CITATION: Coburn v. McCreight et al., 2026 ONSC 2523
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
FAMILY COURT
RE: Cody Richard Parker Coburn, Applicant
AND:
Chelsy Lynn McCreight, Respondent
AND:
Kevin Ricard, Respondent
BEFORE: MITROW J.
COUNSEL: Kenneth Fraser, for the Applicant
Chioma Adiele, for the Respondent Chelsy Lynn McCreight
William Doran, for the Respondent Kevin Ricard
HEARD: April 1, 2026 and by written submissions last received April 21, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
INTRODUCTION
1This is an urgent motion brought by the applicant, prior to a case conference, relating to the subject child, a boy, born in January 2025. The child was 14 months of age at the time of the hearing of the applicant’s motion.
2The respondent Chelsy Lynn McCreight1 is the child’s mother, and the respondent Kevin Ricard is the child’s father; for convenience in these reasons, the respondents McCreight and Ricard are sometimes referred to, respectively, as “the mother” and “the father”.
3The father also brings a motion for a parenting order.
4A case conference has been set for June 8, 2026.
5The applicable legislation is the Children's Law Reform Act.
6For reasons that follow, the order below includes a two-week parenting schedule, where the child is in the applicant’s care during the first week and in the care of each respondent as specified in the order during the second week.
BACKGROUND
7The factual matrix underlying this case is somewhat unusual. For the purpose of the motions, many of the material facts are not in dispute.
8The applicant and the mother began a relationship in September 2022. According to the applicant and not disputed by the mother, they began living together in July 2023, in a rental property owned by the applicant’s biological grandparents.
9The applicant and the mother separated in June 2025.
10While the applicant and the mother were cohabiting, the mother became pregnant and, as noted earlier, the child was born in January 2025.
11Prior to separation, the mother and the applicant were both involved in parenting the child. The applicant was registered as the child’s father on the birth certificate. For the period of time from the child’s birth, until approximately six months after separation, the applicant was a fully involved father in raising their child, with no knowledge or information that he was not the child’s biological father.
12Following separation, the applicant and the mother agreed to a week-about parenting schedule with the exchanges to occur each Sunday at 10:30 a.m. As discussed in more detail below, the father’s time with the child subsequent to separation was significantly more than the 50 per cent agreed to by the parties, because the mother elected to pursue activities other than caring for the child. The mother routinely requested the applicant to care for the child during her scheduled parenting time, and the applicant routinely obliged.
13Six months after separation, the mother contacted the applicant, advising him that she did not believe that the applicant was the child’s father, and she requested the applicant to obtain a DNA test.
14The applicant responded to the mother’s request, through his counsel, indicating that he would obtain a DNA test the next time that the child was in his care, but making it very clear that the DNA test result would not change anything regarding the applicant’s relationship with the child and his love for the child.
15The applicant completed the DNA test in December 2025 and received the test result in early January 2026 that he was not the child’s biological father. The applicant’s counsel provided the mother with the test results on January 7, 2026, and a request was made that the mother advise as to the identity of the father. The mother was encouraged to seek legal counsel.
16The mother communicated the DNA test result to the father.
17The father deposes, with no dispute from the mother, that they met in December 2023 while working at the same fast-food restaurant; that they had a romantic relationship from approximately January 2024 to December 2024; that the mother told the father in the spring of 2024 that she was pregnant; but that in September 2024 the mother advised the father as to her belief that the applicant was the biological father, following which the relationship between the mother and the father ended, and they ceased having any communication.
18The father further deposes that on or about January 7, 2026, he received information from the mother as to her belief that he was the child’s biological father. The father completed the DNA test on January 14, 2026, and the test result was received on January 21, 2026 that he was the child’s biological father.
19The applicant’s next parenting week was to start January 18, 2026. However, on January 17, 2026, the applicant received a text message from the mother that she was not agreeable to the applicant picking up the child the next day for his parenting week. The text message also mentioned there being no court order and that “future parenting arrangements can be discussed through proper legal channels.”
20Thereafter, the mother rebuffed attempts by the applicant’s counsel to reinstate the week-about parenting time. The mother responded to the applicant’s counsel about addressing parenting arrangements through legal channels, and the mother did not provide any further information.
21Given the circumstances, the applicant brought an urgent motion to reinstate his parenting time with the child. The motion was first returnable on February 4, 2026, before Bignucolo J. Both respondents appeared without counsel and requested an adjournment to retain counsel. Each respondent had filed a brief affidavit. The father’s affidavit (sworn January 28, 2026) indicated all the days he had seen the child starting January 11, 2026 up to January 28, 2026, which was every day except for five days. The mother’s affidavit denied acting improperly and emphasized that she needed an adjournment.
