CITATION: Winter v. McAnulty, 2026 ONSC 2189
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
FAMILY COURT
RE: Jeffrey Christian Winter, Applicant
AND:
Taryn Elizabeth McAnulty, Respondent
BEFORE: MITROW J.
COUNSEL: Jeffrey Winter, self-represented
Rebecca Kaeser Reiss, for the Respondent
HEARD: April 10, 2025
ENDORSEMENT
INTRODUCTION
1Each party brings a motion for interim relief. There were two significant issues: the parenting order that is in the best interests of the parties’ two children; and the respondent’s claim for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.
2Prior to the motions being heard, the parties did have a case conference limited to parenting issues. At the time of the conference, the respondent had yet to serve and file her answer. A further case conference has been scheduled.
3For reasons that follow, the interim order below awards primary care of both children to the respondent; grants to the respondent exclusive possession of the matrimonial home; and provides for the applicant to have parenting time with both children as specified in the order. The order also includes various provisions that are incidental to the parenting order.
BRIEF BACKGROUND
4For convenience, at times I refer to the applicant as “the father” and the respondent as “the mother”.
i) Issues with the Father’s Evidence
5Each party filed a “primary” affidavit. The mother also had one third-party affidavit. In addition, the father filed a “reply” affidavit of 40 pages inclusive of exhibits. This document exceeds substantially the five-page limit for reply affidavits, as set out in the province-wide practice direction.
6The mother’s responding material raised one new claim, contained in her motion, which was her request for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. Otherwise, the mother’s evidence was confined to parenting issues. While, technically, the father is entitled to a “responding affidavit”, to address the claim for exclusive possession, the reality is that the father’s affidavit contained very little, if any, response to this issue. The reply affidavit focused almost exclusively on parenting issues. Many portions of the affidavit relating to parenting issues are improper reply.
7In addition, there are a number of exhibits in the reply affidavit consisting of statements from various persons that can be described as character references. A letter or a statement appended as an exhibit to an affidavit constitutes inadmissible hearsay evidence: see Re LiSanti v. LiSanti 1990, CanLII 4229 (Ont. C.J.), at paras. 4–6. In deciding the motions, I ascribe no weight to the aforementioned letters and statements.
8Also, the father’s initial affidavit, sworn March 12, 2026, has numerous errors regarding dates, by referring to the correct month and day but referring to the wrong year—referring to 2025 when it should be 2026. This error, and confusion, are evident regarding the date of separation, various events in March 2026 involving police and Children’s Aid, and the date of the infant’s surgery scheduled for April 13, 2026. The significant frequency of using the wrong year makes this affidavit a confusing document to read and raises some concern about the overall reliability of the father’s evidence.
ii) Background
9The parties separated on or about February 22, 2026. They have two children, both boys, ages three years and four months. The infant child was scheduled for surgery to occur April 13, 2026, three days after the hearing of the motion. This child is diagnosed with craniosynostosis. The surgery will involve the child’s skull.
10The father characterized the parties as having “cohabited” and being in a “spousal relationship” until their separation. The father makes no mention of the parties being married.
11The mother explains in more detail that the parties began to cohabit in April 2018; were separated from May 30, 2021, to December 31, 2022; reconciled January 2023, and were married June 7, 2025. There is no evidence from the father in his reply affidavit disputing the mother’s evidence as to the history of their relationship, including that the parties are married.
12The evidentiary record establishes that this is a high-conflict case. Police have been involved on several occasions, and Children’s Aid (“the Society”) have opened an ongoing file.
13On separation, the mother left the matrimonial home with the children, in the presence of the police. Since then, the mother and both children have been residing in her parents’ residence. There has been substantial conflict regarding the father’s parenting time since separation and making arrangements for same.
14The father complains that the mother has unreasonably restricted his parenting time. The mother maintains that the father’s significant use of marijuana creates a safety risk for children and that his parenting either needs to be supervised or, alternatively, should be in the community.
15The father further claims that the mother has ongoing unresolved mental-health issues, and that the children should be with him in the matrimonial home, where he has continued to reside since separation.
16At this time, the mother is on maternity leave from her employment. She deposes that the father has been unemployed since September 2025, and that he has been unemployed for the “vast majority” of the parties’ relationship. The father does not dispute this evidence.
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY EACH PARTY
17Each party’s position is set out in his or her respective motion.
