Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

The plaintiff entered into an unwritten real estate arrangement orchestrated by a third-party broker, whereby she obtained mortgage financing to purchase a property from power of sale proceedings, allowing the former owner to live there and potentially repurchase it after one year.

When the year expired, the former owner failed to secure financing to repurchase the property.

The court held that the plaintiff retains full title to the property and is entitled to vacant possession.

The court also found that the broker breached his duty of care by failing to document the arrangement or advise the parties to seek legal counsel, making him liable for the plaintiff's costs and for $20,000 to the former owner.

Furthermore, the court ordered the removal of a third mortgage fraudulently registered against the property by another defendant.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The action arose from Facebook posts made by the defendant accusing the plaintiff, a school principal, of sexual harassment and abuse of power, using the #MeToo hashtag.

The court found that while the expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit and there were grounds to believe the defendant had no valid defence.

The court concluded that the significant harm suffered by the plaintiff, including loss of employment and community standing, outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion was dismissed, allowing the defamation action to proceed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant for an unprovoked assault at a stag-and-doe party that resulted in a T11 compression fracture.

The defendant failed to defend the action and was noted in default.

The court found the defendant liable for battery and assessed damages, awarding $85,000 in non-pecuniary general damages, $17,585 for past income loss, $50,000 for loss of competitive advantage, and $21,640 for future care costs, totaling $177,248.60.

The defendant brought a motion to quash two summonses to witness issued by the plaintiffs, which sought to examine two of the defendant's lawyers on pending interlocutory motions regarding the sale of jointly owned property.

The court quashed the summonses on three grounds: failure to comply with service requirements under the Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to demonstrate that the lawyers' evidence was relevant and necessary, and abuse of process.

The court found the summonses were issued for ulterior purposes, including gathering evidence for a separate action against the lawyers and attempting to create a conflict of interest to preclude them from acting as counsel.

The defendants requested that the plaintiff's action be dismissed or stayed under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff, a former student suspended from Mohawk College, had commenced three separate actions arising from the same incidents, claiming $100,000,000 in damages in this third action.

The court found the claim against the individual defendants and 'Security and Emergency Management' to be frivolous and vexatious, as no specific allegations were pleaded against them, and dismissed those claims.

The action against Mohawk College was stayed, with the plaintiff granted a limited opportunity to amend the claim and lift the stay upon satisfying certain conditions, including paying a prior costs order.

The applicants, purchasers of pre-construction residential units, sought a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) after the respondent vendors terminated the agreements of purchase and sale, relying on an early termination condition, and subsequently offered the units at a 25% price increase.

The respondents argued the court lacked jurisdiction due to a mandatory arbitration clause in the Tarion Warranty.

The court held it retained jurisdiction to issue a CPL under the Courts of Justice Act despite the arbitration clause.

The court granted the CPL, finding a triable issue regarding the respondents' reliance on the early termination condition and concluding that damages might not be an adequate remedy given the unique location and advantageous pricing of the units in a rapidly rising real estate market.

The applicant sought an urgent injunction to prevent the respondent physician from performing an apnea test on the patient, who had suffered a severe brain injury, to determine neurological death.

The patient's mother, acting as substitute decision-maker, refused consent for the test and applied to the Consent and Capacity Board to determine if the test constituted 'treatment' under the Health Care Consent Act.

The physician argued the test was an assessment not requiring consent and that the Board lacked jurisdiction.

The court granted the injunction, holding that the Board is the appropriate body to determine at first instance whether an apnea test constitutes 'treatment' requiring consent under the Act, and that the RJR-MacDonald test for an interim injunction was met.

This is an addendum to a ruling granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the action.

The court clarified that the dismissal is not an adjudication on the merits and does not automatically declare the 1997 will takes precedence over the 2001 will.

The court ordered the parties to attend a settlement meeting if the matter is not resolved within 45 days.

Following a trial on damages for the repudiation of a commercial lease, the plaintiff sought costs.

The plaintiff claimed substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle and allegations of perjury by the defendants.

The court rejected the claim for substantial indemnity costs, finding no special circumstances or perjury.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the trial and re-ordered the payment of costs from a prior summary judgment motion, resulting in a total costs award of $55,461.70 to the plaintiff.

The respondents to a counter-application filed a requisition to dismiss the counter-application because the applicant failed to pay previously ordered costs by the specified deadline.