22The applicant was agreeable to an adjournment, but subject to terms. Bignucolo J.’s order adjourned the applicant’s motion, included timelines for filing further affidavit material and included an interim interim without prejudice order that the applicant have parenting time from February 4th to February 8th, from February 11th to February 13th, and thereafter during alternating weeks from 10:30 a.m. Sunday to the following Sunday at 10:30 a.m., commencing Sunday, February 15th. No order was made for parenting time for the respondents. In making her order, Bignucolo J.’s reasons included the following:
a. That case law sets out that self-help is not to be condoned;
b. That the status quo had been that the child was in a shared arrangement and the evidence supports that the child often spends more than 50 per cent of his time with the applicant;
c. That the applicant had acted as a parent for the first year of the child’s life and that it was not in the child’s best interest that this relationship be suddenly severed; and
d. That the mother had acted unilaterally.
23The evidentiary record now before the court is complete, with affidavit material from all parties. The father has provided specific detail as to the times that he has had parenting time with the child during times that the mother was present and also during times that the mother was not present. Focusing on the period starting January 11, 2026 when the father’s parenting time started, until the date of Bignucolo J.’s order on February 4, 2026, it is abundantly clear that the mother and father acted in unison and ensured that the father had regular and frequent parenting time with the child during this period, including at least three overnight visits, with the last overnight visit ending on the day of the motion.
24During this period, the mother had taken the lead role in communicating with the applicant and his counsel and then withholding the child from the applicant despite the fact, as discussed later in these reasons, that the applicant for the past six months had been the child’s primary caregiver. In the meantime, the father was having regular and frequent parenting time with the child that he had just met and to the exclusion of any parenting time with the applicant.
25The mother’s self-help remedy was fueled by her belief that the applicant should have no further involvement in the child’s life because he is not the child’s “real father”. For his part, the father shared the mother’s belief. He helped himself to parenting time as the newly identified “real father”, seemingly oblivious as to how the child may have been affected by severing the child’s relationship with the applicant. This is discussed in more detail later.
26The foregoing conduct of the mother and the father was not in the child’s best interests and constitutes unreasonable behaviour.
27It is noteworthy that prior to issuing his application, and serving his motion, that the applicant received no confirmation from the mother as to the father’s identity.
28Rather, the applicant was able to piece together information he had received from the mother, including past conversations about her co-workers, to deduce that the respondent Ricard was most likely the child’s father, and that he should be added as a party.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
29Each party has provided a draft order for the relief sought.
30The applicant seeks a parenting schedule with the child to reside with the applicant on alternate weeks, and at other times, the child to reside with the mother and the father as arranged by them.
31The mother seeks primary care of the child, with the child to be in the mother’s care except during times that the child is in the father’s care. The mother proposes parenting time to the father on alternate weekends from Friday at 4 p.m. to Monday at 8:30 a.m., and each Tuesday at 4 p.m. until Wednesday at 8:30 a.m. In the mother’s proposal, there is no role for the applicant in the child’s life.
32The father proposes that he have parenting time on alternate weekends from Friday at 4 p.m. until Monday at 8:30 a.m. and each Tuesday from 4 p.m. until Wednesday at 8:30 a.m.
33The father’s proposed order does not address who should have primary care, does not address the mother’s parenting time and does not address whether the child should be in the applicant’s care.
34All parties request an order that the child shall not be left with an individual named David Rockwood. That issue is discussed below.
BEST INTERESTS FACTORS
i. The Children's Law Reform Act – Best interests factors
35In making an order in a child’s best interests, the court is required to consider various factors in relation to a child’s best interests. Those factors are set out in s. 24(3):
(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
ii. Factor (a) – Child’s needs
36The child is very young, just 14 months of age when the motions were heard as mentioned earlier. At this stage in his life, the child’s needs center around the requirement for stability. The child should be able to continue his relationship with the caregivers known to the child.
iii. Factor (b) – Child’s relationships
37At the time of the hearing of the motions, the child’s main relationship was with the applicant and the mother. They raised the child together for six months following the child’s birth; and they had a shared parenting arrangement for six months following the separation. The applicant and the mother were the child’s “parents” during the first year of the child’s life.
38The father first met the child approximately eight days prior to the child’s first birthday in January 2026. Since then, the father has had regular parenting time. The father’s evidence is that the child has transitioned well while in his care.
39The applicant’s grandparents have been very supportive and have played an important role in the child’s life. They have assisted the applicant with child care when the applicant is working.
iv. Factor (c) – Maintaining child’s relationship with the other parent
40Consideration of this factor raises significant concerns regarding both respondents.