18The father’s motion requests an order of the court:
a) that the father be granted temporary decision-making responsibility, and parenting time, for both children; on a “defined and enforceable schedule”, and enforceable by police;
b) that the mother be ordered to facilitate and not interfere with the father’s parenting time;
c) that the mother be required to provide a minimum notice of 24 hours before attending at the matrimonial home;
d) that a non-harassment order be issued against the mother;
e) that the father be recognized as an equal parent with full rights to participate in all medical decisions and appointments, including the infant child’s surgery scheduled for April 13, 2026; and
f) for the return of the dog removed from the matrimonial home.
19The evidence is insufficient to justify a police assistance order, or a non-harassment order against the mother. Those issues were not addressed during the hearing of the motions in any event. Those claims are dismissed.
20The claim regarding the return of the dog was not pursued during the hearing of the motions, and it is dismissed.
21It is noted that the father failed to provide as required, a draft copy of the order that he sought. The mother did provide draft copies of various alternative veresions of orders that she sought.
22The mother’s motion sought an order:
a) that the father’s motion be dismissed;
b) that the mother have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home;
c) that both children reside in the primary care of the mother;
d) that the father have supervised parenting time at Merrymount Family Support and Crisis Centre (“Merrymount”) and video parenting time on alternate days between 5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.;
e) alternatively, that the father have parenting time with the children in the community as specified in the notice of motion;
f) that the father not consume alcohol, cannabis, non-prescription drugs or, intentionally misuse prescription medication, at least 12 hours prior to and during his parenting time;
g) that the father not video or audio record the mother without her express permission;
h) orders dealing with the nature of communications between the parties; and
i) that the parties communicate exclusively through a parenting application.
THE BEST INTERESTS FACTORS.
23The relevant legislation for the parenting order is the Children’s Law Reform Act. When the motions were heard, the mother had yet to file her answer. In his application, the father made no claim for a divorce.
24Section 24(3) of the Children’s Law Reform Act sets out the factors to be considered when determining the best interests of the child:
(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
25In the context of the present case, the discussion below considers the foregoing factors.
26For factors (a), (b), and (c), the children’s needs at this time require stability, a defined parenting plan, and any necessary and ancillary orders to minimize parental conflict and to minimize exposure of the children to their parents’ conflict. The evidence suggests that each party has a strong relationship with each child; further, each party is supportive of the children having a relationship with the other party.
27Regarding factor (d), I am satisfied on the evidence that the mother was the children’s primary caregiver prior to separation. The mother took maternity leave for the eldest child, and she is now on maternity leave for the infant child. Also, the third-party affidavit filed by the mother from her brother-in-law included evidence corroborating that the mother was the children’s primary caregiver.
28The foregoing conclusion should not be viewed as in any way minimizing the father’s important role in the care and upbringing of both children.
29Subsequent to separation, there is no dispute that the children have been in the mother’s care; however given the father’s complaints that the mother has withheld parenting time, the foregoing discussion on the “status quo” focuses primarily during the time prior to separation.
30Factor (e) is not germane given the children’s ages.
31Factor (f) is not engaged in any meaningful way on the facts.
32Regarding factor (g), the father’s plan is to reside with the children in the matrimonial home. He seeks decision-making responsibility. His affidavit material is not entirely clear as to his proposal regarding parenting time for the mother.
33The mother’s plan is to reside with the children in the matrimonial home. She seeks primary care of the children. The mother makes no request regarding an order for decision-making responsibility. Regarding the father’s parenting time, the mother seeks supervised parenting time and, in the alternative, that parenting time occur in the community with locations to be specified in the order.
34Factor (h)—the ability and willingness of each party to care for the children and meet the needs of the children—was the subject of much of the evidence on the motions.
35The father complained vociferously that the mother has unresolved mental-health issues, including postpartum depression. He alleged that the mother`s behaviour posed a safety risk to the children. The father portrays himself as the stable parent and that he should have the children placed in his care. He claimed to have 15 videos of the mother’s alleged erratic behavior, none of which he has produced to the mother.
36The mother explains that she has had to deal with prenatal anxiety and postpartum depression with both pregnancies. She deposes that she has a good health team, including her psychiatrist, that she follows treatment recommendations and that she is stable as a result. In a text message to the mother, the father inappropriately refers to the psychiatrist as “stupid” and then uses a racial slur directed at the psychiatrist.
37The mother refers to the financial stress resulting from the father not being employed. In addition, the mother’s father is in the later stages of a terminal cancer diagnosis, which is a further stressor for the mother.
