Court File and Parties

CITATION: Auciello v. Auciello, 2026 ONSC 2485

COURT FILE NO.: FC-22-811-00

DATE: 2026-04-28

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Erika Auciello Applicant

– and –

Angelo Auciello Respondent

COUNSEL:

Charles Mota, for the Applicant

Self-Represented

HEARD: November 26-December 4, 2025

REASONS FOR DECISION

Madam Justice R. Sonya Jain

“Output always equals input.” – Colonel James Van Fleet

Introduction

[1] The applicant mother, Erika Auciello (hereinafter “the applicant” or “Ms. Auciello”), and the respondent father, Angelo Auciello (hereinafter “the respondent” or “Mr. Auciello”) were married on April 23, 2005, and after 17 years of marriage, they separated on July 12, 2022. They have two children, Lukas (19) and Serena (15).

[2] Parenting time for Serena was settled by way of Final Order of Douglas J. dated May 14, 2025. There was no parenting order required for Lukas as he was over the age of majority. The issues for the trial are decision-making responsibility for Serena; determination of incomes of the parties for support purposes; imputation of income; ongoing and retroactive child support (table and s. 7’s); ownership of property at date of marriage; equalization and division of net family property (“NFP”); post-separation adjustments; spousal support (entitlement, retroactive and ongoing or lump sum); and costs.

[3] The applicant seeks an order for sole decision-making responsibility for Serena. The respondent seeks an order for joint decision-making responsibility. Serena lives primarily with the applicant and has regular parenting time with the respondent. Communication between the parties has ranged from highly conflicted, to strained civility, to non-existent. The respondent alleges that the applicant has not consulted with him for major decisions. The applicant denies the allegation.

[4] The pre-eminent issues in this trial for which the majority of time was spent were financial, specifically the determination of NFP, equalization, and other property issues; the determination of income for child and spousal support purposes; and the determination of entitlement to spousal support.

[5] The respondent was the undisputed primary financial provider for the family throughout the marriage. He started a road construction company in 2010 called A.I. Roadtech Inc. As there was no agreement on the value for the company or the respondent’s income, the parties relied heavily upon their competing expert witness business valuators and appraisers and their expert reports (whose differing conclusions were in serious conflict).

[6] This conflict was mainly due to the differing information that was provided to each valuator and appraiser. Thus, throughout the trial, the court was faced with credibility and reliability issues. The court had to make findings regarding the appropriate weight to be given to the conflicting expert reports. The findings the court made on the expert valuations and appraisals had a direct effect on the issues of determining income, child support, equalization, and spousal support. Generally, the quality of the information and evidence that was provided to the experts and to the court, significantly affected the quality of the expert reports and the final outcome of the trial.

Preliminary Issues

Respondent was Self-represented for the Trial

[7] The respondent had retained counsel to represent him throughout the proceedings up to and including the Trial Scheduling Conference date on January 14, 2025, and the Trial Management Conference held on May 14, 2025. He decided not to retain counsel for the trial. He was self-represented through the trial. As the respondent was self-represented, the court took some time at the beginning to provide procedural guidance and explain the process of a trial. The court provided the respondent with a handout entitled “Representing Yourself at your Family Trial in the Superior Court of Justice.” A copy was also provided to the applicant.

Respondent’s Appraisal Expert did not attend Trial

[8] Both parties have provided three (3) expert reports. Each party submitted an expert report regarding income, an expert report regarding business value, and an expert report (appraisals) regarding business, personal equipment, and vehicles. At the Trial Readiness Conference held on October 30, 2025, the respondent advised the court that he was uncertain whether he would be able to arrange for one of his expert witnesses (appraiser for business, personal equipment, and vehicles) to attend for the trial. Justice Bruhn made an endorsement that said, “If the Respondent’s expert does not attend trial, the parties will address whether his reports ought to be admitted into evidence and if so, what weight they ought to be afforded.” On the first day of the trial, the respondent advised the court that his expert witness from Markham Finch Appraisals would not be attending court. The respondent said this witness “was not able to attend.” The respondent did not serve or file any Summons to Witness. He advised the court that because this report was made prior to separation, this report was a participant expert report, not a litigation expert and this evidence had been provided to the applicant well in advance of the trial. Mr. Mota objected to these appraisals being admitted. He questioned the authenticity and reliability of the Markham Finch Appraisals and submitted they should not be accepted, or have very little weight given to them. After hearing submissions from both parties, the court ruled that the report may be entered as an exhibit through the respondent. However, the court explained and cautioned the respondent that the appraisal report amounts to hearsay, and that it may be given very little weight because it cannot be authenticated. Further, it lacks reliability, and the author of the report cannot be cross-examined. The respondent indicated that he understood.

[9] All other expert witnesses for both parties attended the trial by Zoom.

Late-filed Affidavits and Financial Statements

[10] Both the applicant and the respondent served and filed late updating affidavits. They were unopposed and permitted to be filed. The applicant said that the Financial Statement recently updated by the respondent reflected some inconsistencies. As a result, the applicant served and filed a late affidavit dated November 17, 2025. The respondent replied by way of affidavit. Both were allowed to be filed with the court through the witness.

Issues

[11] The issues this court must determine are:

1. Should the court make an order for sole or joint decision-making responsibility for the child Serena?
2. What are the strengths and challenges with each expert report? How much weight should the court give to the competing expert reports? Which expert report/s should the court rely upon?
3. What is the value of the respondent’s interest in A.I. Roadtech Inc.?
4. What is the NFP for each party and the resulting equalization and division of net family property? What, if any, are the post-separation adjustments?
5. What are the incomes of the parties? Should the court impute income to either party and if so, how much?
6. What is the appropriate ongoing table child support and s. 7’s payable by the respondent to the applicant?
7. Does the respondent owe the applicant retroactive child support and contribution to s. 7 expenses?
8. Is the applicant entitled to retroactive and ongoing spousal support? If so, what is the appropriate quantum and duration? Should there be an order for periodic monthly payments or a lump sum payment?
9. Costs.

Decision

[12] The court finds that it is in the best interests of the child Serena for there to be a communication protocol for major decisions regarding Serena’s health and education, however, the applicant will have sole decision-making responsibility. Both the respondent and applicant will have equal rights to information and communication with any professionals or institutions regarding the child.

[13] The court finds the family law value of the respondent’s business to be $466,000.

[14] The court finds the respondent owes the applicant an equalization payment of $241,675.65.

[15] The court finds that the applicant’s income is $47,179 and the respondent’s estimated Guideline income for support purposes shall be imputed to $203,687 in 2020; $237,621 in 2021; and $162,515 in 2022. Further, the go forward income for the respondent in 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026 shall be an average of the three previous years being $201,607.70.

[16] The court finds that based on the imputed income of $201,607.70, the appropriate ongoing table child support payable by the respondent to the applicant is $1,719 per month. The parties shall share ongoing s. 7’s based on a 70/30 split with the respondent paying 70% and the applicant paying 30%.

[17] The court find that the respondent owes the applicant retroactive child support in the amount of $51,374.64.

[18] The court finds that the respondent owes the applicant arrears of s. 7’s in the amount of $7,054.50.

[19] The court finds that the applicant is entitled to retroactive and ongoing spousal support which shall be paid in a one-time, final lump sum in the amount of $227,702. This is based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAG’s”) calculation using the midpoint NPV Assumptions in the low range with a spousal support duration of 8.75 years.

Law

[20] In making my decision, I am bound to follow the relevant and applicable sections of the Divorce Act, (hereinafter “the DA”), the Family Law Act (hereinafter “the FLA”) and the Children’s Law Reform Act (hereinafter “the CLRA”).[^1]

[21] Regarding decision-making responsibility and parenting time for the children, I am bound to follow and consider the best interests of the children criteria as listed in s. 16 of the DA, and s. 24 of the CLRA. When considering the factors in determining the best interests of the children, I must give primary consideration to the children’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being. The factors relating to the circumstances of the children include, (a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability; (b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life; (c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent; (d) the history of care of the child; (e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained; (f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage; (g) any plans for the child’s care; (h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child; (i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the chid; (j) any family violence or history of family violence and its impact.

[22] Every parent is obligated to support their children. Before I can make any child support order, I must determine the parties’ incomes. In doing so, I am bound to follow s. 15.1 of the DA and the Federal Child Support Guidelines[^2] (hereinafter “the CSG’s”). Although they are called “Guidelines,” they are the law. Child support is the right of the child (in this case – Serena). The CSG’s contain a chart of the appropriate child support amounts the court sets based on the number of children and the payor’s ability to earn income. The CSG’s also set out requirements for financial disclosure, and what the court can do when those disclosure requirements have not been met (i.e. the court can make adverse – or negative findings against a payor and impute income to them). When a payor’s income is in dispute, there is also case law that helps guide the court on when and how it is appropriate to impute income to a payor. In certain circumstances, the court may also have regard to the payor’s annual income over the last three years and determine an amount that is fair and reasonable in light of any pattern or fluctuation in income.

[23] Section 15.2 of the DA provides the court with authority to make an order requiring a spouse to pay such lump sum or periodic sums as the court thinks is reasonable for the support of the other spouse. According to s. 15.2 (3) of the DA, the court may impose such terms, conditions or restrictions in connection with a spousal support order as it thinks fit and just. In making an order for spousal support and determining the quantum of same, he court must do so having considered the condition, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse and factors set out in s. 15.2 (4) of the DA including:

(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

[24] There are four economic or financial objectives that a spousal support order should strive to achieve (whether the payments are interim, final, lump sum or periodic). These objectives are set out in s. 15.2 (6) of the DA and provide that an order for spousal support should:

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

[25] Once entitlement for spousal support has been established, the SSAG’s are an important and helpful tool to determine the quantum and duration.

[26] Sections 4 and 5 of the FLA are the key property settlement provisions of the FLA. Section 4(1) of the FLA contains definitions of net family property, property, and valuation date as follows:

“net family property” means the value of all the property except property described in subsection (2), that a spouse owns on the valuation date, after deducting,

(a) The spouse’s debts and other liabilities, and

(b) The value of property, other than a matrimonial home, that the spouse owned on the date of the marriage, after deducting the spouse’s debts and other liabilities, other than debts or liabilities related directly to the acquisition or significant improvement of a matrimonial home, calculated as of the date of the marriage;

“property” means any interest, present or future, vested or contingent, in real or personal property and includes,

(a) Property over which a spouse has, alone or in conjunction with another person, a power of appointment exercisable in favour of himself or herself,

(b) Property disposed of by a spouse but over which the spouse has, alone or in conjunction with another person, a power to revoke the disposition or a power to consume or dispose of the property, and

(c) In the case of a spouse’s rights under a pension plan, the imputed value, for family law purposes, of the spouse’s interest in the plan, as determined in accordance with section 10.1, for the period beginning with the date of the marriage and ending on the valuation date;

“valuation date” means the earliest of the following dates:

1. The date the spouses separate and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation.

2. The date a divorce is granted.

3. The date the marriage is declared a nullity.

4. The date one of the spouses commences an application based on subsection 5(3) (improvident depletion) that is subsequently granted.

5. The date before the date on which one of the spouses dies leaving the other spouse surviving.

[27] After the NFP has been calculated, the next step is to “equalize” the NFPs under s. 5 by requiring, as a general rule, the spouse with the larger net family property to pay half the difference to the other spouse. Section 5(1) of the FLA reads:

EQUALIZATION OF NET FAMILY PROPERTIES – (1) When a divorce is granted or a marriage is declared a nullity, or when the spouses are separated and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation, the spouse whose net family property is the lesser of the two net family properties is entitled to one-half the difference between them.

[28] Section 5(7) sets out the purpose of s. 5 and reads:

PURPOSE – The purpose of this section is to recognize that child care, household management and financial provision are the joint responsibilities of the spouses and that inherent in the marital relationship there is equal contribution, whether financial or otherwise, by the spouses to the assumption of these responsibilities, entitling each spouse to the equalization of the net family properties, subject only to the equitable consideration set out in subsection (6).

[29] In addition to the above, under s. 9 of the FLA, in an application for equalization of NFP, the court may order:

(a) that one spouse pay to the other spouse the amount to which the court finds that spouse to be entitled under this Part;

(b) that security, including a charge on property, be given for the performance of an obligation imposed by the order;

(c) that, if necessary to avoid hardship, an amount referred to in clause (a) be paid in instalments during a period not exceeding ten years or that payment of all or part of the amount be delayed for a period not exceeding ten years; and

(d) that, if appropriate to satisfy an obligation imposed by the order,

(i) property be transferred to or in trust for or vested in a spouse, whether absolutely, for life or for a term of years, or

(ii) any property be partitioned or sold.

[30] Both parties relied upon expert evidence in this trial. The Family Law Rules[^3] govern the duty of experts, the type of expert opinion evidence and the process and notice for service and filing expert reports. Rules 20.1 and20.2 read:

Rule 20.1: DUTY OF EXPERTS

20.1 Application –

(1) This rule applies to,

(a) a person who is a litigation expert within the meaning of rule 20.2; and

(b) an expert who is appointed by the court under rule 20.3.

(2) DUTY OF EXPERT – It is the duty of every expert to whom this rule applies to,

(a) provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan;

(b) provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within the expert’s are of expertise; and

(c) provide such additional assistance as the court may reasonably require to determine a matter in issue.

(3) DUTY PREVAILS – In the case of a litigation expert, the duty in subrule (2) prevails over any obligation owed by the expert to a party.

Rule 20.2: EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE

20.2 DEFINITIONS

(1) In this rule,

“joint litigation expert” means a litigation expert engaged to provide expert opinion evidence for two or more parties;

“litigation expert” means a person engaged for the purposes of litigation to provide expert opinion evidence;

“participant expert” means a person who is not engaged to provide expert opinion evidence for the purposes of litigation, but who provides expert opinion evidence based on the exercise of his or her skills, knowledge, training or experience while observing or participating in the events at issue.

[31] The balance of r. 20.2 sets out the process and notice requirements for service and filing of expert witness reports, supplementary reports, documentation to accompany the report, testimony, and cross-examination of an expert witness.

Facts and Analysis

Decision-Making Responsibility

[32] The parties were married for 17 years. They have two children, Lukas (19) and Serena (15). They separated on July 12, 2022. Parenting time for Serena was settled by way of Final Order of Douglas J. dated May 14, 2025. There was no parenting order required for Lukas as he was over the age of majority. As the parenting time schedule has been decided; the only live parenting issue is decision-making responsibility regarding Serena, who was 15 years old at the time of the trial.

[33] The applicant seeks an order for sole decision-making responsibility for Serena. The respondent seeks an order for joint decision-making responsibility. Serena lives primarily with the applicant and has regular parenting time with the respondent. It is undisputed that communication between the parties has ranged from highly conflicted, to strained civility, to non-existent.

[34] The respondent is asking the court to make an order for joint decision-making regarding Serena. He said that during the early years of the relationship, when the children were young, he worked a lot. He acknowledged that he wasn’t around to take either child to doctors’ appointments. He acknowledged that the applicant did more of the parenting as part of her role in the family. However, the respondent said he was an active father, and he had a nightly routine with the children. He said that Serena knows how much she means to him, and he asserted that she relies on him. He said that “we have an amazing relationship. She calls him for advice. She tells him about her boyfriend problems. Serena knows about everything with him except for the legal proceedings. We don’t talk about the legal proceedings. Our personal relationship has grown a lot through her life.” He said that they have become so close through the separation, and he wants to be there for her.