41I start with the mother. She is adamant that the child only should be raised by herself and the father because they are his biological parents, whereas the applicant is not. The mother is harshly dismissive of the applicant, and his role as the child’s “father”. The applicant has complained of ongoing messages from the mother deriding his role in the child’s life; the mother referring to the respondent Ricard as “the real father”; the mother stating that the child is “not yours”, just a daily reminder; and referring to the applicant as somebody who is not the child’s parent.
42Based on the evidentiary record, there is no reasonable prospect that the mother will support any development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the applicant; rather, there is a significant risk that the mother will do what she can to undermine and terminate not only that relationship, but also any relationship between the child and the applicant’s extended family, including the applicant’s grandparents.
43The father’s evidence is that “… the applicant’s involvement in the [child’s] life, now that I have become involved, should end…” However, the father does depose, as an alternative, that the applicant’s continued involvement with the child should be “secondary and limited” with no entitlement to decision-making responsibility or “any such other parenting entitlement”.
44While the father’s position somewhat ameliorates the mother’s draconian stance, I find there is little prospect that the father will promote in any way the child’s relationship with the applicant or his extended family.
45In stark contrast, the applicant harbours no similar agenda or animus towards the respondents. The evidence suggests that the applicant is supportive of maintaining both the mother’s and the father’s roles in the child’s life.
46The applicant also deposes that the mother has a limited relationship with her father and her paternal grandmother, and that as a result, the applicant and his grandmother have promoted the child’s relationship with those individuals, including taking the child for visits with the mother’s paternal family on a regular basis.
v. Factor (d) – History of child care
47Following the child’s birth in January 2025 until June 2025 when the applicant and the mother separated, the mother and the applicant jointly parented the child. As the applicant was working full-time, while the mother was at home with the child, the reality was that the mother spent more time with the child than did the applicant.
48On separation, the applicant’s evidence is that the parties entered into a week-about parenting arrangement, as previously discussed. In his evidence, the applicant provides a detailed summary giving all the relevant dates between the date of separation and the end of December 2025 when the mother contacted the applicant to ask him to take the child during her scheduled parenting time. The evidence of the applicant includes the following:
a. The applicant attached monthly calendars as exhibits showing all his parenting time including the pickup and drop-off dates and times;
b. The applicant deposed that during this six-month period (June 2025 to December 2025) that the child was in his care for approximately 80 per cent of the time;
c. The mother’s reasons for not being available to care for the child included:
i. Telling the applicant she had a “bad mental day” and then going out to get her nails done and going out to dinner;
ii. Telling the applicant she had “plans for the weekend” or “had too many plans and was too busy”; and
iii. On at least five occasions, the mother was not available to care for the child because she was going to the races, often out of town, with her boyfriend; some of these occasions resulted in the mother missing her entire scheduled weekend with the child.
49Despite the applicant’s significant and detailed evidence, spanning many paragraphs in his affidavit, the mother’s response under the heading “Primary Caregiving” contains five brief sentences where the mother baldly asserts that she has been the child’s primary caregiver “since birth”, and that the applicant has never been the child’s primary caregiver.
50The mother provides no response to the applicant’s calendar or his detailed evidence, including no response to the various reasons why the mother was unavailable to care for the child. It is not open to the mother to stand mute. She has an obligation to respond to the applicant’s evidence.
51The result is that the applicant’s evidence as to the status quo subsequent to separation is unchallenged by the mother. I conclude that the status quo since separation is that the child has been in the applicant’s primary care to a significant extent. The mother’s bald assertion that she has been the child’s primary caregiver since birth, without more, is unconvincing and difficult to believe.
52The time spent by the father with the child has been discussed previously.
vi. Factors (e) and (f) – Child’s views and preferences; child’s culture and heritage
53The foregoing two factors are not engaged on the facts.
vii. Factor (g) – Plans for the child’s care
54By way of some additional background, the mother in her financial statement confirms that she has not worked since December 2, 2024. She plans “to get a job soon” according to her form 35.1 affidavit. The mother currently resides with her “best friend” and three other adults who appear to be related to her best friend.
55The father is employed full-time. He currently resides with his mother and grandmother, who are supports available to the father in caring for the child.
56The applicant, who works full-time as noted previously, is in a relationship. His partner has three children. The applicant and his partner are not living together.
57The plans for each party for the child’s care have been discussed earlier and are not repeated here.
viii. Factors (h) and (i) – Ability to meet the child’s needs; ability and willingness to cooperate with one another
58For the first year of his life, the child was raised by the applicant and the mother. They both demonstrated an ability to care for the child and meet the child’s needs. However, for the six-month period subsequent to separation, the mother regularly relinquished her scheduled parenting time to the applicant to engage in social and other activities. This behaviour is demonstrative of prioritizing the mother’s needs instead of the child’s needs.
