Spencer v. Tellier, 2026 ONSC 1120

Court File and Parties

CITATION: Spencer v. Tellier, 2026 ONSC 1120

COURT FILE NO.: FC-25-00000482-0000

DATE: March 5, 2026

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

FAMILY COURT

RE: Jonathon Mark Spencer, Applicant

AND:

Paige Elizabeth Tellier, Respondent

BEFORE: MITROW J.

COUNSEL: Mic Liu, for the Applicant Michelle Retief, for the Respondent

HEARD: February 4, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

INTRODUCTION

1Each party brings a motion and seeks interim orders. This case involves the parties’ child who was 26 months of age when the motions were heard. The respondent brought her motion first, seeking interim table amount of child support based on the applicant’s income.

2The applicant served a cross-motion requesting an interim order that the parties have equal parenting time with their child; that interim child support be ordered pursuant to s.9 of the child support guidelines using the set-off table amounts; and an interim order specifying each party’s proportionate share of s. 7 expenses.

3While each party’s motion seeks permission to be heard on an urgent basis prior to a case conference, that relief now has been rendered moot as a case conference was held on December 9, 2025.

4Regarding the applicant’s claim for equal parenting time, that request is opposed by the respondent, and in her material the respondent sets out a parenting-plan proposal where the child would remain in the respondent’s primary care, with a specified parenting schedule in favour of the applicant.

5For reasons that follow, the child is placed in the respondent’s primary care, with the applicant to have parenting time as specified in the order below; and the applicant is ordered to pay table amount of child support. The order below also deals with s. 7 expenses.

ISSUE: INTERIM PARENTING ORDER

6As discussed in more detail below, there are factual disputes between the parties, including disputes relating to each party’s role regarding the care of the child, and the respondent’s complaints regarding the applicant’s behaviour towards her.

7The parties met and began dating in December 2022. They became a couple in January 2023. The parties have one child, DS, born in […] 2023. The parties did not move in together during their relationship which ended on April 19, 2025.

8The respondent lives on her own. She is employed full-time. The respondent has no other children.

9The applicant lives on his own. He has three other children who are in the primary care of their mother following a trial in 2025. The applicant has parenting time with his three children as specified in the final court order. The applicant has worked full-time, but his last affidavit filed just prior to the hearing of the motions indicated that his employment was terminated without cause in early January 2026. More discussion about the applicant’s employment status follows later in these reasons.

10This matter is quickly devolving into a high-conflict case. It is apparent that the parties have experienced ongoing conflict in their attempts to establish a regular parenting schedule.

11In Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273 (Ont. S.C.J. (Divisional Court)), in an appeal by the appellant mother from an interim order granting the father equal parenting time with the parties’ 15-month-old child, the Divisional Court set aside the order of the motion judge on grounds that included a failure to consider many of the factors set out in the s. 24(3) of the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12. (CLRA): (see para. 24). In relation to the motion judge’s failure to consider the status quo, the Divisional Court stated at para. 28:

[28] The motion judge failed to make any mention of the status quo, prior to hearing the motion. There is no consideration in the reasons of the parenting schedule that existed from the child’s birth to the date of the motion, how the child was doing under that schedule, or how a substantial change to the schedule would affect the child. It is a long-standing legal principle that absent evidence of a material change, and that an immediate change is required, the status quo is ordinarily to be maintained until trial: Churchill, at para. 36; Hatab v. Abuhatab, 2022 ONSC 1560, 69 R.F.L. (8th) 18, at para. 33.

12Section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act creates a statutory framework regarding the court’s obligation to consider the child’s best interests, in the context of the factors listed in s. 24(3). The following provisions in the CLRA are relevant:

24 (1) In making a parenting order or contact order with respect to a child, the court shall only take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with this section.

Primary consideration

(2) In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

Factors

(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

13In these reasons, at times, for convenience, the terms “parent” or “parents” are used to describe the parties; and the applicant and the respondent are referred to, respectively, as the “father” and the “mother”.

(i) Factors (a) (b) and (c)

14Regarding the first three factors in s. 24(3):

(a) the child’s needs, at this interim stage, require stability by having a defined and predictable parenting schedule, where physical contact between the parents is minimized, and where there are some controls regarding communication between the parents;

(b) the evidence supports the conclusion that each parent has a strong and loving relationship with the child; but that the mother’s relationship with the child must be viewed in the context that she has been the child’s primary caregiver as discussed below in more detail; and

(c) the evidence suggests that each parent supports the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent.

(ii) Factor (d) – the history of the child’s care

15The history of the care of the child is a contentious issue with conflicting evidence.

16As noted earlier, the parties agree that their relationship ended on April 19, 2025 (date of separation).

17During the course of their relationship, as discussed earlier, the parties did not live together. The respondent has cystic fibrosis. She described her pregnancy as high-risk. The respondent deposed that after the child’s birth, she focused on recovery and being a new mother.

18The respondent is clear in her evidence that during the parties’ relationship, that she continued living with her parents, including after the child was born. The respondent was on maternity leave from her employment for a period of 18 months—from November 2023 until May 2025. The respondent’s maternity leave was extended until July 2, 2025. The child was breastfed.

19It was only recently that the respondent moved into her own apartment with the child.

20The respondent does agree that during the parties’ relationship, that she spent “a few nights a week” at the applicant’s home.

21The respondent’s evidence is that she has been the child’s primary caregiver since the child’s birth.

22The applicant’s evidence is that the child “has been in both of our primary care since his birth.” The applicant deposes that while the parties were together, that the respondent stayed with the applicant in his home “…typically 5 to 6 days each week…”, and that this continued after the child was born until their separation on April 19, 2025.

23The applicant took three weeks of paternity leave. The applicant has been working full-time from home since March 2020 with the exception of being temporarily unemployed for five months.