[35] The respondent acknowledged that he does not have this same closeness with his son Lukas. He said that he “wished” he could be as close, and he still reaches out to Lukas and tries to maintain communication. He said, “I want them in my life. These are my children. After all of this, nothing can take me from my children. They deserve and need my love and support.” He said that if the applicant has sole decision-making, then “I am less of a parent. I don’t want sole decision-making responsibility; I just want it to be equal. I just want my daughter in my life, and I feel she feels the same about me.”

[36] When discussing communication with the applicant, the respondent said that he “doesn’t have a problem communicating with the applicant.” He said there were issues in the early stages of the separation, things were unclear, and they “escalated.” He said that now we “see each other two to three times per week. I have been very respectful towards our relationship. I can communicate via phone or email. I promise to be respectful of her concerns and what is right or wrong for the kids. I am willing to be respectful towards everything she wants to bring to me. I am genuinely concerned about her and her family. I think we can communicate respectfully as adults.”

[37] The respondent alleged that the applicant has not consulted with him for major decisions. He said that the applicant needs to be more transparent regarding “major decisions” and give him notice of major decisions – but he alleged that the applicant withholds the important information regarding Serena. When asked for a specific example, the only example he provided the court was with respect to when Serena had a mole removed, which he described as a “surgery.” He said that the applicant didn’t tell him about it in advance, and he only found out about it during his parenting time, after Serena asked for help “changing gauze.” He said he bought the necessary supplies. The court found it interesting that the respondent would characterize a mole removal procedure as a “major decision” and yet he minimized or gave no evidence to contradict the applicant’s allegation about when he permitted Serena to get a navel piercing during his parenting time (without prior consultation or consent from the applicant). The applicant said that Serena came home from a weekend with her father with her naval pierced. The applicant said that she never agreed with it, and the respondent never discussed it. The applicant said she was concerned about it becoming infected, which it did, and she had to take care of the infection.

[38] The applicant denies the respondent’s assertion that he was an involved or active father. She says that she took a maternity leave after the birth of the children, but she also worked from home. She said that the respondent was the primary income earner for the family and that he worked a lot, and so she made most decisions regarding the children on her own during the marriage and after separation. She said that throughout the relationship the respondent treated her inconsistently and was often verbally abusive. She described how she was treated by the respondent as his own “personal emotional punching bag.”[^4] The applicant became quite emotional when talking about the past, the marriage, and family memories. She said that she “knew he had a lot of stress on him” but she “didn’t know how he would be when he came home, and if he was in a bad mood.” She said that the children and her “walked on eggshells” around the respondent and that she was repeatedly called bad and derogatory names. The children heard him call her the “C word.” The applicant said she doesn’t want her daughter to hear things like that. The applicant said that the respondent was loud and scary, secretive and controlling, and this behaviour has continued after separation. The applicant said that the respondent was always name-calling and swearing, and had a “tendency of losing his temper anytime things don’t go his way.”[^5] She provided several examples of many incidents prior to and after separation in her affidavit.[^6]

[39] The applicant said that she has never “withheld” information or major decisions from the respondent. She said that the respondent never had any problem with her parenting or decisions regarding the children’s health or education. She said that decisions were made by her all the time throughout the marriage. She managed and attended all the children’s doctors’ and dentist appointments. She said this has not changed before or after their separation. She said that she made all decisions regarding the children’s school, and she attended all teacher parent nights. She acknowledged that he attended some early on, but he has not attended for any since the separation even though he was permitted to do so. She said that she registered the children for their activities (gymnastics, dance, tap, jiujitsu, skating, etc.) and she was the parent responsible to taking them to their activities. The applicant said that the respondent’s relationship with Lukas was very difficult during the marriage as the respondent “heavily disciplined” and interrogated Lukas and used physical discipline at times. She said the relationship between the respondent and Lukas deteriorated after the parties’ separation when the respondent threatened that he “would cut him from his life.”

[40] The applicant said that she took care of everything related to the children’s needs, and that following their separation, it has been very difficult dealing with the respondent when making decisions. She provided examples of the difficulties with respect to arranging therapy for the children, and the respondent’s refusal to pay for Serena’s braces (despite the orthodontist advising it was necessary).[^7] Further, the applicant advised the court that when it came time to make a decision about high school for Serena, the respondent was aware of the decision being made, and he expressed no opinion on the decision for Serena’s school.

[41] The applicant asserts that she is fully supportive of the respondent’s relationship with Serena. The applicant pointed to the April 8, 2025, Minutes of Settlement, where she has already agreed to the possibility of an “equal” week about (50/50) parenting time arrangement for Serena subject to Serena’s wishes, once the respondent lives closer to them. Despite this, she said that it is the respondent who has never moved closer to make equal parenting possible. She also said that the respondent has no relationship with Lukas, and he has been inconsistent with respect to pick up and drop off for his parenting time with Serena (making last minute changes or not even exercising the planned parenting time).[^8]

[42] The respondent explained that he hasn’t moved closer because of the uncertainty of litigation. He acknowledged that Serena has said she would be “ok with it” (i.e. living equally with both parents), but that he “didn’t want to make it harder for her.” He said “I don’t want to take Serena from her Mom. Serena is ok with her Mom and Lukas. For now, it is ok. Moving forward once this is settled, I will find some housing closer to her school. It is still my intention to move forward on that.” He said that he “heavily supports Serena’s wishes.” The respondent said this is also why he doesn’t follow the parenting time schedule consistently. The respondent said that sometimes Serena wished to go home early because she didn’t want to carry things to school. So, sometimes he will drop her off back at the applicant’s home on Sunday night instead of Monday morning at school. Also, sometimes, Serena will call him and ask for a later pick up because of her social life or friends. He doesn’t feel he is doing anything wrong, and he doesn’t consider these changes to be inconsistencies. He said, “I wasn’t doing anything wrong.” In my view, because of Serena’s age, these types of last-minute changes could be viewed as being “flexible” and respecting Serena’s wishes, but only so long as it does not cause Serena to be placed in the middle of the parents’ communication and conflict.

[43] I found that I could not give significant weight to the respondent’s evidence about decision-making. I found the respondent was inconsistent and lacked insight with respect to the decision-making and parenting issues. For example, when the respondent was discussing money and child support, he said that one of the reasons he does not owe the applicant any retroactive child support was because he has been giving money directly to Serena. The respondent said that shortly after the separation, he began directly paying Serena $400-500 per month (approximately $100 per week). Serena was only 12 years old at the time. He explained that this was for her “lunches” and then when the court asked him some further questions about it, he explained that he didn’t start doing this until after he had moved out of the matrimonial home in 2023. He said that he “didn’t want Serena to feel left out if she was at the mall. I tried to encourage her to save some of the money and teach her fiscal responsibility.” The court asked the respondent how much Serena saved of the money he gave her, the respondent said “none.” The court asked the respondent if he did the same for Lukas, to which the respondent answered, “I didn’t do the same for Lukas. We were estranged. There was no relationship. I didn’t know what he needed or how he was doing.”

[44] The court does not believe that the respondent showed any insight regarding how the differing treatment of Serena and Lukas would affect Lukas’ and Serena’s emotional well-being. In my view, the payments he made to Serena directly involved her in the financial conflict between the parties. It also likely created further estrangement between Lukas and the respondent, and potentially jeopardized Serena and Lukas’ relationship. In my view, the respondent was using the money to manipulate the affections of the children. He had no real or valid concerns about whether Serena was getting sufficient lunches, nor was he teaching her “fiscal responsibility.” She never saved a dime.

[45] Further, the court did not give a great deal of weight to the respondent’s evidence regarding the applicant’s lack of consultation regarding major decisions. I found that most of his comments were not based on fact, and they did not overcome the reality that the applicant was a stay-at-home mother from the birth of their first child. There is no history of him questioning the applicant’s parenting decisions or allegations that she ever put the children at risk of harm. However, it is the respondent who has a strained relationship with the parties’ son Lukas. Plus, there is significant evidence that the respondent continued to expose the children to their conflict after the separation.

[46] In my view, for the respondent, the issue of decision-making is more about control and “fairness” rather than being about the best interests of the children. Like he said in his own testimony, he “just wants it to be equal.” The court does not believe this issue is truly important to the respondent. During cross-examination, the respondent did not ask the applicant any questions about the children on the issue of decision-making responsibility. He didn’t ask her any questions about their lifestyle or their roles during the marriage. As a result, in my view, he didn’t sufficiently dispute the applicant’s evidence regarding the decision-making and parenting issues. Further, in his closing submissions he focused solely on the financial issues. He didn’t even address the issue of decision-making at all.

[47] With respect to the decision-making for Serena, she is 15 years old, and the court finds that in Serena’s case, as Benotto J. said in Fielding, “time has overtaken the custody issue.”[^9] Serena’s actions give voice to her wishes. Serena’s behaviour demonstrates her capacity for self-determination and her love, affection, and connection with both her father and her mother. Since the separation, the applicant had primary care of both of the children. Additionally, since at least May 2025, the parents have permitted Serena to determine how and when she spends time with her mother and father. Serena has chosen to remain in the primary care of her mother and visit her father on alternate weekends and one day per week. The court cannot and will not change that now, especially as Serena is closer to being a young adult than a child.

[48] Both parties have acknowledged there were issues that made their communication problematic. For joint decision-making to work, respectful communication and cooperation between the parents are needed. The respondent suggests that the party’s communication has improved, and it is respectful. If that is true, that is fantastic for the children. However, even when giving evidence, the respondent questioned the applicant’s decision-making and made allegations that the applicant had “withheld” important medical information about Serena. Based on the evidence before me, I do not agree. In my view, the respondent was being over-dramatic and feigned his “concern” about not being involved in the arrangement or decision about Serena’s mole removal procedure. I found his comments about the applicant were contradictory and passive aggressive regarding her decision-making. I find that it is the respondent who has exercised questionable decision-making and involved Serena in the separation and conflict between the parties. The respondent’s inconsistent treatment for the children and their relationship with him does not bode well for ensuring their emotional safety.

[49] In making my decision regarding sole or joint decision-making responsibility, I must give primary consideration to the children’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being. I do not believe that the respondent would ever intentionally harm Serena. I believe that both parents love their children very much. However, I find that the status quo has always been the applicant providing and supporting the children’s consistent safety, security, and well-being. There is no evidence whatsoever that the applicant has ever made a decision that was not in the children’s best interests.

[50] While the applicant and respondent should consult with each other prior to making major decisions regarding Serena’s health and education, I find that in the event of a disagreement regarding these or other major decisions, it is in the child’s best interests that one parent have sole decision-making, so as not to delay treatment, services or medication. For all these reasons, the respondent and applicant will have equal rights to information and communication with any professionals or institutions regarding the child. I will make an order for a communication and consultation protocol for major decisions regarding Serena, however, I will make an order that the applicant will have sole decision-making responsibility. Lastly, I will make an order that the applicant shall hold on to Serena’s important documents since she has decision-making authority.

Expert Reports and Determination of Respondent’s Business Value and Income

Expert Reports

[51] As stated in the introduction, both parties have provided multiple expert reports. Each party submitted an expert report regarding business value and an expert report regarding the respondent’s income. Each expert report regarding the business value relied upon different business equipment appraisals, therefore, the expert reports differed significantly regarding the calculation of income and business value. The court had to decide how much weight to give to the competing reports and valuations of the respondent’s business and income.

[52] In relation to the use of expert witnesses, the role of the trial judge and the expert has evolved: “Appellate courts have repeatedly instructed trial judges that they serve as gatekeepers when it comes to the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. They are required to carefully scrutinize, among other things, an expert witness’ training and professional experience, along with the necessity of their testimony in assisting the trier of fact, before the expert is qualified to give evidence in our courts.”[^10] Further, the FLR’s have duties on experts, and “required expert witnesses to attest to those duties, namely to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan.”[^11] These professional duties and limits help address a common complaint that the party was using an expert as a “hired gun” who tailored their reports and evidence to suit the client’s needs.

[53] Generally, in life, good ingredients make a good product. Whereas when the ingredients lack quality, or some ingredients are missing, the quality of the product is correspondingly lacking. In a family court trial, the quality of the evidence is every participant’s responsibility. Expert witnesses provide invaluable assistance to the parties and the court with their unique expertise and analysis of relevant facts and can provide tremendous help to the court in understanding the facts and in making factual findings. The use of chartered business valuators is quite commonplace in resolving family disputes involving litigants with business income or corporate assets.

[54] Good, reliable expert reports and valuations of business and income, depend upon fulsome, frank, and accurate financial disclosure. Additionally, the expert and their report must be tested in court by cross-examination, so the court can make findings of credibility and determine if they can sufficiently rely upon the expert report and determine the weight that will be given to their opinion evidence. In most cases, when the disclosure provided to the expert is lacking or inaccurate, and/or the author of the report does not attend court and subject themselves to cross-examination to test their opinion evidence, the court will not be able to rely upon or give the expert report significant weight. This trial might have been avoided or simplified, if the parties had jointly retained the appraisers and business/income valuators, and, if there had been cooperative, fulsome, frank, and accurate financial disclosure, and, if all authors of the reports attended court.

[55] In this case, the respondent has his own road construction and maintenance company, A.I. Roadtech Services Inc., (hereinafter “A.I. Roadtech” or “the company”) which was incorporated on March 8, 2010. It is undisputed that the applicant assisted the respondent with incorporation of the business and set it up on an administration level. She also took care of the accounts payable and receivable. The respondent ran the business solely in his name, and despite the respondent’s assertion that it is now insolvent, the business is still active to this day. The applicant stated that she had firsthand knowledge of the business and was “well aware of all the business equipment and vehicles that the respondent held at any given time.”[^12]

[56] As there was no agreement on the value for the company or the respondent’s income, the parties relied heavily upon their competing expert witness business valuation reports and appraisers (whose differing conclusions were in serious conflict). It is undisputed that the disparity between the parties’ equalization calculations are largely attributed to the differences in the valuation of the respondent’s interest in A.I. Roadtech and the asset appraisals that were relied upon by the parties’ respective experts.[^13] In my view, this disparity was primarily due to the differing quality and reliability of the information that was provided to each valuator and appraiser.

[57] The respondent retained Mr. Lewis of White & Lewis LLP, and the applicant retained Mr. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP. Both Mr. Lewis and Mr. Gravelle prepared two reports each: an income report to help determine the respondent’s income for the child and spousal support issues; and a valuation of the respondent’s interest in the business for equalization purposes. For ease of reference, the court will hereinafter refer to Mr. Lewis’ expert reports as the “Lewis Business Valuation”[^14] and the “Lewis Income Valuation”[^15] and refer to Mr. Gravelle’s expert reports as the “Wilkinson Business Valuation”[^16] and the “Wilkinson Income Valuation.”[^17]

[58] Both Mr. Lewis and Mr. Gravelle were called as witnesses during the trial, and they both provided additional evidence and were cross-examined. The qualifications of the experts who testified (i.e. Mr. Lewis and Mr. Gravelle) were accepted. However, both parties asserted that the court could not rely on the other party’s expert income report or business valuation. This is primarily because both the Lewis Business Valuation and the Wilkinson Business Valuation relied heavily on very different business equipment appraisals. The Lewis Business Valuation relied primarily upon information provided by the respondent, and appraisals by Markham Finch Appraisals.[^18] The Wilkinson Business Valuation relied primarily upon information provided by the applicant, and appraisals by Kohli Appraisers.[^19] Further, proof of ownership was not required and where an appraisal was not provided, they relied on an estimate provided by the respondent or the applicant. The Lewis Business Valuation estimated the business assets including equipment and land to be valued at $248,625. The Wilkinson Business Valuation estimated the business assets including equipment and land to be valued at $715,450.