59For the brief time that the father has been parenting the child, the evidence suggests that he is able to meet the child’s needs.
60The applicant throughout has demonstrated an ability to meet the child’s needs, including being the primary caregiving parent subsequent to separation.
61Regarding communication and cooperation between the parties, it is expected that the order below regarding parenting time will be implemented by the parties without any form of vituperation. The mother must cease referring to the applicant as not being “the real father”. Such comments are degrading to the applicant and are not in the child’s best interests.
ix. Factor (j) – Family violence
62The mother has alleged that the applicant has engaged in family violence. She alleges that the applicant displayed anger by throwing and smashing objects in the presence of both the mother and child. In her form 35.1 affidavit, the mother expands her allegations. The mother deposes that on one occasion, the applicant was enraged, acted in a physically aggressive manner and handled the child roughly. The mother deposes that on another occasion, the applicant, during an argument, forcibly entered a room and broke down the door; that on another occasion, the applicant caused damage by smashing a pot against the sink; and that on a further occasion, the applicant forcibly restrained the mother against the wall during an argument while moving a crib to the nursery.
63The applicant denies these allegations, stating the following:
a. The allegation that he handled the child roughly is a fabrication;
b. The occurrence regarding the door did occur but is significantly exaggerated and occurred prior to the mother being pregnant. The parties were arguing, the mother slammed the door shut on leaving the room and the parties continued their argument through the door and while pushing on the door;
c. The incident regarding the pot is a fabrication;
d. Regarding the incident while moving the crib, the applicant admits there was an argument but states it was escalated by the mother calling him a vulgar name; however, the applicant denies any physical contact with the mother during this altercation;
e. Further, the applicant denies being physically abusive toward the mother at any time. The applicant claims that the mother pushed and hit him, that she punched walls and threw items, causing damage to the home; and
f. The applicant deposes that both parties acted in a manner that they each regretted. The applicant deposes that there have been no incidents since separation.
64It is the applicant’s evidence that since separation, he has had counselling and commenced taking medication to address stress and anxiety.
65The foregoing family violence allegations made by the applicant and the mother are concerning. While no finding of fact can be made due to the conflicting evidence, the fact that the allegations have been made cannot be ignored. I do consider, with no dispute from the mother, that no incidents have occurred since separation. The order below includes conditions regarding communication and behaviour at parenting exchanges.
x. Factor (k) – Civil and/or criminal proceedings relevant to the safety of the child
66While there are no criminal or civil orders relating to the child’s safety, I do address an issue that is relevant to the child’s safety.
67An incident occurred on March 23, 2026. The father deposed that the mother had moved in with an individual named David Rockwood (“Mr. Rockwood”) and that the mother had sent the father a copy of a sentence order that involved Mr. Rockwood “and his nieces”. This document was partially redacted and was filed as an exhibit. The sentence order is dated August 9, 2021; it shows Mr. Rockwood’s name but the offence and the offence date are redacted. The sentence order includes 12 months’ probation and requires Mr. Rockwood to participate in programs, as directed, that include “sexual offending”. The probation terms also include provisions for no contact and no communication with two named persons.
68The father deposes that Mr. Rockwood made comments “… that he was not able to change [the child] due to him sexualizing his penis”. It is not clear from the father’s evidence how he learned of this information. Also, the information itself is not entirely clear as to its meaning.
69The child was in the father’s care at the time. The father refused to return the child to the mother, claiming that the mother failed to address the father’s concerns regarding Mr. Rockwood. The father contacted the children’s aid society and the police. The mother also contacted the police.
70The father then returned the child to the mother while the society investigated.
71The mother denies that she resided with Mr. Rockwood, but she deposes that she did spend occasional overnights with him, while the child was in the applicant’s care. The mother describes her relationship with Mr. Rockwood as being intermittent over a significant period of time, but she deposes that the relationship with Mr. Rockwood is now ended.
72The mother’s further evidence is that she is aware of Mr. Rockwood’s “… past criminal charges relating to sexual assault of a minor”. The mother claims that Mr. Rockwood never played a parenting role in the child’s life. The mother deposes that Mr. Rockwood has not engaged in inappropriate behaviour towards the child and that any suggestion that he “… sexualized [the child] in any manner is false”.
73The mother denies any overnight visits involving the child and Mr. Rockwood.
74The mother asserts that “… to my knowledge…” Mr. Rockwood’s involvement with the child was “limited” and that he has seen the child “only a few times at my residence or his own”. It is concerning that the mother characterizes Mr. Rockwood’s contact with the child as being “… to my knowledge”. Is the mother suggesting that Mr. Rockwood could have had contact with the child without her knowledge?