24The respondent disputes the applicant’s evidence regarding the time spent at his residence. She points to a series of text messages between the parties in December 2024 and January 2025 that speak to the applicant not seeing the child or the respondent for various periods of consecutive days including a week or more. The applicant, in reply, does acknowledge the respondent’s evidence about not seeing the respondent and the child, but claims that this was an initial brief separation, and that the parties reconciled in February 2025. The applicant admits that the respondent and child did not spend “5–6 days per week at my home” during this period.

25The respondent also explains that she did not feel comfortable staying for long periods of time at the applicant’s residence when the applicant and his three other children were there. The respondent deposes that she had not established a close bond with the applicant’s children; and that the applicant was “adamant” that the respondent hide her pregnancy leading up to the applicant’s family law trial with his ex-wife. The respondent deposes that as a result she spent no time with the applicant’s children.

26In his reply, the applicant does not dispute the allegation that he wanted to hide the respondent’s pregnancy; rather, the applicant claims that even after his three other children were aware of DS’s existence, that the respondent allegedly remained uninterested in merging their families.

27The applicant did admit, when the issue was raised by the respondent, that he was seeing the respondent and DS much less than he would have preferred, during his two-week family law trial.

28In challenging the applicant’s evidence as to the time she allegedly spent in the applicant’s home, the respondent’s evidence included that she was subjected to verbal abuse and physical intimidation by the applicant. There is a dispute about these allegations. This issue is discussed in more detail later, in these reasons, in relation to factor (j) dealing with family violence.

29Subsequent to separation in April 2025, until August 2025, the applicant complains that the respondent limited his time with the child. The applicant attached as exhibits monthly calendars containing what the applicant states was his parenting time with the child. These calendar entries do confirm that until August 2025, that the applicant had only limited time with the child, even taking into account the respondent’s evidence as to some alleged inaccuracies in the applicant’s calendar.

30For the period starting August 2025 until November 2025, there were ongoing negotiations between the parties, at times directly between the parties rather than through counsel, to arrive at a parenting schedule.

31The applicant’s evidence is that the child has been with the parties on a “50/50” parenting time schedule except for the period “from separation in April 2025 to August”, when the child was primarily with the respondent due to her allegedly withholding the child.¹

32As stated earlier, the applicant’s monthly calendars showing his parenting time initially were attached as an exhibit to his first affidavit.² The calendar for November 2025 showed the applicant’s parenting time schedule only until November 16^th; however, the last two entries on the calendar for November 15^th and 16^th are not reliable as those parenting-time entries are for dates after the applicant’s affidavit and the exhibit were sworn.³

33Further, the respondent deposed that the applicant’s actual parenting time on those two dates was substantially less than shown on his November calendar.⁴ As discussed later, the applicant in a subsequent affidavit changed his calendar entries for those two dates to conform with the respondent’s evidence.

34The applicant’s claim about a “50/50” schedule starting August 2025 is not supported by the applicant’s own calendar entries that he has provided.

35The respondent has provided her calculations as to the applicant’s parenting time using the entries in the applicant’s calendar for the period including August 2025 to November 16, 2025. The respondent’s calculations indicate that the applicant’s parenting time for that period was less than 40 per cent.⁵ The respondent, in her affidavit, showed her calculations. The applicant did not take issue with those calculations.

36Furthermore, the respondent does not agree with a number of the entries contained in the applicant’s calendar, and the respondent provides details as to a number of instances when the applicant’s parenting time was less than claimed by the applicant in his calendars.⁶

37In a reply affidavit⁷, the applicant appends an updated calendar that has entries for most of the month of November 2025—up to November 29^th. However, I place little weight on this “updated calendar” because the affidavit and exhibit are sworn November 24, 2025, but the entries include parenting-time entries every day for the period November 25 to November 29 inclusive.

38As mentioned earlier, the applicant’s updated November calendar corrected the parenting time entries for November 15^th and November 16^th to be consistent with the respondent’s evidence as to the correct parenting time. It is noteworthy that the respondent’s calculations of the applicant’s parenting time, being less than 40 per cent, would have been based on the applicant’s inflated parenting-time entries for those two dates. This means that the respondent’s calculations were more generous to the applicant than they should have been, taking into account the applicant’s true parenting time on those two dates.

39On two occasions, the applicant has appended, as exhibits, calendars to his affidavits purporting to show his actual parenting time in circumstances where some of the entries showing his parenting time are for dates subsequent to the date that the affidavits were sworn. This impacts adversely as to the reliability of the applicant’s evidence.

(iii) Factors (e) and (f)

40These two factors are of little, if any, significance on the facts. The child is too young to ascertain his views and preferences; and the factor relating to the child’s culture, linguistics, religion and heritage was not a germane consideration and was not at issue on the motions.

(iv) Factor (g) – Any plans for the child’s care

41The evidence, including the text-message communications between the parties, is clear that the applicant wanted a shared-parenting schedule. In turn, this defined the applicant’s proposals for child support—that child support should be payable based on table set-off amounts pursuant to s. 9(a) of the Ontario child support guidelines.

42For her part, the respondent’s position, including in her text messages, indicated that she opposed the applicant’s proposal. The respondent went further and alleged that the applicant was pressing for a shared-parenting schedule in order to reduce his child support obligation. The applicant denies that allegation.

43Both parties included their parenting time proposals in their evidence.

44The applicant proposed a schedule⁸ where, during a two-week period, the child would spend six full days with the applicant and eight full days with the respondent. Each parent would have the child on alternate weekends from Friday at 3 p.m. to Monday at 3 p.m. All exchanges would be at the daycare when it was open; otherwise exchanges were to occur at a neutral public location. The applicant’s proposal places the child in the applicant’s care for 42.9 per cent of the total time, despite the applicant’s claim in his motion for “an equal” shared-parenting schedule.

45The applicant further requested provisions in the parenting order for communications to be through OurFamilyWizard in situations where a parent anticipates being late or is unable to attend. This would include a requirement to provide necessary and pertinent information when the child is ill, including information about any medication the child is taking, such as dosage and when the medication was last administered.