The court reviewed the affidavit confirming non-payment and ordered the counter-application dismissed in accordance with its prior order.

The defendants were successful on a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court and sought costs of $8,421.09.

The plaintiff opposed the quantum, arguing the hourly rates and time spent were excessive, and challenging the disbursements.

The court found the fees reasonable but reduced the disbursements because they were undocumented.

Costs were fixed at $7,431.70 payable forthwith.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the successful motions by the defendants, Jim Egalite, Jonathan Collings, and Stephane Langlois, to dismiss the plaintiffs' actions against them.

The court found the defendants' requested partial indemnity costs to be very reasonable, considering their complete success and the absence of a legal basis for the claims.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay specific amounts to each successful defendant.

The court determined the applicable exchange rate for damages previously awarded in U.S. dollars.

Pursuant to section 121(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court exercised its discretion to fix the exchange rates at the historical dates when the obligations to pay arose, rather than the date of payment or judgment delivery.

This approach ensured a fixed Canadian dollar judgment and placed the creditor in the position they would have been in had payments been made when due.

The total Canadian dollar award was calculated.

This decision addresses costs following a trial where the plaintiff, Mark Couper, was largely successful on a breach of contract claim, while most other claims and the defendants' counterclaim were dismissed.

The court considered principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, including the result, offers to settle, complexity, and conduct of parties.

It denied substantial indemnity costs for mutual allegations of fraud and discreditable conduct, treating them as offsetting.

However, substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff for the counterclaim due to the defendants' extraordinary non-disclosure of documents, and for the mistrial motion from the date of the plaintiff's unaccepted offer to settle under Rule 49.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs for the main action.

The plaintiffs, shareholders in an aircraft charter business, brought a motion for interim relief pending trial of their oppression action.

They sought an injunction restraining the defendants from leasing aircraft below market rates, an order establishing a maintenance reserve for a specific aircraft, and monthly production of financial and flight records.

The court dismissed the requests for injunctive relief and the maintenance reserve, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the corporations to make business decisions pending trial.

On consent, the court ordered quarterly production of financial and flight records.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for damages arising from the defendants' breach of a real estate purchase agreement.

The defendants failed to close the transaction to purchase the plaintiff's property for $310,000.

The plaintiff relisted the property and eventually sold it for $260,000.

The court found that the plaintiff took reasonable steps to mitigate her damages and awarded $59,135.72, representing the $50,000 difference in purchase price plus carrying costs, legal fees for the aborted sale, and prejudgment interest.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff was awarded $160,480 after a 20% deduction for contributory negligence, the court determined the costs of the action.

One of the plaintiffs abandoned her claim on the eve of trial.

The court declined to award costs directly against the abandoning plaintiff but reduced the successful plaintiff's costs to reflect the shared representation.

The successful plaintiff was awarded $72,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, with a deduction for an insurance premium disbursement.

In a case‑managed Commercial List proceeding, the successful parties sought full indemnity costs following success on a motion to compel production of documents and to resist a motion for bifurcation.

The court emphasized that case management aims to ensure timely, fair, and cost‑effective resolution of civil disputes and that parties are expected to resolve procedural disputes informally where possible.

The court held that litigation conduct undermining case‑management objectives—such as unreasonable resistance to documentary production or attempts to derail an agreed timetable—may justify elevated cost sanctions even absent traditional “reprehensible” conduct.

Applying Rule 57 factors and proportionality principles, the court found the requested costs reasonable.

Full indemnity costs were therefore awarded.

Following the dismissal of a civil action for delay, a defendant sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the plaintiffs had made serious allegations of professional misconduct against a lawyer without evidentiary foundation.

The court reviewed the governing principles for fixing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While allegations of misconduct against professionals can justify elevated costs where they are reckless or unfounded, the court found insufficient evidence to conclude the plaintiffs’ claims met the threshold of reprehensible conduct.

The defendant was therefore entitled to costs on a partial indemnity scale only.

The amount of costs was ordered to be determined by an Assessment Officer based on the hourly rates set out in the defendant’s Costs Outline.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' motor vehicle accident claim as statute-barred, arguing the two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs argued the discoverability principle extended the limitation period because the plaintiff did not know her injuries met the statutory threshold until later.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding discoverability, noting that the plaintiff's initial concerns about her injuries were insufficient to start the limitation period without medical evidence establishing a serious and permanent impairment.

The motion was dismissed.