[59] The applicant alleges that the Lewis Business Valuation extremely undervalued the respondent’s interest in A.I. Roadtech because they relied on the appraisals from Markham Finch Appraisals.[^18] The respondent denies this allegation. In my view, the business valuations from both parties had their own strengths and challenges. This led the court to accept and give weight to certain parts from each report, and to disregard other parts from each report and make adverse inferences due to the gaps in the evidence.

Appraisals

Markham Finch Appraisals

[60] The respondent provided handwritten business equipment appraisals completed by Markham Finch Appraisals (1462960 Ontario Inc. located at 2511 Markham Road, Scarborough, Ontario). The Markham Finch Appraisals were completed on Ministry of Finance Forms for Retail Sales Tax.

[61] The respondent attached the appraisals to his trial affidavit and said these appraisals were completed prior to separation for the purpose of arranging insurance, so he asserted he had no reason to undervalue the vehicles.[^20] The appraiser from Markham Finch Appraisals (Mr. Michael Tzemis) was not called as a witness. The respondent did not serve him with a Summons to Witness, and the respondent did not request that he attend court. The respondent referred to the Markham Finch Appraisals as “participant expert reports.” However, the Markham Finch Appraisals and Mr. Michael Tzemis was not qualified as an expert. There was no opportunity to cross-examine him or question him regarding his appraisals. Despite this, the respondent submitted that his business asset appraisals should be preferred because he asserted they were appraised in person, by licensed appraisers who could comment on the condition of the assets. He described these appraisals as “reliable and contemporaneous” and showing the total assets of the business being outweighed by the liabilities.

[62] When a purported expert (whether a litigation expert or participant expert) is not called as a witness in a trial, they cannot be questioned or qualified as to their special skills, knowledge or training or experience or to the context of their engagement. The court cannot properly weigh any inconsistencies in their reports. As set out above, since the respondent didn’t call the author of the reports as a witness, they were not only NOT expert reports, they amounted to hearsay evidence. The court permitted them to be entered as exhibits to the respondent’s trial affidavit.[^21] However, I made it clear that the court could not rely on them or give them significant weight.

[63] Further, the court heard evidence from Mr. Kohli of Kohli Appraisers, disputing the values given in the Markham Finch Appraisals. Mr. Kohli confirmed that he had been provided with copies of the respondent’s Markham Finch Appraisals. Mr. Kohli said that these are the motor vehicle forms sent by the Ministry of Transportation so they can apply a tax for any transfer. The form is usually utilized by used car salespeople or mechanics to indicate the vehicle’s value is lower than average for tax purposes. This is actually clearly shown on the forms where the appraiser certifies that “the appraised value of the vehicle is lower than average due to severe damage or excessive wear.” Mr. Kohli was asked what the difference between this form and his report is. Mr. Kohli advised that these forms are not accepted appraisals for the lending industry. He said there is no method of coming up with the values in these forms. He said that he doesn’t use these, and that “the folks that do this are making quick judgment calls and the ministry just accepts them at face value.” He said that he has rarely heard of any further audit by the Ministry for the values given on these forms.

[64] Lastly, the applicant provided evidence that Markham Finch Appraisals “advertise and pride themselves in purposely lowering the appraised value of vehicles.” Their website says the following: “Save money when transferring owners of a vehicle. We will try to LOWER the appraised value of your vehicle to SAVE YOU MONEY. Any model, any year.” The applicant said that the A.I. Roadtech balance sheet listing some of the business equipment and vehicles along with their approximate values from February 2022, directly contradicts the values in the Markham Finch Appraisals.[^22]

[65] The Wilkinson Business Valuation relied heavily on the Kohli Appraisal and the Lewis Business Valuation relied heavily on the Markham Finch Appraisals. The Markham Finch Appraiser did not attend court to be qualified as an expert, nor did he subject himself to cross-examination. He did not attend to authenticate or defend his appraisals or explain the context behind them (i.e. the intention, why, when, how, what). Anything that the Markham Finch Appraiser said to the respondent about values and all appraisals he provided to the respondent and Mr. Lewis about the values is hearsay. I cannot give it any weight.

[66] For all these reasons, the court finds that the Markham Finch Appraisals could not be relied upon as being authentic or providing the actual value of the equipment and vehicles. No weight was given to the Markham Finch Appraisals. Further, as the Markham Finch Appraisals were heavily relied upon by Mr. Lewis, this finding correspondingly had a serious and negative effect on reliability and the weight that could be given to the Lewis Business Valuation.

Kohli Appraisers

[67] The applicant retained Mr. Kohli of Kohli Appraisers to provide an appraisal report dated July 8, 2024 of the business equipment owned by the respondent on the date of separation in July 2022, hereinafter referred to as “the Kohli Appraisal.”[^23] Mr. Kohli advised the court that Kohli Appraisers was started in 1978 by his father and a partner, and that he has been leading the firm since 2005. He has performed or been a part of over 30,000 appraisals for the past 30 years. He advised that he teaches and mentors in this profession and that he has testified in court before and been certified as an expert in appraisals in court. He summarized all of his training and certifications in appraising trucks and large equipment and property. He said that they have “done many hundreds, perhaps thousands of truck and equipment appraisals, and that we have done them for much bigger companies than this one.” His website profile shows he performs appraisals of “transportation equipment valuations in areas such as passenger, commercial, trucking and construction.” I found that Mr. Kohli was qualified as an expert in business and heavy equipment appraisals during the trial.

[68] The respondent asked the court to reject the Kohli Appraisal because they were a “desktop appraisal” based on insurance schedules and photographs that he asserted did not establish ownership or value. He further submitted that unproven assets must be excluded.

[69] According to the Kohli Appraisal, he appraised the value of the equipment at $908,750. Mr. Kohli confirmed that he wrote the Kohli Appraisal, and he certified it is true. He confirmed that Ms. Auciello retained him. The print date of the Kohli Appraisal is July 8, 2024; however, the effective date of the report is actually the date of separation in July 2022. Mr. Kohli called it a ‘retrospective report.’ He advised the court that he didn’t inspect the equipment because we were told it would be difficult or unavailable. Further, if inspected physically, it could create a problem with the “effective date” because the conditions between effective date damage and wear and tear could have changed from the actual date of the viewing or inspection. The amount/value could than be affected.

[70] Mr. Kohli explained that all they could do was review the assets based on the information provided to them. The Kohli Appraisal was based upon information and pictures provided by the Applicant. The conclusion of the fair market value (“FMV”) was found on page 5 and was found using the most common “Market approach”. Mr. Kohli described FMV as a “credible estimate based on certain assumptions and data that Appraisers have gathered to come to their conclusions.” During cross-examination, the respondent criticized the use of a desktop appraisal and asserted it is not an accurate reflection of the value because there is no physical inspection of the asset. Mr. Kohli said that “a physical inspection would allow them to verify certain details, and the assumptions are more granular than if allowed to inspect.” He said it is always more favorable to have an onsite inspection. However, the conclusion in the Kohli Appraisal is a FMV based on the assumptions.

[71] Mr. Kohli explained that a desktop appraisal is a “retrospective appraisal” (i.e. they have to make their assumptions working backwards, because they are determining the value in 2025 of assets that existed in 2022). He said that “we do the best we can with the information we receive. It is not a current value appraisal, and I didn’t have access to the equipment. We do desktop appraisals all the time and they give an accurate value based on the information provided. It is an expected and common approach in the industry and in this case, it was the only option. It is reliable because it is the only reliable approach. It shows the fair value assuming the assets are in working order.”

[72] Mr. Kohli explained that retrospective appraisals are different. He confirmed that Ms. Auciello provided all the information that was given to them to base the appraisals upon. He said that certain items were omitted from the list of assets and equipment because they didn’t have enough details and data. He said he was provided with an asset list from the applicant and “we had some back and forth for details. We worked with the spreadsheet provided by the applicant. We omitted some documents because we didn’t have any information.” He said that there were comfortable with their final list because we had enough data for each item.[^24] He said that he stands behind the list based on the assumptions of standard use, but they did not have hours of use or mileage information.

[73] During cross-examination, the respondent criticized the Kohli Appraisal because they didn’t confirm ownership or serial numbers or VIN of each item of equipment listed. Mr. Kohli confirmed that they were retained to provide values on assets - not to verify ownership. Service Ontario records were not provided. Mr. Kohli acknowledged that they did not confirm whether any of the assets were leased or borrowed. They assumed they were owned fee simple free and clear. He confirmed that determining ownership was beyond our scope. He said we cannot take responsibility for the ownership. Mr. Kohli went on to explain that where they did not have a VIN or serial number, they used the make and model and the description and pictures. He said they “don’t need a serial number to confirm the value. You need a model. The serial number could correlate to the year. It may or may not correlate to the options and extras. Usually all we need is the pertinent information for the model.” He said that “for about 80% of the items, we had the model and year, and those tended to be the higher value items. We had to omit certain items from the applicant’s list because we didn’t have enough information for them.”

[74] The court acknowledges and understands that some of the assets may have been older, and they would have depreciated in value. Further, it may be counterintuitive if the equipment and vehicles were found to be older and heavily used, yet the Kohli Appraisal assigned values that were so much higher than the Markham Finch Appraisals. Mr. Auciello asked Mr. Kohli if the value of equipment would be affected if that equipment has been heavily used and had maintenance records. Mr. Kohli said “Yes. Certain items values can be varied, e.g. A dump truck can be used and maintained well for 20 years, and if not maintained and you may only get 10 years. It depends on the operator and maintenance just like for passenger vehicles.” He said that we were not inspecting the working order or mechanics of the assets. They based their estimate on the assumptions they were in working order. Mr. Kohli said that “we assumed all items were in working order, based upon Ms. Auciello’s information. We did not confirm ownership of vehicles. We did not confirm items that were present at date of separation.” He acknowledged that if there is an incorrect asset included in the list, it could inflate or increase the value of the equipment appraisal.

[75] The applicant confirmed that she “provided Kohli Equipment Appraisers with all the information/documentation I had relating to the business equipment and vehicles, including pictures that I took of the equipment and vehicles, insurance documentations and Quickbooks Ledgers.[^25] She said that the appraiser asked if she had pictures, and she said she would get them and they were emailed to them by her.

[76] Mr. Auciello criticized Mr. Kohli for never meeting with him or talking with him to determine the equipment/asset list. Mr. Kohli agreed that talking to only one side in a court case can lead to an inaccurate appraisal result. He said, “We like it when both sides are present and cooperating, we can see and agree on the equipment/asset list together.” He acknowledged there is a risk of bias if one party provides all the information and pictures. He said, “in all retrospective appraisals we need to rely on the assumptions and make and model. The appraisal is limited based on the information provided. The valuations rely heavily on assumptions. All valuations rely heavily upon assumptions.” He said that the certainty level for Kohli Appraisal was moderate, and it was as high as we could give for this type of appraisal.” Mr. Kohli advised the court that he has testified for court in divorce cases before. He said that “we do these for lawyers and clients all the time, but these are low volume for us. Our most work is for lenders and lending industry. Retrospective reports all use the same method. In cases where the parties are cooperative, we can inspect/view the asset with them together. In this case it was not possible.”

[77] In my view, Mr. Kohli was a highly qualified appraiser for the exact purpose he was retained to do, i.e. to give a credible retrospective estimate of the values of the vehicles and business equipment as of the date of separation. If the list of assets or equipment was inaccurate and/or he provided values for vehicles or equipment that were not owned by the respondent or the company, that does not reduce the weight or reliability of the appraised values in Kohli Appraisal. Mr. Kohli was not retained to certify ownership. If the respondent had been cooperative with respect to making the vehicles and equipment available for onsite inspection of their condition, existence, and confirmation of ownership, it would have simplified the issue tremendously. I find that I can sufficiently rely upon the Kohli Appraisal and the retrospective appraised values of the vehicles and equipment it provided as of date of separation. I find it is the only credible and reliable evidence that I have regarding the values of the equipment and vehicles.

Value of Business Assets (equipment and land)

[78] Despite the findings made above, I do find there is one weakness in the Wilkinson Business Valuation. Specifically, based on the evidence, there is some significant uncertainty of ownership in the list of assets that the applicant provided to Kohli Appraisals. The respondent provided evidence that the Kohli Appraisals “included valuations of vehicles and equipment that was not owned by A.I. Roadtech Services Inc. on the valuation date.”[^26] This weakness was corroborated by the respondent’s expert Mr. Lewis. Mr. Lewis advised the court that after they issued the Lewis Business Valuation, they received the Wilkinson Business Valuation and Kohli Appraisals. As a result, Mr. Lewis wanted to see if there were any adjustments to be made based on that information. Mr. Lewis advised the court that he wrote a letter with a list of questions about the asset list provided by Kohli.[^27] He asked to be provided with a list of assets that is supportable as being owned by the respondent and the business. I find that Mr. Lewis’ questions were legitimate, and therefore the court shared the respondent’s concerns about the accuracy of the list of assets appraised by Kohli as of the date of separation. The accuracy of the list of assets could dramatically change and drive the value of the assets. Mr. Lewis said he was not provided with any response.

[79] When you compare the book value of the assets in the Lewis Business Valuation and the Wilkinson Business Valuation, there is a large difference in the appraised value and the book value. The book value represents the cost of the equipment less the accumulated amortization or depreciation. The Wilkinson Business Valuation said the value of assets was approximately $715,450 for vehicles, equipment, and land. The Lewis Business Valuation said it was $248,625.

[80] As the Wilkinson Business Valuation relied heavily upon the Kohli Appraisals despite the list of assets being unconfirmed, I recalculated the Tangible Asset Backing and Adjusted New Book Value by using the list of business assets provided to the Lewis Business Valuation[^28] and using the corresponding values for the equipment and vehicles and land provided in the Wilkinson Business Valuation.[^29] This results in a reduction in the final appraisal amount for the Net Tangible Assets in Schedule 3 page 1 used in the Wilkinson Business Valuation from $640,450 to $428,800. After I added the Burk’s Falls land value of $75,000 it changed the total Net Tangible Assets from $715,450 to $503,800 and the Tangible Asset Backing and Adjusted New Book Value from $685,000 to $473,823 as set out below:

Net Tangible Assets as at July 12, 2022:

Shareholders Equity as at March 31, 2022 – Schedule 1 $401,230

Add:

FMV of capital assets $428,800

Land $ 75,000 $503,800

Deduct:

Net book value of capital assets – Schedule 1 ($401,207)

Loss of tax shield benefit of capital assets ($ 30,000)

Tangible Asset Backing and Adjusted New Book Value $473,823

[81] The court acknowledges that the above changes that have been made to the estimated value of the net tangible business assets and equipment and land may have affected the estimated disposition costs, taxes, and liabilities. However, the court had no information, evidence or submissions to assist in making any changes to the deductions set out above, so it did not make any further changes to calculation. The court acknowledges this may lead to an aberrant result; however, the court has done the best it could with the information and evidence that was properly before it. The gaps in information and evidence forced the court to make inferences that may be adverse to one or both parties. The court is entitled to determine if an approach reflected in a report is limited because a fundamental assumption was not proven on the evidence. Factual assumptions are not evidence of the facts, which must be proved by other admissible evidence: Mazur v. Lucas, 2010 BCCA 473, 325 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at paras. 37, 40.