46The respondent’s proposal⁹ for the applicant’s parenting time is stated to be a four-week schedule; however, the first two weeks are the same as the last two weeks. The respondent’s proposal for parenting time for the applicant can be summarized as follows:

a. Week 1 – Tuesday 3 p.m. to Wednesday 3 p.m. and Friday 3 p.m. to Sunday 6 p.m.;

b. Week 2 – Tuesday 3 p.m. to Thursday 3 p.m.; and

c. The respondent’s proposal places the child in the applicant’s care 36.6 per cent of the total time.

(v) Factors (h) and (i)

47The evidence suggests that each parent is able and willing to meet the needs of the child. Regarding each parent’s ability and willingness to communicate on matters affecting the child, the evidence does confirm that the parents have been able, for example, to make parenting arrangements; however, at times, that was preceded by somewhat confrontational and accusatory electronic communications between the parents. The order made below will eliminate the need for the parents to continue to negotiate about the parenting schedule. Necessary communication between the parents can be controlled by court order, including the use of OurFamilyWizard.

48The aforementioned discussion regarding factors (h) and (i) does not consider the presence of any family violence. That issue is discussed below.

(vi) Factor (j) – Family violence

49Family violence is defined in s. 18(1) of the CLRA as follows:

“family violence” means any conduct by a family member towards another family member that is violent or threatening, that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, or that causes the other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person, and, in the case of a child, includes direct or indirect exposure to such conduct;

50Considerations regarding the impact of family violence as set out in s. 24(4):

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

51In Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada noted as untenable, the suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability; and that courts must consider family violence and its impact on the ability and willingness of any person who engages in family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child. The Court stated at paras. 143 and 146 as follows:

[143] The suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability is untenable. Research indicates that children who are exposed to family violence are at risk of emotional and behavioural problems throughout their lives: Department of Justice, Risk Factors for Children in Situations of Family Violence in the Context of Separation and Divorce (February 2014), at p. 12. Harm can result from direct or indirect exposure to domestic conflicts, for example, by observing the incident, experiencing its aftermath, or hearing about it: S. Artz et al., “A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on the Impact of Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence for Children and Youth” (2014), 5 I.J.C.Y.F.S. 493, at p. 497.

[146] The recent amendments to the Divorce Act recognize that findings of family violence are a critical consideration in the best interests analysis: s. 16(3)(j) and (4). The Divorce Act broadly defines family violence in s. 2(1) to include any violent or threatening conduct, ranging from physical abuse to psychological and financial abuse. Courts must consider family violence and its impact on the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child.

52Although Barendregt involved the Divorce Act, the analysis applies similarly to cases involving the CLRA given the similar amendments to the CLRA. The respondent’s evidence relevant to family violence includes:

a. On separation, the applicant threw the respondent and the child out of his home;

b. During their relationship, the applicant routinely and loudly verbally abused the respondent and intimidated her;

c. The applicant hit the respondent’s pillow next to her face;

d. The applicant attempted to control the respondent to do as he wanted. The respondent described their relationship as “toxic”;

e. The respondent described having arguments with the applicant and that the applicant would threaten to come to her door. On one occasion, when the applicant attended against the respondent’s wishes, the respondent deposed that she was afraid of the applicant and “felt forced to comply”;

f. The respondent explained her fear of the applicant coming to her home. She deposed that she was “aware” that during the applicant’s separation from his ex-wife, that the applicant had aggressively banged on his ex-wife’s door when she failed to open it. Consequently, the respondent felt pressured into “agreeing” because of her fear of the applicant making a scene that the neighbours or the child could hear; and,

g. The respondent deposed that on separation, the applicant told her that he was going to financially ruin her.

53The applicant, in reply to the above allegations, denied “vehemently” that the relationship was toxic. The applicant instead complained about the respondent’s refusal to be involved in the lives of his three other children, claiming that the respondent pressured him to choose between his three children, and the respondent and DS. The applicant described this behaviour as “toxic”.

54Although the applicant did a paragraph-by-paragraph reply, he did not dispute, specifically, the respondent’s allegations that he threw the respondent and DS out of his home; and that he had hit the respondent’s pillow next to her face.

55The applicant denied “vehemently” telling the respondent that he was going to financially ruin her.

56Regarding the respondent’s evidence about the applicant’s unwanted attendances at her home, the applicant deposed that he “never once threatened” the applicant to go into her home. As to the respondent’s evidence about her fears based on the applicant’s conduct towards his ex-wife, the applicant characterized that evidence as not being “remotely accurate”, that it “never happened”, and that it was “fiction”.

57Both parties were permitted to file a brief update affidavit subject to court-ordered page limits. The respondent’s update affidavit contains additional complaints regarding the applicant’s aggressive behaviour.

58The respondent deposed that on December 20^th, that the applicant was at her front door from 9:30 a.m. to 9:40 a.m., despite there being no agreement for the applicant to have the child. According to the respondent, the applicant stayed at her front door for over 10 minutes, knocking loudly 11 separate times, and that he called and texted her repeatedly. The child was crying from the noise. The applicant messaged the respondent that he could hear the child and persisted with loud knocking. After the applicant left, the respondent’s neighbour came to check on the respondent because of the disturbance.

59In his update affidavit, the applicant addresses the December 20^th incident. He admits attending at the respondent’s home. He deposes that he attended to exercise parenting time and “to obtain clarity when parenting time was in dispute.” The applicant’s only evidence regarding his behaviour was to deny “any intent to intimidate” the respondent.

60The applicant’s evidence falls far short of denying the detailed and specific conduct described by the respondent. The only evidence that the applicant mustered was to deny any “intent” to intimidate the respondent. This evidence does not constitute a denial of his actual behaviour.

61I am satisfied on the evidence that on December 20, 2025 that the applicant acted aggressively while at the respondent’s door in the manner as described by the respondent, and importantly, that the applicant did so with no regard to the child’s emotional upset resulting from the applicant’s behaviour.

