Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-549661 DATE: 20190912

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC. Plaintiff

– and –

PATRICIA MARCHE (also known as Patricia Kerr and Patricia Marche-Kerr), 1261140 Ontario Inc. and Susan Worsley Defendants

COUNSEL: L. Lung and E. Fan, for the Plaintiff B. Illion, for the Defendants Patricia Marche and 1261140 Ontario Inc. A. Van Kralingen and K. Chau, for the Defendant, Susan Worsley

HEARD: July 15 and September 9, 2019

Reasons for Decision

LEIPER J.

Introduction

[1] The defendants, Patricia Marche (Marche) and 1261140 Ontario Inc. (126) bring an application to set aside a default judgment made on December 11, 2017.

[2] For the reasons that follow, the motion to set aside the default judgment is dismissed. Marche and 126 have failed to show that there is a reasonable explanation for the default or that they have an arguable defence to the claim.

Background Facts and Preliminary Evidentiary Issues

[3] 126 was an Ontario corporation which carried on business as “Ontario Wireless.” Marche was the sole shareholder and director of 126. 126 had a dealer agreement with TELUS Communications Inc. (TELUS) based in Mississauga, Ontario.

[4] In 2010 TELUS terminated its agreement with 126.

[5] Between January 2014 and February 2016 Marche incurred thousands of dollars’ worth of courier costs to ship dog food and other animal care items to animal rescue shelters. The charges were made on the TELUS account that had been in use by 126 during its dealership contract with TELUS. At Marche’s direction, the defendant Susan Worsley (Worsley) also made shipments using the TELUS shipping account. Worsley believed the use of the account was authorized.

[6] On January 14, 2016, a TELUS employee contacted Marche to question her about the use of the shipping account. Marche said that she had been using the shipping account as part of a “pay it forward” program between TELUS and the Ontario Science Centre. This was not true.

[7] TELUS disabled the on-line shipping account on January 15, 2016.

[8] On February 17, 2016 Marche used manual waybills to make further shipments on the TELUS account at shipping service centres in Toronto. She filled in the forms with initials that were not hers and used a different address than the addresses she had used on the electronic waybills. Marche’s attendances at the shipping centres were captured by CCTV cameras. Worsley later identified Marche as the person depicted in the CCTV footage.

[9] The correspondence between Marche and TELUS leading to the termination of 126 was included with the cross-examination transcript brief filed on this motion. Marche refused to answer several questions about the termination. Marche objected to the filing of the communications concerning the termination of 126 by TELUS, on the grounds that it would amount to evidence of bad character.

[10] Following argument, I permitted the 2010 termination documents to remain in the record for the limited purpose of considering whether there was an air of reality to one of the defences Marche wishes to advance: that Marche was authorized by TELUS to use the shipping account for charitable purposes after her dealership agreement was terminated. The correspondence was silent as to any such charitable program or any authorization provided to Marche by TELUS.

TELUS Commences a Claim, The Claims are Served and Statements of Defence are Filed

[11] On March 30, 2016, TELUS brought an action against Marche, 126 and Worsley for the unauthorized shipping charges. Attempts at personal service were unsuccessful on Marche, 126 and Worsley. On May 17, 2016, TELUS obtained an order for substituted service.

[12] Text messages between Worsley and Marche on April 1, 2016 reveal that Marche asked Worsley (who was a tenant in her house at the time) to return any envelopes arriving at the house and to block any emails from TELUS’s law firm. Marche also told Worsley that she (Worsley) was not being sued. This was not true.

[13] Marche asserted litigation privilege over the messages between Marche and Worsley on the basis that they shared a common interest. Worsley argued that although there was some common interest at the outset of the litigation, this did not last. Marche filed an affidavit which denied she tried to evade service of the claim. In cross-examining Worsley, counsel for Marche asked about the communications. Worsley argues that Marche waived any claim of privilege and put her intentions around service in issue. Finally, Worsley argues that a fair reading of the messages reveals that Marche was counselling Worsley to assist her in evading service. As a result, there is no policy reason to extend the protection of litigation privilege to those communications.