38The father deposes that he called Children’s Aid initially, and anonymously. When the Society became involved, the mother described the father’s behavior as becoming escalated and aggressive. Both parties met with the assigned child protection worker. The mother deposes that during her home visit, the child protection worker expressed no concern with the mother’s care of the children, and then instead the child protection worker suggested that the mother should not return to the matrimonial home and that she should make a safety plan. It was also the mother’s evidence that the father was becoming confrontational with the Society.
39While there were no Society records filed on the motions, the evidence is undisputed that the children have remained in the mother’s care despite the father’s allegations and call to the Society.
40Regarding the mother’s evidence that the father became confrontational with the Society, the mother deposes that the father sent an email to the mother’s lawyer, apparently rather than sending the email to the Society, complaining that the child protection worker, a female, had been negligent and referring her to as “that Jenn broad”. It is noted that the father did not dispute this evidence in his reply. Further the father acknowledged contacting a supervisor within the Society and filing a complaint with the “Ombudsman”.
41The mother’s concerns regarding the father’s ability to care for the children center around the father’s ongoing and regular use of marijuana. The mother only recently had learned that the father has a marijuana vape that he uses during the day. The issue of the father’s marijuana use was a significant concern for the mother. The father does not dispute that he uses marijuana on a regular basis. In a recent text message from the father, appended as an exhibit to the mother’s affidavit, the father states “I smoke weed at night as I always have through our entire relationship to sleep.”
42There are other texts that deal with this issue and the father’s refusal to give up marijuana. The mother deposes that she no longer has any idea when the father is sober and when he is not.
43As noted earlier, the father does not dispute his marijuana use. He refers to a “medical authorization” to use marijuana. In an exhibit appended to his reply affidavit (exhibit QQ) there was a document from the “Apollo Cannabis Clinics” with a prescription start and end date, and an upcoming appointment. However, there is a note on the document that it is “NOT a prescription/medical document”. There is also no evidence from the father explaining any alleged medical need to use marijuana.
44In his reply, the father explains that his additions counsellor has confirmed in writing that there is “no impairment during sessions, therapeutic approach appropriate”. The father identifies this document as being Exhibit QQ, which it is not.
45The father does have an admitted history of alcohol abuse for which he received treatment in the summer of 2024 by attending a 30-day treatment program, paid for by the mother’s parents. It is not clear from the father’s evidence whether the reference to his addictions counsellor refers to his alcohol addiction or to his marijuana use.
46The affidavit from the mother’s brother-in-law includes some corroboration, based on the brother-in-law’s personal observations, that the father’s marijuana use affects his demeanor and behavior.
47I am satisfied on the evidence that the extent of the father’s marijuana use raises a concern regarding the safety of the children if left in the father’s care.
48Regarding factor (i), the ability of the parents to communicate is problematic given the high-conflict nature of the relationship. The parenting order below includes provisions related to communication.
49Regarding family violence—factor (j)—I note the following:
a) There is ample evidence that both parties have behaved inappropriately in engaging in verbal abuse;
b) The mother deposes that after leaving the matrimonial home, that she received hundreds of text messages per day from the father. She describes the messages as “non-sequitur, contradictory, confusing and aggressive”. She describes the texts as alarming and threatening. A few examples are attached as exhibits. A text sent by the father on February 23, 2026, included “I love you honey.” and later followed by “…I am going to do some things that will probably scare you...” None of the foregoing evidence regarding the nature, the volume and the content of the father’s text messages is denied by the father in his reply affidavit;
c) That latter statement I take into account as a compromise to the safety of the mother and the children, and as a reason for the mother to fear for the safety of herself and the children, within the meaning of sections 24(4)(e) and (f) of the Children’s Law Reform Act. Those sections state:
Factors relating to family violence
(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3)(j), the court shall take into account…
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person.
d) In Menchella v. Menchella, 2012 ONSC 6304 (Ont. S.C.J.), relied on by the mother, the court found that text messages received by a spouse can constitute “violence” within the meaning of s.24(3)(f) of the Family Law Act, in relation to factors that the court is required to consider in making an order for exclusive possession of a matrimonial home. I am satisfied that the father’s text messages, as described by the mother, also fall within the category of family violence referred to in s.24(3)(j) of the Children’s Law Reform Act;
50Factor (k) is not engaged on the facts of this case.
DECISION – PARENTING ORDER
51Based on the evidentiary record, including the discussion above relating to the best interests factors, I conclude that it is in the children’s best interests that their primary care shall be with the mother. The facts supporting this conclusion include the status quo prior to separation, the father’s extensive use of marijuana and the father’s threatening behaviour. As stated earlier, the mother has not made a claim for decision-making responsibility.