62The respondent recounts an incident that occurred on December 23^rd. The respondent describes the applicant being in a “terrible mood” and she alleges that the applicant “smacked” her hand away when the respondent held out to the applicant a syringe necessary to administer the child’s medication, causing the syringe to fall on the floor. The applicant claimed that he did not need the syringe. When the respondent told him the syringe was required to administer medication, it is the respondent’s evidence that the applicant “ordered” the respondent to pick it up and give it to him.

63In his reply to the above allegation, the applicant “categorically” denies any physical aggression.

64The respondent further alleged in her update affidavit:

a. that on December 24^th, she attended at the applicant’s residence to pick up the child; that she was left waiting at the door for 10 minutes; that when she first knocked, that the applicant started blasting Christmas music to drown her out; that as she left with the child, the applicant “yelled” after them “gotta love these drama free pickups”; and

b. that on December 25^th, when the applicant attended at the respondent’s residence to pick up the child, that he “slammed” his hand over her doorbell camera making it visibly shake.

65The applicant does not address specifically the aforesaid occurrences on December 24^th and December 25^th.

66The respondent raises issues about the aggressive nature of the applicant’s electronic messages, including that the applicant reacted angrily when the respondent’s counsel raised the issue of child support with the applicant’s counsel.

67The applicant has described the parties’ communications as courteous and considerate. I have reviewed the communications appended as exhibits to the parties’ respective affidavits. While some of the communications are appropriate, there are other communications that are accusatory and confrontational.

(vii) Factor (k)

68There is no evidence relating to any civil or criminal proceeding that is relevant to the child’s safety, security and well-being.

(viii) Discussion: what is the parenting order that is in the child’s best interests?

69It is trite to observe that courts routinely are tasked with the obligation to make an interim order on the basis of conflicting affidavit material. This case is no exception. Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, some of the applicant’s evidence raises concerns as to the reliability of his evidence.

70The applicant was forced to retreat from his bald assertion that the respondent and child spent five to six days of the week at his residence, when presented with evidence to the contrary from the respondent. This includes the respondent’s evidence regarding periods of time when there was no contact. There is also the respondent’s evidence that she was not present with DS when the applicant’s three other children were present; the applicant effectively confirmed this evidence given his complaints that the respondent and DS were not present when the applicant’s three other children were with him.

71While the applicant’s parenting time did increase, I do not accept the applicant’s attempts to portray a shared-parenting arrangement since August 2025. For reasons discussed earlier, the applicant’s own calendar schedules do not support his claim of shared parenting. Further, a number of the applicant’s entries in his calculations as to his parenting are challenged by the respondent as overstating the applicant’s actual parenting time.

72The reliability of the applicant’s evidence is called into question, as discussed earlier, when he filed the two affidavits that included calendars summarizing his parenting time, which included calendar entries subsequent to the date that his affidavits were sworn.

73Taking the foregoing into account, and in considering all of the evidentiary record, I find as follows:

a. I am satisfied that prior to the date of separation, on April 19, 2025, that the respondent was the child’s primary caregiver;

b. In reaching that conclusion, I also take into account that the respondent took an 18-month maternity leave to May 2025 plus a further extended maternity leave to July 2, 2025;

c. I do not accept as reliable the applicant’s evidence that the respondent and the child spent five to six days per week at the applicant’s residence. I find the respondent’s evidence to be more reliable as to the times that the respondent and child spent at the applicant’s residence and at the respondent’s parents’ residence;

d. Subsequent to the parties’ separation on April 19, 2025 up to the end of July 2025, I find the child was in the respondent’s primary care; and I find that for the period starting August 2025 until November 16, 2025, that while the applicant’s time with the child increased, that the child continued to be in the respondent’s primary care;

e. While there were no calendar entries filed containing specific parenting-time entries for December 2025 and January 2026, there is evidence that parenting time during that period was similar to the parenting time from August 2025 to November 16, 2025. This also takes into account the respondent’s evidence that on December 23^rd, the applicant accepted the respondent’s proposal for a parenting-time schedule, until January 28, 2026, which the respondent deposes was similar to the respondent’s proposal for a regular parenting-time schedule, discussed earlier in these reasons, which provided for the child to be in the applicant’s care for 36.6 per cent of the total time.

74I turn to the parenting-time schedule that meets the child’s best interests. The evidence regarding the various factors in s. 24(3) has been discussed earlier.

75Family violence includes conduct that is violent or threatening. A number of the occurrences described in the respondent’s evidence constitute aggressive and threatening behaviour by the applicant and constitute family violence. The respondent described being fearful of the applicant.

76For some of the occurrences, as discussed earlier, the applicant either failed to address the occurrence, or he did address the occurrence but failed to contradict the respondent’s specific allegations.

77To the extent that allegations of family violence were denied by the applicant, the court must be mindful of the fact that the allegations, although denied, are being made.

78The court is required to consider the impact of family violence as set out in s. 24(4). To the extent that the applicant’s evidence falls short of disputing specifically his aggressive and threatening behaviour, I find that some of the behaviour was in the presence of the child and caused emotional upset to the child. These incidents occurred usually at the parents’ respective residences. The applicant’s conduct has caused the respondent to be fearful.

79In relation to s. 24(4)(g), there is no evidence that the applicant has taken any steps to address his behaviour, and there is no evidence that the applicant accepts any responsibility for his behaviour.

80As discussed earlier, as noted in Barendregt, supra, any suggestion that family violence has no impact on children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability, is untenable.

81I find that it is in the child’s best interests for the child to be placed in the primary care of the respondent and for the applicant to have parenting time in accordance with the respondent’s proposal discussed earlier but with a minor change to extend the applicant’s parenting time to 6 p.m. Monday if Monday is a statutory holiday.

82I have considered the applicant’s evidence that he had minimal time with the child from the date of separation in April 2025 until August 2025. While the applicant blames the respondent and alleges that she was withholding the child, the evidentiary record on the motion does not contain sufficient information to understand why, or if, this occurred.