[14] Marche and 126 referred to the leading case on litigation privilege Blank v. Canada (Department of Justice), 2006 SCC 39. Blank describes the nature of litigation privilege – to protect communications between solicitors and third parties, or litigants and third parties to prepare contending positions in private without adversarial interference (paras. 27 and 28). Litigation privilege facilitates investigation and preparation for trial with the objective of protecting the adversarial process. As noted by Worsley in her factum, none of these communications discussed the substance of the TELUS action, the co-ordination of a defence or the seeking of information to advance a defence to the action. I agree with Worsley’s position that these communications ought not to attract the protection of litigation privilege because they are limited to discussions about avoiding service of the claim by TELUS.

[15] If I am incorrect, I agree that when Marche referred to these communications in her materials and asked questions about them during the examination of Worsley, she waived any privilege in the text messages. As a matter of fairness and consistency, they should be allowed to remain in the record: S & K Processors Ltd. v. Campbell Avenue Herring Producers Ltd. 45 BCCR 218 at para. 6.

[16] These communications did not play a decisive role in the analysis of the test for setting aside default judgment, but they are relevant to understanding Marche’s attitude toward the litigation.

[17] After substituted service took place, Marche and 126 delivered a statement of defence. Worsley delivered a statement of defence and cross-claim against Marche.

[18] Marche and 126 did not take active steps in defending the claim. The defence was pro forma in nature. Counsel delivered a pro forma request for particulars. Marche and 126 did not deliver an affidavit of documents.

Counsel to Marche and 126 Asks to be Removed from the Record

[19] On May 25, 2017, counsel for Marche and 126 brought a motion to be removed from the record due to an inability to obtain instructions from his clients. Master Short granted the order and made provisions for service by email and to Marche’s residence and post office box number in Bolton Ontario. Former counsel to Marche sent her a copy of the order by email and mail on May 25, 2017.

[20] The order removing counsel from the record provided that if 1261140 did not, within 30 days of being served, appoint a new lawyer, or obtain leave to be represented by a person who is not a lawyer, the Court could strike out its defence.

[21] The order also provided that if Marche did not, within 30 days of being served, appoint a new lawyer or serve a notice of intention to act in person, the Court could strike out her defence.

[22] On June 2, 2017, the order was delivered by email to Marche and 126 in accordance with its terms concerning service. Marche conceded that she received the order and was aware of the steps required by the order.

[23] On July 12, 2017, counsel for TELUS sent another copy of the order to Marche and 126. Counsel wrote in the cover letter:

More than 30 days have passed and to our knowledge, you have not taken the steps set out in paragraph 5 of the order. If you have not complied with paragraph 5 of the order by July 22, 2017, our instructions are to bring a motion to have your defence struck out.

The letter was sent to Marche’s email and other addresses provided for in the order. Marche acknowledged that she received this letter.

[24] Marche and 126 did not take the steps required by Master Short’s order.

Worsley’s Motions to Strike and for Judgment

[25] On August 11, 2017, Worsley’s counsel served a motion record for a motion to strike Marche and 126’s statement of defence. The materials were sent to the email address and home address. The emailed material was not returned. Marche and 126 filed no responding materials.

[26] On September 1, 2017, Master Short granted Worsley’s motion. Marche and 126’s statement of defence was struck. Costs were awarded in favour of Worsley on the motion.

[27] On September 21, 2017, Marche and 126 were noted in default with respect to Worsley’s cross-claim.

[28] On September 22, 2017, Worsley’s counsel served a notice of motion for default judgment on Marche and 126 at the addresses as before. The emailed material was not returned. Marche and 126 filed no responding material or took any steps to contact counsel.

[29] On November 10, 2017, Worsley’s counsel served Marche and 126 with the motion record for default judgment by email and regular mail to her residential address. The email was not returned.

[30] On November 20, 2017, Worsley’s counsel served Marche and 126 with the factum and book of authorities for the motion for default judgment. This email bounced back. The notice described it as suspected “spam.”

[31] On November 21, 2017, Worsley’s counsel sent hard copies of the factum and book of authorities by courier to the front door of Marche’s residence.

[32] On December 11, 2017, Justice Diamond made an order for contribution and indemnity as against Marche and 126 for any damages ordered against Worsley in favour of TELUS and costs of $20,000.00.

TELUS’s Motions to Strike and for Default Judgment

[33] TELUS brought a motion to strike Marche and 126’s defence returnable September 1, 2017 at the same time as the Worsley motion to strike.