75The applicant deposes that he has known Mr. Rockwood to be the mother’s “on again off again” boyfriend. The applicant has had concerns about the mother’s involvement with the child while in a relationship with Mr. Rockwood. It was the applicant’s evidence that subsequent to separation, that the mother moved to London and at times resided at the London home of her “new boyfriend”, Mr. Rockwood.
76The applicant was previously aware of Mr. Rockwood’s “criminal charges” but he was not aware of the information contained in the father’s affidavit. Neither respondent advised the applicant of the involvement of the police and the society.
77The mother deposes that the society intervened, that no file was opened and that the matter was closed.
78I find that the mother exhibited bad judgment exposing the child to Mr. Rockwood, knowing of Mr. Rockwood’s “past criminal charges relating to sexual assault of a minor” as the mother put it. The mother’s bad judgment allowing Mr. Rockwood to have contact with the child exposed the child to a potential safety risk. No explanation was offered by the mother why she chose to expose the child to Mr. Rockwood.
79Each party’s draft order included a safety plan that Mr. Rockwood not be left alone with the child.
80That safety plan does not go far enough. There is conflicting evidence as to whether the mother actually resided with Mr. Rockwood. His full criminal history is not known. There is no child-focused reason to allow any contact between Mr. Rockwood and the child.
81If the mother chooses to resume her relationship with Mr. Rockwood, and if the mother wants the child to have contact with Mr. Rockwood, then the mother can return to this court, on notice to the other parties, to explain why contact between the child and Mr. Rockwood is in the child’s best interests, and at the same time, the mother can provide copies of Mr. Rockwood’s form 35.1 and 35.1A affidavits, and a copy of his criminal record.
82I find that the mother’s bad judgment in exposing the child to Mr. Rockwood in the first place, coupled with the history of the mother’s “on again off again” relationship with Mr. Rockwood, is sufficiently concerning to the extent that the court cannot rely on the mother to ensure that Mr. Rockwood is not left alone with the child, should the mother choose again to expose the child to Mr. Rockwood.
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
83The mother cites Chartier v. Chartier 1999 707 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 242 (S.C.C.), and Gordon v. Goertz 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 SCR 27 (S.C.C.), in support of her position.
84These cases do not assist the mother. In Chartier, the issue before the court was framed in para. 1—can a person who stands in the place of a parent to a child within the meaning of the Divorce Act unilaterally give up this status and escape the obligation to provide support for that child, after the breakdown of the marriage? The court unanimously decided that a person cannot do so.
85As indicated in Chartier, at para. 40, every case must be determined on its own facts. There is no dispute in the present case, and the facts are clear, that the applicant and the mother parented the child on the basis that the applicant was the child’s father. The issues of whether the applicant stood “in loco parentis” to the child, or whether the applicant can unilaterally give up that status, do not arise in the present case.
86Gordon v. Goertz was a mobility case. The discussion in that case does not assist the applicant considering the very disparate facts in the present case when compared to the facts in Gordon v. Goertz.
87Both Chartier and Gordon v. Goertz were decided prior to the recent amendments to the Divorce Act2which incorporated into the Divorce Act the best interests factors now contained in s. 16(3), and which are similar to the best interests factors contained in s. 24(3) of the Children's Law Reform Act.
88The mother further relies on Chapman v. Chapman, 2001 24015 (ON CA), 2001 CarswellOnt. 537 (Ont. C.A.). This was an application for access by the paternal grandmother to her two grandchildren over the objection of the parents. The trial judge ordered access to the grandmother. The parents appealed, and the trial judgment was overturned. The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the issue was not about preserving a relationship, but whether the stress caused by the grandmother’s constant attempts to gain access was in the children’s best interests. The right to decide the nature and extent of the access was the responsibility of the parents. The parents had decided that the children’s best interests did not require the lengthy or frequent visits requested by the grandmother, and the parents’ decision should be respected. The appellate decision did not prevent the grandmother from exercising access; rather, the access would be in the discretion of the parents.
89The decision in Chapman does not assist the mother, as the facts in that case do not bear any resemblance to the claims asserted by the applicant in the present case.
90The applicant, in his submissions, attaches significant weight to the jurisprudence in relation to status quo—that in the absence of a material change, the status quo should be maintained until trial.
91The applicant cites K. v. K., 2024 ONSC 982 (Ont. S.C.J.), where the court stated at paras. 12–14:
12It is a long-standing legal principle that absent evidence of a material change and that an immediate change is required, the status quo is ordinarily to be maintained until trial: Niel v. Niel (1976), 1976 1925 (ON CA), 28 R.F.L. 257 (Ont. C.A.); Grant v. Turgeon (2000), 2000 22565 (ON SC), 5 R.F.L. (5th) 326 (Ont. S.C.); Kimpton v. Kimpton, 2002 2793 (Ont. S.C.); Easton v. McAvoy, 2005 ONCJ 319; M.W. v. E.B., 2005 18315 (Ont. S.C.); and Horton v. Marsh, 2008 NSSC 224.