83There is the context of the respondent’s evidence regarding the family violence, her expressed fear of the applicant, her allegation that the applicant threw the respondent and the child out of his home, and her allegation, denied by the applicant, that he threatened to ruin her financially when the relationship ended.

84Therefore, a proper and informed finding as to the reasons underpinning the applicant’s lack of parenting time during that period may need to await a trial. However, it is apparent as discussed earlier, that the applicant’s parenting time did increase effective August 2025.

85The order below includes the requirement for the parties to use OurFamilyWizard but with the condition that a separate account shall be set up as there was some evidence from the respondent that the applicant inappropriately wished to use an existing OurFamilyWizard account that he has with his ex-wife.

86The parenting order made below also includes various provisions incidental to a parenting order. This includes the requirement to administer to the child all prescribed medication. Although denied by the applicant, the respondent raised some issues that the applicant had not always administered the child’s medication as prescribed. Finally, the order below allows the parties to implement the cadence of the parenting schedule. This will allow the applicant an opportunity to have the child in his care on the same weekends that he has his other three children. The respondent was agreeable to this.

(ix) Parenting Plan Guide: AFCC-Ontario

87In Tremblay-Chartier, supra, the Divisional Court discussed the parenting plan guide prepared by the Ontario Chapter of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC-O Guidelines) and noted that the motion judge made a finding that the AFCC-O Guidelines “are not law and less applicable in this case” (para. 39).

88The Divisional Court then stated at para. 40:

[40] While the AFCC-O Guidelines are not binding law, Ontario courts have accepted the social science behind the Guidelines when making parenting orders in the best interests of young children: Hatab, at para. 61. If a judge departs from the established and widely accepted social science research, reasons are needed to depart from same. None were given in this case. [My emphasis.]

89In Gjorsovski v. Krajisnik, 2025 ONSC 7220, J. Breithaupt Smith J. discussed, at paras. 16–33, the finding of the Divisional Court that a judge must give reasons for departing from the AFCC-O Guidelines, noting the following:

a. The Divisional Court elevated this useful tool to the level of definitive authority (para. 17);

b. Clarification is needed from the Court of Appeal for Ontario as to whether Tremblay-Chartier changes the import of the Guidelines and sets the Guidelines as a mandatory benchmark in circumstances where the Divisional Court did not require the Guidelines to be argued by counsel before a failure to consider the Guidelines would trigger a reversible error in law (para. 32);

c. The Divisional Court’s statements regarding the Guidelines are obiter dicta, as the Divisional Court had already determined that legal errors had occurred because the motion judge had failed to consider adequately the best interests factors; had failed to address adequately the status quo; and had failed to consider adequately the family violence allegations (para. 31(b)); and

d. In disagreeing with the Divisional Court that the Guidelines should be a mandatory consideration, the court stated at para. 33:

33. With very sincere respect for my distinguished colleagues sitting on the Divisional Court, I disagree that the Guide should be a mandatory consideration, and I decline to apply it to my analysis where counsel have not referred both to its specific content and to the underlying social science upon which a particular recommendation is based. In this matter, both counsel made only vague references to the Guide. Neither undertook any detailed analysis of its applicability; neither took any pains to compare and contrast the parties’ proposed schedules with the portions applicable to a preschooler. No underlying social science principles or scholarly articles were cited. No expert opinion specific to this family was tendered. I thus decline to apply the general contents of the Guide in my analysis of Danilo’s best interests.

90The discussion in Gjorsovski is, respectfully, informative and perceptive.

91In the present case, there was no mention or discussion of the AFCC-O Guidelines whatsoever—either in the evidentiary record or during counsels’ submissions.

92The reality in this case is that the discussion and analysis earlier in these reasons in relation to the best interests factors, subsumed any relevant considerations contained in the Guidelines applicable to a child of DS’s age.

ISSUE – INTERIM CHILD SUPPORT

93The applicant issued his application on May 16, 2025. In their respective pleadings, both parties sought table amount of child support and an order for contribution to s. 7 expenses.

94The applicant’s most recent financial statement sworn December 4, 2025 included copies of his notices of assessment for the last three years, showing line 15000 income as follows:

2022 – $122,006

2023 – $136,696

2024 – $122,749

95In this financial statement, the applicant disclosed his current 2025 annual income at $160,000. That same annual income is used in the final divorce order between the applicant and his ex-wife dated May 29, 2025 quantifying the applicant’s obligation to pay table amount of child support for his three children in the amount of $2,844 per month and also in relation to s. 7 expenses.

96In her initial financial statement filed with her answer, the respondent disclosed no employment or other income. The only money disclosed that was being received was the child tax benefit and GST rebate. The respondent did attach her notices of assessment for the last three years disclosing her line 15000 income as follows:

2022 – $44,566

2023 – $48,520

2024 – $29,439

97The respondent disclosed in her most recent financial statement sworn December 3, 2025 monthly gross income in the amount of $5,033, or an annual equivalent of $60,396 which I round to $60,400.

98As discussed earlier, the respondent’s maternity leave, including the extended maternity leave, ended July 2, 2025. The respondent’s pay statements show her total hours worked and are consistent with the respondent resuming her employment in July 2025. For the purpose of s. 7 expenses, I fix the respondent’s annualized income at $60,400 effective July 1, 2025. For May and June 2025, the respondent had no income and would not be obligated to share in s. 7 expenses.

(i) Interim Child Support – 2025

99In her motion, the respondent seeks table amount of child support commencing November 1, 2025.

100In his motion, the applicant seeks an order requiring him to pay table set-off child support commencing December 1, 2025. He also seeks an order that the parties share in the child’s s. 7 expenses proportionate to their incomes. The applicant does not specify a start date for the s. 7 expenses.