[33] Counsel for TELUS delivered its motion record by email and regular mail to Marche and 126. The motion record was not returned.

[34] On September 1, 2017, Master Short granted TELUS’s motion and struck the Marche and 126 pleading without leave to amend. Marche and 126 were ordered to pay costs to TELUS.

[35] On November 24, 2017, TELUS counsel served a motion record, factum and book of authorities on Marche and 126 by mail to the Marche residence.

[36] On November 27, 2017, the TELUS motion record, factum and book of authorities were also delivered by email. For the first time since using the Marche email address for service, counsel’s email bounced back from Marche.

[37] Counsel for TELUS advised Justice Diamond on the return of the motion for default judgment that it had sent motion materials to Marche and 126 by email and regular mail, and the email has been returned as undeliverable. TELUS also advised that it had reached an agreement with Worsley that it would hold the action against her in abeyance and consent to a dismissal of the action against Worsley on a without costs basis, conditional on TELUS recovering judgment from Marche and/or 126.

[38] Justice Diamond gave default judgment against Marche and 126 in favour of TELUS in the amount of $544,008.36, prejudgment interest of $7,404.47 and costs of $10,000. Justice Diamond made a declaration that the judgment was a debt resulting from the obtaining of services by false pretences.

TELUS Garnishes the Marche and 126 Bank Accounts

[39] On January 22, 2018, TELUS issued six notices of garnishment to three branches of the Toronto-Dominion Bank in Brampton, Bolton and Toronto. By early February 2018, a total of $38, 756.43 was garnished from Marche and 126’s various TD bank accounts.

[40] Also, on January 22, 2018, former counsel to Marche and 126 sent a letter apparently responding to a request from Marche for an accounting and return of trust funds. Former counsel’s letter was filed by Marche. It said among other things, that on April 12, 2017, counsel had warned Marche that “if your documents are not produced, TELUS will almost certainly bring a motion to strike your defence.”

[41] Garnishment payment notices and garnishee’s statements were copied to counsel for TELUS and to Marche/126 according to the notations on those records made by the bank. Marche did not deny receiving the notices of garnishment.

Marche/126 Mail Begins to be Returned to TELUS’s Counsel

[42] Beginning in late February of 2018, and after the bank accounts had been garnished, counsel for TELUS began to receive returns of its correspondence to Marche dating back to 2017, marked variously, “address incomplete” or “no such address.”

TELUS Takes Further Steps to Enforce Its Judgment Against Marche/126

[43] On December 12, 2017, TELUS obtained a writ of seizure and sale in this action. The Sheriff for Peel sent letters to Marche and posted notice of the sale of Marche’s residence in a local newspaper. An auction was scheduled for October 25, 2018.

[44] Five days prior to the date of the auction to sell the Marche residence, Marche and 126 retained counsel to have the default judgment set aside. A collateral mortgage in favour of TELUS was granted to protect its interest in the litigation and the auction was postponed pending a decision on this motion.

Positions of the Parties

[45] Marche and 126 state that the parties failed to properly serve the default judgment motion materials to her Bolton mail box address and that she never received any of the motion materials. Further, on becoming aware of the pending sale of the residence, Marche and 126 acted promptly. The delays prior to the default judgment motion were explained by Marche’s difficulty in attending to her responsibilities due to the death of her husband in April of 2013 and an alleged sexual assault on July 29, 2017.

[46] Marche also argued that her first lawyer was removed from the record in a hasty way, leaving her vulnerable to default proceedings. This assertion was not supported by the record of correspondence between Marche and her first lawyer.

[47] Marche did not deny using the TELUS shipping account to make the shipments to the animal rescue agencies. She asserted that she was authorized to do so as part of a charitable program by TELUS. Although there is no mention of such a program in the termination documents, and the named employees from TELUS who Marche identified as the source of her authority denied the existence of any such program, Marche argues that this is a credibility issue for trial.

[48] Marche argues in the alternative that TELUS did not terminate her shipping privileges, nor did it challenge any of the payments for years, as it was entitled to under the terms of its contract with the shipper.

[49] TELUS and Worsley submit that Marche and 126 had notice of many steps in the proceedings, including the claim, the order removing their counsel from the record, correspondence of an intention to strike the defence, the motion to strike, the motion for default judgment and the notices of garnishment. The parties submit that there is evidence from which an adverse inference can be drawn that Marche was deliberately returning correspondence to avoid dealing with the litigation.