52I find it is not in the children’s best interests to award decision-making responsibility to the father. At this early stage in the proceeding, it is expected that the parties will cooperate should any major decisions have to be made regarding the children. For example, thus far, the parties have been able to agree to the infant child’s surgery and the parties eventually did sign all of the necessary consents for that surgery.
53While the father has raised the mother’s mental-health issues as serious concerns, the evidence satisfies me that the mother has taken appropriate steps to address any mental-health issues. Further there is no evidence that the Society has taken any steps, or made any suggestions, limiting or imposing any restrictions of the mother’s care of the children. As discussed earlier, the mother was the children’s primary caregiver prior to separation.
54As discussed earlier, the father’s extensive use and dependency on marijuana poses a safety risk for the children. Although I decline to make an order for supervised parenting time, I do find it is in the children’s best interests for the father to have parenting time to occur within the community.
55The parties are encouraged to consider some provisions for random drug testing to determine whether the father continues to use marijuana, and the level of the marijuana use. There must be a process to expand the father’s parenting time, and to remove the condition requiring parenting time to be in the community.
56The order below proscribes the use of various substances by the father 24 hours prior to and during his parenting time.
57There is no dispute in the evidence from the father that he has apparently taken multiple videos of the mother. The father makes ongoing reference to those videos in his evidence. The father further indicated he intends to continue making videos. This constant video and/or audio recording shall cease immediately. The order below addresses that matter.
58The order below includes additional orders that are in the children’s best interests and are included as part of the parenting order.
59I mention briefly the decision in Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273 (Ont. S.C.J. (Divisional Court)), where the Divisional Court discussed the Parenting Plan Guide (“the Guide”) prepared by the Ontario Chapter of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, and at para. 40, stated that if a judge departs from the accepted and widely established social science research behind the Guide, that reasons are needed to depart from same. 1
60In the present case there was no mention at all of the Guide by either party. In any event, the analysis in these reasons, in relation to the best interests factors, subsumes any relevant considerations contained in the Guide.
MOTHER’S CLAIM FOR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF THE MATRIMONIAL HOME
61The Family Law Act requires the court to consider various criteria in determining whether to make an order for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. These criteria are included in s.24(3) and s.24(4):
Order for exclusive possession: criteria
(3) In determining whether to make an order for exclusive possession, the court shall consider,
(a) the best interests of the children affected;
(b) any existing orders under Part I (Family Property) and any existing support orders or other enforceable support obligations;
c) the financial position of both spouses;
d) any written agreement between the parties;
(e) the availability of other suitable and affordable accommodation; and
(f) any violence committed by a spouse against the other spouse or the children.
Best interests of child
(4) In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider,
a) the possible disruptive effects on the child of a move to other accommodation; and
(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained.
62The parties are joint owners of the matrimonial home. Having found that the children shall reside in the mother’s primary care, I consider the above factors, and I find that the mother should have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home for the following reasons:
a) It is in the children’s best interests to reside in the matrimonial home which is the children’s familiar surrounding;
b) The mother has no financial means at this time to obtain alternate accommodation for herself and the children. As discussed earlier, the mother is already under significant financial strain to meet daily living expenses while she is on maternity leave, and in circumstances where the father remains unemployed;
c) The mother has made clear that it is not reasonable to continue residing with her parents. She deposes that her father’s medical condition is negatively affected by “a rambunctious toddler and an infant.” The mother further deposes that her father’s cognition is impacted by his disease, that his palliative care team is regularly in and out of the home, and that the home environment is not appropriate for long-term residence for the mother and the children;
d) Further the mother deposes that the father has access to good options for accommodation. The father’s brother and sister-in-law live in Acton and have a large multi-bedroom house and they have no children. The mother also mentioned a friend who has offered that the father could stay with them temporarily. The mother deposes that these options provide an appropriate accommodation for one adult. The mother further deposes that the father is close to his brother;
e) In her affidavit, while the mother names the friend with whom she suggests the father could reside, there is no indication where this person resides;
f) More importantly however, the father, in his reply affidavit, did not dispute the mother’s evidence regarding alternate accommodation. The father elected in his 40-page reply affidavit not to address the issue of alternative accommodation at all; nor was there any response in his affidavit to the mother’s claim for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home; and
g) I do regard the father’s perpetration of text messages, as discussed earlier, as constituting “violence” within the meaning of s. 24(3)(f).