The Business Valuations

Wilkinson Business Valuation

[82] The applicant called Mr. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP (hereinafter “Wilkinson”) as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding the value of the respondent’s business A.I. Roadtech Inc. and income.[^30] Mr. Gravelle affirmed that he prepared the Wilkinson Business Valuation and Wilkinson Income Valuation. He adopted and relied upon it and swore that everything was true and accurate to the best of his knowledge. He confirmed that he had been at Wilkinson since 2017. He has been an accountant for 35 years and worked in public accounting for 25 years. He advised the court that he had completed several hundred valuations and reports of this nature. He has completed a Bachelor of Commerce and Chartered Professional Accounting in 2009. He is associated with CPA Ontario and CPA Canada. He is a fraud examiner and a member of the Chartered Business Valuation Institute. He has completed courses specific to both valuations of business and income. He had never testified in a family court before. The Court found Mr. Gravelle to be an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding valuing business and income for family law purposes.

[83] Mr. Gravelle confirmed that they were engaged by Galbraith Law and the applicant to value the company as of the valuation date – which was July 2022. The information they received was from the applicant and some disclosure from the respondent’s former lawyer – which consisted of a majority of the accounting records. Mr. Gravelle requested the financial statements, corporate tax returns, and personal expenses paid by the company on behalf of the respondent. They never received the company’s bank statements. This is concerning because if there were significant values in the bank accounts it would impact the business valuation.

[84] The Wilkinson Business Valuation concluded that the FMV of 100% of the shares of A.I. Roadtech was between $670,000 and $690,000 with a midpoint of $680,000 as at the valuation date.[^31] Mr. Gravelle explained that in a Chartered Business Valuation, they are required to provide their conclusion, scope of review, background of the company, and whether it is a going concern or a liquidation situation. The Wilkinson Report indicated that they relied upon various documents as set out in the Scope of Review. As set out above, this included the vehicle/equipment appraisals by Kohli Equipment Appraisers. As described in the Scope Limitations, Mr. Gravelle said that they requested certain documentation and information (eg. he would have liked to have Financial Statements for 2022, corporate tax return for 2022, and an outline of Mr. Auciello’s duties). He said they “noted various discrepancies between certain figures reported on the Company’s corporate income tax returns and figures in the company’s general ledgers” and they were also not provided with any information about the sale of land in Burk’s Falls. He said these were requested in their engagement letter in June 2024. This request was shared with opposing counsel. However, Mr. Gravelle said the respondent did not provide any of the information and gave them no explanation for the discrepancies.

[85] Mr. Gravelle said they used a “going concern” approach, and not the “liquidation approach” because the company was solvent and a going concern. He said we can only use what is known and reasonably known as at the date of separation. The business was doing well, so it was valued on a “going concern” basis. Mr. Gravelle explained that as at the valuation date, “the company was financially solvent and it was experiencing a trend of increasing revenues.” Also, it was their understanding that at the valuation date, the respondent “had no plans to wind up the company or significantly change operations.” Based on this, they performed the valuation using a going concern approach, specifically, they “elected to perform the valuation based on capitalization of estimated maintainable net earnings.”

[86] Mr. Gravelle explained that there are three different types of business valuation reports, and each report involved a different level of review and disclosure, and consequently, each report provides a different level of assurance. These three types of reports are as follows: a. Calculation Valuation Report; b. Estimate Valuation Report; and c. Comprehensive Valuation Report. The Comprehensive Valuation Report involved the most review and provides the greatest disclosure and assurance. The Estimate Valuation Report contains a conclusion as to the value of shares, assets or an interest in a business that is based on limited review, analysis, and corroboration or relevant information. The Calculation Valuation Report contains a conclusion as the value of shares, assets or an interest in a business that is based on minimal review and analysis and little or no corroboration of relevant information. Mr. Gravelle explained that this was a “Calculation Valuation Report” and that the calculation level of valuation is the lowest level of assurance. The Lewis Business Valuation was also a Calculation Valuation Report.[^32]

[87] Mr. Gravelle explained that the most significant difference between the Wilkinson Business Valuation and the Lewis Business Valuation was the values for the vehicles and the equipment. He confirmed that they relied on the Kohli Appraisals and used a value of $715,450 for the equipment/vehicles and land. Whereas the Lewis Business Valuation used the Markham Finch Appraisals and information provided by the respondent. There was also a receivable from GTA Rail and Services (GTA) that was removed. During questioning, Mr. Gravelle confirmed that if the court was to find that various vehicles, boats, etc. were owned by the company, would that increase the value of the business “dollar for dollar.” During cross-examination, the respondent criticized the Wilkinson Business Valuation for relying so heavily on the “inflated values” in the Kohli Appraisals. Mr. Gravelle said that in his experience, “heavy equipment tends to retain its value.” He couldn’t say whether the values were inflated. He acknowledged that depreciation is a reality, but he is not an expert in appraisals. He said, “I am aware that heavy equipment can retain its value and be sold for high amounts.”

[88] The Wilkinson Business Valuation estimated the net tangible business assets and equipment and land to be valued at $715,450.[^33] For the reasons set out above, this has been reduced to $503,800. When I plugged this value into the Wilkinson Business Valuation - Schedule 7, I arrived at an Adjusted Net Book Value as follows:

Low: $455,172 High: $477,172

[89] Again, the court understands that the changes it made may have affected the liabilities and taxes, however, as the court had no information, evidence or submissions to assist it in making any changes to the liabilities or income taxes, the court did not change anything else in the Wilkinson Business Valuation. Any gaps in information and evidence forced the court to make inferences that may be adverse to one or both parties.

Lewis Business Valuation

[90] The respondent called Mr. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. (hereinafter “White & Lewis”) as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding the value of the respondent’s business A.I. Roadtech Inc. and income.[^34] Mr. Lewis confirmed that he prepared the Lewis Business Valuation and Lewis Income Valuation and that everything was true and accurate to the best of his knowledge. Mr. Lewis confirmed that he is a partner at White & Lewis, and he is a Certified Financial Forensics, CPA and Chartered Business Valuator. He has practiced for 15 years in family law, forensic accounting, assisting in mediations and arbitration, and in the Superior Court of Justice. He confirmed that he was retained by the respondent and asked to prepare a business valuation report of A.I. Roadtech as of July 12, 2022, as well as an income report under the Federal CSG’s for 2020-2022. Mr. Lewis adopted and relied upon these reports and affirmed that to the extent of his knowledge and scope of retainer it is true and accurate. The court found Mr. Lewis to be an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding valuing business and income for family law purposes.

[91] Mr. Lewis confirmed that they were engaged by the respondent’s former counsel and the respondent to value the company as of the valuation date, being July 2022. The information they received was from the respondent and the respondent’s former lawyer. Mr. Lewis confirmed many similarities between his report and the Wilkinson Business Valuation including the purpose, providing a family law value, and type, being a calculation report. He affirmed there were no audits performed to verify the information that had been provided. He further confirmed the scope of review, and qualifications and limitations in his report because there were some inconsistencies and lack of reconciliations.[^35] Similar to Mr. Gravelle, Mr. Lewis asked the respondent for more details regarding certain assets and their values to help reconcile these inconsistencies or gaps in information, and the respondent did not provide them. All the respondent provided was a list of assets where he has obtained appraisals (the Markham Finch Appraisals). Mr. Lewis explained that impact of these qualifications calls into question the integrity and reliability of the conclusions in their valuation.

[92] After separation, the respondent sold land near Burk’s Falls for $50,000 that was owned by A.I. Roadtech. It had been purchased the year prior (approx. 6 months before the date of separation) for $99,900. The applicant says this sale was not an arms length transaction and asserts it was sold to the respondent’s friend for approximately half the value. The respondent denies the allegation. Mr. Lewis and Mr. Gravelle both testified that if the Burk’s Falls property was sold for less than it was purchased and this was not an arm’s length sale to a third party, that $25,000 should be added to the value of the business. I preferred the applicant’s evidence over the respondent regarding this sale, and thus I preferred the treatment given to the value of the Burk’s Falls property in the Wilkinson Business Valuation.

[93] The Lewis Business Valuation concluded that the FMV of 100% of the shares of A.I. Roadtech owned by the respondent was $167,000 as at the valuation date. Similar to Mr. Gravelle, Mr. Lewis confirmed that A.I. Roadtech is a going concern and expected to continue operating. Given the nature of the business, (paving and commercial and municipal and snow removal in winter months), the operations are solely by the respondent who is responsible for running the company on a day-to-day basis. The majority of and concentration of customers are significantly from “bid work” and other business comes from long-standing relationships and work performed and developed by the respondent. Mr. Lewis confirmed that the majority of sales were large corporate entities and municipalities.

[94] As set out above, Mr. Lewis confirmed that he reviewed the Kohli Appraisal to improve his understanding of the business asset values and the differences between his report and the Wilkinson Business Valuation and ensure whether or not it would affect my valuation. He determined they didn’t. As set out above, the court did not agree. The court is not going to repeat the analysis or recalculation using the Lewis Business Valuation. For the reasons set out above, the court has already found that it prefers the Wilkinson Business Valuation. However, I will add one more reason to why it found the Wilkinson Business Valuation to be more reliable. This additional reason came out during Mr. Lewis’s oral evidence that in my view, showed there was a serious credibility issue with the information that the respondent provided to Mr. Lewis.

[95] Mr. Lewis advised the court that after receiving and reviewing the Wilkinson Business Valuation he made an adjustment to the Lewis Business Valuation. Specifically, Mr. Lewis told the court that he agreed with the Wilkinson Business Valuation’s Adjusted Net Book Value.[^36] Mr. Lewis advised that in his report, he wrote down the debt from GTA from $90,000 to zero. But in the Wilkinson Business Valuation, it explained that regarding the loan to GTA, “according to the 2022 general ledger, there was a loan made to GTA Rail & Road Services (“GTA”) with a book value of $90,000 as at March 31, 2022. The last advance of $20,000 was made on April 22, 2021. According to the Lewis Business Valuation, Mr. Auciello advised that as of the Valuation Date, GTA was no longer in operation and the Company was not able to collect the funds. Based on our examination of the accounts payable entries in the general ledger, it appears that as of March 31, 2022 GTA owed the company $75,547, for a net amount owing to the company of $14,453. The Lewis Business Valuation makes no mention of any amounts owed by the company to GTA. We requested, but were not provided with, a backup copy of the company’s accounting data which would have allowed us to determine whether the accounts payable were actually repaid by the company or netted against the amount loaned by the company to GTA. It is a question of law whether or not the company was entitled to offset the amount it owed against its loan to GTA. However, in the absence of the requested information, we assumed that both the loan amount and the accounts payable amount should be written off.”[^37]

[96] Mr. Lewis explained that by including it in the accounts payable and not separating it like Mr. Gravelle, (as they discovered it in the General ledger) this changed the outcome and conclusion of the valuation. Mr. Gravelle wrote down the liability to 0 as the asset is 0. Mr. Lewis agreed with what Mr. Gravelle did to write it down. This would have the effect of decreasing the liabilities of A.I. Roadtech and increasing its value. After the adjustment, Mr. Lewis said he would increase the value or conclusion for the value of A.I. Roadtech to $243,000 from $167,000. This is in my view a significant jump, and it is all due to something that was hidden in the respondent’s records, and he is not the one who was forthcoming with the correction.

[97] To be clear, Mr. Lewis was not asked to make this adjustment, and he did not provide any written report to change his conclusions. He volunteered this evidence in compliance with his duty to the court under r. 20.1, which in my view increases Mr. Lewis’ professional and individual credibility. Unfortunately, at the same time, this evidence reduced the court’s ability to rely upon the Lewis Business Valuation due to the serious questions about the respondent’s credibility and the accuracy of the information that the respondent provided to the experts.

Conclusion regarding Expert Reports and Business Valuation

[98] The Wilkinson Business Valuation concluded that the FMV of 100% of the shares of A.I. Roadtech was between $670,000 and $690,000 with a midpoint of $680,000 as at the valuation date. Mr. Lewis confirmed that the new conclusion for the Lewis Business Valuation of the company was $243,000. After making the findings and changes set out above regarding the Markham Finch Appraisals, Lewis Business Valuation and Kohli Appraisals and the Wilkinson Business Valuation, the court prefers and relies upon the majority of the Wilkinson Business Valuation. For the reasons set out above, I find that the estimated FMV of the respondent’s shares in A.I. Roadtech Services Inc. (Rounded) is $466,000, which is the midpoint between $455,000 and $477,000.

Net Family Property and Equalization

[99] In addition to the business valuation issue, there were other property issues and equalization issues in this trial. The applicant and respondent both provided the court with written and oral evidence regarding their NFP and equalization calculations.[^38]

[100] In the respondent’s NFP calculation, he submits that his NFP is $260,068.90 and the applicant’s NFP is $555,608.71. This results in an equalization payment from the applicant to the respondent in the amount of $147,769.91.[^39] The respondent describes himself as “insolvent.” Despite all of the evidence that contradicted his position, the respondent still submits that the “value of [his] debts and liabilities on the date of separation (and today) far exceeded the value of [his] assets.”[^40] He asserts that he is owed an equalization payment. However, his closing submissions contradict his own sworn evidence. In his closing submissions, the respondent submits that his NFP is $386,581.89 and the applicant’s NFP is $599,078.77 and that there is an equalization payment owing from the applicant to the respondent in the amount of $106,248.44. It is unclear to the court how this calculation was made, because it doesn’t appear to be based upon the Lewis Business Valuation or the respondent’s own NFP Statement.[^41]

[101] The applicant’s NFP calculation[^42] (attached as Schedule A to these Reasons) submits that her NFP is $757,914.94 and the respondent’s NFP is $1,520.066.23. This results in an equalization payment from the respondent to the applicant in the amount of $381,075.65. This calculation is based upon the Wilkinson Business Valuation and using a value of $680,000 for the respondent’s 100% business interest in A.I. Roadtech.

[102] The respondent acknowledged that the disparity between his equalization calculation and that of the applicant was largely attributed to the valuation of the respondent’s interest in A.I. Roadtech and the asset appraisals relied upon by their respective experts.[^43] Once the court replaces the value of $680,000 with $466,000 in the applicant’s NFP calculation as set out above, the respondent’s NFP is reduced from $1,520.066.23 to $1,306,066.23. This correspondingly results in reducing the equalization payment from the respondent to the applicant from $381,075.65 to $274,075.65 (calculated as follows: $1,306,066.23 - $757,914.94 = $548,151.29 divided by 2 = $274,075.65).

[103] In addition to the property issues set out above, the parties do not agree on the value for some personal vehicles. The applicant’s NFP calculation includes a number of personal vehicles with a value of these assets being $268,300 attributable to the respondent. The applicant’s values for all of the personal vehicles were all taken from the Kohli Appraisal. The respondent contests the accuracy of the items on the list and the appraised values of these personal vehicles. The respondent agreed to include in the NFP calculation the 2017 Corvette, 2004 Dodge Viper, Harley Motorcycle, Monterey Boat and Sea Doo, for which he provided his own appraisals for these five items.[^44] The respondent’s appraisals for these vehicles total only $85,000. Again, for the same reasons as given in the analysis of the appraisals for the business assets, the court cannot rely upon the respondent’s appraised values, but it will rely on the respondent’s list of personal vehicles. The total value of these same five items in the Kohli Appraisals was $203,500.[^45] As a result, the court reduced the amount for these assets in the applicant’s NFP statement from $268,300 to $203,500 attributable to the respondent.