[50] TELUS and Worsley allege that the delayed return of mail relating to the litigation represented Marche’s attempts to avoid service or to claim improper service, consistent with her earlier attempts to avoid receiving the claim at the start of the litigation.

[51] TELUS and Worsley submit that there is no air of reality to any of Marche and 126’s defences: they compare the use of the shipping account to an employee using an employer credit card for personal purchases. They argue that Marche made fraudulent representations by placing orders to ship material, knowing TELUS would pay and by falsely representing to the shipper that she had authority to place the orders. TELUS rebuts Marche’s claim of authority to use the shipping account with affidavits from the employees identified by Marche as her sources of permission. TELUS submits that it is completely implausible that it would spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on a “pay it forward” program with a former dealer, years following termination of the dealer agreement.

Analysis: Should the Default Judgment Against Marche and 126 be Set Aside?

[52] Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

19.08(1) A judgment against a defendant who has been noted in default that is signed by the registrar or granted by the court on motion under rule 19.04 may be set aside or varied by the court on such terms as are just.

(2) A judgment against a defendant who has been noted in default that is obtained on a motion for judgment on the statement of claim under rule 19.05 or that is obtained after trial may be set aside or varied by a judge on such terms as are just.

(3) On setting aside a judgment under subrule (1) or (2) the court or judge may also set aside the noting of default under rule 19.03.

[53] The parties agree that the factors to be applied on a motion to set aside a default judgment are found in Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 48 and 49:

(a) whether the motion was brought promptly after the defendant learned of the default judgment;

(b) whether there is a plausible excuse or explanation for the defendant’s default in complying with the Rules;

(c) whether the facts establish that the defendant has an arguable defence on the merits;

(d) the potential prejudice to the moving party should the motion be dismissed, and the potential prejudice to the respondent should the motion be allowed; and

(e) the effect of any order the court might make on the overall integrity of the administration of justice.

These five factors are not rigid rules. They guide the analysis considering the unique circumstances of each case. I will discuss each factor in turn with reference to the facts of this case.

Factor 1-Was the Motion Brought Without Delay?

[54] Marche argues there was no delay in bringing this motion: it was brought swiftly by Marche when she learned of the pending auction to sell her house. She states that the TELUS motion record for the motion to strike and the TELUS default motion materials were returned to sender.

[55] The time frame identified in Mountain View Farms begins from the time the defendant learns of the default judgment, and not from the point at which a defendant becomes aware that enforcement proceedings are imminent.

[56] Here, Marche says she did not receive notice of the default judgment proceeding. Yet, there is evidence that Marche and 126 received the following:

i) notice of TELUS’s intention to strike the defence in July of 2017;

ii) the Worsley motion for noting in default returnable on September 1, 2017;

iii) motion materials from Worsley for the default judgment motion returnable on December 11, 2017;

iv) notices of garnishment in early February of 2018.

In addition, TELUS materials that were delivered by mail were the subject of late returns. Given the efforts of the parties to make service, the evidence of email delivery that was sent and not returned, and the history of returning mail unopened, I infer that Marche received these notices and materials, but chose to either ignore them, not read them and/or to return mail unopened so that she could say that she did not receive the correspondence. I find as a fact that Marche attempted to shield herself from having actual knowledge of the details of the default proceedings in an attempt to avoid having to respond.

[57] Unlike many other matters where there may be concern that a plaintiff received a statement of claim (for example, Casa Manila Inc. v. Iannvailli, 2018 ONSC 7083 at para. 13-14), here no such concern exists. Marche and 126 had retained counsel and filed defences.

[58] I conclude that Marche and 126 had notice of the default proceedings prior to the motion and were aware that default judgment was being sought on December 11, 2017. The notices of garnishment reinforced the fact that the judgment was being enforced.

[59] Marche and 126 took no action until five days prior to the auction to sell the Marche residence in October of 2018. Marche was able to retain and instruct counsel in a period of time when she was also appearing as a witness in an unrelated criminal matter.

[60] I conclude that by waiting until October of 2018 to act, Marche and 126 did not bring the motion to set aside the default judgment promptly.