101The only identified s. 7 expense is the child’s monthly daycare expense. The applicant had agreed to be responsible for the monthly daycare expenses. Pursuant to an exhibit containing various electronic communications between the parties, and between the applicant and the daycare centre,¹⁰ it is apparent that the child commenced daycare in early May 2025, but that the respondent paid the daycare expense for the month of May 2025.

102In the expense portions of their respective most recent financial statements, the respondent discloses a monthly childcare expense of $446 per month, and the applicant discloses a monthly childcare expense of $440 per month.

103The evidentiary record discloses that when the respondent brought her motion for interim child support, initially returnable November 26, 2025, that the applicant had made no payments to the respondent for child support. The respondent’s material also shows that her counsel made multiple unsuccessful efforts to schedule an early case conference date. Out of frustration, the respondent then brought her motion for interim child support and sought leave to have that motion heard prior to a case conference on an urgent basis.

104The applicant explains that he instructed his counsel not to respond to the respondent’s counsel for the time being because he and the respondent were having discussions attempting to resolve the parenting-time schedule. I find this explanation to be disingenuous.

105First, from the date of separation in April 2025 until the end of July 2025, the child spent minimal time with the applicant and it was abundantly clear that the applicant would be obligated to pay the full table amount of child support for that period of time. Instead, the applicant paid nothing.

106Second, for the period starting August 2025, during which the applicant believed there was a shared-parenting arrangement, the applicant deposed that he should be paying the table set-off amount. However, the applicant paid nothing.

107In Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed, at para. 36, that in the Guidelines era, that the payor parent is always under a free-standing legal obligation independent of any court order to pay child support commensurate with income. This is what the applicant failed to do.

108The fact that the applicant was paying the s. 7 daycare expense does not excuse his failure to pay child support voluntarily. The applicant could have approximated the respondent’s share of daycare expenses proportionate to incomes, and deducted that amount from any voluntary child support payment.

109Instead, the picture that emerges is that the applicant was withholding voluntary child support payments as leverage for his ongoing requests for a shared-parenting schedule.

110Hassan J., in her endorsement dated November 26, 2025, found that the applicant’s “complete lack of payment of child support makes that issue urgent”. The endorsement did note that the applicant has paid some s. 7 expenses. Both motions were adjourned to a case conference set for December 9, 2025, and pending the adjournment, the applicant was ordered to make a one-time payment of $1,600 directly to the respondent by December 1, 2025, said amount to be credited against any child support found to be owing by the applicant.

111On December 9, 2025, Hassan J. adjourned both motions to January 28, 2026, and pending the adjournment, ordered the applicant, on an interim interim without prejudice basis, to pay child support in the amount of $700 per month. It is noted that this amount would have approximated the table set-off amount.

112I agree with the applicant’s request to deal with s. 7 expenses. I will do so back to May 2025, being the month following the date of separation.

113For May and June 2025, the applicant shall pay the full amount as the respondent had no income. Starting July 2025 until December 2025, the daycare expense shall be shared proportionate to the parties’ annualized incomes—$160,000 for the applicant and $60,400 for the respondent.

114The order below uses a monthly daycare expense of $440 as indicated in the applicant’s financial statement. Neither party provided any evidence as to available tax credits or deductions; therefore, the order below apportions the full cost of the daycare expense.

115There was no evidence of any other s. 7 expense. Schedule C to the respondent’s most recent financial statement (said schedule summarizing special or extraordinary expenses for the child) listed only the daycare expense. The applicant’s most recent financial statement did not include a Schedule C. Accordingly, the only s. 7 expense dealt with in the order below is the daycare expense.

116Although the respondent’s motion requested interim child support to commence November 1, 2025, and the applicant’s motion requested interim child support to commence December 1, 2025, it is noted that both motions included a request for such further and other relief as the court deems just.

117There is no excuse for the applicant’s failure to pay child support since the date of separation. Further, the s. 7 order is being made effective May 2025.

118Accordingly, the order below requires the applicant to pay the table amount of child support pursuant to s. 3(1)(a) of the Ontario child support guidelines based on an income of $160,000 from May to December 2025. Although the applicant’s income exceeds $150,000, which engages s. 4 of the guidelines, the amount by which his income exceeds $150,000 is marginal, and in the circumstances, I find pursuant to s. 4(a) of the guidelines, that it is appropriate to determine child support under s. 3.

119This is not a proper circumstance to defer the payment of any accumulated child support arrears because the applicant made a deliberate decision not to make child support payments while earning an income of $160,000.

(ii) Payment of interim child support commencing January 1, 2026

120As noted earlier, both parties were given permission to file an update affidavit. The filing deadline was January 30, 2026. That deadline was contained in my order dated January 28, 2026, where both parties’ previously-filed update affidavits were struck because of excessive exhibits.

121The applicant’s affidavit was served 11:14 a.m. on January 30, 2026, which was shortly after the respondent’s affidavit was served, that same day at 10:50 a.m. The foregoing is based on the certificates of service signed by counsel and filed in Case Center.

122In his update affidavit, the applicant deposes that he is in receipt of employment insurance income of $37,895. He attaches no proof of employment insurance income. The applicant further deposes that his employment ended on January 8, 2026 due to a “position elimination/layoff”. The applicant deposes he notified the respondent of this change.

123The applicant attaches a letter from his employer dated January 8, 2026 that states his employment will terminate effective immediately on January 8, 2026 due to the abolishment of the applicant’s position. The letter refers to the employer providing the applicant “with the following severance package” which is then listed; however, the severance package only mentions paying the applicant any unpaid salary owing to the date of termination; plus any accrued and unpaid vacation pay to the end of the “Statutory Notice Period (as defined below)”. There is nothing in the letter defining the “statutory notice period”. The letter reads as if a portion of the letter is missing.

124The service of the applicant’s update affidavit occurred after the service of the respondent’s update affidavit. This resulted in the respondent being unable to respond to the applicant’s evidence that he was now unemployed.