[104] Once the court replaces the value of $268,300 with $203,500 in the applicant’s NFP calculation as set out above, the respondent’s NFP is further reduced to $1,241,266.23 (calculated as follows: $1,306,066.23 - $268,300 + $203,500 = $1,241,266.23). This correspondingly results in reducing the equalization payment from the respondent to the applicant from $274,075.65 to $241,675.65 (calculated: $1,241,266.23 - $757,914.94 = $483,351.29 divided by 2 = $241,675.65).

[105] The parties jointly owned a matrimonial home, and a vacation property in the Bahamas, both of which were sold. There were some interim disbursements throughout the litigation, however, a significant amount of the sale proceeds remain held in trust. The parties jointly owned a matrimonial home which was sold October 31, 2023, for $1,450,000. There were some interim disbursements made on consent, and now approximately $761,000 of the net proceeds remain held in trust. The property in the Bahamas was also sold post-separation, and the net sale proceeds of approximately $70,398.10 USD are currently being held in a joint Scotiabank US daily savings account.

[106] After separation, the applicant sold the family trailer which was legally in the applicant’s sole name. The respondent claimed to have a 50% beneficial interest in the trailer as he contributed funds to acquire and renovate the trailer. The trailer was sold in 2022 (after separation) for $110,000 and the applicant kept all the proceeds of the sale (which after commissions was net $99,000). She says she kept the proceeds out of necessity due to the respondent not paying support. The applicant correctly included the entire net value of the trailer under her column in her NFP calculation.

Conclusion regarding NFP and Equalization

[107] For the reasons set out above, I preferred and relied upon the majority of the applicant’s evidence and submissions with respect to the values in the NFP and equalization calculations. As such, after the findings and changes set out above, the court finds that the respondent owes the applicant an equalization payment in the amount of $241,675.65. The post-separation adjustments are addressed and credited in the child support sections below.

Child Support & Spousal Support (retroactive and ongoing and lump sum)

The Applicant’s Income

[108] The respondent asks that the court impute an income to the applicant. He says that the applicant has failed to disclose a second source of income (seasonal work) and that once the court imputes that income to the applicant, he alleges that the applicant earns equal to or more than the respondent. The applicant denies the respondent’s allegations.

[109] The applicant’s evidence was that prior to the parties’ separation, she worked part-time. The applicant has a diploma in Business Management from Seneca College. Prior to the respondent starting A.I. Roadtech, the applicant worked in a few different administrative roles. In 2010, upon the inception of A.I. Roadtech, she began working for the family business in an administrative role. Later, in or around the fall of 2021, the bookkeeper for A.I Roadtech was terminated, and the applicant took on additional responsibilities including payroll, CRA remittances, accounts payable, accounts receivable, preparing Records of Employment, and other bookkeeping tasks. Currently, the applicant is employed by Hermann’s Contracting Ltd. Initially, she started out as a receptionist/admin staff and since then she has been able to work her way up to the role of executive assistant.[^46]

[110] The applicant’s income at the time of separation in 2022 was $25,057. However, post-separation, in order to meet her needs and the needs of the children, she asserts that she has “maximized” her earnings to become more financially independent. As a result, her income increased to $47,179 by 2023.[^47] The income she earned in 2024 and 2025 was disclosed, however, I do not find it to be near as much as the respondent alleges.[^48] The applicant gave evidence regarding the work she did at Madison Greenhouse Event Venue. She said it was a summer seasonal position (on the weekends) and she was paid a standard minimum wage of $17.60 per hour plus some tips. She also said that at her full-time job at Hermann’s Contracting Ltd. is also partially seasonal. She makes $30/hr. Her paystubs are higher in the summer than the winter because she works more in the summer and her work hours decrease in the winter. Her 2024 income shows her total income of $55,136 at line 15000. I do not find there is sufficient credible evidence to impute the applicant with an income equal to or more than the respondent.

[111] In my view, it is admirable that the applicant has been able to double her income just one year after the separation due to her own hard work and past experience working for A.I. Roadtech. She has done more than enough contribute to her own self-sufficiency and support the children.

[112] For these reasons, I find that it is fair to use the applicant’s 2023 income of $47,179 for the purposes of calculating child and spousal support and s. 7’s.

The Respondent’s Income – The Wilkinson Income Valuation & The Lewis Income Valuation

[113] The applicant submits that the respondent has been underreporting his income and underemployed since separation. She asks the court to impute income to the respondent and order that he pay her retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support based on that imputed income.

[114] The respondent denies the applicant’s allegations. He disputes the amount of income being requested to be imputed to him, and he disputes the amount of retroactive and ongoing child support. The respondent completely opposes the applicant’s spousal support claim. He says she is not entitled to any spousal support and asks that the court dismiss her claims.

[115] The respondent asserts that the lifestyle the family enjoyed “was not a reflection” of him “having a successful business and high income.”[^49] I disagree. As was found by J. McDermot on April 13, 2023, in my view, the evidence clearly shows that the respondent’s self-employment income in his company permitted the parties to live an “upper middle-class lifestyle. The family car is a late model Jaguar SUV. There is a summer sports car, a Mazda 380Z. The parties own a comfortable home, a condominium in the Bahamas and a trailer in Muskoka.”[^50] In addition, the respondent collected, bought, and sold many expensive “toys” like sports cars, a motorcycle, boats, and other recreational vehicles. The parties took 2-3 family vacations per year and ate out frequently. The respondent had an expensive watch and gun collection.[^51]

[116] The applicant said that as she worked closely with the respondent’s business, she had “first-hand knowledge” of how their lifestyle was funded. She said that the respondent would pay himself on a weekly basis, “approximately $1,300” which was used for their mortgage, groceries, and bills. She went on to say that the business account was “used as a personal account” for “dinners, LCBO, personal fuel, including marine fuel, events, concerts, guns, clothing, watches, local weekend outings, and international vacation costs.” She said that the respondent used all of these personal expenses as being paid out to imitate as if they were business expenses. The respondent would also use the business account to “purchase personal large ticket items, including purchase of cars and property” and payment of resort fees.[^52]

[117] As previously discussed, the court received expert evidence from Mr. Gravelle and Mr. Lewis regarding determining the respondent’s income.[^53] Both Mr. Gravelle and Mr. Lewis were already qualified as experts and they both swore their reports were true and accurate to the best of their knowledge. For the reasons set out below, the court preferred the evidence of Mr. Gravelle and the applicant and therefore relied upon and accepted the Wilkinson Income Valuation.

[118] Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the obligation of a party to support his/her dependants, and to support him/herself when they are claiming support from another. In order to meet this obligation, the parties must earn what they are capable of earning. If they fail to do so, they will be found to be intentionally underemployed.[^54]

[119] The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made.[^55] Once a party seeking the imputation of income presents the evidentiary basis suggesting a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the individual seeking to defend the income position they are taking.[^56]

[120] An individual must make full and complete financial disclosure to ensure that the information required to make a decision on the issue is before the court.[^57] The court will usually draw an adverse inference against a party for his or her failure to comply with their disclosure obligations and impute income.[^58] Further, a person’s lifestyle can provide the basis for imputing income.[^59]

[121] The court may consider pre-tax corporate income, together with line 150 income over the previous 3 years to determine income if the court believes the line 150 income of the payor does not adequately reflect income. This approach is also consistent with the fundamental object of the CSG’s, which is to ensure fairness to both spouses, and to their children, in determining what amount of money is in fact reasonably available for the payment of support.[^60] This approach is equally applicable when dealing with spousal support.

[122] The Wilkinson Income Valuation concluded that the respondent’s Estimated Guideline Income was:

2020 $203,687;

2021 $237,621; and

2022 $163,515.

[123] The Wilkinson Income Valuation did not provide any conclusions regarding the respondent’s income for 2023, 2024 or 2025 or ongoing income because the information was not made available to Mr. Gravelle.

[124] The Lewis Income Valuation provided two scenarios and concluded that the respondent’s Estimated Guideline Income was:

2020 Scenario 1 $140,000 Scenario 2 $130,000;

2021 Scenario 1 $184,000 Scenario 2 $120,000;

2022 Scenario 1 $127,000 Scenario 2 $110,000;

2023 Scenario 1 $113,000 Scenario 2 $110,000; and

2024 Scenario 1 $ 87,000 Scenario 2 $ 80,000.

[125] Similar to the evidence regarding the business valuations, both income valuations widely differed based upon the information that was provided to the experts. Both experts discussed their scope of review and limitations in the financial information. Both experts mentioned there were discrepancies and inconsistencies between what was reported for tax purposes and A.I. Roadtech’s financial statements. Both experts acknowledged there was no auditing or verification of the amounts, bank accounts, and cash available to the company. Both experts confirmed that they were not provided with timely responses from Mr. Auciello and his accountant regarding their questions or concerns. In both income valuations, no values for any cash earnings were added back. They both noted that for these types of companies/clients (i.e. the majority of which were municipalities and government), the client list was unlikely to pay cash. Both concluded there was insufficient information to determine if there were any significant cash earnings.

[126] Due to the discrepancies between the valuations, Justice Bruhn ordered on July 24, 2024 that experts needed to confer. Specifically, the court ordered that “[t]he parties shall instruct their respective income determination and business valuation experts to confer as soon as possible to identify the differences in their reports and determine whether any adjustments to those reports are appropriate.” Mr. Lewis confirmed that this happened, and he did make several adjustments to the respondent’s income as a result.

[127] Despite the similarities and the adjustments, the Wilkinson Income Valuation still imputed the respondent’s income significantly higher than the Lewis Income Valuation.[^61] For example, in 2020 using Line 15000 as the starting point from the respondent’s Notice of Assessment “(NOA”) being $82,680; an additional $121,007 was imputed to respondent’s income for a total of $203,687. In 2021, using Line 15000 as the starting point from the respondent’s NOA’s being $76,440; an additional $108,565 was imputed to the respondent’s income, and a shareholder loan to Mr. Auciello of $52,616 was added for a total of $237,621. Mr. Gravelle explained that what a shareholder loan is not paid back that same year, they should be attributed to the respondent’s income. As they saw the withdrawals in the General Ledger, the shareholder loan increases were attributed to the respondent. The same thing happened in 2022. In 2022, using Line 15000 as the starting point from the respondent’s NOA of $81,120; an additional $72,236 was imputed to the respondent’s income, and a shareholder loan to Mr. Auciello of $10,157 was added back for a total of $163,515. After reviewing the Wilkinson Income Valuation, Mr. Lewis said there was a change by way of an attribution of income for the shareholder loans of $52,616. Mr. Lewis agreed to this in 2021.

[128] There was also a significant difference in the amounts imputed to the respondent’s income due to the difference in the treatment for certain claimed expenses. For example, there was significant difference in treatment given to the Jaguar. It was acknowledged by both parties that the Jaguar was driven primarily by the applicant. However, the respondent claimed the Jaguar as a vehicle business expense. The respondent weakly defended this claimed expense in his evidence asserting that the applicant used it to “drive to the mailbox” to pick up business mail, or to attend appointments with the accountant. Mr. Gravelle explained that since A.I. Roadtech does primarily paving, snowploughing, and road work, a Jaguar would not be used for operations. Therefore, there is no business use for a Jaguar. As such, Mr. Gravelle added back 100% of that expense as it was all personal. I agree.

[129] There were also some differences in the treatment of personal use and business expenses in the income valuations for mileage, meals, and entertainment (business development), home office, TV, and phone expenses. Based on personal benefits that the respondent received, a portion of the expenses of a personal nature were grossed up to what the amount would have to be earned to pay for the net benefit. This was done in both income valuations, however, they differed in terms of the amounts.

[130] The Lewis Income Valuation did not include or add back any personal mileage for the respondent. The Wilkinson Income Valuation did. The Wilkinson Income Valuation added back home office expenses, but the Lewis Income Valuation only did it in 2021. The Wilkinson Income Valuation added back home heating expenses because the business was paying for all the propane to heat the home. Further, the Wilkinson Income Valuation assumed certain amounts claimed for phone expenses were personal. For example, in 2020, the respondent’s Rogers phone and his son’s phone were discounted to 50%. Mr. Gravelle explained that since Lukas doesn’t work for the company, that portion of Lukas’ bill would be 100% added back. Further, the Telus phone was the applicant’s phone, so they added back 100% of that. The Lewis Income Valuation did not add these back.

[131] During cross-examination, the respondent confirmed that a large part of the business was municipal contracts, he said, “75-80% was obtained through a bidding process. Most of it.” This was corroborated in the Wilkinson Business Valuation where the list of the clients confirms that: 85.7% of top five clients in 2020 - 85.7% were municipal; in 2021 it was 83.3% and then 2022 it was about 67%. During cross-examination, Mr. Mota pointed out that the Lewis Income Valuation said that Mr. Auciello had told them that only 30% of the business was bid work. Mr. Lewis confirmed that Mr. Auciello told him that “70% of his business was non-bid work.” Mr. Lewis said he “took him at his word. It was not audited.” The respondent did not explain the contradiction and discrepancy in the information that was provided to Mr. Lewis. He just said, “I wasn’t handling certain aspects and now I see it differently.” Further, during cross-examination, Mr. Mota asked the respondent if a municipality always goes with the lower bid. Mr. Auciello said, “Yes, when you are bidding, there is no relationship. You don’t speak to anybody.”

[132] The Wilkinson Income Valuation added back 50% of the claimed meals, entertainment, and vehicle expenses. Mr. Gravelle explained that as A.I. Roadtech’s municipal contracts or “bid work” with local government were the primary sources of the respondent’s income, (i.e. there is no relationship between the respondent and the municipality requiring him to incur business expenses for meals and entertainment with the municipal clients). Therefore, this would change the amount allocated to personal. I agree.

[133] The respondent defended the expense claims, saying it was necessary for the development of the business to take municipal clients out for meals and golf tournaments or give them tickets to events. During cross-examination, Mr. Mota asked the respondent “What would the purpose be of taking them out for golf tournaments, or dinners or sporting events?” The respondent said, “As you get the projects, you start to build a relationship with the people.” For example, he said that clients from Metrolinx were “invited many times to golf tournaments, and to go out for lunch and talk progress.” He said, “I would take them out. I took out clients with Metrolinx and CN. I don’t want to incriminate anyone, but if I came in with hockey tickets, it was appreciated and it was good for business.” The court concluded that the respondent was basically admitting that he was claiming that any of the benefits and/or gifts that he paid for or gave to municipal and government employees “was good for business” and therefore they were legitimate business expenses. To put it mildly, the court disagrees.

[134] The respondent asserted that his “business has been suffering” and that “circumstances post-separation have impacted” his “ability to operate the business at the capacity” he “was accustomed to during the marriage.” He said that while he was “able to support a comfortable lifestyle before” he is “failing to maintain a level of solvency in recent years.” He said he is “worried” about his ability to support himself moving forward.

[135] Unfortunately, the respondent did not provide any evidence of the alleged “circumstances” that have impacted his ability to work and earn income to support the family. Further, the respondent’s assertions completely contradict both expert reports regarding the business continuing to be a “going concern.” After the experts conferred, the adjustments to the business and income valuations were upwards, not downwards. The respondent’s assertions completely contradicted both the applicant and respondent’s evidence regarding their lifestyle, income, and ability to earn income.