Factor 2-Is There a Plausible Excuse or Explanation for Marche and 126’s Default in Complying with the Rules?

[61] The litigation in this matter began in 2016. Unlike many cases of default judgment, Marche and 126 retained counsel to act for them and filed a defence. This ended when counsel could not obtain instructions and was removed from the record. Marche and 126 were required to take steps in accordance with the order of Master Short of May 25, 2017. They did not do so, and this led to the noting in default and the default judgment.

[62] Marche has stated that she was having difficulties arising from the death of her husband in 2013, and a sexual assault in the summer of 2017. In the period leading up to the motion for summary judgment, the evidence shows that she participated in other activities, including instructing counsel in estate litigation with her husband’s parents and entering into minutes of settlement on August 30, 2017.

[63] During cross-examination of Marche, counsel refused to allow her to answer a question about the estate litigation, including this question, “Is it fair to say that there was nothing stopping you from dealing with this particular litigation during the summer of 2017?”

[64] Marche has said that in the aftermath of her husband’s death in 2013, she experienced periods of intense grief where she became “reclusive and hides from the world.” In her cross-examination, Marche agreed that her other activities at the time of the TELUS litigation included working part time as a travel agent, taking flying lessons at the Brampton Flying School and driving a motorcycle. This period also included the shipping activity and instructing her tenant, Worsley on how to make such shipments. While such activities are not inconsistent with periods of grief, this is evidence on which I rely to conclude that Marche was not incapacitated for months at a time from any activity. Yet, her failure to respond to her counsel and to the parties to the TELUS litigation spanned over a year.

[65] During the submissions on this factor, counsel for Marche pointed to the fact that TELUS filed the transcript of the sexual assault trial in which Marche was a complainant. Counsel submitted that this was improper and irrelevant material. TELUS submitted that because Marche raised the issue of sexual assault to explain her inability to respond to the TELUS litigation, it was obliged to respond to establish the factual background in response to that explanation. The transcript was of marginal relevance beyond establishing the timing of Marche’s evidence at a criminal trial and the date that the matter was resolved. The transcripts are marked subject to a publication ban by Schwarzl, J. and they continue to be subject to that order. I decline to make any further orders relative to the transcripts. I gave them little weight, but I am not prepared to conclude there was any impropriety or irregularity in their being filed.

[66] It is understandable that a defendant in Marche’s shoes might feel overwhelmed by multiple pieces of litigation such as Marche faced during the summer of 2017. The criminal trial at which she was a witness, was taking place at the time of the pending sale of her property. The last day of the trial was October 25, 2018, the date scheduled for the sale. Yet, Marche chose which tasks and litigation in which she would participate. She appears to have addressed the TELUS litigation by ignoring correspondence, blocking emails and returning materials to sender to avoid dealing with the matter until it became clear she could lose her house. In balancing all the evidence relating to this factor, I am not able to conclude that Marche has provided a reasonable explanation for failing to comply with the order of Master Short or responding to the default proceedings.

Factor 3-Do the Facts Establish that Marche and 126 Have an Arguable Defence on the Merits?

[67] Marche and 126 need only demonstrate an arguable defence, otherwise described as a defence with an “air of reality”: Mountain View Farms Ltd., para 51.

[68] Marche claims to have been authorized to use the TELUS shipping account to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars of TELUS’s money shipping supplies (but not describing the product accurately to avoid drawing attention to the shipments) to animal rescue shelters. She says she had no intention to deceive and derived no personal benefit from her actions.

[69] The shipments happened four years after TELUS terminated its relationship with Marche and 126, without any mention being made of this program in the email communications between them at the time of termination. Marche made more shipments after TELUS began to investigate the shipments and cancelled the on-line account. Marche gave evidence of certain TELUS employees having authorized her use of the account. Her initial response to TELUS said that the Science Centre was involved with the program. These assertions were contradicted by the evidence. By the time of the argument on the motion, counsel for Marche retracted any reliance on the Science Centre’s involvement.