13In making an interim parenting order, a court should generally maintain the status quo in the absence of important reasons suggesting that change is necessary in the child’s best interests: McEachern v. McEachern (1994), 1994 7379 (ON SC), 5 R.F.L. (4th) 115 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
14To disturb the status quo, there must be compelling evidence to show the welfare of the child would be in danger in maintaining the status quo, namely the evidence must clearly and unequivocally establish that the status quo is not in the child’s best interests: Miranda v. Miranda, 2013 ONSC 4704, at para. 26.
92In Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273 (Ont. S.C.J.) (Divisional Court), the court addressed the consideration of status quo as follows:
28The motion judge failed to make any mention of the status quo, prior to hearing the motion. There is no consideration in the reasons of the parenting schedule that existed from the child’s birth to the date of the motion, how the child was doing under that schedule, or how a substantial change to the schedule would affect the child. It is a long-standing legal principle that absent evidence of a material change, and that an immediate change is required, the status quo is ordinarily to be maintained until trial: Churchill, at para. 36; Hatab v. Abuhatab, 2022 ONSC 1560, 69 R.F.L. (8th) 18, at para. 33.
29A temporary order is meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be fully canvassed at subsequent conferences or resolved at trial. If the status quo is to be changed on an interim basis, the evidence must show clearly and unequivocally that maintaining the status quo is not in the best interests of the child: Churchill, at paras. 35-36.
93A key pillar supporting the mother’s position, that it is not in the child’s best interests for him to have any further relationship with the applicant, is founded on the proposition that the child is biologically related only to the mother and the father, and that it would not be in the child’s best interests to have more than two parents. The mother cites no jurisprudence to support this position.
94The applicant submits that the jurisprudence does not support the mother’s position. The applicant cites Jacobs and Coulombe v. Blair and Amyotte, 2022 ONSC 3159 (Ont. S.C.J.).
95This case involved a trial where the applicants were a same-gender male couple with no biological relationship to the subject child, and the respondents were the child’s biological parents. The court made a final order granting sole decision-making responsibility and primary care to the applicants and providing parenting time to the respondents that included a regular schedule of alternate weekends and a mid-week visit. The court cited various authorities that there is no presumption in favour of biological parents when making a parenting order. Further, the Children's Law Reform Act was amended to remove, from the best interests factors, consideration of the child’s relationship by blood or adoption to a party. The court stated at paras. 220–223:
220The CLRA used to contain a provision under s. 24(2) that referred to “the relationship by blood or through an adoption order between the child and each person who is a party to the application” as a factor for determining what is in the best interests of a child. Since the 2020 amendments, this is no longer a listed factor under s. 24.
221Eldon v. Grant, 2021 ONSC 3799, is a recent case in which two men, the Applicant and the Respondent, both alleged they were the biological father of the child in question. Charney J. explained the legal principles for determining parenting orders between biological and non-biological parties, explaining that biological connection is only one factor to be considered:
35It is not unusual in today’s society for children to have multiple parents, including biological parents and step-parents. It is important that children have an opportunity to build loving relationships with each of their parents, siblings or half siblings and grandparents that may be part of their respective families. If the applicant is the child’s biological father, it may well be that the child will benefit from establishing and maintaining a relationship with the applicant and his family. This need not be at the expense of the child’s continued relationship with the respondent and the respondent’s other son.
36The merits of an application in respect of custody or access are determined on the basis of the best interest of the child. There is no presumption that the biological parent will be awarded custody in preference to a step-parent: Re Moores and Feldstein et al., 1973 535 (ON CA).
37In R.A. v. D.P. 2017 ONSC 4522, Woodley J., summarized the legal principles for determining custody between biological and non-biological parties at paras 33 and 34:
Courts routinely deny that a biological parent has a prima facie right to custody.
Although a child’s relationship by blood is a relevant consideration – there is no “parental right” to custody. Biological connection is only one factor to be considered.
222I concur there is no presumption in favour of the biological parents or genetics when determining a parenting order for a child. The governing principle as per subsection 24(1) is best interests, having regard to the considerations outlined in 24(2) and the factors outlined in 24(3) of the CLRA. The best interests standard is a child-centered approach.
223I agree with the comments made by Keast, J. in Pheasant v. Idowu, 2008 ONCJ 420 when he aptly stated at Paragraph 31:
There is no hierarchy of rights in considering the best interests of children under the Act. To place emphasis on parental rights may diminish the importance of the attachment process in the healthy emotional development of children. If there is a right, it is the right of the child to maximize his or her attachment and emotional development and minimize attachment uncertainties, regardless of blood relationship.