[136] The corporate filing for A.I. Roadtech shows that it is still an active business.[^62] Although the respondent said he is no longer working for his company and that A.I. Roadtech is no longer operating, he has not provided sufficient uncontradicted evidence or documentation to prove this assertion. During questioning on December 18, 2024, the respondent stated that he was not working, and has not been working at all or in his company since August 2024.[^63] However, there is evidence that A.I. Roadtech continued to make bids and tenders and completed jobs in 2024.[^64] The records and evidence provided by the applicant shows that the respondent’s companies “have continued to obtain and complete public sector projects, indicating ongoing business activity and operational capacity.” In fact, “none of the records” obtained and reviewed show that A.I. Roadtech has been “dissolved, struck from the register, or declared bankrupt.”[^65]

[137] During cross-examination, the respondent admitted there were many transfers back and forth from A.I. Roadtech and his personal account in 2023 and 2024. He admitted there was gross revenue in the hundreds of thousands of dollars in 2022, 2023, and 2024, but he said “he didn’t care about the accounting after separation” and he made numerous transfers to avoid CRA seizing the amounts.[^66]

[138] Lastly, Mr. Auciello says he was working for a numbered company 2189762 Ontario Inc. operating under the trade name “Blue Ocean Landscaping.” However, there is evidence that this business may not be active or in operation since 2021. Further, the respondent has not provided sufficient records, payroll documentation, or corporate filings showing that he is employed with either the numbered company or Blue Ocean Landscaping.[^67]

[139] I am not satisfied with the respondent’s evidence that he is unable to earn what he earned when the parties were together. At one point during the trial he said, “I never kept any organized records or accounts after separation. Shortly after separation I started to not care anymore, and I was letting a lot of things go.” In my view, this comment says volumes about the respondent’s ability and intention to earn income. He simply “didn’t care anymore,” and so he “let things go.”

[140] The court cannot accept the respondent’s evidence or circumstances that he cannot fulfil his support obligations. Both parties are equally obligated to support themselves and their children to the best of their abilities. In my view, it shows a lot about the respondent’s character that when the going got tough, he just “let things go.” The court finds that the “circumstances” (if any) that the respondent has asserted that are preventing him from earning income, were circumstances of his own making. The evidence shows that when things are not going his way, he loses his temper, and exerts financial control over the applicant and the children in whatever way he can, including damaging property, withholding support, and being verbally abusive to the applicant in front of the children.[^68] In my view, if his business is truly unable to recover, (as asserted by the respondent and which I do not accept) it is simply because he made a choice to let it go.

[141] As a result, the court did not give any weight to the Lewis Income Valuation because it was based on information provided by the respondent, whom I find simply lacks credibility. The respondent did not provide fulsome financial disclosure to support his position and assertions. In my view, there were simply too many discrepancies, and too many gaps in the respondent’s evidence and disclosure for the court to rely on him or his expert reports.

[142] For these reasons, I find that the respondent underreports his income and actual earnings, and, if he is currently earning as little as he claims to be, he is also underemployed. I find that the respondent’s estimated Guideline income for support purposes shall be as per the conclusions in the Wilkinson Income Valuation and imputed to $203,687 in 2020; $237,621 in 2021; and $162,515 in 2022. As set out above, the Wilkinson Income Valuation did not provide any conclusions for the respondent’s income in 2023, 2024, 2025, and ongoing. In accordance with s. 17 of the CSG’s, the court finds that a fair and reasonable determination of the respondent’s income on a “go forward” basis in 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026 shall be based an average of the three previous years (i.e. 2020, 2021 and 2022) being $201,607.70.

[143] The applicant asked that the respondent’s income be fixed at $201,607 and non-variable. I do not agree. The Wilkinson Income Valuation confirmed that there are fluctuations in the respondent’s income. Setting the respondent’s income as non-variable would not be in accordance with the CSG’s which permits variation of child support orders if there is a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either spouse or of any child who is entitled to support.

Child Support & Spousal Support (retroactive and ongoing, entitlement and lump sum)

Child Support & s. 7’s – retroactive and ongoing

[144] Commencing November 2023, the respondent paid child support to the applicant. The respondent has not paid any spousal support to the applicant from the date of separation to present.

[145] Pursuant to Minutes of Settlement dated September 25, 2023, the respondent agreed to interim child support and s. 7 expenses. Commencing November 1, 2023, the respondent began paying the applicant child support in the amount of $1,228 per month. In February 2024, he increased the child support payments to $1,492 based on the three-year average of his income in the preliminary income report by White and Lewis Inc. Commencing on January 1, 2025, he unilaterally reduced the child support and decided to pay $932 per month because that is what he said was “table amount” child support “for Serena only” because Lukas was “no longer a child of the marriage.”[^69] In September 2025, he again unilaterally changed the amount he is paying to $549 per month, which is based upon the respondent’s NOA for 2024.[^70]

[146] The September 2023 minutes listed “orthodontist – braces for Serena” as an agreed upon expense. Despite this, the respondent refused to contribute to the expense and has refused to pay his proportionate share of 76% of Serena’s hockey, dentists and Lukas’ driving lessons, all of which were agreed to in the September 2023 minutes.[^71] The applicant asks for the respondent to pay his share of s. 7 expenses for both Serena and Lukas (for the period he was considered a child of the marriage). These include Serena’s hockey; Serena’s braces and orthodontic work; school expenses; and driving to school for both.

[147] The applicant’s evidence is that she incurred and solely paid for the children’s s. 7’s from separation to present. She provided evidence of the children’s s. 7 expenses from separation to February 26, 2025, totalling $10,078.54.[^72]

[148] The respondent’s evidence was that he refused to contribute and pay for these s. 7 expenses because he says that the expenses were not disclosed ahead of time, i.e. he wasn’t consulted and didn’t receive prior notice. He acknowledged that Serena was in dance previous to the separation and he did not object to her continuing in dance or hockey. He acknowledged that Serena’s braces were recommended by the same dentist that provided braces for Lukas during the marriage. He complained again that he was not given proper notice of the braces expense, despite there being no restriction on him contacting the dentist himself. He acknowledged that he didn’t object per se to the expenses, his objection lay in the lack of consultation.

[149] I gave no weight to the respondent’s evidence regarding the s. 7 expenses. I find his refusal to pay his share arose out of spite and control, rather than any real concern about the appropriateness or prior consultation regarding the expense. The pro rated share for the respondent is approximately 70%. Therefore, I find that the respondent owes the applicant 70% of $10,078.54 which is $7,054.50.

[150] The respondent asks that he be given credit for the child support he has paid to the applicant. I agree.

[151] The respondent asks that he be given credit for the respondent for the payments he made on the common expenses for the matrimonial home prior to it being sold. I agree.

[152] From the time of separation in July 2022 until March 2023, the parties both occupied portions of the matrimonial home. The respondent was paying the common expenses for the home, maintaining the jointly owned asset for the benefit of both parties and the children. Between April 2023 and the closing of the sale of the matrimonial home in October 2023, the respondent says that he continued to be responsible for the carrying expenses for the matrimonial home. According to his financial statements, the total carrying costs of the mortgage, property taxes and property insurance was approximately $3,280.41 per month.[^73] Fifty percent of $3,280.41 is $1,640.21 per month.

[153] The respondent asks that he be given credit for the monies he gave directly to Serena. I disagree. The $400-500 per month that he allegedly gave directly to Serena was not child support. The respondent gave nothing to Lukas. I find the monies that the respondent gave directly to Serena was more about control, and nothing about providing adequate support for the children.

[154] For all the reasons set out above, the court finds that the appropriate ongoing table child support for the child Serena, payable by the respondent to the applicant to be $1,719 per month based on his imputed average income of $201,607.70. Commencing June 1, 2026, the respondent shall pay the applicant child support in the amount of $1,719 per month.

[155] The court finds that the respondent owes the applicant $7,054.50for arrears of s. 7 expenses (which is 70% of the $10,078.54 s. 7 expenses set out above). The parties shall share ongoing s. 7’s based on a 70/30 split with the respondent paying 70% and the applicant paying 30%.

[156] The court finds that the respondent owes the applicant retroactive child support in the amount of $51,374.64. This is calculated in the table set out below:

Year	Monthly Child Support owed	Yearly Child Support owed	Total Child Support paid	50% Credit for payment of common expenses	Retroactive CS owed by Respondent to Applicant
2022 Imputed income $162,515	$2,288	$2,288 x 6 =$13,728	NIL	$1,640.21 x 6 = $9,841.26	$3,886.74
2023 Imputed 3-year avg. income $201,607.70	$2,765	$2,765 x 12 =$33,180	$1,228 x 2 =$2,456	$1,640.21 x 10 =$16,402.10	$14,321.90
2024 Imputed 3-year avg. income $201,607.70	$2,765	$2,765 x 12 =$33,180	$1,492 x 11 =$16,412 + $1,228 $17,640		$15,540
2025 Imputed 3-year avg. income $201,607.70	$1,719	$1,719 x 12 =$20,628	$832 x 8 =$6,656 + $549 x 4 =$2,196 $8,852		$11,776
2026 Imputed 3-year avg. income $201,607.70	$1,719	$1,719 x 5 =$8,595	$549 x 5 =$2,745		$5,850
Total		$109,311	$31,693	$26,243.36	$51,374.64

Entitlement for Spousal Support and Lump Sum Spousal Support

[157] In the seminal Supreme Court of Canada case, Moge v. Moge,[^74] Justice L’Heureux-Dubé made it clear that the purpose of spousal support is to apportion the economic consequences of a marriage or its breakdown equally between spouses.[^75] More specifically, the Supreme Court broke down the distinctions between compensatory and non-compensatory support in the ruling in Bracklow v. Bracklow.[^76] With respect to compensatory spousal support, the Supreme Court in Bracklow noted the following:

Under the Divorce Act, compensation arguments can be grounded in the need to consider the “condition” of the spouse; the “means, needs and other circumstances” of the spouse, which may encompass lack of ability to support oneself due to foregoing career opportunities during the marriage; and “the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation”, which may support the same argument.[^77]

[158] The applicant has made a claim for spousal support. She claims to be entitled to it on a compensatory and means/needs basis. She asks that if the court awards her spousal support, that it be in the mid-range according to the SSAG’s and paid to her in a lump sum.

[159] The respondent opposes the applicant’s claim and asks that it be dismissed entirely. He claims that she has not fully disclosed her income. He says that the applicant is not entitled to spousal support on a compensatory or needs basis, and he has no means to pay it. The respondent stressed the applicant’s education, experience, and sophistication in office administration to show that she was a “healthy, competent, and successful individual” who is not entitled to spousal support.

[160] In my view, the respondent gave very contradictory evidence regarding the applicant’s entitlement to spousal support. It was an undisputed fact that the respondent was the primary financial provider for the family throughout the marriage. The respondent acknowledged that he was the primary income earner for the family. If anything, he took pride in this fact. Further, in my view, he went out of his way to stress how unimportant the applicant was to the success of the business when it suited his narrative. For example, in his evidence about the business valuations, the respondent stressed how he was the sole owner, director, and “guiding mind” of A.I. Roadtech. He was the only one who could be trusted to give accurate information and disclosure to the experts. He said, “she helped out with invoicing, and he prepared rough lists and gave her instructions, and she would prepare the documents. Her duties were limited. She was working elsewhere. We would spend evenings together. She would be sitting at the desk, and I would be kneeling pointing things out. She would create the invoices, run errands and pick up documents and did some mailings. She was not in control of the finances or the bidding or on site or equipment. Those were not in her scope. Her scope was very general secretarial stuff.”

[161] However, when he was giving evidence about how the applicant was not entitled to spousal support, his narrative changed. He stated that the applicant “was responsible for registering my business and took on administrative and bookkeeping roles for the business. I have not been able to afford to employ someone to replace her role, which has largely impacted the success and maintenance of the business.” He said that during the marriage, they “worked cooperatively to establish, maintain, and grow” his business.[^78] He said that he has been “struggling to keep my business afloat since the applicant stopped taking care of the paperwork, including the invoicing and CRA remittances.” Then he said that as a result of A.I. Roadtech’s “significant CRA debt, which reached $336,925 by the year of separation” his business bank accounts were frozen in December 2022. The court emphasized “by the year of separation” because this seems to contradict his prior statement that he has been struggling since the separation when the applicant stopped taking care of the paperwork. In my view, all of this indicates that the respondent was in fact the directing mind, however, the applicant had detailed knowledge and added value to the business and its success. Despite this, the respondent is only willing to admit this when it helps him.

[162] Further contradictions in the respondent’s evidence were found when he said that his business and income is not going to recover. The respondent said that he didn’t have the means to pay spousal support and he was unable to earn as much money as he used to. The respondent said that “[t]he company ceased operations as of May 1, 2025. The company is no longer active and has not generated revenue since that date; the company’s shutdown was due to operational and financial difficulties, not because of a formal bankruptcy filing or insolvency proceeding.”[^79] He went on to say that the company continued to perform work after the date of separation on July 11, 2022. The company continued operating during this period in an effort to maintain business as usual. However, following the separation, the company’s workload began to decline significantly, business activity slowed, and the overall operations of the company deteriorated in the years that followed. Other than his earlier comments about “letting things go,” he provided no explanation for why the company deteriorated after separation.

[163] In my view, the respondent provided contradictory and unreliable evidence regarding the company’s activity and viability. His disclosure and evidence always seemed to be a moving target. During questioning, he said the business dropped dramatically after separation and ceased operating in 2024 despite clear evidence to the contrary. Then, during the trial he changed the date and said it ceased operations in May 2025. He provided some evidence which would coincide with the slowdown or cessation of operations; however, he provided no evidence that the business is shut down permanently.[^80]

[164] The respondent said the company is no longer a going concern as of May 2025. However, this is reliant upon his word, and some late-filed documents like ROE’s for some employees and insurance cancellation. The court does not know if there is a new insurance company in place, or if the respondent hired new employees. The respondent’s own evidence about employees was that the number of employees he had varied “depending on the project we were on, we had anywhere from three employees to eight employees. At any given time it was fluctuating depending on how much work we had.”[^81]

[165] The court received insufficient financial statements for the business and fluctuating and contradictory evidence regarding the respondent’s alleged CRA debt that was claimed in the respondent’s Financial Statement dated April 2, 2025.[^82] The respondent provided no evidence as to how and when the alleged debts to CRA accrued. Four previous Financial Statements filed by the respondent contradict and change the respondent’s evidence regarding the alleged debt to the CRA.[^83]

[166] Further, the respondent still owns all of the vehicles and equipment. If he chose to, he could restart this business or another one similar to it immediately after the trial. If the respondent did in fact close down A.I. Roadtech, the court would suspect that he may have done so intentionally, to reduce his ongoing child and spousal support obligation. I find the respondent is capable of either continuing to run the company, and/or continuing to earn similar income to when he was running the company.

[167] The court asked the respondent how he was going to support himself and the children. Since he still owned all the vehicles and equipment, the court asked him if he planned to restart another business. The respondent said, “I am currently out of work. I was employed for a short duration, but it is seasonal and limited. The economy has made it difficult to find work and there has been a significant drop. My intention is to continue in my field working for someone. I may consider another role, like working for a municipality working in roads, maintenance, and inspection. I am going to be 50 and it has taken a toll on my body. I don’t want to be a boss. I want to do my 9-5 and enjoy my life with kids and travel. I don’t need the expensive home.” He went on to say, “It was a big wheel and I killed myself to keep it going. When I stopped, the wheel keeps turning. I have so much debt. I have no credit. The business is diminished. I am preparing myself to mentally keep going and get through everything as well as I can. It is a huge challenge. I am going to be carrying the debts for a long time, probably the rest of my life.”