125Further, the applicant’s affidavit is bereft of any information as to what efforts he has made to find further employment; whether he has had any interviews; whether he has any imminent prospects of employment; or whether his former employer is providing assistance, financial or otherwise, for the applicant to obtain alternate employment.

126The applicant fails to provide any evidence as to his education or what his occupation is. When this was mentioned by the court during argument, the applicant’s counsel advised the court, without objection from the respondent, that the applicant is an electrical engineering technologist.

127Also, the applicant should have, and failed, to serve and file immediately after January 8, 2026 an updated financial statement as a consequence of the material change in income. The applicant also has not provided his record of employment.

128There is no evidence from the applicant as to how long he was employed with his most recent employer. As mentioned earlier, the applicant deposed that in the past he was temporarily unemployed for five months.

129The respondent complained about the timing of the applicant’s disclosure and requested that child support be payable based on the applicant’s income disclosed in his most recent financial statement.

130The applicant proposed in his update affidavit to pay child support in the table amount of $310.95 (based on his EI income of $37,895). The applicant also requested that the child’s s. 7 daycare expenses be apportioned using the cost of $478.50 per month, which is the amount that was paid for January 2026.

131Given the lateness of the applicant’s disclosure, and considering the dearth of any evidence from the applicant as to his employability and his likelihood of finding employment, and considering the lack of an updated financial statement, and having regard to the applicant’s past earning history since 2022, I find that the applicant’s income should be imputed to $80,000 (which is 50 per cent of his 2025 income) for a period of five months from January to May 2026; and thereafter, the applicant’s income should be imputed to the average of his income for the past three years, which I round to $140,000.¹¹

132The foregoing history supports the imputation of income in the amounts noted, and the imputation of income is “grounded in the evidence” as required in Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 41868 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 44.

133The order below also includes an ongoing financial disclosure obligation on behalf of the applicant that includes evidence regarding his attempts to find employment. The order below also provides that the child support order for both the table amount and s. 7 expenses for the period commencing January 1, 2026 is on an interim without prejudice basis subject to either party’s right to vary the child support order by way of further motion.

134The s. 7 daycare expense shall be shared in proportion to the parties’ incomes using the monthly amount of $478.50.

ORDER

135I make the following interim order pursuant to the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Family Law Act:

1. The child’s primary place of residence shall be with the respondent.

2. The applicant shall have parenting time with the child in accordance with the following schedule set out in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and subject to the following terms and conditions:

a) Week 1 – Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. to Wednesday at 3:00 p.m., and Friday at 3:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. to be extended to Monday at 6:00 p.m. if Monday is a statutory holiday;

b) Week 2 – Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. to Thursday at 3:00 p.m.;

c) If the parties fail to agree as to the sequence that Week 1 and Week 2 shall be implemented, then the date of this order shall be deemed to be in Week 1;

d) The applicant shall have such other parenting time as may be agreed to by the parties in writing;

e) All parenting exchanges shall occur at the child’s daycare when the daycare is open; if the daycare is not open, then the exchanges shall occur at the residences of the parties as follows:

i. The party who is receiving the child shall attend at the other party’s residence to pick up the child;

ii. The party who has the child shall have the child ready for pickup, and the parenting exchange shall occur promptly when the other party arrives to pick up the child;

iii. There shall be minimum communication between the parties during the exchange, with any communication to be polite and respectful, and limited only to any necessary information regarding the child that needs to be shared;

iv. Each party is at liberty to have another adult person present at the parenting exchange, on the condition that the adult person maintains a distance of at least 2 metres from the point of exchange and does not engage in any communication with anyone present at the exchange;

v. At all times during the parenting exchange, both parties shall exhibit polite behaviour and shall refrain from any threatening or aggressive behaviour;

vi. There shall be no electronic or other recording of the parenting exchange, whether by video or audio, by the parties or by anyone else; and

vii. If a conflict occurs at any parenting exchange, which the parties are unable to address or resolve through communications between counsel, then either party is at liberty to bring a motion to request that parenting exchanges (other than the exchanges at the child’s daycare) shall occur at specific locations(s) in the community, or that the parenting exchanges shall be supervised.

3. Except in the case of an emergency, or except at parenting exchanges as provided in this order, all communication between the parties shall be in writing via the parenting application “OurFamilyWizard” (OFW) as follows:

a) The cost of OFW shall be shared equally by the parties;

b) The OFW account shall be a stand-alone account created solely for the parties, and no other person may participate in the OFW account, or have access to the OFW account, except as agreed in writing by the parties;

c) All communication through OFW shall be polite and respectful, and shall be brief and limited only to exchanging necessary information relating to the child; and

d) Where the child is ill the parties shall share all relevant information regarding the child’s illness, including full details as to prescribed medication and the dosage, and the details as to the medication administered by each party.

4. The following additional provisions shall apply:

a) The parties shall remain flexible and child-focused in rescheduling parenting time in the child’s best interests to accommodate any emergencies, special family events, or special activities involving the child. Where a party has missed parenting time as a result of rescheduling, then that party shall be provided with make-up parenting time where it is practicable to do so; and

b) Each party, while the child is in his or her care, shall administer to the child the proper dosage for all medication prescribed by the child’s physician.

5. For the period commencing May 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025, the applicant shall pay to the respondent for the support of the child the following amounts based on the applicant’s income of $160,000 pursuant to s. 3(1)(a) of the Ontario child support guidelines:

a) On the first day of each month for the period May 1, 2025 to September 30, 2025 the sum of $1,371 per month; and

b) On the first day of each month for the period commencing October 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025, the sum of $1,403 per month.

6. For the period May 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025, the child’s monthly daycare expense of $440 shall be shared as follows:

a) The applicant shall be solely responsible for this expense for May and June 2025;

b) For the months of July to December 2025, inclusive, the applicant shall be responsible for 72.6% of the expense, and the respondent shall be responsible for 27.4% of the expense, based on the applicant’s income of $160,000 and the respondent’s income of $60,400; and

c) Each party shall be credited with the daycare expense actually paid by that party, and the parties shall agree in calculating any amount owing by one party to the other, failing which a motion may be brought.