ORDER
63The order made below, when signed and issued, shall include the full names and dates of birth of both children; and also, the address of the matrimonial home which is set out in paragraph 3 of the mother’s motion. This information is not included in these reasons for privacy.
64In the issued application, the middle names of the parties were not shown in the title of the proceeding. In subsequent documents, the parties have changed the names to include the middle names, without having amended the application.
65Accordingly, the order below amends the parties’ names in the title of the proceeding.
66I make the following interim order pursuant to the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Family Law Act:
The two children shall reside in the primary care of the respondent.
The applicant shall have parenting time with the children as follows:
a. on Tuesdays from 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. at Pinafore Park in St. Thomas, Ontario, or at the St. Thomas Library;
b. Saturdays from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. at the St. Thomas Library or other child-focused community location as agreed between the parties in writing; and
c. virtual parenting time by video every other day from 5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., with flexibility having regard to the children’s ages, stages of development and attention spans.
The applicant shall not consume alcohol, cannabis, non-prescription drugs, nor intentionally misuse prescription medication, for the period starting 24 hours before, and during, the applicant’s parenting time. For greater clarity, the restrictions regarding the use of cannabis as set out in this paragraph, continue to apply, even if the applicant obtains a prescription for the use of cannabis.
The applicant and the respondent shall communicate exclusively via a parenting app, and only as strictly necessary for parenting matters. All communication shall be brief, informative, polite and shall not contain name-calling or swearing. If the parties are unable to agree on the app, then the app shall be selected by the respondent, and any costs of the app shall be shared equally by the parties.
The applicant and the respondent shall not speak ill of the other party in the presence of the children, and shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that no third party does so.
Neither the applicant nor the respondent shall discuss adult issues or this litigation in the presence of the children, and both parties shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that no third party does so.
Each party is at liberty to have a third person accompany him or her to any parenting exchange.
There shall be no video or audio recording made by the parties, or anyone else, at any parenting exchange of the children.
If the parties have not been able to come to an agreement for an expansion of the applicant’s parenting time by July 1, 2026, then the applicant is at liberty to bring a motion, after July 1, 2026, for an increase in his parenting time subject to the following conditions:
a. The applicant has complied with paragraph 3 of this order; and
b. If the parties have not been able to agree to a protocol requiring drug tests for cannabis, then the mother is at liberty to raise same as a condition of any increase to the applicant’s parenting time.
Each party is equally entitled to receive, on a presentation of a copy of this order, any information, including any records, relating to each child, from the child’s doctor, dentist, any other health-care provider, teacher, school principal or daycare provider.
Each party is entitled to attend any medical or dental appointment for the children. The party who makes the appointment shall notify the other party immediately, in writing, as to the date, time and location of the appointment.
The respondent shall have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.
The title of this application, as set out in the issued application, is amended to show the applicant’s name as “Jeffrey Christian Winter” and to show the respondent’s name as “Taryn Eizabeth McAnulty”.
The respondent shall forward to the applicant, for his approval, a draft copy of this order. The applicant shall have 24 hours to forward to the respondent an approved draft copy, failing which the respondent is at liberty to have the order signed and issued by the clerk.
Except for costs, all other claims made in the motions are dismissed.
The parties may make written costs submissions. The costs submissions shall be limited to three typed pages (two typed pages for reply), minimum font 12 and double-spaced. The costs submissions may include copies of any offers to settle and bills of costs. Any reference to authorities shall be included in the written costs submissions and shall be by hyperlink. The respondent’s costs submissions are due within 14 days of the date of this order; the applicant’s responding costs submissions are due within 14 days thereafter; and the respondent’s reply, if any, is due within 7 days thereafter. All written costs submissions shall be served, and filed with the court in the usual manner, together with proof of service.
“Justice Victor Mitrow”
Justice Victor Mitrow
Released: April 15, 2026
CITATION: Winter v. McAnulty, 2026 ONSC 2189
COURT FILE NO.: FC48/26
DATE: April 15, 2026
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY COURT
BETWEEN:
Jeffrey Christian Winter
Applicant
- and -
Taryn Elizabeth McAnulty
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
MITROW J.
Released: April 15, 2026
Footnotes
- See Gjorsovski v. Krajisnik, 2025 ONSC 7220 (Ont. S.C.J.), where the court declined to follow the Divisional Court decision in Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette in relation to judges being required to give reasons for departure from the Guide.