[168] In contrast to the allegedly dire circumstances described by the respondent, the applicant asserted that the respondent’s lifestyle has remained largely unchanged. She says that he “has continued with his expensive hobbies and outings, and went on multiple vacations a year.” She also believes that the respondent has purchased vehicles/trailers since their separation and possibly put them under third party names (i.e. his father or a friend) to conceal them. These include a trailer in Huntsville, a golf cart, a KTR Motorcycle, a Ducati Motorcycle, a Vintage Mustang, and a hot tub.[^84]

[169] The respondent denied the allegations, however, he did admit to buying a motorcycle and going on trips to Italy, Punta Cana, and Florida. Under cross-examination the respondent acknowledged that he bought a BMW after separation, and it is registered to him personally. The respondent also acknowledged that he bought a 2011 Porshe Panamera after separation. He said that he borrowed money from “a friend” to purchase it. Mr. Mota pointed out that he never indicated a personal loan in his sworn financial statement. The respondent said that he “told his counsel about it.” He advised the court that it was a “female friend named Michele” who loaned him the money. The respondent said he "doesn’t know her last name.” He said the friend has asked for repayment, and he has not paid anything back. The respondent went on to admit that the Porshe was involved in an accident. The Porshe was written off by insurance and the value was paid out to him by the insurance company, but he didn’t use the funds to pay off the loan. Instead, he used the funds to purchase the new car. In my view, all of these undisputed facts cast a great deal of doubt on the respondent’s assertions of being in dire financial circumstances.

[170] Further, as shown above, he admitted there were lots of transfers back and forth from A.I. Roadtech and his personal account in 2023 and 2024. He admitted there was gross revenue in the hundreds of thousands of dollars in 2023 and 2024, but he said he didn’t care about the accounting after separation. He said “I was not focused and didn’t keep records and the office was not organized. I just got the work done. I didn’t have any assistance with the office. I was just trying to keep things afloat. I lost my children and lost focus on the business. There was not a lot of organization.” He admitted that he went to Italy, Punta Cana, and Florida, but he said it was “while the business is failing and falling apart. I did that because of the stress. I went to the trailer with my daughter and spent money on gas and a boat, but the business was failing.” Mr. Mota asked the respondent why he did this when he said he couldn’t afford to pay child support. The respondent said, “I had to prioritize. I always paid for my children. I continued to give additional funds to Serena on a monthly basis between $400-500 per month because there were times that Serena didn’t have lunch.”

[171] Credibility was a very important issue in this trial. The evidence was in such conflict. There were a number of places where the parties disagreed significantly on the evidence. When a person is telling the truth, it is very easy to keep their story straight. When a person is not telling the truth, I have found that their stories change. That is why people get caught in lies. The court kept this in mind when assessing credibility of the parties in this trial. In my view, the applicant’s story and evidence did not waver or change. However, the respondent’s stories and evidence had several serious credibility challenges:

1. There are serious disclosure problems and a lack of reliability and weight to be given to his evidence regarding his income and the roles of the parties in the marriage. I found that the respondent works hard and makes money when he wants to, and he pays for what he wants, when he wants to.
2. There are the unilateral changes he made to child support; his refusal to pay his share for s. 7’s; and his lack of compliance with the previous agreements and court orders.
3. There is the respondent’s refusal to pay the applicant any spousal support and child support in the face of prima facie entitlement and need.
4. There is the respondent’s evasiveness and lack of honour in paying his debts, taxes, and source deductions. He acknowledged borrowing money from personal friends and not paying it back. All through his evidence he discussed the ways that he “kept the business” going and “supported their lifestyle” by evading paying income taxes and source deductions. He discussed how he would transfer large amounts of cash from one bank account to another to avoid “seizure.” He also strongly emphasized the fact that he was the guiding mind behind the business, and he minimized the Applicant’s assistance or support in running the business. Therefore, the decisions to evade paying taxes and source deductions can only be attributed to him.
5. There is an overall lack of transparency in his business dealings. He gave viva voce evidence defending his gifts of hockey tickets, dinners, lunches, and golf tournaments for his clients as legitimate business development expenses. He said these were “good for business” but he didn’t want to give names or “incriminate” anyone to confirm his claims. This evidence was troubling because it does not support his earlier evidence regarding the bidding and tender system for obtaining contracts and work. If most of his work came from municipalities, all of whom use a bidding system for the work, and the work would be awarded to the lowest bid, then how would his gifts be “good for business”? In my view, at best, this shows that he has been claiming these types of transactions as inappropriate business expenses, and at worst, he knows this type of “business development” is opaque and shady.
6. In his evidence, the respondent asserted that he is no longer able to work and earn income like he used to, and therefore he does not have the means to support the children and the applicant. However, the respondent is only 48 years old. He is healthy and able-bodied. He has shown he is healthy enough to travel, ride a motorcycle, drive sports cars, and do landscaping work. There was no evidence provided that justified the respondent needing to work less or to semi-retire. Barring any material change in his circumstances, I find the respondent is capable of working full time and still has all the skills, experience, equipment, and vehicles to work to his full potential for many years to come.

[172] In contrast, the applicant gave compelling unimpeachable evidence about how she supported the family and the respondent.[^85] The applicant provided ample evidence that during the marriage, she was in charge of the household and took care of the family, home and the children’s needs. It is undisputed that the respondent worked long hours to financially support and maintain the family’s comfortable lifestyle, “where money was never an issue.” The applicant said that “[t]he Respondent and I were married for 17 years, and as a family, the Respondent and I made the decision that I would stay home to raise our children, to save on daycare costs. This allowed me to assist the business in administrative tasks, which further saved costs. As a result of this, this left me with no time to upgrade my education or obtain any further experience in employment.”[^86] The respondent did not dispute any of this and did not cross-examine the applicant about any of these facts.

[173] The applicant said that she gave up her career goals to raise the children and be able to provide a supporting role for A.I. Roadtech. She said that as a stay-at-home parent, along with working for the business, she did not contribute much to her CPP, and as such, she has very minimal government and private retirement savings. She said that A.I. Roadtech and its success was their plan for retirement, along with their trailer in Huntsville, and their condo in Bahamas – both of which were sold during the course of the litigation.[^87] The applicant also gave evidence regarding her current debts accumulated since the separation, and the assistance she has received from her parents to support the children.

[174] For all the above reasons, I find the applicant has a prima facie spousal support entitlement based on the roles assumed during the marriage, the length of the marriage, and the incomes of the parties.

[175] The applicant seeks mid range lump sum spousal support in the amount of $284,293.00. The SSAG calculation provided by the applicant (attached as Schedule B to these Reasons) shows that the low range lump sum would be $227,702; the mid range lump sum would be $284,293; and the high range lump sum would be $340,954. The duration would be between 8.75 and 17.5 years.

[176] The SSAG’s are a useful tool that assist the court in calculating the appropriate amount and duration of spousal support. They “suggest a range of both amount and duration of support that reflects the current law. Because they purport to represent a distillation of current case law, they are comparable to counsel’s submissions about an appropriate range of support based on applicable jurisprudence.”[^88] The formulas generate ranges for amount and duration. The amount cannot be considered alone.[^89] The SSAG’s “must be considered in in context and applied in their entirety.”[^90] The “amount and duration” are interrelated parts of the formula – they are a package deal. Using one part of the formula without the other would undermine its integrity and coherence.”[^91]

[177] As set out above, the applicant will be paid an equalization payment and lump sum payment for arrears of child support and s. 7’s. These total approximately $300,000. The applicant is earning approximately $50,000 per year to contribute to her own support and the support of the children. The applicant was 46 years old at the date of separation. She is 50 years old now, and in my view, she is young enough to continue working and contributing to her own support for many years. In my view, the applicant would be entitled to spousal support for a period of 8.75 years (low range). A spousal support award in the low range will adequately compensate the applicant for the functions she performed during the marriage and assist her in meeting her needs by increasing her ability to support herself. For these reasons, I find that the applicant is entitled to spousal support in the low range for a period of 8.75 years.

[178] The principles that govern awards of lump sum spousal support were examined by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Davis v. Crawford.[^92] The Court of Appeal detailed various considerations respecting a lump sum award at para. 67, stating:

The advantages of making such an award will be highly variable and case-specific. They can include but are not limited to terminating ongoing contact or ties between the spouses for any number of reasons (for example, short-term marriage; domestic violence; second marriage with no children, etc.); providing capital to meet an immediate need on the part of a dependant spouse; ensuring adequate support will be paid in circumstances where there is a real risk of non-payment of periodic support, a lack of proper financial disclosure or where the payor has the ability to pay lump sum but not periodic support; and satisfying immediately an award of retroactive spousal support.[^93]

[179] The provision of capital to meet the immediate needs of the dependent spouse and ensuring adequate support due to serious risk of non-payment of periodic support are of particular concern in this case. In Davis, there was a significant concern on the part of the Court of Appeal that, if ordered to make periodic spousal support payments, the husband would not make said payments. When considering this concern alongside the other facts of the case, the Court of Appeal saw “no basis on which to interfere with the trial judge's decision to award lump sum spousal support.”[^94]

[180] In Racco v. Racco,[^95] the Court of Appeal establishes a framework for awarding a lump sum spousal support payment. In upholding the trial judge’s order of a lump sum support award, the Court of Appeal concluded:

This was an appropriate case for a lump sum payment. The appellant has an ability to pay. There was a high level of animosity between the parties, a history of non-payment by the appellant, the possibility that the appellant's financial situation would continue to be precarious, the desirability of terminating personal contact, the need to effect a retroactive award of support and the need to provide capital to the respondent. These factors support a lump sum award.[^96]

[181] The above assessment of the facts in Racco closely mirrors those in the case at bar. This has been a contentious separation, wherein the respondent has refused to pay spousal support, despite being the family’s primary source of financial support during the relationship. The conduct of the parties since their separation makes it clear that there is a desire to cease personal contact. The applicant has worked since separation and made admirable efforts to obtain self-sufficiency. In this matter, there are several advantages to making a lump sum spousal support award: (a) the respondent has never paid the applicant any spousal support; (b) a lump sum award will terminate ongoing contact between these two parties; (c) the respondent’s refusal to pay spousal support in this matter and his unilateral changes to child support shows there is a very serious risk that he will not make the periodic payments if they were ordered; (d) lastly, as this matter has taken so long to be finalized, there would be a significant retroactive spousal support amount owing.

[182] I have no faith that the respondent will comply with paying periodic spousal support if I were to order it. I have no faith that he will comply with paying a retroactive spousal support award. He has not complied with court orders in the past. Now that the house and condo have been sold, the respondent may have the assets to pay a lump sum award.

[183] In this case, lump sum payment is appropriate. As set out above, I have already found that the applicant is entitled and needs spousal support in the low range. For all the reasons set out above, I will order that the respondent pay the applicant a final lump sum of spousal support in the amount of $227,702 which is the SSAG low range lump sum (midpoint for the applicant’s after-tax benefit and the respondent’s after-tax cost). This is based on the attached SSAG’s calculation using the midpoint NPV Assumptions in the low range with a spousal support duration of 8.75 years.

Conclusion

[184] The applicant seeks that the funds for the equalization of NFP, child support arrears, s. 7 arrears, and lump sum spousal support be released to her from the respondent’s share of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home, and the respondent’s share of the proceeds of sale of the condominium. She submits that this security is necessary. I agree. I find that the security is necessary for the same reasons that lump sum spousal support award is appropriate. The respondent’s lack of compliance with court orders and his unilateral changes to child support and resistance to pay s. 7’s and spousal support all make it necessary to secure as much as possible to ensure the amounts owing are paid.

Final Order

[185] For the reasons set out above, final order to go:

1. Both the applicant and respondent are equally entitled to information and documents from any institution or professional involved in the life of their child Serena Auciello born August 16, 2010 (hereinafter “the child” or “Serena”). This shall include all schools, teachers, principals, coaches, doctors, medical professionals, and any other third parties working with the child.
2. Both the applicant and respondent may make emergency medical decisions for the child. They shall immediately inform the other parent of the emergency and the decision.
3. The party with whom Serena is scheduled to be with in accordance with the parenting schedule will make the day-today decisions affecting Serena during that time.
4. The applicant shall inform the respondent prior to making any major (non-emergency) decisions regarding the child’s health, education, and general welfare.
5. The applicant shall have sole decision-making regarding Serena’s health, education, and general welfare. She is permitted to make these decisions without the respondent’s consent.
6. Both parties may travel with the child for vacations outside of Canada. They both shall sign any documents and provide any necessary consents. They both shall provide each other with a detailed itinerary, flight, and contact information. Consent for travel shall not be unreasonably withheld.
7. The applicant’s annual income is $47,179. The respondent’s income is imputed to be $201,607.70.
8. Commencing May 1, 2026, and on the 1^st of each month thereafter until further court order or consent, the respondent shall pay the applicant ongoing table child support in the amount of $1,719 in accordance with the CSG’s and the respondent’s imputed income of $201,607.70.
9. In the event that Serena’s residence changes such that she resides equally with both parents in accordance with a shared parenting arrangement, table child support will be adjusted to reflect a set-off table child support pursuant to s. 9 of the CSG’s.
10. Commencing May 1, 2026, all the children’s s. 7 expenses shall be jointly paid by the parties based on their respective incomes, with 70% of the cost apportioned to the respondent and 30% of the cost apportioned to the applicant. The party seeking to incur the expense shall pay up front. The other party shall reimburse within 14 days of being provided the receipt/invoice.
11. If the incurred expenses attract a tax credit or are deductible, the parent claiming the expense will reimburse the other parent by June 30^th of the following year, if the deduction was not already applied in the proportionate sharing upon payment.
12. All s. 7 expenses shall be agreed upon prior to incurring the said expense. Neither party shall unreasonably withhold consent. The following is a non-exhaustive list of agreed upon expenses: a. Ongoing hockey expenses for Serena, including but not limited to lessons, registration fees, equipment, and skate sharpening. b. Educational tutoring. c. School expenses, including but not limited to school trips, yearbook, semi-formal tickets, and graduation expenses between $50-$100 each. Any expense exceeding $100 shall require consent of the other parent, prior to incurring the expense. d. Uninsured necessary medical expenses, including dental (dentist or hygienist fees), eye care, and prescription medication. e. Necessary medical record fees related to the children. f. Driving lessons up to a total cost of $800 per child. g. Orthodontist – Braces for Serena. h. Serena or Lukas’ post-secondary expenses including but not limited to tuition, residence, books, meal plans, and reasonable expenses for groceries. i. Any further reasonable expenses agreed upon in advance, in writing, consent not to be unreasonably withheld.
13. The respondent shall pay the applicant $51,374.64 for retroactive arrears of child support, payable on or by 30 days from the date of this Order.
14. The respondent shall pay the applicant $7,054.50 and contribution for s. 7’s payable on or by 30 days from the date of this Order.
15. The court finds the family law value of the respondent’s business to be $466,000.
16. The respondent shall pay the applicant an equalization payment in the amount of $241,675.65, payable on or by 30 days from the date of this order.
17. The respondent shall pay the applicant a lump sum of spousal support in the amount of $227,702, payable on or by 30 days from the date of this order.
18. Following the payment of the spousal support lump sum, there shall be no spousal support payable by either party to the other.
19. Currently, the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home are being held in trust by Quinn Law, in the amount of approximately $761,000.00. Pursuant to this order, all of the respondent’s portion of the net proceeds of sale shall be released to the applicant’s counsel in trust in partial satisfaction of the child support arrears, section 7 arrears, lump sum spousal support, and equalization payment.
20. The applicant’s portion of the funds shall be released to the applicant’s counsel in trust.
21. Currently, the net sale proceeds of the Bahamas property are being held in a joint Scotiabank US daily savings account, in the amount of approximately $70,398.10 USD, pursuant to the parties’ Minutes of Settlement dated January 14, 2025. Pursuant to this Order, all of the net proceeds of the sale shall be released to the applicant in partial satisfaction of the child support arrears, section 7 arrears, lump sum spousal support and equalization payment.
22. If the above payments are insufficient to satisfy the child support arrears, s. 7 arrears, lump sum spousal support and equalization payment, the respondent shall pay these amounts, or the balance of them, on or by 30 days from the date of this Order.
23. Commencing in 2027, and on for as long as child support is paid, the payor and recipient, if applicable, must provide updated income disclosure to the other party each year, within 30 days of the anniversary of this order, in accordance with s. 24 of the Child Support Guidelines.
24. Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.
25. The Divorce shall proceed on an uncontested basis.
26. This order bears interest at a rate of 4% per year on any payment or payments in respect of which there is a default from the date of default.