7. Commencing January 1, 2026, the applicant shall pay to the respondent for the support of the child, the following amounts on the first day of each month pursuant to s. 3(1)(a) of the Ontario child support guidelines:

a) Commencing January 1, 2026, the sum of $743 per month based on an imputed income of $80,000: and

b) Commencing June 1 2026, and continuing monthly thereafter, the sum of $1,249 per month based on an imputed income of $140,000.

8. For the period commencing January 1, 2026, the child’s monthly daycare expense of $478.50 shall be shared as follows by the parties:

a) For the months of January to May 2026, inclusive, the applicant shall be responsible for 57% of the expense and the respondent shall be responsible for 43% of the expense, based on the applicant’s imputed income of $80,000 and the respondent’s income of $60,400;

b) Commencing the month of June 2026, and for each month thereafter, the applicant shall be responsible for 69.9% of the expense, and the respondent shall be responsible for 30.1% of the expense, based on the applicant’s imputed income of $140,000 and the respondent’s income of $60,400; and

c) Each party shall be credited with the daycare expense actually paid by that party, and the parties shall agree in calculating any amount owing by one party to the other, failing which a motion may be brought.

9. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of this order are made on an interim without prejudice basis subject to the following conditions:

a) Until the applicant obtains employment, the applicant shall provide to the respondent by the 15^th day and 30^th day of each month, full details as to all attempts to obtain employment, including a copy of his resume, a summary of all interviews and a list of all prospective employers to whom the applicant has applied;

b) Within 14 days the applicant shall serve and file an up-to-date financial statement which shall have appended to it his record of employment from his last employer and verification of any employment insurance income received;

c) The applicant shall provide full details immediately as to any changes in his employment status, including full details as to any employment income;

d) If the applicant claims that he has been unable to find employment then the applicant is at liberty to bring a motion on or after May 1, 2025 to vary paragraphs 7 and 8 of this order;

e) If the respondent claims that higher income should be imputed to the applicant, then the respondent is at liberty to bring a motion on or after May 1, 2026 to vary paragraphs 7 and 8 of this order; and

f) If there is any change in the applicant’s employment status, and if the parties are unable to agree on an order for child support and s.7 expenses, then either party is at liberty to bring a motion to vary paragraphs 7 and 8 of this order.

10. All payments made by the applicant pursuant to the two orders of Hassan J. dated November 26, 2025 and December 9, 2025, shall be credited towards the applicant’s child support obligations contained in paras. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this order.

11. The parties may make written costs submissions regarding the costs of the motions. The costs submissions shall be filed via the portal in the usual manner and shall be limited to three typed pages (two typed pages for reply), minimum font 12 and double-spaced plus copies of any time dockets, bills of costs and offers to settle. The respondent’s costs submissions shall be served and filed within 14 days of the date of this order; the applicant’s responding costs submissions shall be served and filed within 14 days thereafter; and the respondent’s reply, if any, shall be served and filed within 7 days thereafter. Any reference to authorities shall be by hyperlink in the costs submissions.

“Justice Victor Mitrow”

Justice Victor Mitrow

Date: March 5, 2026

Week A (a) Applicant: Thursday 3 p.m. to Friday 3 p.m. (b) Respondent: Friday 3 p.m. to Monday 3 p.m. (c) Applicant: Monday 3 p.m. to Wednesday 3 p.m. Week B (a) Respondent: Wednesday 3 p.m. to Friday 3 p.m. (b) Applicant: Friday 3 p.m. to Monday 3 p.m. (c) Respondent: Monday 3 p.m. to Thursday 3 p.m.

Footnotes

1. 1Applicant’s affidavit sworn November 14, 2025 at para. 12 (Case Center – Applicant Document #15).
2. 2Exhibit F to the applicant’s affidavit sworn November 14, 2025 (Case Center – Applicant Document #15).
3. 3The applicant’s affidavit and exhibit were sworn November 14, 2025. However, the applicant’s calendar for his parenting time for November included entries for parenting time on November 15 and November 16, 2025.
4. 4See respondent’s affidavit sworn November 21, 2025 (Case Center – Respondent Document #3) – Exhibit D (respondent’s comments regarding applicant’s calendar). The applicant’s calendar for November 15 stated that the child was with the applicant all day. The respondent’s evidence is the child was with the applicant that day until 7:30 p.m. For November 16^th, the applicant’s calendar indicated that the child was with the applicant that day until 9 a.m. The respondent’s evidence is that the child was not in the applicant’s care at all on that day.
5. 5Respondent’s affidavit sworn November 21, 2025, para. 27 (Case Center – Respondent Document #3). The respondent’s calculations show that the applicant’s parenting time was 2.18 per cent or less for the period April to July 2025. For August, September, and October 2025, the respondent’s parenting time was, respectively, 34 per cent, 34 per cent and 37.7 per cent; and for November up to November 16^th, it was 49.86 per cent. The average for August to October was 35.23 per cent, and the average for August to November 16^th was 38.89 per cent.
6. 6Ibid, footnote 4.
7. 7Applicant’s affidavit sworn November 24, 2025, Exhibit A (Case Center – Applicant Document #17).
8. 8Applicant’s affidavit sworn January 29, 2026, paras. 11–12 (Case Center – Applicant Document #38). The schedule proposed was:
9. 9Respondent’s affidavit sworn November 21, 2025, Exhibit E (Respondent’s proposed interim parenting-time schedule) – Case Center Respondent Document #30.
10. 10Respondent’s affidavit sworn November 21, 2025, Exhibit C (texts and emails regarding the child’s daycare fees) –Case Center Respondent Document #30.
11. 11Applicant’s income for 2023, 2024 and 2025 was $136,696, $122,749 and $160,000, respectively. The average is $139,815, rounded to $140,000.