96The trial judgment of Gregson J. in Jacobs and Coulombe resulted in the child having “four parents”, as noted earlier. The respondents in that case claimed that the child should be placed in their care because they were the biological parents—which is similar to the position being advanced by the mother and the father in the present case. That argument was thoroughly rejected by Gregson J., in thoughtful and cogent reasons that are germane to the present case, at paras. 264–266:
264The Applicants have exclusively cared for Isabelle for the first 16 months or her life. They have had joyous occasions with her, and more than likely, sleepless nights. They have met all of her physical, emotional, developmental and financial needs. They can read her cues and they are making decisions for her future. There was no evidence they were not providing good and proper care of her.
265I realize the Applicants are not Isabelle’s biological parents. I concur the Respondents have been providing good care to Isabelle during their parenting-time. However, Isabelle’s psychological parents, with whom she is attached, are her two “dads”, namely, the Applicants. The Applicants have provided her with physical, emotional and psychological safety for her well-being.
266Isabelle appears to have a secure attachment with the Applicants. There is a possibility that if she were to be placed with the Respondents, she could still form further secure attachments, which would not negatively affect her development. However, why would I do this? Why would I risk this child’s development when she is feeling loved, safe, nurtured and has a parental connection with the Applicants? Why would I now change the status quo when the Applicants have a history and a proven track record with the development of this child and have met all of her needs, and presumably will continue to do so? The fact that the Respondents are her biological parents and want her return is simply not enough. I must look at the totality of the evidence and the circumstances and be guided by the legislative factors to determine what is in this child’s best interests.
97Regarding the issue of multiple parents, it is noteworthy to observe that the Children's Law Reform Act contemplates more than two “parents” in situations relating to pre-conception parentage arrangements (s. 9) and surrogacy (s. 10).
98I mention briefly the conclusion of the Divisional Court in Tremblay-Chartier, supra, at para. 40, regarding the parenting plan guide (“the Guide”) prepared by the Ontario chapter of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC-O). The Divisional Court referred to the Guide and found that if a judge departs from the established and widely accepted social science research, that reasons are needed to depart from same.
99In Gjorsovski v. Krajisnik, 2025 ONSC 7220 (Ont. S.C.J.), the court at paras. 16–33 refused to follow the Divisional Court finding that the Guide should be a mandatory consideration.
100In the present case, the Guide was never mentioned or referred to in the evidence or during submissions. In my view, the analysis in these reasons regarding the s. 24(3) factors would subsume any relevant considerations contained in the Guide applicable to the age of the child in this case.
DECISION
101The mother’s affidavit evidence includes statements that it is not appropriate for the child to have multiple “father” figures; that the applicant’s involvement as a parent risks creating confusion for the child regarding parental identity; that the child has not developed “a long-standing or deeply-rooted psychological parent bond with [the applicant]”; and that given the child’s age, any such relationship can be transitioned without harm.
102The foregoing evidence is not only disturbing, but it is bereft of any understanding and insight into the child’s best interests. Most, if not all, of that evidence is inadmissible opinion evidence from the mother masquerading as an expert witness.
103The main reason advanced by both respondents to sever the applicant’s relationship with the child is because the applicant is not a “biological parent”. That alone is enough for the respondents. The applicant’s role as a psychological father to the child during the child’s formative first year is a non-factor in the respondents’ biological-parent world.
104The respondents, acting together, have propounded their ill-informed theory that the child must only have two parents (so as not to confuse the child) and that those two parents can only be the biological parents, to the exclusion of the applicant. This theory of parenthood espoused by the respondents is not supported by the jurisprudence, as discussed earlier, and importantly, it is not tethered to any child-focused analysis of the child’s best interests in relation to the factors in s. 24(3). Interestingly, in Jacobs and Coulombe, supra, where that court’s final order resulted in there being “four parents”, the child in that case was approximately 16 months of age, which is very close to the age of the child in the present case.
105The applicant has been the child’s psychological father since the child’s birth. Since separation in June 2025, the applicant has been the child’s primary caregiver until the end of December 2025. The applicant had to step into that role because the mother had more important things to do other than parenting the child, including, it seems, spending time with Mr. Rockwood and also going to the races.
106As soon as the father entered the picture in early January 2026, he joined the mother to put into play their “two-parent” theory of parenthood. The respondents allocated between themselves all of the parenting time to the child and excluded the applicant, until their ill-conceived self-help social experiment was quickly halted by the order of Bignucolo J. dated February 4, 2026.