[186] If counsel and parties cannot agree on costs, I will receive written submissions on a 7-day turnaround, commencing with the applicant on or by May 8, 2026, followed by the respondent’s submissions on or by May 15, 2026, then the applicant’s reply submissions, if any, on or by May 22, 2026. Cost submissions shall be no more than 5 pages in length (12 pt font size, regular 1 inch margins, 1.5 spacing), exclusive of any costs outline or offers to settle. All costs submissions shall be delivered via email through my judicial assistant at BarrieSCJJudAssistants@ontario.ca. If no submissions are received on or by May 22, 2026, the issue of costs will be deemed to have been settled between the parties.

R. S. Jain J.

Released: April 28, 2026

[^1]: Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) as amended; Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 as amended; and Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12. [^2]: Federal Child Support Guidelines (SOR/97-175, as amended). [^3]: Family Law Rules (O. Reg. 114/99, as amended). [^4]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at para. 13. [^5]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at para. 16. [^6]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, paras. 11-48; and Exhibit D – Transcript of audio recording made by the applicant January 3, 2023, of verbal abuse and argument between the respondent and Serena where the respondent frequently used obscenities in the presence of the child, calling the mother a “fcking cnt” in front of the child. [^7]: Exhibit 1 –Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 36-44. [^8]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025; and Exhibit A. [^9]: Fielding v. Fielding, 2015 ONCA 901, 70 R.F.L. (7th) 253, at para. 17. See also L. (N.) v. M. (R.R.), 2016 ONSC 809, 76 R.F.L. (7th) 428, where Perkins J. speaks to the autonomy of a 15-year-old child. [^10]: Bruff-Murphy v. Gunawardena, 2017 ONCA 502, 138 O.R. (3d) 584, at para. 2, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 343. [^11]: Lecker v. Lecker, 2024 ONSC 4413, at paras.19-25. See also r. 20.1 (2) and (3) of the FLR’s. [^12]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 49-55; and Exhibit E. [^13]: Exhibit 12 – Affidavit of Respondent dated April 14, 2025, at para. 75. [^14]: Exhibit 8 – Calculation Valuation Report of Respondent prepared by B. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. dated January 17, 2024. [^15]: Exhibit 10 – Calculation of Income Report of Respondent prepared by B. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. dated March 13, 2025. [^16]: Exhibit 7 – Valuation of A.I. Roadtech Services Inc. prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 10, 2024. [^17]: Exhibit 6 – Guideline Income Report of Respondent prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 5, 2024. [^18]: Exhibit 12 – Affidavit of Respondent dated April 14, 2025; and Exhibit P. Ministry of Finance - Motor Vehicle Appraisal Records dated April 19, 2022, May 8, 2022, May 10, 2022, and May 12, 2022. [^19]: Exhibit 5 – Kohli Appraisers Desktop Appraisal prepared by S. Kohli dated July 8, 2024. [^20]: Exhibit 12 – Affidavit of Respondent dated April 14, 2025, at para. 77. [^21]: Exhibit 12 – Affidavit of Respondent dated April 14, 2025, at para. 78; and Exhibit “P”. [^22]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 57-60; and Exhibit G. [^23]: Exhibit 5 – Kohli Appraisers Desktop Appraisal prepared by S. Kohli dated July 8, 2024. [^24]: Exhibit 5 – Kohli Appraisers Desktop Appraisal prepared by S. Kohli dated July 8, 2024. The equipment list is found at Appendix E, pages 3 – 6. Equipment not included is found at page 6. [^25]: Exhibit 1 – Applicant’s Affidavit dated March 31, 2025, at para. 65; and Exhibit K. [^26]: Exhibit 12 – Respondent’s Affidavit dated April 14, 2025, at paras. 80-82. [^27]: Exhibit 9 – Letter dated January 28, 2025, from Mr. Lewis to previous counsel for the Respondent. [^28]: Exhibit 8 – Calculation Valuation Report of Respondent prepared by B. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. dated January 17 2024, Schedule 1. [^29]: Exhibit 7 – Valuation of A.I. Roadtech Services Inc. prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 10, 2024, Schedule 3. [^30]: Exhibit 7 – Valuation of A.I. Roadtech Services Inc. prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 10, 2024. [^31]: Exhibit 7 – Valuation of A.I. Roadtech Services Inc. prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 10, 2024. [^32]: Exhibit 8 – Calculation Valuation Report of Respondent prepared by B. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. dated January 17, 2024. [^33]: Exhibit 7 – Valuation of A.I. Roadtech Services Inc. prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 10, 2024, Schedules 5 and 6. [^34]: Exhibit 7 – Valuation of A.I. Roadtech Services Inc. prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 10, 2024. [^35]: Exhibit 8 – Calculation Valuation Report of Respondent prepared by B. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. dated January 17, 2024, at page 2. [^36]: Exhibit 8 – Calculation Valuation Report of Respondent prepared by B. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. dated January 17, 2024, at page 7. [^37]: Exhibit 8 – Calculation Valuation Report of Respondent prepared by B. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. dated January 17, 2024, at page 7. [^38]: Exhibit 1 – Applicant’s Affidavit dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 66-79 and 110-112; Exhibit 2 – Affidavit of K. Arlette dated October 15, 2025; Exhibit 3 – Form 13.1 Financial Statement dated March 18, 2025; Exhibit 4 – Affidavit of Applicant dated November 17, 2025; Trial Record Tab 9 - Applicant’s NFP Statement dated April 11, 2025; Exhibit 12 – Respondent’s Affidavit dated April 14, 2025, at paras. 69-84, and 87-91; Exhibit “J”; Trial Record Tab 10 – Respondent’s NFP Statement dated April 17, 2025; Exhibit 13 – Affidavit of Respondent dated November 18, 2025; and Exhibits 14-19 (appraisals). [^39]: Trial Record Tab 10 – Respondent’s NFP Statement dated April 17, 2025; and Exhibit 12 – Respondent’s Affidavit dated April 14, 2025, at para. 69; Exhibit J. [^40]: Exhibit 12 – Respondent’s Affidavit dated April 14, 2025, at paras. 83-84. [^41]: Exhibit 12 – Respondent’s Affidavit dated April 14, 2025, at para. 69; and Exhibit “J”. [^42]: Trial Record Tab 9 – Applicant’s NFP Statement dated April 11, 2025. [^43]: Exhibit 12 – Affidavit of Respondent dated April 14, 2025, at para. 75. [^44]: Exhibit 14 – Appraisal of 2017 Chevy Corvette dated November 23, 2022 ($42,500); Exhibit 15 – Appraisal of 2004 Dodge Viper dated December 15, 2022 ($20,000); Exhibit 16 – Appraisal of 2013 Monterey 184FS dated June 6, 2022 ($10,000); Exhibit 17 – Appraisal of 2018 Sea Doo GTI 155 dated June 6, 2022 ($8,000); and Exhibit 18 – Appraisal of 2008 Harley Davidson Street Guider dated June 6, 2022 ($4,500). [^45]: Exhibit 5 – Kohli Appraisers Desktop Appraisal prepared by S. Kohli dated July 8, 2024, at Appendix E pages 3-6, (valued the Corvette at $78,000, the Viper at $68,000, the Harley Davidson at $16,000, the Monterey at $28,500, and the Sea Doo at $13,000). [^46]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 80-85. [^47]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 80-85 and 97-109. [^48]: Exhibit 2 – Affidavit of K. Arlette dated October 15, 2025 (adopted and relied upon by the Applicant) at paras. 2-4; and Exhibit 3 – Form 13.1 Financial Statement dated March 18, 2025. [^49]: Exhibit 12 – Affidavit of Respondent dated April 14, 2025, at para. 86. [^50]: Endorsement of J. McDermot dated April 6, 2023. [^51]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of the Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 66-75. [^52]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of the Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 88-91. [^53]: Exhibit 6 – Guideline Income Report of Respondent prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 5, 2024; and Exhibit 10 – Calculation of Income Report of the Respondent prepared by B. Lewis of White & Lewis Inc. dated March 13, 2025. [^54]: Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (C.A.). [^55]: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, 65 R.F.L. (6th) 17. [^56]: Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663, 15 R.F.L. (7th) 344; and Charron v. Carrière, 2016 ONSC 4719. [^57]: Charron, at para. 65. [^58]: Smith v. Pellegrini; Maimone v. Maimone. [^59]: Aitken v. Aitken (2003), 42 R.F.L. (5th) 1 (Ont. S.C.); Jonas v. Jonas, [2002] O.J. No. 2117 (S.C.); Price v. Reid, 2013 ONCJ 373. [^60]: Mason v. Mason, 2016 ONCA 725, 132 O.R. (3d) 641. [^61]: Exhibit 6 – Guideline Income Report of Respondent prepared by M. Gravelle of Wilkinson & Company LLP dated July 5, 2024, at page 1. [^62]: Exhibit 4 – Affidavit of the Applicant dated November 17, 2025, at Exhibit A is the Corporate Filing of A.I. Roadtech. [^63]: Questioning Transcripts – Respondent December 18, 2024 – Trial Record, Tab 26. [^64]: Exhibit 4 – Affidavit of Applicant dated November 17, 2025; Exhibit B – shows a job completion in October of 2022 (showing the company continued performing municipal work after the date of separation); Exhibit C – shows a November 2024 job completion (showing the company continued performing municipal work in 2024); Exhibit D – Ontario Business Registry Profile shows the respondent’s new company called South Simcoe Mini Bins (this is a disposal business); Exhibit E – shows town of Aurora bid and tender documents in end of 2024 (showing that the respondent continues to participate in public procurement processes through his business); Exhibit F – shows bids and tenders for City of Barrie in 2024; and Exhibit G – Certificates of Substantial Performance and related Notices of job completion for A.I. Roadtech between 2017 and 2024. [^65]: Exhibit 4 – Affidavit of the Applicant dated November 17, 2025, at paras. 2-16. [^66]: Exhibit 45 – Respondent’s Business RBC bank statements from December 2023 – to December 2024. [^67]: Exhibit 4 – Affidavit of Applicant dated November 17, 2025, at paras. 14-22; and at Exhibit “H” – is the Profile Report shows the Numbered Co. that the respondent says he works for, Blue Ocean, expired July 2021. [^68]: Exhibit 1 – Applicant’s Affidavit dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 15-19. [^69]: Exhibit 12 – Affidavit of Respondent dated April 14, 2025, at paras. 54-58. [^70]: Exhibit 44 – Respondent’s Financial Statement sworn April 2, 2025. [^71]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of the Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras. 116-118. [^72]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of the Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at para. 96. [^73]: Exhibit 39 – Respondent’s Financial Statement sworn March 13, 2023. [^74]: 1992 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813. [^75]: Moge, at pp. 864-65. [^76]: 1999 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420. [^77]: Bracklow, at para. 39. [^78]: Exhibit 12 – Affidavit of the Respondent dated April 14, 2025, at paras. 19-22. [^79]: Exhibit 13 – Affidavit of Respondent dated November 18, 2025, at para 2. [^80]: Exhibit 13 –Affidavit of Respondent dated November 18, 2025, at paras. 3-13 (included exhibits that were Records of Employees (ROE’s) that were terminated in November 2024 and cancellation of insurance). [^81]: Trial Record – Tab 26 – Questioning Transcripts – Respondent, at page 18. [^82]: Trial Record – Tab 6 – Respondent’s Financial Statement dated April 2, 2025, declares that the Respondent owes the CRA - GST/HST in the amount of $109,411.21 as of October 25, 2024, and another debt owed to CRA of $174,212.95 as of October 22, 2024. No evidence was provided by the Respondent that shows this debt was owing as of date of separation, or whether it was accrued after the date of separation. In Exhibit 13 – Affidavit of Respondent dated November 18, 2025, the Respondent attached two incomplete Notices from CRA date stamped August 12, 2025, that indicated A.I. Roadtech owed CRA $91,623.60 and $199,593.94. No other information was provided to show a breakdown of whether these were arrears of GST/HST, source deductions, and/or income taxes, and no information was provided to show when these alleged debts accrued. [^83]: Exhibit 38 – Respondent’s Financial Statement sworn September 15, 2022, does not mention or include any debts to CRA. Exhibit 39 – Respondent’s Financial Statement sworn March 13, 2023, mentions that as of date of separation, A.I. Roadtech owed CRA HST in the amount of $164,094.29 and owes another debt to CRA in the amount of $406,540.70 – no statements proving said amounts were attached. Exhibit 40 – Respondent’s Financial Statement sworn July 18, 2024 – under Part 4 (e) Business Interests - the respondent includes a deduction of “Contingent Income Tax (re. disposition)” in the amount $72,700 on date of valuation. No other explanation or statement was provided. The court is not aware of what “disposition” the respondent is referring to; i.e. did he sell an asset of the business? This same Financial Statement also included a deduction of GST/HST owing to CRA in the amount of $84,278.99 as of the date of the Financial Statement (i.e. it does not mention or include the same amount that was included in Exhibit 39 and it does not claim it was owing as of date of separation). Exhibit 41 – Respondent’s Financial Statement sworn January 8, 2025, declares under Part 4 (e) Business Interests that A.I. Roadtech owes CRA GST/HST $31,138.38 as of September 30, 2024 and another debt to CRA in the amount of $174,212.95 as of October 22, 2024. The Respondent did not include these as amounts as of the date of separation (like he did in Exhibit 39). Again, no statements proving said amounts were attached and no evidence was provided to break down any details about these debts. [^84]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant dated March 31, 2025, at paras 74-75. [^85]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant March 31, 2025, at paras. 97-109. [^86]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant March 31, 2025, at para 100. [^87]: Exhibit 1 – Affidavit of Applicant March 31, 2025, at paras. 101-104. [^88]: Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, 88 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 98. [^89]: Wharry v. Wharry, 2016 ONCA 930, 408 D.L.R. (4th) 548, at paras. 84-87. [^90]: Mason v. Mason, 2016 ONCA 725, 132 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 121. [^91]: Fisher, at para. 109. [^92]: 2011 ONCA 294, 106 O.R. (3d) 221. [^93]: Davis, at para. 67. [^94]: Davis, at para. 80. [^95]: Racco v. Racco, 2014 ONCA 330, 373 D.L.R. (4th) 240. [^96]: Racco, at para. 31.