to explain an eyewitness’s earlier reluctance to identify the shooter.

Applying the Mohan framework and the two‑stage admissibility analysis described in Abbey, the court found the proposed evidence met the threshold requirements of relevance and expert qualification.

However, the court concluded the evidence was not necessary because the eyewitness had already testified about the alleged code of silence and the jury could assess credibility without expert assistance.

The court held the potential prejudice—particularly the risk of implying gang involvement without supporting evidence—outweighed the probative value.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault under s. 266 of the Criminal Code following a domestic altercation.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence and failed to properly consider the defence of consent arising from the complainant's conduct during the confrontation.

The appeal court held that the trial judge mischaracterized key aspects of the appellant’s testimony, including whether he was certain his hands did not slide to the complainant’s throat and whether he had instructed the complainant to leave the room.

These errors materially affected the credibility analysis and the application of the W.(D.) framework.

Because the misapprehension of evidence was substantive and central to the conviction, the court found a miscarriage of justice and ordered a new trial.

The applicant appealed a conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting a Crown concession that a Charter s. 10(b) breach occurred, in refusing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) after finding an unlawful detention contrary to s. 9, and in concluding that impairment was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal judge held that a trial judge is not bound to accept a Crown concession on a Charter issue and must reach an independent conclusion.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to recognize that the unlawful detention also produced a separate s. 10(b) breach, the evidence would still not have been excluded under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The remaining grounds of appeal lacked merit and the conviction was upheld.

The accused required a Tagalog interpreter for a criminal trial, but there were no accredited Tagalog interpreters in Ontario.

Defence counsel objected to the court conducting a competency inquiry into non‑accredited interpreters, relying on prior decisions suggesting that only accredited interpreters should be used.

The court held that s. 14 of the Charter guarantees a competent or qualified interpreter, not necessarily an accredited one, and determined that a competency inquiry into proposed interpreters was appropriate.

The matter was adjourned to allow arrangements for a conditionally accredited Tagalog interpreter who had previously interpreted at the preliminary inquiry to attend.

The accused waived s. 11(b) Charter rights for the adjournment period.

Sentencing following convictions for three counts of trafficking crack cocaine and one count of possession of proceeds of crime after undercover police purchases.

The offender, a first-time offender with refugee status and no prior record, sold small quantities of crack cocaine on three occasions and was arrested with marked buy money.

The court considered the sentencing principles under s.718 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while also weighing the offender’s rehabilitative efforts and lack of prior criminal history.

Applying the framework for conditional sentences under s.742.1 and the guidance in R. v. Proulx, the court concluded that the risk of re‑offending was minimal and that a community-based sanction could achieve the objectives of sentencing.

A conditional sentence of imprisonment followed by probation was imposed.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings on drug trafficking charges, alleging that police used excessive force during his arrest while executing a search warrant for firearms.

The applicant claimed repeated kicks to the head and a blow with a shotgun butt, asserting violations of ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court rejected the applicant’s account as not credible and accepted the officers’ evidence that the applicant resisted arrest in a confined space during a high-risk firearms search.

The court found that the force used to gain control of the applicant was reasonable and that the injury sustained was an unintended consequence of lawful force.

No Charter breach was established and the requested stay was denied.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted after the trial judge found a breach of the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in an impaired driving prosecution.

The appeal court held that the trial judge mischaracterized certain periods of delay as institutional rather than neutral and erred in inferring prejudice to the accused.

Recalculating the delay reduced the unreasonable delay to approximately 11¾ months, which was insufficient to justify an inference of prejudice in the absence of evidence of actual prejudice.

The court found no error in the balancing of societal interests and Charter rights but concluded the stay was improperly granted.

The accused was charged with trafficking in cocaine, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited weapon following an undercover drug investigation.

The Crown relied primarily on an undercover officer’s identification of the accused as the seller during a brief drug transaction and on drugs allegedly discovered during a later arrest.

The court held that the identification process was unreliable due to the short observation period, inconsistent descriptions, and suggestive identification circumstances.

The court also found serious inconsistencies in the police evidence concerning the search and alleged discovery of drugs during the arrest.

Given these evidentiary weaknesses, the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.