[70] Marche and 126’s defence of authorization has no air of reality. Her assertion of having authority to make the shipments in implausible and completely at odds with the evidence and with common sense. Her wholly unsubstantiated assertion does not create a credibility issue for trial. The evidence all points to fraudulent misrepresentation to its shipping agent which cost TELUS thousands of dollars in unauthorized shipping charges unrelated to its business. Marche may have been motivated to act this way by altruistic impulses, however, she carried out these acts of charity using the resources of others. She attempted to hide the nature of the deliveries and concealed her identity when she shipped using the paper waybills after TELUS began its investigation. These acts are inconsistent with a lack of intention or an honest belief that the deliveries were permitted.

[71] The alternative defence presented by Marche and 126 is that TELUS’s payments constitute validation of the payments also has no air of reality. I accept TELUS’s position that the defence of contributory negligence does not apply to fraudulent misrepresentation: Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 1996 CanLII 149 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 727 at para. 35; Sylvan Lake Golf and Tennis Club v. Performance Industries Ltd. 2002 SCC 19, [2002] 1 SCR 678 at para. 70.

[72] In United Services Funds (Trustees of) v. Richards Greenshields of Canada Ltd., (1988), 22 8 C.L.R. (2d) 322 (B.C.S.C.) Southin J. (as she then was) quoted the words of Lord Chelmsford in Central Railway Co. of Venezuela v. Kisch, (1867), L.R. 2 H.L.99 (V.K.H.L.), at pp. 120-121:

Once the plaintiff knows of the fraud, he must mitigate his loss but until he knows of it in my view, no issue of reasonable care or anything resembling it arises at law.

And, in my opinion, a good thing too. There may be greater damages to civilized society than endemic dishonesty. But I can think of nothing which will contribute to dishonesty more than a rule of law which requires us all to be on perpetual guard against rogues lest we be faced with a defence of “ha ha, your own fault I fool you.” Such a defence should not be countenanced from a rogue.

[73] The defence advanced by Marche that TELUS is taken to have consented by not monitoring the account more closely or disputing the payments to the shipper would run counter to the law for the policy rationale that a fraud is not committed if the deception can be successfully hidden from the victim for a period of time.

Factor 4-Is there Prejudice to the Parties?

[74] One of TELUS’s witnesses, Mr. Campbell, was an investigator who collected much of the evidence related to this case. Mr. Campbell has passed away. TELUS argues that this creates potential prejudice because of his importance to the chain of custody of material required for the case, including the video of Marche using the hard copy waybills to send shipments after being advised of the TELUS investigation into her use of the electronic waybills.

[75] Marche submits that any prejudice to TELUS is minimal, because the evidence has been preserved and Marche does not deny having placed the orders to ship material.

[76] As for prejudice to Marche and 126, as noted in Baron Finance Incorporated v. Marchuk, 2018 ONSC 6832 at para. 58, there is prejudice to any moving party where a motion to set aside a default judgment is not granted. I agree with the observation by Favreau J. in Baron Finance that where there is a meritorious defence, the prejudice to an unsuccessful moving party is greater than in circumstances where the proposed defence lacks an air of reality.

[77] I conclude that there is some potential prejudice to TELUS with the loss of its investigative witness. I conclude that the prejudice to Marche and 126 flowing from a dismissal of their motion is reduced by the lack of merit in the proposed defences.

Factor 5-The Effect of Setting Aside the Default Judgment on the Integrity of the Administration of Justice

[78] The integrity of the administration of justice is best served by parties who are responsive, timely and willing to explain any delays or defaults candidly and completely. It is also served by having cases decided on the merits, particularly where there is a defence with an air of reality available to a defendant. This does not apply here. Setting aside the default judgment would work an unfairness to both TELUS and to the co-defendant, Susan Worsley, given the efforts of those parties to have the matter addressed in a timely way. The litigation has been ongoing since 2016. Marche and 126 have had ample opportunities to defend despite some of the hardships experienced by Marche in her life since 2013. The integrity of the administration of justice is best served by dismissing the motion.

Conclusion

[79] The motion to set aside the default judgment is dismissed. If the parties are unable to agree as to costs, they are asked to provide brief submissions on or before September 25, 2019.

Leiper J.

Released: September 12, 2019

COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-549661 DATE: 20190912

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC. Plaintiff

– and –

PATRICIA MARCHE (also known as Patricia Kerr and Patricia Marche-Kerr), 1261140 Ontario Inc. and Susan Worsley Defendants

REASONS FOR DECISION

Leiper J.

Released: September 12, 2019