107I find that it is in the child’s best interests to be in the care of the applicant during alternate weeks, and with the other weeks to be shared by the respondents as set out in the order below. In making the parenting order, I consider all the factors in s. 24(3), including the conduct of the respondents engaging in self-help, the status quo after the mother and the applicant separated, and the applicant’s willingness to acknowledge the importance of both respondents in the child’s life as contrasted with the desire of the respondents to exclude the applicant from the child’s life.
108As this case moves forward, all the parties must be laser-focused only on the child’s best interests, and not on their own interests. The parties are encouraged to consider the involvement of the OCL when they attend the case conference.
109Cooperation between the parties, civil dialogue, and information-sharing about the child are important stepping stones towards ensuring that the child’s best interests are promoted by all the parties. The order below deals with communication and parenting exchanges.
110The applicant is reminded of the requirement to comply with ss. 21.1 and 21.2 of the Children's Law Reform Act regarding police records and children’s aid society records.
111The applicant has submitted a “criminal record check” within the meaning of the Police Record Checks Reform Act, 2015, s. 8(1) clause 1. However, that record check cannot be used by a non-parent applying for decision-making responsibility: see Police Record Checks Reform Act, 2015, s. 2(2) clause 1.
112The applicant must use the criminal record check prescribed by Ontario Regulation 24/10 pursuant to the Children's Law Reform Act.
ORDER
113I make the following interim order pursuant to the Children's Law Reform Act:
The child shall be in the care of the parties in accordance with the following two-week parenting schedule:
a. For week one, the child shall be in the care of the applicant from 10 a.m. Saturday to the following Saturday at 10 a.m.;
b. For week two, the child shall be in the care of both respondents according to the following parenting schedule:
i. with the respondent Ricard from 10 a.m. Saturday to 5 p.m. Sunday; ii. with the respondent McCreight from 5 p.m. Sunday to 5 p.m. Tuesday; iii. with the respondent Ricard from 5 p.m. Tuesday to 10 a.m. Thursday; and iv. with the respondent McCreight from 10 a.m. Thursday to 10 a.m. Saturday; andc. If the parties are unable to agree as to the cadence of the parenting weeks, then the date of this order shall be deemed to be in week two.
The parenting exchanges shall occur as follows:
a. The party who is receiving the child shall pick up the child at the residence of the party who has care of the child, unless the parties involved in the parenting exchange have agreed in writing to use a different location;
b. The party who is scheduled to pick up the child may delegate an adult person to pick up the child, so long as:
i. the adult person is known to the child; and ii. the party who is receiving the child gives at least 24 hours’ notice in writing to the other party as to the name of the adult person who is picking up the child.The parties shall use one parenting application (“app”) to communicate with each other regarding all information or matters that pertain to the child, including parenting exchanges, subject to the following:
a. If the parties cannot agree on the parenting app within 14 days, then the parenting app shall be chosen by the applicant; and
b. Any cost relating to the parenting app shall be shared equally by all three parties, except that while the respondent McCreight remains unemployed, the cost shall be shared equally between the applicant and the respondent Ricard.
Each party, while the child is in his or her care, shall advise the other parties immediately, including in writing, regarding any urgent matter or emergency affecting the child. Each party also shall advise the other parties, in writing, of any important information, milestones, and medical appointments regarding the child.
On a presentation of a copy of this order, the applicant, the respondent McCreight and the respondent Ricard are each entitled to receive any documents, records, or information pertaining to the child, from the child’s doctor, dentist, any other health-care provider, teacher, school principal or day-care provider. If required, all parties shall sign any consent, as necessary, to facilitate the release of the aforementioned documents and information relating to the child.
All communication between the parties, whether oral or written, shall be polite and respectful at all times, including,
a. at parenting exchanges;
b. while using the parenting app; and
c. in the presence of the child.
David Rockwood shall have no contact with the child, and all parties shall at all times ensure that there is strict compliance with this paragraph.
The applicant within 45 days,
a. shall comply fully with s. 21.2 of the Children's Law Reform Act relating to children’s aid society records; and
b. shall provide a police records check for a non-parent seeking decision-making responsibility, as required by s. 21.1 of the Children's Law Reform Act and Ontario Regulation 24/10.
The spelling of the respondent mother’s name is corrected and the application is amended to show the respondent mother’s name as Chelsy Lynn McCreight.
The parties may make written costs submissions limited to two typed pages, double-spaced, minimum font 12, together with copies of any time dockets, bills of costs, and offers to settle. All references to authorities shall be hyperlinked in the written costs submissions. The applicant’s costs submissions are due within 14 days; the costs submissions of both respondents are due within 14 days thereafter; and the applicant’s reply, if any, is due 7 days thereafter. All costs submissions shall be served and filed in the usual manner and then uploaded to Case Center in the usual manner.
“Justice Victor Mitrow”
Justice Victor Mitrow
Date: April 29, 2026